Justia Professional Malpractice & Ethics Opinion Summaries

This case concerns a business dispute between two individuals, Alan Weigel and Jason Albertson, regarding Veritas Crane LLC, a company providing crane and hoist services. Albertson founded Veritas in 2018, and Weigel joined the business in 2019, with both claiming at least 50% ownership. Their relationship deteriorated, leading Albertson to request the company’s bank to restrict access to its accounts due to allegations of fraudulent activity. In response, Weigel limited Albertson’s access to company facilities. Weigel then filed a complaint, naming himself and Veritas as plaintiffs, asserting both derivative claims on behalf of Veritas and direct claims against Albertson.The District Court of Cass County, East Central Judicial District, reviewed the matter after Albertson moved to disqualify Weigel’s attorney, Joel Fremstad. The court found that Fremstad had a lawyer-client relationship with both Weigel and Veritas, relying on evidence such as Fremstad’s signing of pleadings for both plaintiffs and communications indicating he advised Weigel in his role as CEO of Veritas. The court concluded that this concurrent representation violated North Dakota Rule of Professional Conduct 1.7(a), which prohibits representation of adverse clients, and ordered Fremstad’s disqualification.The Supreme Court of North Dakota addressed Weigel’s appeal and his petition for a supervisory writ. It determined the disqualification order was not immediately appealable under statutory law or the collateral order doctrine and dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Exercising its supervisory authority, the Supreme Court reviewed the district court’s order for abuse of discretion and clear error. Although it noted a harmless legal error in the district court’s reasoning regarding derivative suits, the Supreme Court held that the underlying factual findings were supported by the record. The Court denied the petition for a supervisory writ, upholding the disqualification of Fremstad. View "Weigel v. Albertson" on Justia Law

Coby Edwards was charged with class AA felony gross sexual imposition for allegedly engaging in a sexual act with a five-year-old child. The State intended to use statements made by the child during a recorded interview and a forensic medical examination, which were admitted under an exception to the hearsay rule. During the trial, various witnesses, including the child, testified. Edwards's counsel mentioned difficulties in communication due to Edwards's pretrial detention and failed to call an expert witness. The jury found Edwards guilty, and the conviction was affirmed on appeal.Edwards then filed for postconviction relief, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel. He argued that his counsel's references to the child as "the victim," failure to object to hearsay, and failure to call an expert witness constituted ineffective representation. The district court held an evidentiary hearing and denied the application, finding that the counsel's decisions were strategic and that Edwards did not demonstrate how an expert witness would have changed the outcome. The court also found that the references to the child as a victim were deficient but did not prejudice the trial's outcome.The North Dakota Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that Edwards failed to show a reasonable probability that the trial outcome would have been different without the alleged deficiencies in his counsel's performance. The court noted that the evidence against Edwards, including the child's testimony and statements, was substantial and that the counsel's errors did not undermine confidence in the trial's outcome. View "Edwards v. State" on Justia Law

McKenzie Electric Cooperative, Inc. ("McKenzie Electric") petitioned the North Dakota Supreme Court for a supervisory writ to direct the district court to vacate its order of recusal, deny the motion for recusal, and reassign the case back to Judge El-Dweek. The case began in November 2019, and in July 2020, Judge El-Dweek disclosed his membership in McKenzie Electric. Discovery continued through 2023, and McKenzie Electric disclosed it was seeking significant damages. In May 2024, the respondents filed a motion for a change of venue due to potential juror bias. Following a hearing, the respondents filed a motion for recusal, which Judge El-Dweek granted, citing the appearance of impropriety.The district court's decision to recuse was based on the judge's membership in McKenzie Electric and the potential financial interest he might have in the case's outcome. The respondents argued that the judge's financial interest created a reasonable question regarding his impartiality. The district court agreed and granted the motion for recusal, despite acknowledging the timing of the motion was suspect.The North Dakota Supreme Court reviewed the petition for a supervisory writ. The court emphasized that supervisory writs are issued rarely and cautiously, only to rectify errors and prevent injustice in extraordinary cases when no adequate alternative remedy exists. The court concluded that the claimed injustice, primarily stemming from delay, could not be remedied by granting the writ. The court also noted that any error in granting or denying recusal could be addressed on appeal. Consequently, the North Dakota Supreme Court denied McKenzie Electric's petition for a supervisory writ, finding that this case did not warrant the exercise of its supervisory jurisdiction. View "McKenzie Electric Coop., Inc. v. El-Dweek" on Justia Law

Mitchell S. Sanderson filed a civil lawsuit against Judge Kari Agotness, seeking $200 million in damages and demanding an investigation into alleged criminal conduct by Agotness. Sanderson served the summons and complaint on Agotness and the Office of Attorney General. Agotness responded with a motion to dismiss under N.D.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) and requested attorney’s fees. Sanderson did not respond to these motions. The district court granted the motion to dismiss, found Sanderson’s claims frivolous, and awarded attorney’s fees to Agotness. Sanderson then filed a motion for relief from judgment under N.D.R.Civ.P. 60(b), which was denied. Sanderson appealed.The North Dakota Supreme Court reviewed the case. Sanderson argued that the district court erred in dismissing his claims based on judicial immunity, asserting that Agotness lacked personal jurisdiction. The Supreme Court reviewed the dismissal de novo and found that Sanderson’s complaint lacked factual context and support, making it frivolous. The court held that judicial immunity protected Agotness from civil claims arising from her judicial duties, as she acted within her jurisdiction.The Supreme Court also reviewed the award of attorney’s fees under the abuse of discretion standard and found no error in the district court’s decision. However, the amount awarded was incorrect due to a computational error. The Supreme Court modified the attorney’s fees from $3,213.80 to $2,787.45.Sanderson’s appeal also included a challenge to the denial of his N.D.R.Civ.P. 60(b) motion for relief from judgment. The Supreme Court declined to consider this issue further, as Sanderson failed to adequately brief it.The North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of Sanderson’s case based on judicial immunity, modified the attorney’s fees awarded, and affirmed the judgment as modified. View "Sanderson v. Agotness" on Justia Law

Three petitioners sought to quiet title in mineral rights for parcels of land in McKenzie and Williams Counties, North Dakota. They argued that the state relinquished any claim to these mineral rights when a specific chapter of the North Dakota Century Code became effective in 2017. The petitioners claimed that the state abandoned the minerals, making them available for claim, and that they had claimed them by filing the lawsuit.In the McKenzie County case, the petitioners attempted service by publication on unknown persons. Wesley and Barbara Lindvig answered, claiming ownership of the mineral rights. The petitioners' motions to strike the Lindvigs' answer and for default judgment were denied. The district court dismissed the case for failure to state a claim and awarded attorney’s fees to the Lindvigs, concluding the action was frivolous. The petitioners appealed.In the Williams County case, the petitioners made similar claims. Wesley and Barbara Lindvig, along with Kenneth and Mary Schmidt, answered and moved to dismiss on several grounds, including improper service and lack of ownership by the petitioners. The district court granted the motion to dismiss and awarded attorney’s fees, finding the petition frivolous. The petitioners appealed.The North Dakota Supreme Court reviewed the cases and affirmed the dismissals, holding that the petitioners had no interest in the disputed minerals and could not maintain a quiet title action. The court also affirmed the award of attorney’s fees to the Schmidts in the Williams County case. However, it reversed the award of attorney’s fees to the Lindvigs in both cases, remanding for further findings on whether the Lindvigs had a connection to the disputed mineral interests. View "Nelson v. Persons Unknown" on Justia Law

In May 2020, Daniel Samaniego was charged with gross sexual imposition, a class AA felony. During his trial in May 2021, a detective testified about attempting to interview Samaniego, leading to an objection from Samaniego’s counsel, which was sustained. The jury found Samaniego guilty. Post-trial, a juror indicated that the jury discussed Samaniego’s decision not to testify. Samaniego’s counsel did not move for a new trial based on this potential jury misconduct.Samaniego appealed the criminal judgment in September 2021, arguing insufficient evidence and prosecutorial misconduct. The North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, noting the prosecutorial misconduct claim was not preserved for appeal. In May 2023, Samaniego filed for postconviction relief, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel for not preserving the prosecutorial misconduct issue and not moving for a new trial based on jury misconduct. The district court held an evidentiary hearing and denied the application in February 2024.The North Dakota Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s judgment. The court held that Samaniego did not demonstrate a reasonable probability that the trial outcome would have been different but for his counsel’s alleged errors. The court found no prosecutorial misconduct in the detective’s testimony and noted that the jury’s discussion about Samaniego not testifying did not constitute juror misconduct under the law. The court concluded that Samaniego’s trial counsel’s actions did not fall below an objective standard of reasonableness and that Samaniego was not prejudiced by these actions. View "Samaniego v. State" on Justia Law

The plaintiffs, Sharon Mitzel, Alan Mitzel, and Eric Mitzel, filed a legal malpractice lawsuit against Vogel Law Firm and Jerilynn Brantner Adams, alleging negligence in a divorce action involving the disposition of land known as Section 19. Fred and Sharon Mitzel, who were married and had two sons, formed a family limited partnership and conveyed their farm, including Section 19, to it. During their divorce, they agreed that Section 19 would go to Fred, subject to deeding it to their sons upon his death. However, a subsequent quiet title action determined that the family partnership owned Section 19, nullifying the divorce judgment's property distribution.The District Court of Cass County granted partial summary judgment dismissing Alan and Eric Mitzel’s claims, ruling they lacked standing as non-clients to sue for legal malpractice. The court also granted judgment as a matter of law dismissing Sharon Mitzel’s claims, concluding she presented no evidence that she gave up any marital property to secure the agreement for Section 19 to be deeded to her sons upon Fred’s death. Sharon Mitzel’s claim for attorney’s fees and costs incurred due to Vogel’s alleged malpractice was also dismissed.The North Dakota Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court’s decision to dismiss Alan and Eric Mitzel’s claims, agreeing they lacked standing. The court also upheld the measure of damages used by the lower court, which was based on what Sharon Mitzel gave up to secure Section 19 for her sons. However, the Supreme Court found that the lower court erred in determining Sharon Mitzel presented no evidence of incurring attorney’s fees and costs due to Vogel’s alleged malpractice. The case was affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings consistent with the opinion. View "Mitzel v. Vogel Law Firm" on Justia Law

The plaintiff, Robert V. Bolinske, Sr., filed a defamation claim against Dale V. Sandstrom and Gail Hagerty, alleging that defamatory statements were made and published online on October 18, 2016. Bolinske served a demand for retraction on January 14, 2017, but Sandstrom did not respond. Bolinske commenced the action on February 26, 2019, beyond the two-year statute of limitations for defamation claims.The District Court of Burleigh County initially dismissed Bolinske’s defamation claim, citing the statute of limitations. However, the North Dakota Supreme Court reversed this decision in part, noting that the statute of limitations defense was not specifically pled by answer, and remanded the case for further proceedings. On remand, Sandstrom answered the amended complaint, including the statute of limitations defense, and filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings, which the district court granted, finding the defamation claim time-barred. The court also awarded attorney’s fees to Sandstrom, deeming Bolinske’s claims frivolous.The North Dakota Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s judgment. The court held that the defamation claim was indeed barred by the statute of limitations, as the action was commenced more than two years and 45 days after the publication of the alleged defamatory statements. The court also upheld the award of attorney’s fees, agreeing with the lower court’s assessment that Bolinske’s claims were frivolous and that the fees requested were reasonable. The Supreme Court found no abuse of discretion in the district court’s decisions. View "Bolinske v. Sandstrom" on Justia Law

The case involves East Central Water District ("East Central") and the City of Grand Forks ("City"). East Central alleged that the City unlawfully curtailed its water service area, violating federal and state laws. East Central sought to declare a water supply and service agreement with the City void from the beginning under a specific North Dakota statute. The agreement, entered into in 2000, was designed to avoid conflict in providing potable water as the City annexed territory in East Central's service area. The agreement was subject to a North Dakota statute that required the public lending authority to be a party to the agreement. However, the Bank of North Dakota, the public lending authority, was not a party to the agreement.The case was initially brought before the United States District Court for the District of North Dakota. The City answered East Central’s complaint and counterclaimed, and brought a third-party complaint against William Brudvik and Ohnstad Twichell, P.C. for legal malpractice in their representation of the City during negotiations and execution of the Agreement. The City then moved the federal district court to certify questions to the Supreme Court of North Dakota on the interpretation of the North Dakota statute.The Supreme Court of North Dakota was asked to answer two certified questions of law: whether the language “invalid and unenforceable” in the North Dakota statute means an agreement made without the public lending authority as a party is (1) void from the beginning or (2) voidable and capable of ratification. The court concluded that the language “invalid and unenforceable” means void from the beginning, and does not mean voidable and capable of ratification. The court reasoned that the statute speaks to the authority to contract on this subject matter, as opposed to the manner or means of exercising one’s power to contract. Therefore, none of the parties were authorized to contract for water services without the public lending authority being a party to the agreement. View "East Central Water District v. City of Grand Forks" on Justia Law

This case involves a legal malpractice claim brought by Anne Fahey, Timothy Fife, and Richard Fife (Plaintiffs) against their former attorneys, Andrew Cook, Lukas Andrud, and Ohnstad Twichell, P.C. (Defendants). The claim stems from Defendants' representation of Plaintiffs in a previous case concerning the distribution of their mother's estate. The mother, Marianne Fife, owned a mineral interest in North Dakota and was a resident of Idaho when she died intestate. She had conveyed her mineral interest to her husband, Richard Fife, shortly before her death. Plaintiffs sued their father's estate, claiming their mother lacked capacity to execute the deed due to medication and undue influence from their father. The district court rescinded the deed but held that the mineral interest still passed to Richard Fife under North Dakota's intestate succession laws.The district court's decision was affirmed on appeal. Plaintiffs then initiated a malpractice action against Defendants, alleging negligence in the underlying litigation by failing to contest the validity of a quitclaim deed for their mother's interest in an Idaho home and failing to argue that their mother's estate had a cause of action against their father's estate. Plaintiffs claimed that if Defendants had taken these actions, the value of their mother's estate would have increased, and they would have received some of the minerals under intestate succession laws.The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants, concluding that they did not breach their duty to Plaintiffs and that Plaintiffs did not suffer damages caused by the alleged breach of duty. The court reasoned that even if Plaintiffs had successfully taken the suggested actions, they still would not have received their mother's mineral interests.On appeal, Plaintiffs argued that the district court erred in granting summary judgment on their legal malpractice claims. They contended that the court erred in concluding that their mother's estate, for valuation and distribution purposes, did not include real or personal property outside of North Dakota. They also argued that Defendants were collaterally estopped from arguing that their mother's interest in the Idaho home and personal property would never be part of the estate.The Supreme Court of North Dakota affirmed the district court's judgment. The court concluded that the district court did not err in holding that collateral estoppel does not apply in this case. The court also held that the district court correctly concluded that the Idaho home would not have been part of the mother's North Dakota intestate estate because it was community property and would have passed to the father as a matter of law. Therefore, the court found that Defendants' alleged failure to challenge the Idaho quitclaim deed's validity and argue that the mother's estate had a cause of action against the father's estate did not proximately cause Plaintiffs any damages. View "Fahey v. Cook" on Justia Law