Justia Professional Malpractice & Ethics Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court reversed the order of the district court granting summary judgment for Defendants in this medical malpractice action, holding that a plaintiff who files a noncompliant certificate of merit and then voluntarily dismisses the case need not rely on the certificate filed in the first case when bringing a second action.Plaintiffs timely filed a certificate of merit affidavit in their medical malpractice action but voluntarily dismissed the case when Defendants challenged the qualifications of the expert witness that signed the affidavit. Thereafter, Plaintiffs refiled their case, providing a certificate of merit affidavit signed by a different expert witness. Defendants moved for summary judgment on the basis that the certificate of merit in the first case was deficient. The district court granted the motion to dismiss. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case, holding that Defendants were not entitled to dismissal of their case with prejudice. View "Kirlin v. Monaster" on Justia Law

In this medical malpractice case the Supreme Court reversed the order of the district court vacating Plaintiff's prior voluntary dismissal of her action without prejudice and dismissing the case with prejudice, holding that the district court lacked jurisdiction to rule on Defendant's motion to dismiss.Plaintiff filed a medical negligence suit against Defendant. When Plaintiff failed to file a certificate of merit affidavit Defendant moved to dismiss her petition with prejudice. That same day, Plaintiff voluntarily dismissed her petition under Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.943. The district court subsequently granted Defendant's motion to dismiss, dismissing Plaintiff's claims with prejudice. On appeal, Plaintiff argued that her voluntary dismissal terminated the case. The Supreme Court agreed, holding that Plaintiff's voluntary dismissal was self-executing and ended the case, and therefore, the district court lacked jurisdiction to rule on Defendant's motion to dismiss. View "Ronnfeldt v. Shelby County Chris A. Myrtue Memorial Hospital" on Justia Law

In this interlocutory appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed the order of the trial court compelling discovery pursuant to N.C. R. Civ. P. 37, holding that the trial court was not required to make findings of fact to support its ruling.Plaintiff brought an action for wrongful death against the defendants from which the decedent sought medical care. At issue was Plaintiff's motion to compel Defendants to comply with an existing discovery order. The trial court granted the motion but did not make specific findings of fact. The court of appeals remanded the case for the trial court to enter factual findings and conclusions of law. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Defendants did not specifically request findings of fact regarding the statutory elements set forth in N.C. Gen. Stat. 90-21.22A; and (2) in the absence of such a request, the trial court was not required to make any findings of fact in resolving Plaintiff's motion to compel. View "Williams v. Allen" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that a negligent credentialing is a separate and independent claim from medical negligence but that a negligent credentialing claim cannot proceed without either a simultaneous or prior adjudication of or stipulation to medical negligence.At issue was whether a hospital's grant of staff privileges to a physician, otherwise known as credentialing a physician, confers a duty upon the hospital that is separate and independent of the duty the physical owes to the hospital's patients. If so, the question remained whether a patient's negligent credentialing claim can proceed in the absence of a prior adjudication or stipulation that the physician was negligent in his care of the patient. The trial court in this case granted the hospital's motion for summary judgment on the negligent credentialing claim. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) a negligent credentialing claim cannot proceed without either a simultaneous or prior adjudication of or stipulation that a doctor committed medical malpractice; and (2) because such an adjudication or stipulation was not present in this case, the negligent credentialing claim was properly dismissed. View "Walling v. Brenya" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the court of appeals denying a motion for writs of prohibition and mandamus, holding that there was no error.In the underlying medical negligence action, Petitioners filed a petition seeking a writ of prohibition in the court of appeals to prohibit the enforcement of a circuit court order directing them to provide Norton Healthcare with nine years of Facebook data. Alternatively, Petitioners sought a writ of mandamus directing the circuit court to enter a more constrained discovery order. The court of appeals denied the motion for writs of prohibition and mandamus. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Petitioners' series of general objections were without merit, and therefore, the court of appeals did not err in denying the writ. View "Leslie-Johnson v. Hon. Audra Eckerle" on Justia Law

On November 4, 2016, Kernan had an External Cephalic Version (ECV) procedure to rotate her healthy 39-week fetus from a breech position. The hospital recorded the ECV as successful. Post-procedure fetal monitoring was “reassuring.” The next day, Kernan could not detect fetal movement and returned to the hospital. After an ultrasound, doctors informed Kernan that she had suffered an intrauterine fetal demise and that they could not determine the cause of death. They noted that nothing in the literature linked ECV with fetal demise. Kernan delivered a stillborn baby on November 7. The delivery doctor, Vargas, told Kernan that he could not see any indicators as to why Kernan’s baby died. Kernan eventually ordered an autopsy. After months of delay due to Dr. Vargas not responding to Kernan’s requests to review the autopsy report with her, Kernan met with Dr. Kerns on July 10, 2017, and learned that doctors had discussed her case during a morbidity and mortality conference. Kernan claims she first became subjectively suspicious of medical negligence during that meeting. On November 6, 2017, Kernan served notice of her intention to file suit. Within 90 days, she filed her negligence complaint.The court rejected the suit as time-barred under Code of Civil Procedure 340.5’s one-year limitations period. The court of appeal reversed. The hospital’s records demonstrate that reasonable minds could differ as to whether Kernan should have suspected negligent performance of the ECV on November 5, 2016. View "Kernan v. Regents of the University of California" on Justia Law

In this medical malpractice action, the Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the district court granting summary judgment in favor of defendant-doctors after granting a motion to strike Plaintiff's expert witness, holding that there was no error.Plaintiff brought this action individually and on behalf of her minor daughter alleging negligence during the child's birth. After dismissing one defendant by operation of law and entering an order striking Plaintiff's expert witness the district court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court's decision to strike the expert witness was not an abuse of discretion; and (2) the district court did not err in granting summary judgment to Defendants. View "Carrizales v. Creighton St. Joseph" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the decisions of the district court granting partial summary judgment to defendant-physicians and denying Plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration in light of the decision in Oquendo-Lorenzo v. Hospital San Antonio, Inc., 256 F. Supp. 3d 103 (D.P.R. 2017), holding that the district court did not err or abuse its discretion.Plaintiffs filed this suit on behalf of themselves, their conjugal partnership, and their minor daughter, C.A.K., alleging that Defendants breached their duty of care and departed from medical standards when treating C.A.K. in the emergency room of San Antonio Hospital. The district court granted partial summary judgment for Defendants, concluding that they were absolutely immune from liability for negligence under recent amendments to Article 41.050 of the Puerto Rico Insurance Code. After Oquendo-Lorenzo was subsequently decided, Plaintiffs moved for reconsideration. The district court denied the motion. The First Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment and order denying the motion to reconsider, holding that there was no error or abuse of discretion. View "Kenyon v. Gonzalez-Del Rio" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals vacated the judgment of the court of special appeals reversing the decision of the trial court granting summary judgment to Defendants in this professional malpractice action, holding that the circuit court mistakenly applied Meda v. Brown, 318 Md. 418 (1990), in excluding Plaintiff's experts.In their motion for summary judgment, Defendants argued that there was no evidence or medical circumstances sufficient to allow an expert opinion "inference" that surgical negligence occurred in the underlying matter. After finding that the testimonies of Plaintiffs' expert witnesses were not admissible the Supreme Court granted summary judgment for Defendants. The court of special appeals reversed, finding that the trial court erred as a matter of law in excluding Plaintiff's expert witnesses. The Court of Appeals remanded the case with instructions to reverse the circuit court's judgment, holding that the circuit court erred in excluding the testimony of Plaintiff's expert witnesses. View "Frankel v. Deane" on Justia Law

Johnson suffers from severe, permanent nerve damage, which he alleges was caused by a negligently performed hip replacement surgery. He sued his surgeon, Dr. Armstrong, citing specific negligence and the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. He also brought a res ipsa loquitur claim against a surgical technician who participated in the surgery. Johnson provided one expert witness, also a surgeon, to establish the elements of res ipsa loquitur. The court granted the technician summary judgment, stating that Johnson failed to present an expert witness to establish the standard of care for a technician, that the control element of res ipsa loquitur was not met, and that there was no evidence of negligence on the technician’s part. The court subsequently granted Armstrong summary judgment on the res ipsa loquitur count, leaving the count of specific negligence remaining. The appellate court reversed. The Illinois Supreme Court dismissed and vacated in part. The effect of the summary judgment in favor of Armstrong is to preclude Johnson from proving that Armstrong was negligent under the unique proofs of res ipsa loquitur, but the claim for negligence remains outstanding. The summary judgment order with respect to Armstrong was not a final judgment; the appellate court lacked jurisdiction. With respect to the other defendants, the elements of res ipsa loquitur were met at the time of the decision; no further expert testimony on the standard of care was required. Given that the Armstrong summary judgment was pronounced after the technician was orally dismissed from the res ipsa loquitur count, the circuit court was directed to reconsider that order in light of this opinion. View "Johnson v. Armstrong" on Justia Law