Justia Professional Malpractice & Ethics Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals reversing the judgment of the trial court that two expert reports provided to support Plaintiff's claims for negligence provided the information required by the Texas Medical Liability Act, Tex. Civ. Proc. & Rem. Code 74.351(a), (l), (r)(6), holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Defendant's motion to dismiss.Plaintiff, the guardian of a care facility resident, sued Defendant, the facility, alleging negligence. The trial court concluded that the two expert reports provided by Plaintiff to support the claims provided a fair summary of the experts' opinion regarding the standard of care, breach, and the cause of injury, as required by the Act. The court of appeals reversed on the ground that the reports lacked sufficient detail regarding the appropriate standard of care and breach. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the proffered reports provided a fair summary of the experts' opinions as to the appropriate standard of care and breach of that standard. View "Uriegas v. Kenmar Residential HCS Services, Inc." on Justia Law

Pretrial detainee Wilson complained to Philadelphia Federal Detention Center medical staff about a lump on his testicle in November 2017. They allegedly stated that such a lump was probably cancerous. Wilson subsequently complained that his condition worsened but received no further treatment. Wilson was transferred to Bureau of Prisons custody, where a urologist determined in February 2018 that the lump was cancerous. Wilson's right testicle was surgically removed. Wilson believed that if his cancer had been addressed earlier, treatment would not have involved chemotherapy and surgery.Wilson alleged medical negligence under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA). The court granted extensions for Wilson (pro se) to act on Pennsylvania Rule 1042.3, which requires medical malpractice plaintiffs to certify either that they have expert support for their claims or will proceed without an expert. Wilson explained that he wanted an expert but conceded the impossibility of obtaining one during the pandemic prison lockdowns. He stated that his medical records would demonstrate that his injury “was not inevitable" and specifically identified documents as discoverable material to substantiate his allegations, The court granted the government summary judgment stating that, while a factfinder could find without expert testimony that the delay in treatment was unreasonable, the issue of whether the delay caused the need to remove Wilson’s testicle required expert testimony.The Third Circuit reversed, finding that the FTCA does not incorporate Rule 1042.3. Wilson did not otherwise have an adequate opportunity to seek out an expert or conduct discovery due to his unique position as a pro se inmate during the pandemic. View "Wilson v. United States" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeal concluding that the appellate court, exercising its authority to issue an interlocutory writ of certiorari, could not immediately review a trial court's ruling denying Petitioners' motion to dismiss a medical malpractice action brought them on the basis that Respondent's proposed expert did not meet the requirements of the Medical Malpractice Act, Fla. Stat. 766, holding that there was no error.Respondent sued Petitioners for medical malpractice and included within her presuit notices the affidavit of Dr. James DeStephens. Petitioners moved to dismiss the complaint on the grounds that DeStephens did not satisfy the statutory requisites. The circuit court denied the motion to dismiss, after which Petitioners filed a certiorari petition. The court of appeal dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction on the basis that Respondent had not established irreparable harm. The Supreme Court affirmed on different grounds, holding that it was Petitioners' failure to show that the trial court had departed from the essential requirements of the law, not their failure to demonstrate irreparable harm, that kept them from establishing their entitlement to relief. View "University of Fla. Bd. of Trustees v. Carmody" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court quashed the decision of the superior court granting Defendant's motion to compel production of a complete, unreacted copy of a settlement agreement between Plaintiffs and the former codefendants who settled Plaintiffs' claims, holding that the trial justice abused her discretion in granting Defendant's motion.In granting Defendant's motion to compel production, the trial justice concluded that the amount paid in accordance with the settlement agreement was not discoverable "pursuant to Rhode Island and federal law." When Plaintiffs failed to comply with the order the superior court granted Defendant's motion to dismiss. The Supreme Court quashed the decision below and remanded the case, holding that the trial justice abused her discretion in granting Defendant's motion to compel production of a complete, unreacted copy of the settlement agreement. View "Noonan v. Sambandam" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the superior court in favor of Roger Williams Medical Center (RWMC) in this case alleging medical malpractice and negligent credentialing claims, holding that there was no error in the proceedings below.On appeal, Plaintiff argued that the motion justice erred in granting RWMC's motion for summary judgment on the ground that Plaintiff could not prove his negligent credentialing and medical malpractice claims without expert testimony. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) expert testimony was required to prove Plaintiff's apparent agency claim against RWMC, and because Plaintiff failed to provide expert testimony, RWMC could not be held liable under an agency theory; and (2) Plaintiff's inability to present expert testimony establishing the standard of care applicable to RWMC in credentialing its doctors was fatal to Plaintiff's negligent credentialing claim. View "Dockray v. Roger Williams Medical Center" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted a writ of prohibition in this original jurisdiction case prohibiting the circuit court from enforcing its order denying Petitioner's motion to dismiss the amended complaint brought by Respondents, Angela and Denny Seth Lester, holding that the complaint failed to follow the pre-suit notice requirements set forth in the Medical Professional Liability Act, W. Va. Code 55-7B-1, et seq.Respondents sued Petitioner-hospital and other entities asserting that each negligently mishandled fetal remains following Angela's treatment at the hospital for a stillbirth. Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss. The circuit court denied the motion, concluding that a stillborn fetus cannot be a "patient" under the MPLA, and therefore, Respondents were not required to comply with the MPLA's pre-suit notice requirements. View "State ex rel. Charleston Area Medical Center, Inc. v. Honorable Thompson" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court denied a writ of prohibition sought by the West Virginia Division of Corrections and Rehabilitation (DCR) that would effectively dismiss a wrongful death lawsuit filed against it by Mary Jane McComas, administratrix of the estate of Deanna McDonald, holding that DCR failed to establish that it was entitled to the writ.McComas, as administratrix of McDonald's estate, sued DCR alleging state law and common law claims and causes of action, including intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress and wrongful death. DCR filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the amended complaint asserted claims sounding in medical professional liability under the Medical Professional Liability Act (MPLA) that could not be brought against DCR. The circuit court denied the motion to dismiss, after which DCR filed its writ of prohibition. The Supreme Court denied the requested writ, holding that the MPLA does not apply to DCR, and therefore, the circuit court did not commit clear error as a matter of law in declining to dismiss the amended complaint. View "State ex rel. W. Va. Division of Corrections & Rehabilitation v. Honorable Ferguson" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the district court granting summary judgment to Defendant, an ophthalmologist, and dismissing Plaintiff's claim of professional negligence on statute of limitations grounds, holding that the district court erred in granting summary judgment on statute of limitations grounds.In granting summary judgment in Defendant's favor the district court described the case as a medical malpractice suit that was clearly barred by the statute of limitations. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Defendant waived the right to seek dismissal on statute of limitations grounds based on evidence outside the complaint, and it was not apparent from the face of the complaint that his claims were barred; and (2) therefore, the district court erred in granting Defendant summary judgment on statute of limitations grounds. View "Schuemann v. Timperley" on Justia Law

A patient filed a complaint concerning Dr. Dore, a Board-certified psychiatrist. The Board discovered suspected irregularities in Dore's prescription of controlled substances. Dore declined to answer questions. The Board served her with an investigative subpoena seeking medical records supporting the prescription of the controlled substances to a family member and with investigative interrogatories requesting information about the family member's treatment and employment with Dore. Dore refused to produce the records and objected to the interrogatories. Her family member objected to the subpoena.The Board sought an order compelling compliance and provided reports from the Controlled Substance Utilization Review and Evaluation System (CURES) database. A Board-certified psychiatrist opined it was necessary to obtain the family member’s medical records to evaluate whether Dore complied with the standard of care, noting an AMA ethics opinion counseling physicians against treating family members except in emergencies. Dore's expert, a psychiatrist and licensed California attorney, disagreed with the assertion that prescribing controlled substances to family members presumptively violates the standard of care. The family member explained his reason for seeking treatment from Dore, identifying the medications she prescribed, and describing the treatment she provided.The court of appeal affirmed the trial court, which ordered compliance, impliedly concluding the Board established good cause to justify the production of the family member’s private medical information. The Board had a compelling interest in investigating Dore’s allegedly improper conduct. View "Kirchmeyer v. Helios Psychiatry Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the appellate court in this action to recover damages for Defendants' alleged medical malpractice affirming the trial court's judgment granting Defendants' motion to dismiss, holding that the Supreme Court incorrectly concluded in Morgan v. Hartford Hospital, 21 A.3d 451 (Conn. 2011), that the opinion letter requirement implicates the court's personal jurisdiction for purposes of the procedures attendant to a motion to dismiss.On appeal, Plaintiff argued that the appellate court incorrectly concluded that the trial court should not have considered an affidavit filed by Plaintiff to supplement a potentially defective opinion letter as an alternative to amending the operative complaint. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the opinion letter requirement is a unique, statutory procedural device that does not implicate the superior court's jurisdiction; (2) the sufficiency of the opinion letter is to be determined solely on the basis of the allegations in the complaint and on the face of the opinion letter, without resorting to a jurisdictional fact-finding process; and (3) the opinion letter at issue in this case was legally sufficient under Conn. Gen. Stat. 52-190a. View "Carpenter v. Daar" on Justia Law