Justia Professional Malpractice & Ethics Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Maine Supreme Judicial Court
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Patrick Gordon, an attorney, was suspended from the rosters of the Maine Commission on Public Defense Services, making him ineligible to represent indigent criminal defendants. The suspension followed an investigation into Gordon’s billing practices and representation of a client. The Commission received information suggesting that Gordon had inaccurately billed for a jury trial that was actually a bench trial and that some billed work was performed by others in his firm. Additionally, there were discrepancies regarding Gordon’s client visits.The Superior Court (Kennebec County) affirmed the Commission’s decision. The investigation began after the Commission received information from a post-conviction review counsel. Gordon was asked to provide documents and clarify billing discrepancies but failed to fully comply. Despite multiple requests and extensions, Gordon did not provide the requested documents or satisfactory explanations. The Commission’s Interim Executive Director, Justin Andrus, ultimately suspended Gordon, a decision upheld by the Commission after an intra-agency appeal.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the case and affirmed the Superior Court’s judgment. The Court found that the Commission’s decision was not arbitrary or capricious. The evidence showed that Gordon failed to comply with the Commission’s requests, which were within the Commission’s authority. The investigation and subsequent suspension were justified based on Gordon’s non-compliance with the Commission’s rules. The Court concluded that the Commission’s decision was supported by evidence and did not reflect any abuse of discretion or erroneous findings of fact. View "Gordon v. Maine Commission on Public Defense Services" on Justia Law

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Jamie Pacheco filed a divorce case against her then-husband, Kevin Pacheco, in 2015. She was represented by Jeffrey Bennett, Esq., and his firm, Legal-Ease, LLC, P.A. During the divorce proceedings, Bennett voluntarily produced to Kevin's counsel, Libby, O’Brien, Kingsley, and Champion, LLC, the complete counseling session notes of Jamie’s therapist, Sandra Falsey, with one redacted line. Libby later subpoenaed Falsey without notifying Bennett and obtained her complete counseling records related to Jamie, including the unredacted therapy notes. After the divorce proceedings concluded, Jamie, still represented by Bennett, filed an action against Libby asserting claims of abuse of process, intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED), and negligent infliction of emotional distress (NIED) based on Libby obtaining Falsey’s unredacted therapy notes and disclosing them to Kevin.The Superior Court (Androscoggin County, Stewart, J.) had previously granted a motion to dismiss Jamie’s tort complaint. However, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court partially vacated the dismissal, leaving Jamie’s claims of abuse of process and IIED in dispute. Later, Libby filed a motion to disqualify Bennett, asserting that Bennett’s continued representation of Jamie would violate Maine Rule of Professional Conduct 3.7 and prejudice Libby. The Superior Court granted Libby’s motion, finding that Bennett is likely to be a necessary witness on several topics related to the case.On appeal, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the lower court's decision. The court found that Bennett's actions or inactions in the treatment and disclosure of Jamie’s psychotherapy records were central to Jamie’s case, and Bennett alone had this knowledge, making his testimony relevant, material, and unobtainable from other sources. The court also found that there were sound bases in the record for the lower court’s conclusion that there would be actual prejudice in allowing Bennett to continue representing Jamie. View "Pacheco v. Libby, O'Brien, Kingsley and Champion, LLC" on Justia Law

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The case involves Mark Cardilli Jr., who was convicted of manslaughter after shooting and killing Isahak Muse, the boyfriend of Cardilli's sister. Cardilli claimed he acted in self-defense, fearing that Muse, who was unarmed but physically aggressive, would take his gun and use it against him and his family. The trial court found that Cardilli's belief that deadly force was necessary was objectively unreasonable, leading to his conviction.Cardilli appealed his conviction, arguing that his trial attorneys failed to adequately argue that he acted in self-defense. The post-conviction court agreed, granting Cardilli's petition for post-conviction relief, vacating his conviction, and ordering a new trial. The court found that Cardilli's attorneys did not have a cohesive trial strategy and did not communicate effectively, which could have affected the trial court's fact-finding.The State of Maine appealed the post-conviction court's decision, arguing that Cardilli did not show prejudice resulting from the ineffective assistance of counsel. The Maine Supreme Judicial Court agreed with the State, finding that the trial court's factual findings left no room for any argument that Cardilli's use of deadly force against Muse was justified. The court concluded that the legal argument Cardilli claimed his counsel should have pursued was incompatible with the court's findings about what occurred. The court vacated the post-conviction court's judgment and remanded for the entry of a judgment denying Cardilli's petition for post-conviction relief. View "Cardilli v. State" on Justia Law

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In the State of Maine v. Dale F. Thistle, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court upheld the conviction of Dale Thistle, an attorney, for theft by misapplication of property. Thistle was hired by Donna Friend, personal representative of the estate of Gilman Friend, to explore a potential wrongful death suit against emergency responders. Thistle negotiated a settlement of $390,000, which he deposited into his Interest on Lawyer’s Trust Account (IOLTA). Thistle then misappropriated the funds, failing to distribute the owed amount to Gilman's children, and instead frequently withdrawing money for personal expenses.Thistle appealed his conviction on several grounds, including that the trial court erred by not granting his motion for acquittal due to a statute of limitations defense, the court erred in its instructions to the jury on the Maine Rules of Professional Conduct, the State committed prosecutorial error, and that the evidence was insufficient to convict him.The Supreme Judicial Court rejected all of Thistle's arguments. The court found that Thistle had waived his statute of limitations defense by admitting facts that tolled the limitations period. The court also held that the prosecutor's statements during closing arguments did not constitute error. Finally, the court ruled that there was sufficient evidence to support the jury's finding that Thistle intentionally or recklessly failed to pay the settlement funds to Gilman's children and used the money as his own, thereby committing theft by misapplication of property. View "State v. Thistle" on Justia Law

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In the case before the Maine Supreme Judicial Court, George E. Gooley appealed and Danielle L. Fradette cross-appealed from the District Court’s judgments on their post-divorce and post-trial motions. The court held that the specific provisions concerning parent-child contact and the computation of Gooley’s income, the determination of Gooley’s imputed income, and the award of Fradette’s attorney fees could not be meaningfully reviewed without clear and specific findings. Therefore, those parts of the judgment were vacated and sent back to the lower court for further findings.The couple had divorced and had two minor children. There were several modifications to the divorce judgment, most notably in relation to the children's contact schedule with each parent. Later, Gooley filed a motion for contempt, alleging that Fradette was not following the contact schedule set by the court. Fradette filed a motion for post-judgment relief, requesting modifications to parental rights and responsibilities and asking for attorney fees. Fradette later amended her motion to add her decision to move from Maine to Massachusetts as a basis for modification. The court approved the amendment and held a four-day hearing on the parties’ post-judgment motions.The court found that Fradette met her burden of demonstrating that there had been a substantial change in circumstances due to her plan to relocate to Massachusetts, and granted her motion for post-judgment relief in part. The court awarded Fradette primary residency of the children and the right of final decision-making for the children’s education, and awarded the parties shared parental rights and responsibilities in all other respects. Gooley was awarded contact with the children on specific weekends and Wednesday evenings. The court also ordered Gooley to pay Fradette attorney fees of $30,000.On appeal, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgments in part but vacated the portions of the judgment related to parent-child contact, computation of Gooley’s income, determination of Gooley’s imputed income, and the award of Fradette’s attorney fees. The court remanded the case for further findings on these matters. View "Gooley v. Fradette" on Justia Law

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In this case, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court affirmed a lower court's decision to terminate a mother's parental rights to her two children. The mother appealed the termination of her rights, asserting that she was deprived of effective legal counsel during the proceedings. The lower court had determined that the children were in jeopardy due to the mother's chronic alcohol abuse, unsafe behavior, and poor decision-making, which included permitting a convicted sex offender to care for the children unsupervised. Despite repeated opportunities, the mother failed to demonstrate sufficient improvement to safely care for her children.The mother also proposed that her own mother or aunt should be appointed as permanency guardians for the children. However, the court found that neither individual was suitable for this role due to their loyalties to the mother and lack of objectivity regarding her addiction and reckless behavior. As such, the court determined that adoption was in the children's best interests.On appeal, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court found no evidence of ineffective assistance of counsel. The court noted that the attorney had adequately presented the mother's case and had advocated for the possibility of a familial permanency guardianship. The court concluded that the mother's claim of ineffective assistance did not meet the threshold for a prima facie case, as there was no evidence of serious incompetency, inefficiency, or inattention from her attorney, nor was there any indication that the outcome of the trial was unjust. Consequently, the decision to terminate the mother's parental rights was upheld. View "In re Children of Shannevia Y." on Justia Law

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The Supreme Judicial Court remanded this matter challenging the superior court's judgment affirming a decision of the Board of Dental Practice sanctioning Appellant, a licensed dentist in Maine, for unprofessional conduct for her failure to timely provide patient medical records, holding that the Board's findings of fact were insufficient to permit judicial review.An attorney who represented one of Appellant's patients sent a request to Appellant for the patient's medical records. When the request was refused, the attorney filed a complaint with the Board. The Board found that Appellant had engaged in unprofessional conduct, thereby violating Me. Rev. Stat. 18325(1)(E), and sanctioned Appellant. The superior court upheld the Board's decision. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the superior court's judgment and remanded the matter, holding that the Board did not make sufficient factual findings, precluding review. View "Narowetz v. Board of Dental Practice" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment of the superior court affirming a decision by the Department of Health and Human Services excluding Stephen Doane, MD from participation in and reimbursement from Maine's Medicaid program, MaineCare, holding that the superior court did not err.In 2015, the Board of Licensure in Medicine censured Dr. Doane based on his prescription practices leading to the 2012 death of a patient by apparent overdose. In 2015, the Department terminated Dr. Doane's participation in MaineCare. Thereafter, Doane filed a complaint seeking a declaratory judgment that the Department lacked jurisdiction to terminate his MaineCare participation. On appeal, the Supreme Judicial Court ruled that the Department had jurisdiction. Thereafter, the acting Commissioner ruled that the Department correctly terminated Doane's participation in the MaineCare program. The superior court affirmed. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that substantial evidence supported the Department's decision. View "Doane v. Department of Health & Human Services" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment of the superior court affirming the Department of Public Safety's denial of Appellant's application for a professional investigator license, holding that Appellant's First Amendment rights were not violated by the application of statutory competency standards to his conduct on social media.The Department denied Appellant's application based on comments and posts that he had made on social media using an account bearing the name of his out-of-state private investigation business concerning a police lieutenant. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the circuit court's affirmation of the Department's decision, holding (1) intermediate scrutiny applies to the Department's application of the licensing statutes to Appellant's application; (2) the Department did not err in its findings; and (3) the Department's application of the licensing standards to Appellant did not violate the First Amendment. View "Gray v. Department of Public Safety" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment of the superior court awarding Plaintiff $91,172, plus costs and interest, on her legal malpractice complaint arising from Defendant's representation of her in a divorce action, holding that the jury was correctly instructed concerning Plaintiff's burden to prove proximate cause.On appeal, Defendant challenged the jury instructions concerning some of Plaintiff's claims for damages. Specifically, Defendant argued that the court erred in instructing the jury on Plaintiff's burden to prove proximate cause using language first discussed in Niehoff v. Shankman & Associates Legal Center, P.A., 763 A.2d 121 (Me. 2000). The Supreme Judicial Court disagreed, holding (1) the "modified" or "failure to plead" proximate cause standard in Niehoff and other cases is not an independent alternative test but is, rather, a case-specific application of the proximate cause standard applied in legal malpractice cases; and (2) the trial court properly instructed the jury in this case. View "Reppucci v. Nadeau" on Justia Law