Justia Professional Malpractice & Ethics Opinion Summaries

Robert Mason Elliott was charged with multiple federal offenses, including possession of firearms, sexual exploitation of a minor, and plotting to murder the minor and her mother. Elliott retained Attorney Brandon Sample for his defense. Over a year into the representation, Sample discovered a controlled substance hidden in documents meant for Elliott and sought to withdraw from the case. The court, however, denied Sample's motion, emphasizing Elliott's right to counsel of his choice. Elliott later reached a plea agreement and pleaded guilty to five counts.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana initially handled the case. After Sample's motion to withdraw was denied, Elliott continued with Sample as his attorney. Elliott later filed a second motion to determine his mental competency, which the court granted, and he was found competent to stand trial. Elliott eventually entered a plea agreement, pleading guilty to two counts of murder for hire, two counts of witness tampering, and one count of being a felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition. The court sentenced him to 520 months of imprisonment.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. Elliott argued that Sample had a conflict of interest and that the district court violated his Sixth Amendment right by not informing him of this conflict, rendering his guilty plea involuntary. The appellate court held that Elliott's Sixth Amendment claim was not foreclosed by the appellate waiver in his plea agreement. However, the court concluded that even if Sample had a conflict of interest, Elliott could not demonstrate that he was adversely affected by it. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's judgment. View "USA v. Elliott" on Justia Law

June R. Crow-Johnson, an attorney admitted to practice law in Kansas in 1990, faced disciplinary proceedings for multiple violations of the Kansas Rules of Professional Conduct (KRPC) and Supreme Court Rules. Crow-Johnson was appointed as trustee of a trust in 2019 and failed to perform her fiduciary duties, including failing to communicate with beneficiaries, safeguard trust property, and file necessary tax returns. Additionally, she misrepresented her actions to the court and failed to cooperate with disciplinary investigations. Crow-Johnson also neglected to file tax returns for the Topeka Bar Association (TBA) and misled them about the status of these filings.The Kansas Board for Discipline of Attorneys conducted an evidentiary hearing and found that Crow-Johnson violated several KRPC rules, including diligence, communication, safekeeping property, candor toward the tribunal, and misconduct prejudicial to the administration of justice. The Board recommended disbarment based on these findings.The Supreme Court of Kansas reviewed the case and found clear and convincing evidence supporting the Board's findings. The court noted Crow-Johnson's failure to appear at oral arguments and her lack of cooperation throughout the disciplinary process. The court agreed with the Board's recommendation and ordered Crow-Johnson's disbarment, effective immediately. The court also ordered her name to be stricken from the roll of attorneys licensed to practice law in Kansas and assessed the costs of the proceedings to her. View "In re Crow-Johnson" on Justia Law

James M. Briggs, Jr. was charged with two counts of second-degree assault for attacking two employees at the Lincoln Correctional Center (LCC) on April 21, 2021. The charges were based on allegations that Briggs punched one employee, Parwiz Masoodi, multiple times and kicked another employee, Desaray Kerns, in the face while they were trying to restrain him. Both employees sustained bruising and received emergency medical care.The District Court for Lancaster County held a jury trial in May 2023, where both victims testified, and security footage of the incident was presented. Briggs moved to dismiss the charges at the close of the State’s evidence, arguing insufficient evidence, but the court denied the motion. The jury found Briggs guilty on both counts. At sentencing, the court found Briggs to be a habitual criminal and sentenced him to two consecutive terms of 10 to 12 years’ imprisonment, with a 10-year mandatory minimum for each count.The Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed the case. Briggs argued that the jury instructions were incorrect because they did not include "unlawful" as an element of the offense and that his trial counsel was ineffective for not objecting to this omission. The court found that the instructions, when read as a whole, correctly stated the law and encompassed all material elements of the charged crime. Therefore, Briggs' counsel was not deficient.Briggs also contended that his counsel was ineffective for not informing the court of amendments to the habitual criminal statute that reduced the mandatory minimum sentence. The court noted that the amendments were not in effect at the time of sentencing, so counsel was not deficient. However, applying the rule from State v. Randolph, the court vacated Briggs' sentences and remanded for resentencing under the amended statute, which mitigated the punishment. The convictions were affirmed, but the sentences were vacated and remanded for resentencing. View "State v. Briggs" on Justia Law

The case involves a petitioner who filed a miscellaneous petition in Family Court concerning a child whose parents are the respondent and the late Christine Hasselbrock. The petitioner, who had a long-standing platonic relationship with Ms. Hasselbrock, provided financial and emotional support to her and her child. After Ms. Hasselbrock's death, the petitioner sought to be declared a de facto parent or to have other parental rights recognized, but the respondent denied him access to the child.Initially, the petitioner filed an amended verified petition in Family Court, asserting both statutory and common law claims for de facto parentage. The first hearing justice dismissed the statutory claim due to lack of standing, as the petitioner had never resided with the child. The justice indicated that the petitioner could pursue his common law claims on the miscellaneous calendar. Consequently, the petitioner filed a new miscellaneous petition asserting various common law claims, including de facto parentage, in loco parentis, and visitation rights.The Rhode Island Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the Family Court's orders. The Court held that the Rhode Island Uniform Parentage Act (UPA) supersedes common law de facto parentage claims, as the statute explicitly outlines the criteria for establishing de facto parentage. The Court also found that the petitioner lacked standing to pursue claims for visitation based on being an "unrelated caregiver" or "de facto relative," as there is no statutory authority granting such rights. Additionally, the Court affirmed the denial of the respondent's motion for attorneys' fees, finding no basis for such an award. View "De Vries v. Gaudiana" on Justia Law

In this case, the plaintiff, Shandor S. Badaruddin, was sanctioned by the Nineteenth Judicial District Court, Lincoln County, for his conduct as defense counsel in a criminal trial involving his client, Kip Hartman, who faced multiple felony charges related to securities and insurance fraud. The trial was conducted under strict time constraints due to the COVID-19 pandemic, and the court allocated equal time for both the prosecution and defense. Badaruddin was accused of mismanaging his allotted time, leading to a mistrial declaration by the District Court.The District Court found that Badaruddin had deliberately delayed the trial, which led to the mistrial. Consequently, the court imposed monetary sanctions amounting to $51,923.61 against Badaruddin for the costs associated with the trial. Badaruddin appealed the sanctions, arguing that he was not given adequate notice of the court's concerns and that his actions were not deliberate but rather a result of the challenging circumstances.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case and noted that the U.S. District Court had previously ruled that the mistrial declaration was erroneous. The U.S. District Court found that Badaruddin's actions did not constitute deliberate delay and that his efforts to manage the trial time were competent. The U.S. District Court's ruling was affirmed by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, which held that Hartman could not be retried due to double jeopardy protections.Given the federal court's findings, the Supreme Court of Montana concluded that there was no basis for the sanctions under § 37-61-421, MCA, as there was no multiplication of proceedings. The court reversed the District Court's sanction order, determining that the costs incurred were not "excess costs" as defined by the statute. View "Badaruddin v. 19th Judicial District" on Justia Law

Stephen Stanko appealed the district court’s denial of his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition challenging one of his two South Carolina capital convictions and sentences. Stanko argued that his trial counsel, William Diggs, had a conflict of interest due to a pending ineffective assistance claim from a previous trial. Despite this, Stanko insisted on retaining Diggs for his second trial. The trial court held several hearings to ensure Stanko’s waiver of any conflict was knowing and voluntary. Stanko was convicted and sentenced to death. On direct appeal, the Supreme Court of South Carolina affirmed the conviction and sentence, finding Stanko’s waiver valid.In his state post-conviction relief (PCR) petition, Stanko raised claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, arguing that Diggs’s conflict of interest and his performance during the penalty phase were constitutionally deficient. The PCR court rejected these claims, finding that Stanko had knowingly waived any conflict and that Diggs’s performance was within professional norms. Stanko’s petition for certiorari to the Supreme Court of South Carolina was denied.The United States District Court for the District of South Carolina reviewed Stanko’s federal habeas petition and applied the deferential standard of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA). The court found that Stanko’s claims were either procedurally barred or meritless under AEDPA’s standards. The court also addressed Stanko’s complaints about docket management decisions, finding no merit in one and lacking jurisdiction over the other. The district court granted summary judgment for the state and denied Stanko a certificate of appealability.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The court held that Stanko’s waiver of conflict-free counsel was valid and that the state court’s decision was not an unreasonable application of federal law. The court also found that Stanko’s ineffective assistance claims related to the penalty phase were procedurally barred and that Martinez v. Ryan did not apply to overcome the default. The court dismissed Stanko’s appeal regarding the district court’s denial of his Rule 59(e) motion for reconsideration, as it lacked jurisdiction without a certificate of appealability. View "Stanko v. Stirling" on Justia Law

In 2015, two plaintiffs sued the Chicago Board of Education and various officials, alleging violations of their First Amendment rights and state law. During a deposition in 2017, a confrontation occurred between plaintiffs' attorney Caryn Shaw and opposing counsel Lisa Dreishmire. Shaw allegedly assaulted Dreishmire, leading to police involvement and a complaint to the Illinois Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission (ARDC). The district court held an evidentiary hearing and found that Shaw misled the court about the incident, prolonging the litigation.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois sanctioned Shaw by removing her from the case and ordering "Plaintiffs' counsel" to reimburse the defendants for reasonable attorneys' fees and costs. Shaw and her co-counsel, Anne Shaw and Donald Villar, appealed the sanctions. The district court's sanctions were based on findings that Shaw intentionally pushed Dreishmire and misrepresented the incident to the court.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the sanctions against Caryn Shaw, finding that she had adequate notice and opportunity to respond to the potential sanctions. However, the court vacated the sanctions against Anne Shaw and Donald Villar, concluding that they did not have sufficient notice or opportunity to respond. The court also found that the district court did not abuse its discretion in calculating the fee award against Caryn Shaw. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the opinion. View "Vega v. Chicago Board of Education" on Justia Law

Eric Bradley and Jacqueline Chuang filed a lawsuit in the Washtenaw Circuit Court against Linda Frye-Chaiken for breach of contract, specific performance, and promissory estoppel. The dispute arose from an agreement to sell a condominium in the Cayman Islands, which Frye-Chaiken later hesitated to complete following her mother's death. Frye-Chaiken claimed the contract was obtained through coercion or fraud and counterclaimed that her diminished capacity due to her mother's illness invalidated the agreement. The trial court granted summary disposition in favor of Bradley and Chuang, ordering specific performance of the contract and dismissing Frye-Chaiken's counterclaims.The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision, supporting the summary disposition and the order for specific performance. Bradley and Chuang then sought sanctions, arguing that Frye-Chaiken's defenses and counterclaims were frivolous. Frye-Chaiken hired Barry Powers to represent her in the sanctions proceedings. The trial court awarded $16,714.27 in attorney fees to Bradley and Chuang, holding Frye-Chaiken, Powers, and her previous attorneys jointly and severally liable for the sanctions.The Michigan Supreme Court reviewed the case and held that under MCR 1.109(E) and MCL 600.2591, sanctions for frivolous filings should only be imposed on the attorney who signed the frivolous documents and the represented party. The court found that Powers did not sign any of the frivolous documents and was only involved in litigating the amount of sanctions. Therefore, the trial court abused its discretion by holding Powers jointly and severally liable for the sanctions. The Michigan Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals' decision and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Bradley v. Frye-Chaiken" on Justia Law

Kathleen Saurman, who had mobility impairments, fell on a small stairway at a restaurant while celebrating her 60th birthday. She subsequently died from an infection following surgery for a broken hip. Her husband, Robert, filed a wrongful death lawsuit against the restaurant's former owner and later sued the current owner, Peter’s Landing Property Owner LLC, alleging violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), the Unruh Civil Rights Act, and the Disabled Persons Act (DPA).The Superior Court of Orange County granted summary judgment in favor of the current owner, finding that Robert lacked standing to bring an ADA claim for injunctive relief and had not provided evidence of any act or omission by the current owner. The court also imposed nearly $100,000 in sanctions against Robert’s attorney for pursuing what it deemed a frivolous lawsuit.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. The court held that under California law, a successor in interest has standing to bring an ADA claim for injunctive relief in state court, even if federal standing requirements are not met. The court also found that there was a triable issue of fact regarding the current owner’s compliance with the Unruh Act and the DPA, as the property remained in the same condition as when Kathleen fell. Consequently, the court reversed the summary judgment on the ADA, Unruh Act, and DPA claims but affirmed the summary judgment on the claims for injunctive and declaratory relief. The court also reversed the sanctions against Robert’s attorney and denied the current owner’s motion for sanctions for a frivolous appeal. View "Saurman v. Peter's Landing Property Owner, LLC" on Justia Law

Keiland Construction, L.L.C. entered into a construction subcontract with Weeks Marine, Inc. for a project in Louisiana. Weeks terminated the contract for convenience, leading to a dispute over compensation. Keiland submitted pay applications and demobilization costs, which Weeks partially paid. The disagreement centered on whether the contract required lump-sum payments for work completed before termination or if it converted to a cost-plus basis upon termination.The United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana held a bench trial and found the contract ambiguous. It construed the ambiguity against Keiland, the drafter, and ruled in favor of Weeks. The court awarded Keiland damages based on Weeks’s interpretation of the contract but denied Keiland’s claims for direct employee and demobilization costs. The court also awarded Weeks attorneys’ fees and costs, though less than requested, and denied Weeks’s motion for post-offer-of-judgment fees and costs.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. It affirmed the district court’s findings, agreeing that the contract was ambiguous and that the ambiguity should be construed against Keiland. The appellate court upheld the district court’s rulings on damages, attorneys’ fees, and costs, including the denial of post-offer-of-judgment fees and costs. The court also affirmed the award of prejudgment interest to Keiland, finding no abuse of discretion.In summary, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment in all respects, including the interpretation of the contract, the award of damages, attorneys’ fees, costs, and prejudgment interest. View "Keiland Construction v. Weeks Marine" on Justia Law