Justia Professional Malpractice & Ethics Opinion Summaries

Stern represented Allen in a discrimination suit, after which they became romantically involved. Allen and her husband had separated and had executed a settlement agreement awarding Allen $95,000, to be paid in installments. A month later, Allen visited a bankruptcy attorney, Losey, giving Stern’s name as “friend/referral” on an intake form. In filing for bankruptcy, Allen did not disclose the marital settlement. While her bankruptcy was pending, Allen received the money. A month after her bankruptcy discharge, Allen transferred the settlement proceeds to Stern, who opened a CD in his name. The attorney for Allen’s ex-husband informed the bankruptcy trustee that Allen failed to disclose the settlementand the discharge was revoked. Allen pleaded guilty to making a false declaration in a bankruptcy proceeding, 18 U.S.C. 152(3). She told a grand jury that Stern had not referred her to Losey and was convicted of making a material false statement in a grand jury proceeding, 18 U.S.C. 1623. The court admitted Losey’s client-intake form as evidence of perjury. Stern was convicted of conspiring to commit money laundering, 18 U.S.C. 1956(h). The Seventh Circuit affirmed Allen’s conviction, holding that the intake form was not a communication in furtherance of legal representation and was not subject to attorney-client privilege. Reversing Stern’s conviction, the court held that the judge erred in excluding Stern’s testimony about why he purchased the CDs. View "United States v. Stern" on Justia Law

Carpenter sued Flint, a councilwoman and the mayor, based on Carpenter’s termination from his position as Director of Transportation, asserting age and political discrimination, breach of contract, wrongful discharge, gross negligence, defamation, and invasion of privacy. Defendants argued that the complaint failed to identify which claims were alleged against which defendants, and that the allegations were “excessively esoteric, compound and argumentative.” Carpenter did not respond by the court’s deadline, and about five weeks later, a stipulated order entered, permitting Carpenter to file an amended complaint by April 21, 2011. Counsel manually filed an amended complaint on May 20, 2011, violating a local rule requiring electronic filing. The clerk accepted the filing, but issued a warning. Carpenter failed to timely respond to a renewed motion to strike. Carpenter responded to a resulting show-cause order, but failed to abide by local rules. Another warning issued. Carpenter’s response to a second show-cause order was noncompliant. The court warned that “future failure to comply … will not be tolerated.” After more than five months without docket activity, the court dismissed. The Sixth Circuit reversed. Defendants bore some responsibility for delays and the length of delay does not establish the kind of conduct or clear record warranting dismissal; lesser sanctions were appropriate. View "Carpenter v. City of Flint" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, an attorney, filed suit against the Judge Advocate General (JAG) of the Navy and others, alleging violation of his constitutional rights in an administrative decision which suspended him from practice before naval courts. The disciplinary proceedings stemmed from plaintiff's filing of an appellate brief containing statements he knew were false and misleading. The court concluded that the district court did not err in holding that the Navy JAG had authority to discipline plaintiff; plaintiff received ample due process and his Fifth Amendment rights were not violated during the proceedings against him; and the record did not support plaintiff's Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. 551, 701, and 706, claim. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's claims and denied his request for mandamus review. View "Partington v. Houck, et al." on Justia Law

Spehar, hired by CMGT to assist in finding financing for its business, sued CMGT over a dispute related to this agreement and obtained a $17 million default judgment against CMGT, which had no assets. Spehar Capital devised a plan to: force CMGT into bankruptcy; convince the bankruptcy trustee to bring a malpractice action against CMGT’s law firm on the theory that but for the firm’s negligence, Spehar would not have obtained the default judgment; win the malpractice action or force a settlement; obtain a share of the payment to the bankruptcy estate. The bankruptcy trustee sued CMGT’s law firm, Mayer Brown. The district court granted Mayer Brown summary judgment, reasoning that the doctrine of judicial estoppel barred the inconsistencies in the suit, based on undisputed facts. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. If the trustee were to prevail, there would be a clear impression that a court was misled. It would be “absurd” for Spehar to recover when proving the causation element of malpractice would require the trustee to prove that Spehar was not entitled to prevail in the earlier suit. View "Grochocinski v. Mayer, Brown, Rowe & Maw, LLP" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed the district court's denial of his 28 U.S.C. 2255 federal habeas corpus petition based upon the Supreme Court's decision in Skilling v. United States, which narrowed the scope of the honest services fraud theory. Defendant,a former attorney and trustee of private trusts, pleaded guilty to honest services fraud. The government conceded that defendant was actually innocent of honest services fraud in light of Skilling, which confined the reach of the offense to cases of bribes and kickbacks. The court vacated the district court's dismissal of defendant's honest services fraud claim where no evidence suggested that defendant either engaged in bribery or received kickbacks. View "United States v. Avery" on Justia Law

Gomberg briefly represented Goyal in 2004 settlement negotiations with a former employer over his claims of retaliation for whistle-blowing and gave Goyal’s employer notice of an attorney lien on any settlement or judgment. The negotiations did not produce an agreement; Goyal later retained new counsel to pursue litigation. In 2009, without the aid of any counsel, Goyal settled with his former employer. After Goyal settled, Gomberg reappeared and demanded a share. The employer paid a portion of the settlement to Gomberg. The district court granted Goyal’s motion to quash the lien, effectively ordering Gomberg to pay Goyal. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, stating that Gomberg is not entitled to any part of the settlement funds Goyal secured and that “Gomberg’s professional conduct is questionable.” His position that he “secured” funds for Goyal when the opposing party made an unacceptable and unaccepted settlement offer is unreasonable to the point of being frivolous and possibly warranting sanctions. Gomberg’s assertion of a lien for $70,000 was far greater than 10 percent of even the employer’s unaccepted (and not yet made) offer of $375,000 and was without basis. View "Goyal v. Gas Tech. Inst." on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case centered on a jury award of emotional distress and economic damages in a legal malpractice action. Defendant challenged the damages award on the grounds that emotional distress damages were not available in a legal malpractice case and that the award of economic damages equal to the amount plaintiff paid to settle the underlying case was improper because plaintiff failed to establish that the underlying settlement was reasonable. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed as to the award of emotional distress damages and affirmed as to the economic damages award. View "Vincent v. DeVries" on Justia Law

Ciavarella and another state court judge, Conahan, received $2.8 million in three years from a commercial builder, Mericle, and an attorney and businessman, Powell, during the “Kids for Cash” scandal in Luzerne County, Pennsylvania . Ciavarella committed hundreds of juveniles to detention centers co-owned by Powell, including many who were not represented by counsel, without informing the juveniles or their families of his conflict of interest. The judges, aware that they were under investigation, met with Mericle and Powell to coordinate their stories in 2008. Powell was wearing a recording device, exposing the judges’ efforts to obstruct justice. The judges pled guilty to wire fraud and conspiracy in exchange for an agreed 87-month sentence. Noting that the stipulated sentences were significantly lower than the advisory Sentencing Guidelines for the offenses, the district court rejected the plea agreement; the judges withdrew their pleas. Ciavarella proceeded to trial, was convicted of racketeering, honest services mail fraud, money laundering conspiracy, filing false tax returns, and several other related crimes and was sentenced to 336 months’ imprisonment, restitution, forfeiture, and a special assessment. The Third Circuit remanded for modification of the special assessment for mail fraud, but otherwise affirmed, rejecting an argument that the trial judge was biased. View "United States v. Ciavarella" on Justia Law

The Trustee for McKenzie’s bankruptcy estate filed an adversary proceeding against GKH, McKenzie’s law firm (and a creditor), seeking records pertaining to entities in which McKenzie allegedly had an interest (11 U.S.C. 542). The parties entered into an agreed order. The Trustee then filed other actions, arising from the same post-petition transfer of 50 acres from the Cleveland Auto Mall, an entity in which McKenzie had a 50% interest, to a newly formed entity in which McKenzie had no interest. The Trustee alleged violation of the automatic stay, 11 U.S.C. 362(k) and preferential or fraudulent transfer, 11 U.S.C. 547(b) and 544(g)). The Bankruptcy Court dismissed, finding that under Tennessee law and notwithstanding prior dissolution, CAM existed as a separate legal entity such that the land remained its separate property. The Trustee then filed a state court action, alleging breach of fiduciary duty and civil conspiracy to commit fraud; GKH allegedly represented McKenzie under a conflict of interest in drafting the transfer documents. Several claims were dismissed as untimely. GKH then sued the Trustee alleging malicious prosecution and abuse of process. The Bankruptcy Court dismissed GKH’s adversary proceeding alleging claims, citing quasi-judicial immunity and failure to state a claim, and denied GKH’s motion for leave to file a complaint in state court. The district court and Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "In re McKenzie" on Justia Law

Exact developed business software. Infocon began distributing Exact’s software in 1998. A conflict arose when Exact allegedly abandoned a scheduled upgrade, leaving distributors like Infocon out to dry, and Infocon allegedly failed to remit fees. Exact sued Infocon in 2003. According to the district court, Exact showed “persistent noncompliance with… ever more stringent” discovery orders. When Infocon moved for a default judgment, Exact fired its lawyer, hired new counsel and entered settlement negotiations. . On the eve of settlement, Infocon fired its lawyer, DeMoisey. DeMoisey placed a charging lien on the settlement proceeds. Exact delivered the $4 million settlement to the district court, which distributed most of it to Infocon and placed the remaining $1.2 million in escrow pending resolution of the fee dispute. Nine months later, Infocon sued DeMoisey in Kentucky state court for malpractice. After a summary judgment ruling in favor of the lawyer, the district court held a bench trial and awarded DeMoisey $1.4 million in quantum meruit relief. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that the amount was too high, that Infocon had a right to a jury trial and, for the first time on appeal, that the district court lacked jurisdiction because DeMoisey and Infocon are both from Kentucky. View "Exact Software N. Am., Inc. v. Infocon Sys., Inc." on Justia Law