Justia Professional Malpractice & Ethics Opinion Summaries

In her representation of a client charged with alien smuggling, 8 U.S.C. 1324, Migdal, an attorney who has served as an Assistant Federal Public Defender for nearly 25 years, had a number of disagreements with the federal prosecutor, who ultimately moved for sanctions against Migdal. The prosecutor failed to follow Department of Justice policy requiring supervisory approval of sanctions requests. Despite the government withdrawing the motion and indicating that it did not believe that Migdal acted in bad faith, the district court entered orders strongly publicly reprimanding Migdal. The Sixth Circuit vacated, stating that the record does not support any basis for the orders.View "United States v. Llanez-Garcia" on Justia Law

The Formal Charge against respondent Justice of the Peace Mary Foret arose from a small claims case in her court brought by Norris and Gloria Comeaux against Charles and Carol LeBlanc. Both prior to and after the filing of the lawsuit, respondent engaged in numerous ex parte communications with the parties concerning the substantive issues in the case. Respondent also engaged in improper independent investigation into the background of the case by having her constable obtain the police report of an altercation between Comeaux and LeBlanc. Despite these ex parte communications and independent fact-finding about the case, respondent did not recuse herself. When the Comeaux case was set for hearing, respondent knowingly allowed the constable to participate in the hearing to a significant extent. Respondent also allowed the Constable to participate in her decision-making process by asking him at the conclusion of the hearing what he thought of the case. The Judiciary Commission of Louisiana recommended, and the Supreme Court adopted, that respondent be suspended with pay for sixty days and ordered to pay the costs of the prosecution of these proceedings. View "IIn re: Justice of the Peace Mary Foret" on Justia Law

James Forbes settled a personal-injury action while he was represented by Louis St. Martin. Forbes later sued St. Martin, challenging the validity of his contingency-fee arrangement and the associated attorneys’ fees. The Chancery Court granted summary judgment to St. Martin; the Court of Appeals reversed the chancery court’s decision and remanded the case for further proceedings. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals’ judgment, finding that summary judgment in favor of St. Martin was proper. View "In the Matter of the Estate of Louis St. Martin, Deceased: Forbes v. Hixson" on Justia Law

Steidl and Whitlock were convicted of 1987 murders, largely based on testimony by two supposed eyewitnesses. Long after the convictions, an investigation revealed that much of the testimony was perjured and that exculpatory evidence had been withheld. The revelations led to the release of the men and dismissal of all charges. Steidl had spent almost 17 years in prison; Whitlock had spent close to 21 years. They sued. By 2013, both had settled with all defendants. Because the defendants were public officials and public entities, disputes arose over responsibility for defense costs. National Casualty sought a declaratory judgment that it was not liable for the defense of former State’s Attorney, McFatridge, or Edgar County, agreeing to pay their costs under a reservation of rights until the issue was resolved. The Seventh Circuit ruled in favor of National Casualty. In another case McFatridge sought a state court order that the Illinois Attorney General approve his reasonable expenses and fees; the Illinois Supreme Court rejected the claim. In a third case, National Casualty sought a declaratory judgment that another insurer was liable for costs it had advanced. The Seventh Circuit affirmed that the other company is liable. It would be inequitable for that company to benefit from National’s attempt to do the right thing, especially since it did not do the right thing and contribute to the defense costs under a reservation of rights. View "Nat'l Cas. Co. v. White Mountains Reinsurance Co." on Justia Law

The Judicial Conduct Board concluded that respondent Judge Ernest Balivet violated Canon 3(B)(8) of the Vermont Code of Judicial Conduct. The Supreme Court ordered review on its own motion. The alleged violation stemmed from the judge's handling of a grandfather's petition for guardianship of his granddaughter, and a subsequent request for termination of the parents' parental rights to the child. Before the hearing before the Judicial Conduct Board, the parties identified three disputed issues : (1)whether respondent failed to rule in a timely manner on the motion to revoke guardianship filed by the child’s parents; (2) whether respondent caused unnecessary delay in failing to schedule a hearing on the grandfather’s motion to terminate the father’s parental rights; and (3) whether respondent failed to respond in a timely manner to the order of remand from the family court. The Board’s sanction order recognized respondent’s responsibility for undue delay and endemic court management issues, but also acknowledged that the choices and actions of others played a significant role in the overall duration of the underlying case. It took into account respondent’s forthrightness in his dealings with the Board, his good intentions toward the parties, the reasonableness of his rulings in the underlying case, and his willingness to accept conditions intended to prevent this type of problem from recurring. The Supreme Court saw no reason to set aside the recommended conditions of respondent's sanctions. The Court did conclude, however, that characterization of respondent’s reprimand as “private,” rather than “public,” despite the conceded public character of the reprimand, was confusing and "cannot stand." Accordingly, the Court amended the sanction to characterize it as a “public reprimand.” In all other respects, the Court affirmed the Board’s sanction for respondent’s violation of Canon 3(B)(8). View "In re Balivet" on Justia Law

Marie Reed appeared before Judge Clark as a plaintiff in "Reed v. East Baton Rouge Sheriff Dept." Specifically, the Formal Charge at issue centers on a colloquy which took place in open court between Judge Clark and Ms. Reed while Ms. Reed’s lawyer was absent and on Judge Clark’s order dismissing Ms. Reed’s suit without prejudice after Ms. Reed was unable to prove her eligibility to proceed in forma pauperis. Ms. Reed had an unusual history of continuing to act many times as her own lawyer, even after she hired counsel. The Supreme Court found that because Judge Clark had signed an order dismissing Ms. Reed’s case without prejudice on April 18, 2011, the brief exchange she had with Ms. Reed on April 19th was of no substantive moment. Judge Clark testified, as the written order confirmed, that she denied the motion to stay and dismissed the case without prejudice the prior day. She took the bench only to announce her ruling on the record (an oral entry which would have been made even if no one associated with the case had been present that morning). The Court was "fully persuaded" that nothing with which the Commission charged Judge Clark warranted the Court’s sanction for judicial misconduct. View "In re Hon. Janice Clark" on Justia Law

Reifer suffered a worker’s compensation injury at IU-20 where she provided special education. Her injuries prevented her from returning to work. She retained Attorney Russo. Russo carried legal malpractice insurance with Westport in compliance with the Pennsylvania Rules of Professional Conduct. When IU-20 initiated disciplinary proceedings against Reifer, Russo failed to appear at the hearing. When IU-20 terminated her, Russo failed to appeal. Russo filed suit alleging violation of Reifer’s employment rights, which he lost for failure to exhaust state remedies. When Reifer sought alternate employment, Russo advised her to answer an application question as to whether she had ever been terminated in the negative. Reifer was terminated and disciplined for the false answer. Reifer commenced a malpractice claim against Russo. Russo’s “claims-made” policy only covered losses claimed during the policy period or within 60 days of the policy’s expiration. Russo failed to inform Westport of the action until several months after the policy lapsed and he failed to secure a replacement policy. Westport refused to defend Russo. Russo admitted liability. A jury awarded Reifer $4,251,516. Russo assigned to Reifer his rights under the Westport policy. Reifer sought a declaratory judgment that Westport was required to show it was prejudiced by Russo’s failure to notify and, failing to do so, owed a duty to defend and indemnify. The federal district court, sua sponte declined to exercise jurisdiction and remanded to state court. The Third Circuit affirmed. View "Reifer v. Westport Ins. Corp." on Justia Law

Hill formed Blythe Corporation to acquire vacant lots in Chicago and was Blythe’s sole owner and employee. Blythe entered into a contract with Flawless Financial, which was to acquire the lots; Blythe agreed to pay legal fees of $50,000 to the attorney recommended by Flawless (DeAngelis) and deliver a $25,000 retainer fee. Blythe signed a representation agreement that had been drafted by DeAngelis, an employee of Brown Udell, on Brown Udell letterhead, but never informed Brown Udell of the representation. Blythe remitted a $25,000 check, payable to DeAngelis which was deposited into the “John A. DeAngelis Client Fund Account.” DeAngelis never shared fees received from Blythe with Brown Udell. Blythe investors transferred $250,000 to the DeAngelis Client Fund Account. Following Hill’s instructions, DeAngelis transferred $249,978 to a Flawless account. None of those funds were ever used to purchase lots on behalf of Blythe. Forte, a Blythe investor, contributed an additional $250,000. DeAngelis submitted an Application for Purchase of Redevelopment Project Area Property to obtain the vacant lots. The Department of Planning and Development reviewed the application and indicated steps necessary to move forward. Blythe, however made no effort to amend its application or to pursue necessary approvals. Blythe did not respond to inquiries by DeAngelis; Hill “[could] not recall” what happened to the funds received from Forte. Blythe sued DeAngelis and Brown Udell, claiming legal malpractice and unjust enrichment. The district court entered summary judgment for the defendants. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Blythe Holdings, Inc. v. DeAngelis" on Justia Law

The Federal Election Commission opened an investigation into alleged discrepancies in ARMPAC's financial reporting. ARMPAC conceded that it had violated federal election laws and agreed to pay a civil penalty and terminate operations. Appellant, former treasurer of ARMPAC, was named in the Conciliation Agreement in his official capacity as treasurer. Appellant then filed suit against the law firm that represented ARMPAC and three lawyers, alleging that defendants failed to keep him informed about the Commission's investigation of ARMPAC, signed documents on his behalf without permission, and defamed him in the Agreement. The district court dismissed or granted summary judgment to defendants on each of appellant's claims. The district court concluded that appellant's defamation claim based on the signing of the Agreement was barred by the judicial privilege. The district court also concluded that appellant's remaining negligence claim was barred under D.C. law. The court concluded that appellant's defamation claim was based on statements contained within the Agreement reached between the Commission and ARMPAC, and therefore was encompassed within the judicial privilege. The court also concluded that no D.C. case holds that a plaintiff may maintain a negligence action based on the allegedly defamatory communication. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Teltschik v. Williams & Jensen, PLLC, et al." on Justia Law

A client sued his lawyer for breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, misrepresentation, and professional negligence in a fee agreement dispute. After a jury found in favor of the lawyer and judgment was entered, the client appealed, arguing that the superior court erred by issuing certain jury instructions regarding contract interpretation and by denying the client's motion for a new trial or judgment notwithstanding the verdict. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that any error in the superior court's jury instructions was not prejudicial, and affirmed the superior court's decision to deny the client's post-trial motions because there was sufficient evidence for the jury to find for the lawyer on each of the claims. View "Zamarello v. Reges" on Justia Law