Justia Professional Malpractice & Ethics Opinion Summaries

In this case, the plaintiff, Shandor S. Badaruddin, was sanctioned by the Nineteenth Judicial District Court, Lincoln County, for his conduct as defense counsel in a criminal trial involving his client, Kip Hartman, who faced multiple felony charges related to securities and insurance fraud. The trial was conducted under strict time constraints due to the COVID-19 pandemic, and the court allocated equal time for both the prosecution and defense. Badaruddin was accused of mismanaging his allotted time, leading to a mistrial declaration by the District Court.The District Court found that Badaruddin had deliberately delayed the trial, which led to the mistrial. Consequently, the court imposed monetary sanctions amounting to $51,923.61 against Badaruddin for the costs associated with the trial. Badaruddin appealed the sanctions, arguing that he was not given adequate notice of the court's concerns and that his actions were not deliberate but rather a result of the challenging circumstances.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case and noted that the U.S. District Court had previously ruled that the mistrial declaration was erroneous. The U.S. District Court found that Badaruddin's actions did not constitute deliberate delay and that his efforts to manage the trial time were competent. The U.S. District Court's ruling was affirmed by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, which held that Hartman could not be retried due to double jeopardy protections.Given the federal court's findings, the Supreme Court of Montana concluded that there was no basis for the sanctions under § 37-61-421, MCA, as there was no multiplication of proceedings. The court reversed the District Court's sanction order, determining that the costs incurred were not "excess costs" as defined by the statute. View "Badaruddin v. 19th Judicial District" on Justia Law

Stephen Stanko appealed the district court’s denial of his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition challenging one of his two South Carolina capital convictions and sentences. Stanko argued that his trial counsel, William Diggs, had a conflict of interest due to a pending ineffective assistance claim from a previous trial. Despite this, Stanko insisted on retaining Diggs for his second trial. The trial court held several hearings to ensure Stanko’s waiver of any conflict was knowing and voluntary. Stanko was convicted and sentenced to death. On direct appeal, the Supreme Court of South Carolina affirmed the conviction and sentence, finding Stanko’s waiver valid.In his state post-conviction relief (PCR) petition, Stanko raised claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, arguing that Diggs’s conflict of interest and his performance during the penalty phase were constitutionally deficient. The PCR court rejected these claims, finding that Stanko had knowingly waived any conflict and that Diggs’s performance was within professional norms. Stanko’s petition for certiorari to the Supreme Court of South Carolina was denied.The United States District Court for the District of South Carolina reviewed Stanko’s federal habeas petition and applied the deferential standard of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA). The court found that Stanko’s claims were either procedurally barred or meritless under AEDPA’s standards. The court also addressed Stanko’s complaints about docket management decisions, finding no merit in one and lacking jurisdiction over the other. The district court granted summary judgment for the state and denied Stanko a certificate of appealability.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The court held that Stanko’s waiver of conflict-free counsel was valid and that the state court’s decision was not an unreasonable application of federal law. The court also found that Stanko’s ineffective assistance claims related to the penalty phase were procedurally barred and that Martinez v. Ryan did not apply to overcome the default. The court dismissed Stanko’s appeal regarding the district court’s denial of his Rule 59(e) motion for reconsideration, as it lacked jurisdiction without a certificate of appealability. View "Stanko v. Stirling" on Justia Law

In 2015, two plaintiffs sued the Chicago Board of Education and various officials, alleging violations of their First Amendment rights and state law. During a deposition in 2017, a confrontation occurred between plaintiffs' attorney Caryn Shaw and opposing counsel Lisa Dreishmire. Shaw allegedly assaulted Dreishmire, leading to police involvement and a complaint to the Illinois Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission (ARDC). The district court held an evidentiary hearing and found that Shaw misled the court about the incident, prolonging the litigation.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois sanctioned Shaw by removing her from the case and ordering "Plaintiffs' counsel" to reimburse the defendants for reasonable attorneys' fees and costs. Shaw and her co-counsel, Anne Shaw and Donald Villar, appealed the sanctions. The district court's sanctions were based on findings that Shaw intentionally pushed Dreishmire and misrepresented the incident to the court.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the sanctions against Caryn Shaw, finding that she had adequate notice and opportunity to respond to the potential sanctions. However, the court vacated the sanctions against Anne Shaw and Donald Villar, concluding that they did not have sufficient notice or opportunity to respond. The court also found that the district court did not abuse its discretion in calculating the fee award against Caryn Shaw. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the opinion. View "Vega v. Chicago Board of Education" on Justia Law

Eric Bradley and Jacqueline Chuang filed a lawsuit in the Washtenaw Circuit Court against Linda Frye-Chaiken for breach of contract, specific performance, and promissory estoppel. The dispute arose from an agreement to sell a condominium in the Cayman Islands, which Frye-Chaiken later hesitated to complete following her mother's death. Frye-Chaiken claimed the contract was obtained through coercion or fraud and counterclaimed that her diminished capacity due to her mother's illness invalidated the agreement. The trial court granted summary disposition in favor of Bradley and Chuang, ordering specific performance of the contract and dismissing Frye-Chaiken's counterclaims.The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision, supporting the summary disposition and the order for specific performance. Bradley and Chuang then sought sanctions, arguing that Frye-Chaiken's defenses and counterclaims were frivolous. Frye-Chaiken hired Barry Powers to represent her in the sanctions proceedings. The trial court awarded $16,714.27 in attorney fees to Bradley and Chuang, holding Frye-Chaiken, Powers, and her previous attorneys jointly and severally liable for the sanctions.The Michigan Supreme Court reviewed the case and held that under MCR 1.109(E) and MCL 600.2591, sanctions for frivolous filings should only be imposed on the attorney who signed the frivolous documents and the represented party. The court found that Powers did not sign any of the frivolous documents and was only involved in litigating the amount of sanctions. Therefore, the trial court abused its discretion by holding Powers jointly and severally liable for the sanctions. The Michigan Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals' decision and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Bradley v. Frye-Chaiken" on Justia Law

Kathleen Saurman, who had mobility impairments, fell on a small stairway at a restaurant while celebrating her 60th birthday. She subsequently died from an infection following surgery for a broken hip. Her husband, Robert, filed a wrongful death lawsuit against the restaurant's former owner and later sued the current owner, Peter’s Landing Property Owner LLC, alleging violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), the Unruh Civil Rights Act, and the Disabled Persons Act (DPA).The Superior Court of Orange County granted summary judgment in favor of the current owner, finding that Robert lacked standing to bring an ADA claim for injunctive relief and had not provided evidence of any act or omission by the current owner. The court also imposed nearly $100,000 in sanctions against Robert’s attorney for pursuing what it deemed a frivolous lawsuit.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. The court held that under California law, a successor in interest has standing to bring an ADA claim for injunctive relief in state court, even if federal standing requirements are not met. The court also found that there was a triable issue of fact regarding the current owner’s compliance with the Unruh Act and the DPA, as the property remained in the same condition as when Kathleen fell. Consequently, the court reversed the summary judgment on the ADA, Unruh Act, and DPA claims but affirmed the summary judgment on the claims for injunctive and declaratory relief. The court also reversed the sanctions against Robert’s attorney and denied the current owner’s motion for sanctions for a frivolous appeal. View "Saurman v. Peter's Landing Property Owner, LLC" on Justia Law

Keiland Construction, L.L.C. entered into a construction subcontract with Weeks Marine, Inc. for a project in Louisiana. Weeks terminated the contract for convenience, leading to a dispute over compensation. Keiland submitted pay applications and demobilization costs, which Weeks partially paid. The disagreement centered on whether the contract required lump-sum payments for work completed before termination or if it converted to a cost-plus basis upon termination.The United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana held a bench trial and found the contract ambiguous. It construed the ambiguity against Keiland, the drafter, and ruled in favor of Weeks. The court awarded Keiland damages based on Weeks’s interpretation of the contract but denied Keiland’s claims for direct employee and demobilization costs. The court also awarded Weeks attorneys’ fees and costs, though less than requested, and denied Weeks’s motion for post-offer-of-judgment fees and costs.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. It affirmed the district court’s findings, agreeing that the contract was ambiguous and that the ambiguity should be construed against Keiland. The appellate court upheld the district court’s rulings on damages, attorneys’ fees, and costs, including the denial of post-offer-of-judgment fees and costs. The court also affirmed the award of prejudgment interest to Keiland, finding no abuse of discretion.In summary, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment in all respects, including the interpretation of the contract, the award of damages, attorneys’ fees, costs, and prejudgment interest. View "Keiland Construction v. Weeks Marine" on Justia Law

The State of South Dakota charged Ronald Lee Neels with multiple sex-related offenses, including rape, sexual contact, and incest, for the sexual abuse of his adopted daughter over a 14-year period. During the trial, the prosecutor made an opening statement that asked the jury to imagine themselves in the victim's position, which is considered a "Golden Rule" argument and is generally condemned. Neels did not object to this statement at the time. Following his conviction, Neels filed a pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel for not objecting to the prosecutor's opening statement.The South Dakota Supreme Court summarily affirmed Neels's conviction on direct appeal, stating that the issues raised were without merit. Neels then filed a state habeas corpus petition, which was denied on the grounds of res judicata, as the court found that the issue of prejudice had already been decided on direct appeal. The South Dakota Supreme Court affirmed this decision, holding that the same standard of prejudice applied in both plain error review and ineffective assistance of counsel claims.Neels subsequently filed a federal habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The district court granted the petition, concluding that Neels suffered prejudice from his attorneys' failure to object to the prosecutor's opening statement, despite acknowledging the overwhelming evidence of Neels's guilt. The court reasoned that the magnitude of the prosecutorial misconduct required vacating the conviction to ensure a fair trial.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that Neels did not suffer Strickland prejudice from his counsel's failure to object to the prosecutor's opening statement, given the overwhelming evidence of his guilt. The court emphasized that the jury instructions and the strength of the evidence against Neels mitigated any potential prejudice from the prosecutor's improper remarks. View "Neels v. Fluke" on Justia Law

Shane Clark Johnson was charged with deliberate homicide in 2013 for the death of his brother, Travis. The jury could not reach a verdict on deliberate homicide but convicted Johnson of negligent homicide with a dangerous weapon. On appeal, the Montana Supreme Court reversed and remanded for a new trial. The State again charged Johnson with deliberate homicide but amended the charge to negligent homicide after Johnson filed a motion to dismiss on double jeopardy grounds. The second jury found Johnson guilty of felony negligent homicide and that he used a weapon in the commission of the offense.In the first trial, Judge Daniel Boucher allowed Johnson to present a defense of justifiable use of force, but limited evidence about Travis’s violent behavior and other specific acts. Johnson testified that Travis attacked him, leading to a struggle over a gun, which resulted in Travis’s death. The jury convicted Johnson of negligent homicide. On remand, Judge Matthew J. Cuffe presided over the second trial. Johnson did not present a self-defense theory but argued the shooting was accidental. The prosecutor’s closing arguments included comments on the State’s charging decisions and the lack of evidence that Travis was suicidal, which Johnson’s counsel did not object to at trial.The Montana Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the conviction. The court found that the prosecutor’s comments were permissible and did not warrant a mistrial. The court also declined to exercise plain-error review for the unobjected comments about the State’s charging decisions. Johnson’s ineffective assistance of counsel claims were deemed not record-based and more appropriate for postconviction relief. The court held that the District Court legally imposed a consecutive weapon enhancement sentence in addition to the persistent felony offender sentence. View "State v. Johnson" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute over the control of a nonprofit corporation, which was dissolved by the State due to the executive director’s failure to pay taxes and fees and renew corporate registration. Despite the dissolution, the directors and members continued the corporation’s activities, unaware of the loss of corporate status. When the issue was discovered, some individuals filed paperwork to incorporate a new entity with the same name, offices, and bank account. A national affiliate proposed elections to resolve the leadership, but the new incorporators denied affiliation with the old corporation. Elections were held, and new directors were chosen, leading to litigation over who had authority to act on behalf of the new corporation.The Superior Court of Alaska, Third Judicial District, Anchorage, ruled that the new corporation was essentially the same entity as the old one, with the same members. The court concluded that the disputed election was valid and that the newly elected individuals had authority to act on behalf of the corporation. The court ousted the individuals who had filed the incorporation paperwork and awarded attorney’s fees to the prevailing parties but exempted individual litigants from liability for these fees.The Alaska Supreme Court largely affirmed the Superior Court’s rulings but vacated and remanded the dismissal of one third-party claim for a more detailed explanation. The court also vacated and remanded the Superior Court’s decision to excuse individual litigants from liability for attorney’s fees, finding the reason for this ruling invalid. The main holding was that the new corporation was the same entity as the old one, and the election of new directors was valid, giving them authority to act on behalf of the corporation. View "Aiken v. Alaska Addiction Professionals Association" on Justia Law

In this case, a law firm (HFM) appealed a trial court's judgment denying its third-party claim to $585,000 held in its client trust account. The funds were received from HFM's client, Mann, under a flat fee agreement for future legal services. Mann's judgment creditor, Dickson, served HFM with a notice of levy, asserting that the funds belonged to Mann. HFM contended that the funds belonged to it under the flat fee agreement.The Superior Court of San Diego County denied HFM's third-party claim, concluding that the funds belonged to Mann because HFM had not yet earned the fee by providing legal services. The court also denied HFM's motion for reconsideration, which sought to retain $53,457.95 of the funds based on a prior agreement with Mann. The court found that HFM failed to present this evidence initially and did not act with reasonable diligence.The Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, State of California, affirmed the trial court's judgment. The appellate court held that under the Rules of Professional Conduct, a flat fee is not earned until legal services are provided, and HFM presented no evidence that it had performed any services under the agreement. The court also found that the location of the funds in the client trust account was not dispositive of ownership. Additionally, the appellate court upheld the trial court's denial of the motion for reconsideration, noting that HFM failed to provide a satisfactory explanation for not presenting the evidence earlier.The main holding is that a flat fee paid in advance for legal services is not earned until the services are provided, and funds in a client trust account are presumed to belong to the client unless the law firm can prove otherwise. The judgment denying HFM's third-party claim was affirmed. View "Dickson v. Mann" on Justia Law