Justia Professional Malpractice & Ethics Opinion Summaries

Holsum de Puerto Rico, Inc. ("Holsum") contracted with Peerless Food Equipment ("Peerless") to manufacture a machine for sandwiching cookies and with Compass Industrial Group, LLC ("Compass") for a tray-loader machine. The machines malfunctioned, leading Holsum to sue both companies for breach of contract and negligence. The jury found in favor of Holsum against Compass but ruled in favor of Peerless. Peerless then sought attorney fees from Holsum, citing a fee-shifting provision in their contract and a Puerto Rico court rule.The United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico denied Peerless's motion for attorney fees. The court found that the fee-shifting provision was not clearly incorporated into the contract through a hyperlink and that Holsum did not act obstinately or frivolously in bringing its claims against Peerless. Peerless appealed this decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court agreed that the contract did not clearly communicate the incorporation of the fee-shifting provision via the hyperlink. Additionally, the court found no abuse of discretion in the district court's determination that Holsum's claims were not frivolous and that Holsum did not act obstinately in refusing to settle before trial. The appellate court emphasized that exercising the right to a jury trial in good faith does not constitute obstinacy. View "Holsum de Puerto Rico, Inc. v. ITW Food Equipment Group LLC" on Justia Law

In this case, the defendant was involved in an altercation in Waikiki that resulted in the death of another individual. The defendant, who claimed to have poor vision, was called to the scene by a friend who was being harassed by two men. The situation escalated into a physical fight, during which the defendant stabbed one of the men, who later died from his injuries. The defendant was convicted of second-degree murder by a jury.The Circuit Court of the First Circuit convicted the defendant of second-degree murder and sentenced him to life imprisonment with the possibility of parole. The defendant appealed to the Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA), arguing prosecutorial misconduct and instructional errors. The ICA affirmed the conviction, concluding that the prosecutorial misconduct was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt and that the jury instructions were appropriate.The Supreme Court of the State of Hawai'i reviewed the case on certiorari. The court found that the Deputy Prosecuting Attorney (DPA) committed prosecutorial misconduct by characterizing the defendant as a liar and an "enforcer" during closing arguments, which denied the defendant a fair trial. The court also noted that the DPA improperly inserted personal opinions and new evidence regarding the defendant's eyesight. The court held that this misconduct was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt and vacated the ICA's judgment, as well as the Circuit Court's judgment of conviction and sentence. The case was remanded to the Circuit Court for further proceedings consistent with the opinion. View "State v. Cardona" on Justia Law

On the evening of February 11, 2018, Deizmond C. Peters and three accomplices allegedly committed a series of crimes at a Wichita home, resulting in the death of Donte Devore. The group, armed with handguns, entered the home after assaulting Devore on the porch. During an altercation inside, Devore was shot and killed. Peters was later charged with first-degree felony murder, aggravated robbery, aggravated burglary, criminal possession of a weapon, and four counts of aggravated assault.The Sedgwick District Court held a jury trial where Peters was convicted on all charges. Peters filed a motion for a new trial, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel, which the court denied. He was sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole for 618 months plus an additional 332 months. Peters appealed his convictions, raising several claims of trial and sentencing errors.The Kansas Supreme Court reviewed the case and found merit in two of Peters' arguments. First, the court agreed that the evidence did not support his conviction for criminal possession of a weapon due to an error in the stipulation used to prove this charge. Second, the court noted that the sentencing journal entry of judgment improperly omitted Peters' jail credit award of 1,437 days. The court affirmed the remaining convictions, finding no error in the jury selection process, prosecutorial conduct, jury instructions, or the cumulative error doctrine. The court also upheld the method of determining Peters' criminal history under the Kansas Criminal Sentencing Guidelines, rejecting his constitutional challenge.The Kansas Supreme Court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded the case with directions to vacate Peters' sentence for criminal possession of a weapon, resentence him without the reversed conviction, and issue a nunc pro tunc order correcting the sentencing journal entry to include the jail credit award. View "State v. Peters" on Justia Law

Sir Jeffery McNeil-Lewis was convicted of first-degree murder, first-degree battery, eight counts of terroristic threatening, and firearm enhancements, resulting in a life sentence plus fifteen years. The convictions stemmed from a shooting at an abandoned house in West Memphis, where McNeil-Lewis and an accomplice fired at Jarvis Moore and Stacy Abram. Moore died, and Abram survived, identifying McNeil-Lewis as a shooter. Additional evidence, including eyewitness testimony and gunshot residue, linked McNeil-Lewis to the crime.The Crittenden County Circuit Court denied McNeil-Lewis's petition for postconviction relief under Rule 37, which claimed ineffective assistance of counsel. The court found that McNeil-Lewis failed to prove both deficient performance by his counsel and resulting prejudice. Specific claims included strategic decisions not to object to 911 calls on hearsay grounds, not to pursue self-defense, and not to object during sentencing. The court also found no prejudice from the failure to suppress evidence or from juror misconduct, as no actual bias was shown. Additionally, the court ruled that a Batson challenge would have been meritless and that not calling witnesses during sentencing was a strategic decision. Lastly, the court credited defense counsel's testimony that McNeil-Lewis was informed of and rejected a plea offer.The Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court's judgment, finding no clear error in its conclusions. The court held that McNeil-Lewis's arguments on appeal did not adequately address the circuit court's findings, particularly regarding strategic decisions and lack of prejudice. The court also upheld the circuit court's credibility determinations and strategic decisions made by defense counsel, concluding that McNeil-Lewis failed to meet the burden of proving ineffective assistance of counsel. View "MCNEIL-LEWIS v. STATE OF ARKANSAS" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, two law firms, provided legal services to defendants regarding the estate of Daniel P. O’Brien Sr. and Mary D. O’Brien. The attorney-client agreement stipulated a contingency fee structure, but defendants terminated the agreement without cause after 19 months. Plaintiffs sought compensation for their services based on quantum meruit, claiming their efforts significantly contributed to a favorable settlement for defendants.The Cook County Circuit Court found that plaintiffs had proven the elements of a quantum meruit claim, including the benefit conferred upon defendants. The court determined the reasonable value of plaintiffs’ services using the contingency fee structure from the attorney-client agreement, awarding plaintiffs $1,692,390.60 after deducting fees paid to subsequent attorneys.The Appellate Court affirmed the entitlement to quantum meruit recovery but reversed the amount awarded, ruling that the attorney-client agreement was void due to a violation of Rule 1.5(e) of the Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct, which requires a written fee-splitting agreement and client consent. The appellate court remanded the case for a new determination of the reasonable value of services.The Illinois Supreme Court reviewed the case and agreed that plaintiffs were entitled to quantum meruit recovery. However, it found that the appellate court erred in reversing the circuit court’s judgment on the reasonable value of services. The Supreme Court held that the attorney-client agreement was not void ab initio and that the circuit court did not commit reversible error in using the contingency fee structure as evidence of value. Consequently, the Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court’s judgment, awarding plaintiffs $1,692,390.60. View "Andrew W. Levenfeld & Associates, Ltd. v. O'Brien" on Justia Law

In 2020, Mix Creative Learning Center, an art studio offering children's art lessons, began selling online art kits during the pandemic. These kits included reproductions of artworks from Michel Keck's Dog Art series. Keck sued Mix Creative and its proprietor for copyright and trademark infringement, seeking enhanced statutory damages for willful infringement.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas found that the fair use defense applied to the copyright claim and granted summary judgment to Mix Creative. The court also granted summary judgment on the trademark claim, even though Mix Creative had not sought it. Following this, the district court awarded fees and costs to Mix Creative under 17 U.S.C. § 505 but declined to hold Keck’s trial counsel jointly and severally liable for the fee award under 28 U.S.C. § 1927.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's judgment. The appellate court held that the fair use defense applied because Mix Creative’s use was transformative and unlikely to harm the market for Keck’s works. The court also found that any error in the district court’s sua sponte grant of summary judgment on the trademark claim was harmless, given the parties' concession that the arguments for the copyright claim applied to the trademark claim. Lastly, the appellate court ruled that the district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding fees to Mix Creative or in refusing to hold Keck’s attorneys jointly and severally liable for the fee award. View "Keck v. Mix Creative Learning Center" on Justia Law

In a civil action for underinsured motorist benefits, a law firm representing the plaintiff engaged in ex parte communications with an orthopedic surgeon disclosed by the defendant insurance company as an expert witness. The firm scheduled an appointment for the expert to examine the plaintiff and subsequently disclosed the expert as their own witness, indicating that the expert would testify that the plaintiff's shoulder injury was related to the accident. The expert's report, following the examination, supported this causation.The trial court disqualified the expert from testifying and imposed sanctions on the law firm, requiring it to pay the defendant for the expenses incurred in retaining the expert. The court concluded that the law firm's conduct violated Practice Book § 13-4, which it interpreted as implicitly prohibiting ex parte communications with an opposing party's disclosed expert witness. The Appellate Court reversed the trial court's order, finding that Practice Book § 13-4 did not clearly prohibit such ex parte communications.The Connecticut Supreme Court affirmed the Appellate Court's decision, agreeing that Practice Book § 13-4 was not reasonably clear in prohibiting ex parte communications with an opposing party's disclosed expert witness. The court emphasized that the rule's current version lacks explicit limiting language and that the difference in treatment between disclosed expert witnesses and nontestifying experts in the rule supports this conclusion. The court declined to exercise its supervisory authority to create a new rule prohibiting such conduct, noting that the issue did not rise to a level warranting such an extraordinary remedy. View "Epright v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co." on Justia Law

The plaintiff, a developer and manufacturer of resinous flooring systems, sued several individual and corporate defendants for misappropriation of trade secrets, among other claims. The key individual defendant, S, was a former employee who developed a product called Poly-Crete for the plaintiff. After resigning, S started his own business and developed similar products, allegedly using the plaintiff’s trade secrets. The plaintiff claimed that S and other defendants, including companies that tested and used S’s products, misappropriated its trade secrets.The trial court conducted a bench trial in three phases. In the first phase, the court found that the plaintiff’s formulas for Poly-Crete and other products were trade secrets but ruled that the noncompete agreement S signed was unenforceable due to lack of consideration. The court also found that the plaintiff’s common-law confidentiality claim was preempted by the Connecticut Uniform Trade Secrets Act (CUTSA).In the second phase, the court found that S and some defendants misappropriated the plaintiff’s trade secrets to create products like ProKrete and ProSpartic. However, it ruled that other defendants, including Indue, Krone, ECI, and Merrifield, did not misappropriate the trade secrets as they did not know or have reason to know about the misappropriation. The court also granted attorney’s fees to Krone and ECI, finding the plaintiff’s claims against them were made in bad faith.In the third phase, the court ordered the defendants who misappropriated the trade secrets to disgorge profits and enjoined them from using the trade secrets. The court also sanctioned the plaintiff for attempted spoliation of evidence by its president, F, who tried to remove incriminating photos from the company’s Facebook page during the trial.The Connecticut Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s rulings on most issues but reversed the judgment regarding the enforceability of the noncompete agreement and the standard for determining misappropriation. The case was remanded for further proceedings on these issues. View "Dur-A-Flex, Inc. v. Dy" on Justia Law

Daniel’la Deering, an in-house lawyer for Lockheed Martin, was terminated and subsequently sued the company for discrimination and retaliation. While her discrimination claim was dismissed at the summary judgment stage, her retaliation claim was set to go to trial. However, during the litigation, Deering misled Lockheed Martin and the district court about her employment status and income. She falsely claimed to be employed by nVent and did not disclose her higher-paying job elsewhere, even submitting false information in a deposition, declaration, and settlement letters.The United States District Court for the District of Minnesota, presided over by Judge David S. Doty, found that Deering’s actions constituted intentional, willful, and bad-faith misconduct. Lockheed Martin discovered the deception shortly before the trial, leading to an emergency motion for sanctions. The district court dismissed Deering’s case with prejudice and awarded Lockheed Martin $93,193 in attorney fees. Deering’s motions for a continuance and reconsideration were also denied by the district court.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s decision. The appellate court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the case due to Deering’s prolonged and intentional deception. The court emphasized that dismissal was appropriate given the severity and duration of the misconduct. Additionally, the appellate court found no abuse of discretion in the district court’s denial of Deering’s motions for a continuance and reconsideration. However, the appellate court dismissed Deering’s appeal regarding the attorney fee award due to a premature notice of appeal. View "Deering v. Lockheed Martin Corp." on Justia Law

Jacob Pyne was convicted of malice murder and other crimes related to the shooting death of Gerard Foster on July 6, 2016. Pyne, along with two women who worked as prostitutes for him, was in a car near an apartment complex. After an argument, Pyne and one of the women, Christoyna Section, walked to the complex. Section testified that Pyne began acting aggressively and, after an altercation with Foster, she ran away and heard gunshots. Foster was found dead with multiple gunshot wounds, and surveillance footage linked Pyne to the scene. Pyne was arrested in Tennessee three days later.A DeKalb County grand jury indicted Pyne on multiple counts, including malice murder and felony murder. After a jury trial, Pyne was found guilty on all counts and sentenced to life in prison without parole for malice murder, with additional concurrent and consecutive sentences for firearm possession. Pyne's motion for a new trial was denied by the trial court, leading to his appeal to the Supreme Court of Georgia.The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed Pyne's claims of ineffective assistance of counsel and prosecutorial misconduct. Pyne argued that his trial counsel failed to object to the State's allegedly inconsistent theories and that the prosecutor's comments during closing arguments improperly shifted the burden of proof and commented on his right to remain silent. The court found no merit in these claims, concluding that the State did not present inherently contradictory theories and that the prosecutor's comments were within the bounds of proper argument. The court affirmed Pyne's convictions, holding that his trial counsel's performance was not deficient and that the trial court did not err in its rulings. View "PYNE v. THE STATE" on Justia Law