Justia Professional Malpractice & Ethics Opinion Summaries

In the case before the Maine Supreme Judicial Court, George E. Gooley appealed and Danielle L. Fradette cross-appealed from the District Court’s judgments on their post-divorce and post-trial motions. The court held that the specific provisions concerning parent-child contact and the computation of Gooley’s income, the determination of Gooley’s imputed income, and the award of Fradette’s attorney fees could not be meaningfully reviewed without clear and specific findings. Therefore, those parts of the judgment were vacated and sent back to the lower court for further findings.The couple had divorced and had two minor children. There were several modifications to the divorce judgment, most notably in relation to the children's contact schedule with each parent. Later, Gooley filed a motion for contempt, alleging that Fradette was not following the contact schedule set by the court. Fradette filed a motion for post-judgment relief, requesting modifications to parental rights and responsibilities and asking for attorney fees. Fradette later amended her motion to add her decision to move from Maine to Massachusetts as a basis for modification. The court approved the amendment and held a four-day hearing on the parties’ post-judgment motions.The court found that Fradette met her burden of demonstrating that there had been a substantial change in circumstances due to her plan to relocate to Massachusetts, and granted her motion for post-judgment relief in part. The court awarded Fradette primary residency of the children and the right of final decision-making for the children’s education, and awarded the parties shared parental rights and responsibilities in all other respects. Gooley was awarded contact with the children on specific weekends and Wednesday evenings. The court also ordered Gooley to pay Fradette attorney fees of $30,000.On appeal, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgments in part but vacated the portions of the judgment related to parent-child contact, computation of Gooley’s income, determination of Gooley’s imputed income, and the award of Fradette’s attorney fees. The court remanded the case for further findings on these matters. View "Gooley v. Fradette" on Justia Law

In this case, defendant Samuel Arce-Ayala, a leader of a drug trafficking organization, pled guilty to federal charges related to drug trafficking and firearm possession. He believed, based on his plea agreement and statements made by his lawyer and the district court, that his federal sentence would reflect "credit" for the prison time he served for related non-federal criminal convictions. However, after entering his guilty plea, Arce-Ayala discovered that such credit could not reduce his sentence below the applicable mandatory minimum terms of imprisonment. He moved to withdraw his plea before sentencing, arguing that he didn't understand the consequences of his guilty plea, but the district court denied the motion.The United States Court of Appeals For the First Circuit vacated Arce-Ayala's criminal judgment of conviction. The court held that Arce-Ayala did not have sufficient "knowledge of the consequences of the guilty plea" because he was told by his defense counsel and the district court that the time he spent in Commonwealth custody would be credited toward his federal sentence. He did not know that the mandatory minimum prison sentence set an inviolable floor as to the amount of credit he could receive for time served on the Commonwealth sentences. As such, his plea violated a "core concern" of Rule 11, which requires a defendant to understand the consequences of a guilty plea, and must be set aside. The case was remanded back to the district court for further proceedings. View "United States v. Arce-Ayala" on Justia Law

In the Supreme Court of Georgia, Justice Ellington delivered the opinion on the case of Isaiah Adams who was found guilty by a Fulton County jury of malice murder and other offenses in connection with the shooting death of Laron Lowe and the aggravated assault of Ronda Dobson. Isaiah and his co-defendants were charged with murder, felony murder, aggravated assault, criminal damage to property in the first degree, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. The jury found the Adams brothers guilty on all counts, and Isaiah was sentenced to life in prison for malice murder, among other sentences for the other charges. Isaiah filed a motion for a new trial, which was denied by the trial court. On appeal, Isaiah argued that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions, the trial court erred in admitting certain evidence, and that his trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective. The Supreme Court of Georgia rejected all of Isaiah's arguments and affirmed the trial court’s order denying his motion for a new trial. The Court found that the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to support the jury’s finding that Isaiah participated in the crimes and that the trial court did not err in its evidentiary rulings or in denying Isaiah’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. View "ADAMS v. STATE" on Justia Law

In 2019, Justin Remler was convicted for felony murder and aggravated assault related to the death of Tristan Mitchell, a two-year-old child. Remler, who was alone with Tristan in the hours prior to his death, challenged his conviction, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support the jury's verdict, that the trial court erred in its instructions to the jury, and that his trial counsel was ineffective. The Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed the trial court's judgment, stating that the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction, the trial court did not err in its instructions to the jury, and Remler's trial counsel was not ineffective. The court highlighted that Remler's argument that alternative hypotheses, such as the child's father causing the injuries or the child's death being caused by an enlarged heart, were reasonable was a question for the jury. The court concluded that it was within the jury’s purview to reject these alternative hypotheses as unreasonable given the evidence presented. The court also found that Remler's trial counsel's focus on one defense theory was objectively reasonable professional conduct, and thus did not constitute ineffective assistance. View "REMLER v. STATE" on Justia Law

This case involves attorney Grant Bursek's departure from Johnson Family Law, P.C. (MFL). When Bursek left MFL, 18 clients chose to continue their representation with him, prompting MFL to enforce an agreement that required Bursek to pay a per-client fee. Bursek argued that this fee violated the Colorado Rules of Professional Conduct, which prohibit attorneys from making employment agreements that restrict the right to practice after the termination of the relationship. The Supreme Court of the State of Colorado agreed with Bursek, holding that while a firm may seek reimbursement of specific client costs when a client leaves the firm to follow a lawyer, a firm cannot require a departing attorney to pay a non-specific fee in order to continue representing clients who wish to retain their relationship with that attorney. The court found that such an agreement constitutes an impermissible restriction on the attorney's right to practice and on the clients' right to choose their counsel. The court also held that this provision of the employment agreement was unenforceable, as it violated public policy as expressed in the Colorado Rules of Professional Conduct. The court affirmed in part and reversed in part the Court of Appeals' decision. It affirmed the decision that the per-client fee was unenforceable but reversed the Court of Appeals' decision to sever and attempt to enforce other parts of the agreement. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the opinion. View "Johnson Family Law v. Bursek" on Justia Law

Timothy Robert Ronk, who was convicted of armed robbery and capital murder and sentenced to death, sought post-conviction relief for a second time. He claimed his post-conviction counsel was ineffective. The State of Mississippi, in response, requested an overruling of Grayson v. State, which held that ineffective-assistance-of-post-conviction-counsel claims are an exception to the bars in the Mississippi Uniform Post-Conviction Collateral Relief Act (UPCCRA). The Supreme Court of Mississippi agreed with the State, citing a recent decision (Howell v. State) which invalidated all cases in which Mississippi courts had applied a "judicially crafted fundamental-rights exception" to the UPCCRA’s bars. Therefore, the court partially overruled Grayson and denied Ronk's request for post-conviction relief. The court determined that Ronk's claims, including that his trial counsel failed to investigate his case thoroughly and that the State suppressed evidence, lacked arguable basis, were insufficient to overcome the statutory bars, and did not meet the "newly-discovered-evidence" exception. View "Ronk v. State of Mississippi" on Justia Law

In 1993, Anthony Mungin was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to death. Mungin argued that his lawyer was ineffective during the guilt phase of his trial. In the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, Mungin presented four claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. Two were initially raised in his federal habeas petition, while the other two were added later. The court found that the first two claims failed under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), and habeas caselaw. The other two claims were deemed inadmissible in federal court because they did not relate back to the initial habeas petition and were therefore barred by the statute of limitations. The court corrected its precedent on the standard of review, stating that under Krupski v. Costa Crociere S.p.A, 560 U.S. 538 (2010), they review those decisions de novo. The district court's denial of Mungin’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus was affirmed. View "Mungin v. Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections" on Justia Law

In the case at hand, the Supreme Court of New Jersey considered whether the safeguards relating to eyewitness identification evidence should apply when lawyers meet with witnesses to prepare for trial. The case involved Brandon Washington, who was charged with two counts of attempted murder after shooting two people at a "Ladies Night" event. During the initial investigation, several witnesses selected Washington's picture from a photo array. Later, during trial preparation, an assistant prosecutor showed some witnesses the same photo array they had seen before or a single photo of Washington from Facebook. The witnesses later identified Washington in court. One witness identified Washington for the first time at trial.The Supreme Court held that witnesses who have made a prior identification should not be shown photos of the defendant during trial preparation, neither new photos of the defendant for the first time nor, absent good reason, the same photos they previously reviewed. If a party can demonstrate a good reason to show witnesses a photo of the defendant they previously identified, the party must prepare and disclose a written record of what occurred. If, however, a witness has not previously identified a suspect, investigators can conduct an identification procedure during pretrial preparation in accordance with the principles set forth in State v. Henderson. In this case, the court remanded the case to the trial court to conduct a hearing under United States v. Wade to determine the admissibility of the identification evidence. View "State v. Washington" on Justia Law

In the case, the Nebraska Supreme Court upheld the conviction of Bernard R. Turner for first degree murder. The court found no error in the trial court’s decision to grant the state’s motion to continue the trial due to the discovery of new evidence, a cell phone, a week prior to the original trial date. The Supreme Court stated that the timing of the state’s disclosure of the cell phone and its admission at trial did not violate Turner’s right to due process under Brady v. Maryland or Nebraska Revised Statute § 29-1912. The court also found that Turner waived his right to relief from the state’s belated disclosure by failing to request a continuance.The court further determined that the evidence presented at trial, including the testimony of a key witness who claimed Turner confessed to him, was sufficient to support Turner’s conviction. The court noted that a voluntary confession, with slight corroboration, can establish the corpus delicti as well as the defendant’s guilty participation.Finally, the court rejected Turner’s claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. Turner claimed his trial counsel failed to zealously advocate for him and did not present an adequate defense. However, the court found these claims were insufficiently specific and that Turner failed to show that his trial counsel’s performance was deficient or that this deficient performance actually prejudiced his defense. View "State v. Turner" on Justia Law

This case involves Jeremy Schulman, a former shareholder at the Maryland law firm Shulman, Rogers, Gandal, Pordy & Ecker. Schulman sued insurance companies AXIS Surplus Insurance Company, Endurance American Specialty Insurance Company, and Prosight Syndicate 1110 at Lloyd’s, for breach of contract, detrimental reliance, and lack of good faith, claiming that they wrongfully denied his claim for coverage under his law firm's professional liability insurance policy. The dispute hinges on whether Schulman's indictment in a criminal case qualifies as a "claim" under his professional liability insurance policy, and whether a letter from the insurance companies promising to cover certain costs relating to a subpoena also covered costs related to the later indictment. Schulman also alleges that the insurers acted in bad faith.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision, granting summary judgment to the defendants. The court held that Schulman's indictment in the criminal case did not constitute a "claim" under his professional liability insurance policy, and that the insurers' letter did not promise to cover costs related to the indictment. The court also held that Schulman's claim of bad faith could not succeed because he was not entitled to coverage under the policy and the insurers did not breach any tort duty by denying coverage. View "Schulman v. Axis Surplus Ins. Co., Inc." on Justia Law