Justia Professional Malpractice & Ethics Opinion Summaries

In this case, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the dismissal of Minhye Park’s case against David Dennis Kim by the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York. The District Court dismissed the case due to Park’s persistent and knowing violation of court orders, specifically regarding discovery. The Court of Appeals found that Park’s noncompliance amounted to "sustained and willful intransigence" despite repeated warnings that continued refusal to comply would result in dismissal.Additionally, the Court of Appeals addressed the conduct of Park's attorney, Jae S. Lee. Lee cited a non-existent court decision in her reply brief to the court, which she admitted she generated using an artificial intelligence tool, ChatGPT. The court deemed this action as falling below the basic obligations of counsel and referred Lee to the court’s Grievance Panel. The court also ordered Lee to provide a copy of the decision to her client. The court emphasized that attorneys must ensure that their submissions to the court are accurate and that they have conducted a reasonable inquiry to confirm the existence and validity of the legal authorities on which they rely. View "Park v. Kim" on Justia Law

The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit vacated the conviction of John Miguel Swan, who had pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of ammunition. Swan appealed the district court's denial of his motion to withdraw his guilty plea, arguing that his plea was unknowing and involuntary due to a material misrepresentation made by his plea counsel. His counsel had told him, just before he decided to plead guilty, that all minorities would be removed from his jury, and his case would be tried before exclusively white jurors. The court held that this misrepresentation about Swan's right to an impartial jury selected through racially nondiscriminatory means rendered his plea unknowing and involuntary. The court found that the misrepresentation was not corrected during the district court’s plea colloquy nor negated by Swan’s prior experience in the criminal-justice system. As such, the court held that the district court abused its discretion in denying Swan’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea, vacated Swan's conviction, and remanded for the district court to allow Swan to withdraw his guilty plea and for further proceedings. View "United States v. Swan" on Justia Law

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed and remanded a district court's denial of Lucas James Tighe's habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. After being convicted and sentenced for possession of stolen firearms, possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, and conspiracy to possess stolen firearms, Tighe alleged ineffective assistance of counsel. He claimed that his trial attorney, Sharon Diaz, did not consult with him about filing an appeal. The Court of Appeals, applying the Strickland test, found that Diaz failed to adequately consult with Tighe about the potential appeal, which was considered professionally unreasonable. Furthermore, the court found that Tighe demonstrated a reasonable interest in appealing, given the unexpected severity of his sentence and his request to Diaz to ask the court to run his federal sentence concurrently with his forthcoming state sentence. The court also determined that Tighe had shown there was a reasonable probability that he would have timely appealed, but for Diaz's deficient performance. As a result, the court found that Tighe had successfully made an ineffective assistance of counsel claim which entitled him to an appeal. The case was remanded to the district court with instructions to grant an out-of-time appeal and reenter Tighe's criminal judgment. View "United States v. Tighe" on Justia Law

In the State of Maine v. Dale F. Thistle, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court upheld the conviction of Dale Thistle, an attorney, for theft by misapplication of property. Thistle was hired by Donna Friend, personal representative of the estate of Gilman Friend, to explore a potential wrongful death suit against emergency responders. Thistle negotiated a settlement of $390,000, which he deposited into his Interest on Lawyer’s Trust Account (IOLTA). Thistle then misappropriated the funds, failing to distribute the owed amount to Gilman's children, and instead frequently withdrawing money for personal expenses.Thistle appealed his conviction on several grounds, including that the trial court erred by not granting his motion for acquittal due to a statute of limitations defense, the court erred in its instructions to the jury on the Maine Rules of Professional Conduct, the State committed prosecutorial error, and that the evidence was insufficient to convict him.The Supreme Judicial Court rejected all of Thistle's arguments. The court found that Thistle had waived his statute of limitations defense by admitting facts that tolled the limitations period. The court also held that the prosecutor's statements during closing arguments did not constitute error. Finally, the court ruled that there was sufficient evidence to support the jury's finding that Thistle intentionally or recklessly failed to pay the settlement funds to Gilman's children and used the money as his own, thereby committing theft by misapplication of property. View "State v. Thistle" on Justia Law

David Abraham Lorenz was convicted in 2003 for operating an illegal drug lab and possessing illegal drugs in the state of Montana. His initial sentence was partially suspended, but multiple violations led to the suspension being lifted and further sentencing in 2005 and 2014. In 2020, the State sought to revoke his suspended sentences again. Lorenz, who initially represented himself, requested counsel in July 2021. However, prior to the dispositional hearing in August 2021, his attorney, Michael Haase, filed a motion to withdraw. Lorenz consented to this but then indicated he did not want to proceed without a lawyer. Despite a perceived conflict, Haase continued to represent Lorenz in the hearing, and Lorenz was resentenced after his suspended sentences were revoked.Lorenz appealed, arguing that the District Court had not adequately investigated his complaint about his lawyer. The Supreme Court of the State of Montana disagreed, ruling that Lorenz had not directly raised any issues about Haase's effectiveness or requested a substitution of counsel. The court further noted that Lorenz had agreed to Haase's motion to withdraw, then reaffirmed his desire for Haase's representation during the dispositional hearing. The Supreme Court thus affirmed the District Court's decision. View "State v. Lorenz" on Justia Law

This case arises from an automobile accident involving Lauren Barnes and Nancy Hodys, where both parties sustained serious injuries and neither has any memory of the accident. A syringe was found in Barnes' car and her urine later tested positive for opioids and benzodiazepines. Barnes filed a complaint against Hodys alleging her negligence caused the collision, while Hodys filed a complaint against Barnes alleging her negligence and intoxication caused the accident.Barnes engaged Dr. David M. Benjamin as an expert witness, who concluded that it was "not possible to determine" whether Barnes' post-accident impairment was caused by head trauma, controlled substances, or medication. However, during deposition, Dr. Benjamin changed his previous opinion, stating that a combination of drugs and brain injury was the most likely explanation for Barnes' impairment. After the deposition, Barnes' counsel learned that Dr. Benjamin had a type of cancer, which along with the medication he was taking, caused him confusion, memory issues, and fatigue. Barnes then filed a motion to replace Dr. Benjamin due to his medical unavailability, which was denied by the lower court.The Supreme Court of Rhode Island found that the trial court erred by not providing a rationale for its decision denying Barnes' motion to modify the scheduling order and replace her expert witness. The Supreme Court held that a reasoned exercise of discretion requires some explanation, which was not provided in this case. Therefore, the court quashed the order of the lower court and remanded the case back to that tribunal with instructions to conduct a meaningful analysis of the issues raised, consistent with the Supreme Court's opinion. View "Barnes v. Hodys" on Justia Law

In the case before the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, the defendant, Jonathan Kearn, was initially indicted on three child pornography offenses involving his own children. He faced up to 30 years’ imprisonment for these charges. However, the government offered a plea agreement for a 10-year sentence if Kearn pled guilty to one of the counts. Following a six-minute conversation with his trial counsel about the plea agreement, Kearn decided to reject the offer and proceed to trial. He was then convicted on all three counts and sentenced to 24 years in prison. After exhausting his appeals, Kearn filed a pro se motion arguing that his trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective during the plea-bargaining phase.The district court granted Kearn's motion, finding that his trial counsel provided deficient advice about the proposed plea deal, and that there was a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, Kearn would have pleaded guilty. The court ordered the government to reoffer the plea. It then accepted Kearn’s guilty plea, vacated the prior judgment, and resentenced him to 10 years’ imprisonment.On appeal, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court found that Kearn's trial counsel's brief discussion with him was inadequate to explain the complexities of the plea and that counsel had given Kearn inaccurate and misleading information. The court also found that given the substantial difference in sentencing exposure—20 years—and the evidence suggesting Kearn was amenable to pleading guilty if he had been adequately advised, the district court reasonably found that Kearn would have accepted a properly presented plea deal and avoided trial. View "United States v. Kearn" on Justia Law

In this appeal from the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, the defendant, John Miguel Swan, appealed the district court’s denial of his presentence motion to withdraw his guilty plea. The case originated from a grand jury indictment of Swan for being a felon in possession of ammunition. Swan initially plead guilty, but five months later, the district court allowed Swan's plea counsel to withdraw and appointed new counsel. Swan later wrote a pro se letter to the district court asserting his factual innocence and indicating that his plea counsel had compelled him to plead guilty. This appeal focuses on the claim that plea counsel materially misrepresented the nature of Swan's right to a jury trial, which, Swan argued, rendered his guilty plea unknowing and involuntary.The court found that Swan’s plea counsel informed him that all minorities would be removed from his jury and his case would be tried before exclusively white jurors. This was seen as a material misrepresentation about Swan’s right to an impartial jury selected through racially nondiscriminatory means. The court determined that under these circumstances, Swan’s plea was unknowing and involuntary, and the district court abused its discretion in denying Swan’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Accordingly, the court reversed the lower court's decision and remanded the case back to the district court to allow Swan to withdraw his guilty plea for further proceedings. View "United States v. Swan" on Justia Law

In the case before the Supreme Court of the State of Colorado, the court had to decide whether Anthony Robert Smith had waived some of the claims he had raised in a pro se Crim. P. 35(c) motion by not pursuing certain claims in later briefings and at a postconviction hearing. The court also had to consider whether counsel could abandon some of a defendant’s pro se Crim. P. 35(c) claims without first obtaining the defendant’s informed consent, and whether abandonment of individual postconviction claims requires a showing of intent to do so.Smith was convicted of multiple counts of sexual assault on a child and promotion of obscenity to a minor. After his conviction was affirmed by the court of appeals, Smith filed a pro se Crim. P. 35(c) motion, asserting several claims of ineffective assistance of counsel and prosecutorial misconduct. After appointed counsel filed a Supplemental Motion for Post-Conviction Relief that did not include some of Smith's pro se claims, the postconviction court found that Smith had waived those omitted claims.On appeal, a division of the court of appeals reversed the postconviction court’s decision, concluding that Smith’s claims were preserved because they were not superseded by counsel’s motion. The Supreme Court of the State of Colorado disagreed and reversed the judgment of the court of appeals.The Supreme Court of the State of Colorado held that Smith abandoned the claims he stopped pursuing. The court also decided that counsel, as the “captain of the ship,” has the authority to make strategic decisions, including which claims to pursue. Therefore, counsel may abandon some of a defendant’s pro se Crim. P. 35(c) claims without the client’s informed consent. The court did not rule on whether abandonment of individual postconviction claims requires a showing of intent to abandon such claims. View "People v. Smith" on Justia Law

The case involves the Commonwealth's appeal of a judgment by a single justice of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, which upheld a lower court judge's decision to disqualify a prosecutor, Matthew Green, from a murder case. The defendant, Blake Scanlon, had been indicted on murder charges and was also later charged with soliciting to commit witness intimidation and murder. One of the solicitation targets was Green, the prosecutor for the initial murder indictment. The basis for Green's disqualification was not because he was a victim in the solicitation case, but because he made himself a potential witness at trial. This was due to his interactions with a jailhouse informant, with whom Scanlon was incarcerated and who claimed Scanlon solicited him for a murder-for-hire plot. In exchange for the informant's cooperation, Green advocated for lighter sentences and bail conditions for him in separate legal proceedings. The defendant argued that these actions made Green a potential witness, either to confirm or dispute the informant's claims, or to question the informant's credibility due to bias in favor of the Commonwealth. The lower court judge agreed and disqualified Green from the case. The Commonwealth appealed, arguing that Green's disqualification was an error, as he was only a potential witness, and that other means could be used to present the necessary information at trial. The Commonwealth also argued that the disqualification raised separation of powers concerns by interfering in the executive branch's discretion to choose a prosecutor. The Supreme Judicial Court disagreed, affirming the lower court judge's decision. It found that the level of Green's involvement with the informant's legal proceedings was extensive, making him more than just a potential witness, and that the judge's decision did not constitute an intolerable interference in the executive branch. View "Commonwealth v. Scanlon" on Justia Law