Justia Professional Malpractice & Ethics Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Legal Ethics
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The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of a federal habeas corpus petition by Raymond Anthony Lewis, who was sentenced to death in 1991 after a California jury convicted him of the first-degree murder of Sandra Simms. Lewis argued that the state trial court's admission of his juvenile confession to a prior murder was unconstitutional and that his trial counsel was ineffective in failing to present evidence of his innocence of the prior murder. The court concluded that the California Supreme Court's affirmance of the trial court's admission of Lewis's juvenile confession was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of federal law and that Lewis's trial counsel’s litigation of the evidence of the prior murder did not fall below an objective standard of reasonableness.Lewis also contended that his trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective by failing to investigate, develop, and present certain mitigating evidence during the penalty phase of the trial. The court found that Lewis failed to show that his trial counsel’s performance fell below an objectively reasonable standard. His counsel made reasonable strategic decisions to ask for the jury’s mercy and to appeal to any lingering doubt the jurors may have had about Lewis’s guilt. The court also concluded that much of the evidence Lewis argued his trial counsel was ineffective in not introducing would have been cumulative of evidence his counsel did introduce.Lewis also raised uncertified claims on appeal, but the court denied a certificate of appealability on these claims. View "LEWIS V. ANDES" on Justia Law

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This case involved an appeal by David Clapper, who had filed a lawsuit against American Realty Investors, Inc., and other associated entities. Clapper alleged that these entities had transferred assets to avoid paying a judgment from a previous lawsuit, in violation of the Texas Uniform Fraudulent Transfers Act and the doctrine of alter ego liability. The jury had ruled in favor of the defendants, but Clapper appealed, asserting that the defendants' counsel had made multiple improper and prejudicial statements during the closing argument.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit agreed with Clapper and found that the defendants' counsels' closing argument had indeed irreparably prejudiced the fairness of the trial. The court noted that the counsels had made several improper and highly prejudicial statements, including launching personal attacks against Clapper's counsel, making references to Clapper's wealth, discussing matters not in the record, appealing to local bias, and suggesting Clapper's bad motives. These statements were considered collectively and in the context of the trial.The court reversed the decision of the district court and remanded the case for further proceedings. The court also highlighted the importance of civility in the practice of law, discouraging the use of abusive tactics and emphasizing the need for courtesy, candor, and cooperation in all lawyer-to-lawyer dealings. View "Clapper v. American Realty Investors" on Justia Law

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Claude P. Lacombe appealed the United States District Court for the District of Delaware's denial of habeas relief, arguing that the Delaware Supreme Court wrongfully denied his claims that the State breached its plea agreement and that his counsel was ineffective for failing to demand specific performance of the plea agreement. Lacombe had pleaded guilty to several counts, including second-degree murder, in exchange for the State's agreement to recommend a sentence of 22 years. Instead, Lacombe received a life sentence. The Third Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court's denial of habeas relief. The Court held that even if the State breached its plea agreement and Lacombe's counsel was ineffective, any constitutional error was harmless under Brecht, Strickland, and Puckett v. United States, as Lacombe could not establish that he suffered "actual prejudice" as a result of the State's rhetoric and his counsel's failure to object. The court did not decide whether the State actually breached the plea agreement, citing that a failure to show either deficient performance or sufficient prejudice defeats an ineffectiveness claim. View "Lacombe v. Warden" on Justia Law

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In the case of Robert Wharton, the Philadelphia District Attorney’s Office conceded that Wharton's death sentence should be vacated without conducting a comprehensive investigation into evidence against Wharton’s habeas claim. The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit determined that the office did not disclose key facts about the claim, leading the District Court to find misconduct and impose mild sanctions.Wharton had been sentenced to death for terrorizing and ultimately murdering a family over a disputed debt. On appeal, the Third Circuit ordered an evidentiary hearing on whether Wharton's counsel was ineffective for not investigating prison records or presenting evidence showing that Wharton had adjusted well to prison life. However, before this hearing could take place, the District Attorney’s Office filed a notice of concession. The District Court did not accept the concession and appointed the Pennsylvania Attorney General as amicus curiae to investigate Wharton’s prison adjustment.The court found that the District Attorney’s Office violated Rule 11(b)(3) by failing to investigate the facts of Wharton's case reasonably and by failing to communicate adequately with the victims' family. Consequently, the court ordered District Attorney Larry Krasner to apologize in writing to the victims' family members and to provide a "full, balanced explanation" of the facts when conceding federal habeas cases in the future. This case highlights the importance of conducting thorough investigations and maintaining honesty and forthrightness in court procedures. View "Wharton v. Graterford" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court of Nevada ruled on a motion for disqualification of a supreme court justice in a medical malpractice action appeal. The appellant argued that Nevada Code of Judicial Conduct 2.11(A)(6)(d) required disqualification of Justice Douglas Herndon, who had been assigned the case when he was a district judge, but had not heard or decided any matters in the case before it was reassigned. The appellant argued that the rule required disqualification whenever a judge previously presided over a matter, regardless of the level of involvement.Justice Herndon and the respondents countered that he had seen no documents and performed no work on the case at the district court level, and therefore his impartiality could not be questioned. They argued that the Code of Judicial Conduct does not require disqualification in such circumstances, and that a judge has a general duty to hear and decide cases where disqualification is not required.After considering the language and context of the Code of Judicial Conduct, along with similar cases from other jurisdictions, the Supreme Court of Nevada held that to "preside" over a matter within the meaning of the disqualification rule, a judge must have exercised some control or authority over the matter in the lower court. Given that Justice Herndon had simply been administratively assigned the case and took no action during his assignment, he did not "preside" over the case in a way that mandated disqualification. The court therefore denied the motion for disqualification. View "Taylor v. Brill" on Justia Law

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This case involves an appeal from a judgment of conviction for second-degree murder with the use of a deadly weapon. The appellant, Jamel Gibbs, was convicted following a trial during which a recorded phone call between him and a defense investigator was admitted as evidence. Gibbs was in pretrial detention at the time of the call, which was made on a recorded line using another inmate's phone access code and a three-way calling system.Gibbs argued that the recorded phone call was protected by attorney-client privilege and should not have been admitted into evidence. The district court ruled against him, reasoning that the conversation was not privileged because Gibbs violated jail policy by using another inmate's phone access code and making a three-way call.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Nevada disagreed with the district court's ruling. The court held that a defendant’s call to a defense investigator, even if made through a three-way call, does not, on its own, amount to a waiver of the attorney-client privilege unless it can be shown that the third party remained present during the conversation. The court also found that violating jail telephone policies does not automatically result in a waiver of the attorney-client privilege. As such, the district court erred in admitting the recorded phone call into evidence.Furthermore, the Supreme Court concluded that this error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, as the recorded phone call directly undermined Gibbs's planned defense strategy and necessitated a change in strategy at the start of trial. Therefore, the judgment of conviction was reversed and the case was remanded for a new trial. View "Gibbs v. State" on Justia Law

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In South Dakota, defendant Tashina Abraham-Medved was charged with unauthorized ingestion of a controlled substance. After pleading guilty, her attorney requested to withdraw from the case due to a "serious breakdown of communication" between him and Abraham-Medved. The circuit court denied the request, arguing that as the case was set for sentencing there was little communication left to do.The Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota found that the circuit court erred in denying the motion to withdraw without allowing Abraham-Medved or her attorney an opportunity to establish good cause for the request. The court held that when there is a request for substitute counsel, the circuit court must at least inquire about the reasons for such requests. By failing to do so, the court abused its discretion.Furthermore, the court found that the defendant was prejudiced by this decision as her attorney did not present any sentencing recommendation or argument. Instead, Abraham-Medved spoke on her own behalf. Given the lack of engagement from the attorney, the court found there was a reasonable probability that a different sentence might have been imposed had the attorney properly advocated on Abraham-Medved's behalf.As a result, the court reversed Abraham-Medved’s sentence and remanded the case for a new sentencing hearing. View "State V. Abraham-Medved" on Justia Law

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Fred and Sandra Monaco took legal action against the Faulkner County Assessor and the Faulkner County Tax Collector concerning the 2021 assessment of their property. Sandra Monaco had purchased a parcel of timberland in 2005 and later built a home on it. The property was assessed as agricultural without a building until 2020 when the Assessor's office discovered the improvement and reassessed the property's value. In July 2021, Sandra deeded the property to herself and her husband, Fred, and subsequently filed a form asserting a homestead right on the property and her right to an assessment freeze under amendment 79 of the Arkansas Constitution. Following the Board's upholding of the Assessor's valuation and assessment, Fred filed a petition for writ of mandamus in circuit court, which was denied.The Supreme Court of Arkansas upheld the circuit court's decision on several grounds. Firstly, Fred's attempt to represent Sandra's interests was deemed unauthorized practice of law, rendering the petition null with respect to Sandra's claims. Secondly, Fred could not claim a writ of mandamus as there were other remedies available to him such as appealing the Board's decision. The court found that a writ of mandamus is an extraordinary remedy only issued to enforce an established right or the performance of a duty, and it requires the petitioner to show a clear and certain right to the relief sought and the absence of any other remedy. In this case, Fred failed to meet these requirements. View "MONACO v. LEWIS" on Justia Law

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This case originates from the Supreme Court of Ohio and concerns a defendant, Tyler Wilson, who was charged with attempted murder and felonious assault. The charges stemmed from an altercation at a gas station where Wilson fired a gun out his car window to scare off the other party involved in the dispute. Wilson claimed he acted in self-defense, but the trial court determined that he was not entitled to a self-defense jury instruction because he did not intend to harm or kill the other party. Wilson was found guilty of felonious assault, but not attempted murder.On appeal, the Supreme Court of Ohio reversed the lower court’s decision, ruling that an individual does not need to intend to harm or kill another person to be entitled to a self-defense jury instruction in a criminal trial. The court found that Wilson’s testimony supported the intent element for self-defense and that his trial counsel was ineffective by failing to request a self-defense jury instruction. As such, the court vacated Wilson’s conviction and remanded the case back to the trial court for further proceedings. View "State v. Wilson" on Justia Law

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In this case, a Georgia Supreme Court decision, the defendant, Remond Sinkfield, was convicted of felony murder and other crimes related to the death of Levi Atkinson. Atkinson died after either jumping or being pushed out of a moving vehicle during an altercation with Sinkfield. The vehicle was then struck by another car.Sinkfield appealed the convictions arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions for felony murder and theft, that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress a pretrial interview by police, and that the trial court committed plain error in several ways. Moreover, Sinkfield claimed that he was denied effective assistance of counsel due to his trial counsel's deficiencies, including by failing to retain a medical expert to testify as to the cause of Atkinson's death.The Supreme Court of Georgia rejected all of these claims and affirmed the convictions. The court found that the evidence was sufficient to support Sinkfield's convictions, that the trial court did not commit plain error, and that Sinkfield was not denied effective assistance of counsel. The court also found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in various evidentiary rulings. View "SINKFIELD v. THE STATE" on Justia Law