Justia Professional Malpractice & Ethics Opinion Summaries

The case involves Taiwo Onamuti, who was charged with 23 crimes related to his involvement in a tax-fraud scheme. He pleaded guilty to one count each of identity theft, aggravated identity theft, and presenting false claims for tax refunds. After several changes in defense counsel and an unsuccessful motion to withdraw the guilty plea, Onamuti was sentenced to 204 months in prison. Later, Onamuti moved to vacate his convictions under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, arguing that his attorney had been ineffective for failing to move to dismiss the charge and for advising him to plead guilty. The judge vacated the aggravated identity theft conviction, reduced Onamuti’s prison sentence by 24 months, and denied all other relief.Onamuti filed a motion in his criminal case seeking attorney’s fees under the Hyde Amendment for the legal expenses he had incurred to fight the charges of aggravated identity theft. He argued that the government had pursued those charges vexatiously and in bad faith. The government objected on procedural grounds, arguing that the Hyde Amendment does not apply in a § 2255 proceeding. The judge denied the motion for fees, concluding that the motion was procedurally deficient.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the lower court's decision. The court held that Onamuti did not show that the government’s position was frivolous, vexatious, or in bad faith. The court also held that the civil deadline applies to a motion for attorney’s fees under the Hyde Amendment because it is a civil matter ancillary to the criminal case. Therefore, Onamuti was not entitled to an award of attorney fees under the Hyde Amendment. View "United States v. Onamuti" on Justia Law

The defendant, Donald L. Garcia, was convicted of first-degree motor vehicle theft by a jury. On appeal, Garcia argued that the judge who presided over his case was disqualified due to her previous involvement as a managing public defender, where she briefly covered for his lawyer in a pretrial proceeding. The court of appeals agreed with Garcia and reversed his conviction.The Supreme Court of the State of Colorado, however, disagreed with the court of appeals. The Supreme Court agreed that the judge was disqualified, but concluded that the defendant waived his claim of judicial disqualification by failing to object. The court reasoned that the defendant's attorneys were likely aware of the judge's disqualification, and their failure to object amounted to the intentional relinquishment of a known right. Therefore, the court concluded that the defendant's claim of judicial disqualification was waived.Consequently, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals, reinstating Garcia's conviction and sentence. The court did not need to decide whether it is structural error requiring automatic reversal for a statutorily disqualified judge to preside over a case under the circumstances presented here, as it concluded that the defendant had waived his claim. View "People v. Garcia" on Justia Law

Link Motion Inc., a Chinese company incorporated in the Cayman Islands, filed a legal malpractice action against the law firm DLA Piper LLP (US) and one of its attorneys in the New York State Supreme Court. The case was related to a previous lawsuit filed by a shareholder of Link Motion, Wayne Baliga, in which DLA Piper represented Link Motion. The law firm removed the case to the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, which dismissed Link Motion's complaint as time-barred and denied its motion to remand the case back to state court.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case and concluded that the district court lacked federal jurisdiction. The court found that the federal law standing question identified by the district court as embedded in Link Motion's malpractice claim did not fall within the narrow category of "disputed and substantial" questions of federal law permitting the exercise of federal jurisdiction over a state law claim. Therefore, the court vacated the district court's decision and remanded the case back to the state court. View "Link Motion Inc. v. DLA Piper LLP" on Justia Law

The case involves a petition for a writ of prohibition filed by Judge Timothy L. Sweeney of the Circuit Court of Pleasants County, West Virginia. The petition was filed against the Hearing Panel Subcommittee (HPS) of the West Virginia Lawyer Disciplinary Board (LDB) and several attorneys. The case stems from consolidated lawyer disciplinary proceedings concerning several lawyers who were involved with a program operated by the City of St. Marys, West Virginia, called “Slow Down for the Holidays.” The program allowed certain criminal charges to be dismissed in exchange for donations to benefit needy children and seniors during the holiday season. Judge Sweeney reported the program to the appropriate authorities, leading to disciplinary proceedings against the involved attorneys.The HPS granted a motion by one of the attorneys to depose Judge Sweeney, who then moved to quash the subpoena, arguing that the requested deposition testimony and documents were protected by the judicial deliberative privilege. The HPS denied the motion to quash, leading to Judge Sweeney's petition for a writ of prohibition.The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia granted the writ of prohibition. The court found that the HPS clearly erred in ordering Judge Sweeney to submit to a deposition and produce documents. The court held that the testimony and records sought by the subpoena were protected by the judicial deliberative privilege. The court also found that the HPS erred in failing to hold a mandatory hearing pursuant to Hatcher v. McBride, which sets forth the limited circumstances in which judicial testimony may be compelled. The court concluded that the HPS exceeded its legitimate powers by ordering Judge Sweeney to appear for a deposition and produce documents. View "State ex rel. Sweeney v. Mundy" on Justia Law

Timothy Smith was convicted of two counts of sexual abuse in the second degree for the sexual abuse of his former stepdaughter, H.R. Smith filed an application for postconviction relief, arguing that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance in failing to request additional peremptory strikes after the trial court denied his for-cause challenges to four prospective jurors, in failing to move for a mistrial due to claimed juror misconduct, and in failing to call favorable defense witnesses. The postconviction court denied Smith’s application for postconviction relief.The Iowa Court of Appeals held that the postconviction court erred in denying Smith’s claim regarding trial counsel’s failure to request additional peremptory strikes but did not address the remaining claims. The court of appeals reversed Smith’s convictions and remanded the case for further proceedings. The State of Iowa appealed this decision to the Supreme Court of Iowa.The Supreme Court of Iowa vacated the decision of the court of appeals and affirmed the judgment of the district court. The Supreme Court held that Smith failed to establish that his trial counsel breached an essential duty in not moving for a mistrial due to alleged jury misconduct. The court also held that Smith failed to prove his trial counsel breached an essential duty in failing to call certain witnesses that would have been favorable to Smith’s defense. The court concluded that the cumulative prejudice analysis set forth in Clay was inapplicable here because the court found no breaches of duty for those claims. View "Smith v. State of Iowa" on Justia Law

The case revolves around a legal malpractice action against a state public defender, who represented a client convicted of sexual abuse. The client, Donald Lyle Clark, was convicted and sentenced to prison. The conviction was affirmed on appeal. However, in postconviction proceedings, the court determined that Clark's defense counsel had provided ineffective assistance and ordered a new trial. The state declined to prosecute, and Clark filed a civil action for legal malpractice against the state as the lawyer’s employer. The district court granted partial summary judgment, holding that the finding of ineffective assistance in the postconviction proceedings established counsel’s negligence as a matter of law. The jury found the lawyer negligent and awarded Clark $12 million in emotional distress damages.The Supreme Court of Iowa reversed the judgment for emotional distress damages. The court clarified that to recover emotional distress damages for legal malpractice, the plaintiff must prove more than negligence. The court held that the plaintiff must prove by a preponderance of clear, convincing, and satisfactory evidence that the criminal defense attorney acted with willful and wanton disregard for the client’s rights or safety. The court concluded that the district court erred by instructing the jury that negligence was sufficient. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "Clark v. State of Iowa" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute over a protective order issued by the district court, barring Visser and Associates, PLLC (“Visser”) from communicating with potential class members in a putative class action. The case originated from a claim by Wayside Church that Van Buren County had violated the federal Constitution’s Takings Clause by foreclosing on its property to satisfy a tax debt and then selling the property for a higher amount without refunding the difference. The case was revived in federal court following the Supreme Court's overruling of a previous decision that required such claims to be pursued in state court.The district court preliminarily approved a proposed class action settlement between the plaintiffs and defendant counties. Around the same time, Visser began sending solicitation letters to property owners who it thought might have takings claims against counties in the Western District of Michigan. The district court issued a show-cause order, finding that Visser’s solicitation letters did not cross the line from permissible solicitation to misleading, improper communication with potential class members. However, the court was not satisfied with Visser’s explanation for why it had sent solicitation letters to named plaintiffs who were already represented by class counsel.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's protective order. The court found that Visser had violated ethical rules by soliciting named plaintiffs and misleading the court. The court also found that Visser had continued to solicit potential class members after the district court had preliminarily approved the class settlement. The court concluded that Visser's conduct posed a serious threat to the fairness of the litigation process and the administration of justice generally. Therefore, the district court did not abuse its discretion in issuing the protective order. View "Wayside Church v. Van Buren County" on Justia Law

Jan Kowalski, an attorney, was accused of using her position to hide her brother's assets during his bankruptcy proceedings. She allegedly concealed around $357,000 in her attorney trust account and made false statements under oath to cover up the concealment. Kowalski was charged with four counts of bankruptcy fraud and one count of concealing assets from the bankruptcy trustee. She pleaded guilty to the charge of concealing assets.Prior to her trial, Kowalski had been involved in her brother's bankruptcy proceedings, where she used her attorney trust account to hide her brother's assets from his creditors and the bankruptcy trustee. She also made false statements under oath and fabricated documents to cover up her actions. The bankruptcy trustee confronted Kowalski with inconsistencies between her personal bank records and her earlier testimony, but she continued to lie under oath.Kowalski was sentenced to 37 months' imprisonment by the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division. The court applied two sentencing enhancements: the § 2B1.1(b)(10)(C) sophisticated-means enhancement, and the § 3B1.3 abuse of position of trust enhancement. Kowalski appealed her sentence, arguing that the district court erred in applying these enhancements and that her sentence was substantively unreasonable.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court found that Kowalski had indeed used sophisticated means to commit the offense and had abused her position of trust. The court also found her sentence to be substantively reasonable. View "United States v. Kowalski" on Justia Law

The case involves the trustees of the Stanley and Sandra Goldberg Trusts, C. Leon Nelson and Marilynn Tetrick, who hired legal counsel to assist them in their duties. The same attorneys later defended them in a lawsuit brought by several beneficiaries of the trusts. The jury found that the trustees had breached their fiduciary duties, and the district court entered a judgment against them, most of which was payable to the trusts. The court then removed the trustees and appointed successor trustees. The former trustees, still represented by the same attorneys, asked the court to reduce the amount of the judgment against them. The successor trustees moved to disqualify the former trustees’ attorneys, arguing that a conflict had surfaced under rule 1.9(a) of the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct. The district court agreed and disqualified the attorneys.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Utah reversed the district court's decision. The Supreme Court held that an attorney-client relationship does not automatically arise merely because an attorney represents a trustee. In this case, the attorneys represented the former trustees only, not the trusts, which were not named in the suit. Thus, because the attorneys never represented the trusts in the litigation, rule 1.9(a) does not prevent the attorneys from continuing to represent the former trustees. View "In re Estate of Goldberg" on Justia Law

The case involves Zeth Browder, who was charged with first-degree sexual assault, third-degree sexual assault, first-degree burglary, kidnapping, and evidence tampering. The charges stemmed from an incident where Browder allegedly sexually assaulted an elderly woman while she was camping in a county park. The jury found Browder guilty of all charges.The Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA) reviewed the case and vacated Browder's conviction, ordering a new trial based on inappropriate comments made by the prosecutor during closing arguments. However, the ICA was divided on whether the prosecutor's comment that the witness' testimony was "consistent with someone who's been traumatized" constituted prosecutorial misconduct. The majority held that the statement was not misconduct, while Judge Leonard disagreed, arguing that the remark mirrored one that the Supreme Court of the State of Hawai'i found improper in a previous case, State v. Hirata.The Supreme Court of the State of Hawai'i disagreed with the ICA's majority, holding that the prosecutor's comment was indeed prosecutorial misconduct. The court found that the prosecutor expressed a personal belief about the witness' credibility and introduced new evidence during closing arguments, thereby undermining Browder's right to a fair trial. The court noted that the prosecutor's comment suggested that the witness had been traumatized, a conclusion that was not supported by any expert testimony. The court vacated the part of the ICA's opinion that allowed the prosecutor's comment and remanded the case to the Circuit Court of the Third Circuit. View "State v. Browder" on Justia Law