Justia Professional Malpractice & Ethics Opinion Summaries

A defamation lawsuit was filed by Dana Cheng, a New York resident and political commentator, against Dan Neumann and Beacon, a Maine news outlet, for characterizing Cheng as "far-right" and a "conspiracy theorist" in an article. Neumann and Beacon sought dismissal of the case under both federal law and a New York anti-SLAPP law, which applies to meritless defamation lawsuits. The district court conducted a choice-of-law analysis, decided that New York law applied, and granted the motion to dismiss under New York's anti-SLAPP statute.The district court's decision was appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit. The appellate court agreed with the district court's ruling but for a different reason: it decided that Cheng's lawsuit had to be dismissed under binding First Amendment principles protecting free speech by the press. Back at the district court, Neumann requested attorneys' fees under the fee-shifting provision of New York's anti-SLAPP law. The district court denied Neumann's request after determining that Maine, not New York, law applied to the specific issue of attorneys' fees.Neumann appealed again, arguing that the district court erred in its choice-of-law analysis. The appellate court, noting the lack of clear controlling precedent on the issue, certified to the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine the question of which state's law applies to the attorneys' fees issue. View "Cheng v. Neumann" on Justia Law

Shawn Flaherty was convicted of second-degree domestic assault and armed criminal action following a violent altercation with his wife, during which he brandished a revolver and a bullet from the weapon struck his wife in the knee. Flaherty's defense at trial was that the shooting was accidental, and his counsel requested an instruction for the lesser-included offense of second-degree domestic assault, which the jury ultimately found him guilty of. Flaherty was sentenced to seven years for the assault count and three years for the armed criminal action count, to be served consecutively. His convictions were affirmed on direct appeal.Flaherty subsequently filed a motion for postconviction relief, arguing that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to request a lesser-included instruction for fourth-degree domestic assault. The motion court overruled Flaherty’s motion after an evidentiary hearing, finding that while his trial counsel's performance was constitutionally deficient for failing to request the instruction for fourth-degree domestic assault, this did not prejudice Flaherty.The Supreme Court of Missouri affirmed the motion court's judgment. The court found that there was sufficient evidence to support the motion court’s finding that counsel’s failure to request the lesser-included instruction for fourth-degree assault did not prejudice Flaherty. The court also noted that the motion court judge, who had also presided over Flaherty's criminal trial, was in a better position to assess the impact of the evidence on the jury and whether it was reasonably likely the jury would have been persuaded by arguments that Flaherty's acts were merely criminally negligent. View "Flaherty v. State" on Justia Law

In a medical malpractice case, Bobbi Ann Mertis filed a lawsuit against Dr. Dong-Joon Oh, North American Partners in Anesthesia (Pennsylvania), LLC (NAPA), Wilkes-Barre Hospital, and Commonwealth Health. Mertis alleged that Dr. Oh negligently administered a femoral nerve block, causing her a femoral nerve injury. Dr. Oh retained a law firm, Scanlon, Howley & Doherty, to represent him. Later, Dr. Eugene Kim, the orthopedic surgeon who performed Mertis’s knee surgery and was not named as a defendant, also retained the same law firm after receiving a subpoena to appear at a discovery deposition.The Luzerne County Court of Common Pleas denied Mertis's motion for sanctions to disqualify the law firm from representing Dr. Oh and to bar the firm's further ex parte communication with Dr. Kim. The court found no violation of Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 4003.6, which regulates obtaining information from a party's treating physician. Mertis appealed to the Superior Court, which reversed the trial court's decision and remanded the case. The Superior Court found that Rule 4003.6 was violated and that the law firm's concurrent representation of Dr. Oh and Dr. Kim was tantamount to ex parte communication.The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania affirmed the Superior Court's decision. The court concluded that a law firm representing a defendant treating physician cannot obtain information from a nonparty treating physician without the patient's written consent or through an authorized method of discovery. The court found that the client exception in Rule 4003.6(1) does not permit a law firm to obtain information from a nonparty treating physician by entering into an attorney-client relationship with that physician when the law firm's attorneys were already prohibited from obtaining information from that physician under Rule 4003.6 prior to entering such attorney-client relationship. View "Mertis v. Oh" on Justia Law

The case involves Sharon Lewis, an African-American woman who worked as an assistant athletic director for Louisiana State University’s (LSU) football team. Lewis alleges that she experienced and witnessed numerous instances of racist and sexist misconduct from former head football coach Les Miles and that she received complaints of sexual harassment from student workers that she oversaw. In 2013, LSU retained Vicki Crochet and Robert Barton, partners of the law firm Taylor, Porter, Brooks & Phillips LLP, to conduct a Title IX investigation of sexual harassment allegations made against Miles. The report and its contents were kept confidential, and allegations brought by the student complainants were privately settled.The district court dismissed Lewis's Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act (RICO) claims against Crochet and Barton because Lewis’s claims were time-barred and she failed to establish proximate causation. On appeal of the dismissal order, a panel of this court affirmed the district court on the grounds that Lewis knew of her injuries from alleged racketeering as early as 2013, and thus the four-year statute of limitations had expired before she filed suit in 2021.The district court ordered Lewis to file a motion to compel addressing the lingering “issues of discoverability and the application of [its Crime-Fraud Exception Order].” The district court denied Crochet and Barton’s motion for a protective order and compelled the depositions of Crochet and Barton and the disclosure of documents drafted during the 2013 investigation. Crochet and Barton timely appealed.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed the district court’s Crime-Fraud Exception Order and remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion. The court concluded that the district court clearly erred in holding that Lewis established a prima facie case that the Board violated La. R.S. 14:132(B) and that the alleged privileged communications were made in furtherance of the crime and reasonably related to the alleged violation. View "Lewis v. Crochet" on Justia Law

The case involves a criminal defendant, Tasi Autele, who was indicted on charges of second-degree assault and strangulation. Autele retained attorneys Mackeson and Hall to represent him. However, on the day of the trial, the court granted defense counsel's request to postpone the trial to investigate photographs that had been anonymously delivered to Hall's office. On the next scheduled trial date, the trial court granted defense counsel's request to withdraw due to an ethical conflict that would likely arise from the prosecutor's plan to cross-examine Autele about those photographs. Nine days later, the same attorneys appeared and asked to be allowed to represent Autele, but the trial court denied the request due to its concerns about a continuing ethical issue.The Court of Appeals affirmed Autele's conviction, concluding that the record was insufficient to determine whether the trial court had abused its discretion in denying Autele's request to be represented by his retained counsel. The Supreme Court of the State of Oregon reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals. The Supreme Court held that when a trial court denies a criminal defendant's request to be represented by retained counsel of their choice, the record must demonstrate that the trial court's decision was a permissible exercise of its discretion. The court found that the record in this case did not reflect that the trial court's decision amounted to a reasonable exercise of its discretion. Therefore, the court reversed and remanded the case for a new trial. View "State v. Autele" on Justia Law

The case revolves around Jon Comstock, a lawyer who was observing Rule 8.1 hearings in a Benton County jail courtroom. Comstock was seated behind a glass window where he could see but not hear the proceedings due to a malfunctioning or turned-off sound system. He attempted to make Judge Griffin aware of the violation of the constitutional guarantees of open court proceedings. During a break, Judge Griffin and Comstock had a heated exchange about Comstock's right to hear the proceedings, which resulted in Comstock being held in direct criminal contempt and sentenced to five days in Benton County Jail, with four and a half days suspended.Comstock filed an omnibus motion for a new trial, petition for review, and notice of appeal in the Benton County Circuit Court, arguing that the circuit court had jurisdiction to conduct a de novo trial of the contempt finding. The circuit court initially granted Comstock a new trial, but later ruled that it lacked jurisdiction to conduct a trial in the matter and dismissed the case, determining that the contempt order was a final order from a circuit court and that the appellate court was the proper venue for a review of that order.The Supreme Court of Arkansas affirmed the decision of the Benton County Circuit Court. It held that the contempt order was indeed a final order from a circuit court and that the appellate court was the proper venue for a review of that order. The court also found substantial evidence to support the circuit court’s order finding Comstock in direct criminal contempt. Therefore, the court affirmed the circuit court's finding and declined to reach Comstock’s recusal argument. View "Comstock v. State" on Justia Law

This case involves a legal malpractice claim brought by Victoria Loepp against her former attorneys and their law firm. The dispute originated from an inheritance issue involving a house that Loepp was supposed to sell to her sister, Ms. Scott. Loepp hired attorney Ryan Ford to assist with the sale, but disagreements arose, leading to litigation. After a series of events, Loepp refused to accept the settlement terms negotiated by Ford, leading to his withdrawal from the case. Scott Murray replaced Ford as Loepp's counsel, but a court later ruled in favor of Scott. Loepp then filed a legal malpractice action against Ford, Murray, and their firm, alleging multiple instances of malpractice, breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, and gross negligence.The District Court of Natrona County dismissed Loepp's claims based on a summary judgment order that struck her malpractice expert, Michael Watters, an attorney from California. The court found that Watters was not a qualified expert because he was not familiar with legal practice in Wyoming. The court also granted summary judgment on all claims, arguing that without Watters's expert testimony, Loepp could not prove the elements of legal malpractice.The Supreme Court of Wyoming reversed the lower court's decision, finding that the district court did not fully analyze the reliability and fitness of the proffered expert under W.R.E 702. The court held that where a lawyer is licensed or practices is just one factor to consider in the W.R.E 702 analysis. The court remanded the case for further proceedings on the motion to strike and the related summary judgment decision. View "Loepp v. Ford" on Justia Law

The case involves an individual, referred to as "John Doe," who repeatedly applied for admission to the Idaho State Bar. Doe's applications were denied due to concerns about his character and fitness, including his honesty, judgment, and respect for the rights of others. Doe challenged these denials, arguing that his federal lawsuits against the Idaho State Bar were a necessary defense of his rights and that his conduct was protected by the First Amendment.The Idaho State Bar filed a petition with the Idaho Supreme Court, seeking permission to reject Doe's third application and to prohibit him from filing future applications for a specified period. Doe cross-petitioned, seeking immediate admission to the Idaho State Bar.The Idaho Supreme Court denied Doe's cross-petition, finding that he had not demonstrated that he met the essential eligibility requirements to practice law. The court granted the Idaho State Bar's petition in part, allowing it to reject Doe's third application and prohibiting Doe from filing a new application for two years. The court found that Doe had not shown a significant change in his circumstances that would render him eligible to practice law. The court also ordered the Idaho State Bar to refund Doe's application fee. View "ISB v. John Doe" on Justia Law

The case involves Chad Alan Lee, who was convicted and sentenced to death for three murders. Lee filed a habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, arguing that his trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective at sentencing because he failed to investigate and present mitigating evidence that Lee suffered from Fetal Alcohol Syndrome and Fetal Alcohol Effect. Lee also argued that the Arizona Supreme Court erred by requiring him to establish a causal nexus between his crimes and his mitigating evidence.The district court denied Lee's petition and his motion for leave to amend. The court found that Lee's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel was procedurally defaulted because he did not raise it in his postconviction relief petition. The court also found that Lee's proposed claim that the Arizona Supreme Court erred was untimely, procedurally defaulted, and without merit.On appeal, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that Lee's theories for obtaining a federal evidentiary hearing notwithstanding 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2), which places strict limits on when federal courts can hold evidentiary hearings and consider new evidence, lacked merit. The court also held that even if Lee could demonstrate cause to excuse the procedural default, he could not demonstrate prejudice. The court further held that the district court correctly denied leave to add Lee's proposed claim because it was untimely under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1), procedurally defaulted, and lacked merit. View "LEE V. THORNELL" on Justia Law

The case involves attorney Larry Klayman, who has been subject to multiple disciplinary investigations and proceedings by the District of Columbia Bar’s Office of Disciplinary Counsel. In response, Klayman filed a series of lawsuits against the District of Columbia Bar, the Office of Disciplinary Counsel, and individual D.C. Bar officials, alleging torts and constitutional claims. In June 2020, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals ordered a ninety-day suspension of Klayman’s license to practice law. Employees of the Office of Disciplinary Counsel mailed notice of that suspension to other jurisdictions where Klayman is admitted to practice law. Klayman then brought three lawsuits against the Office of Disciplinary Counsel employees and the Chair of the D.C. Board on Professional Responsibility, alleging that the notification letters amounted to tortious interference and abuse of process. The district court dismissed Klayman’s suits in full and entered a pre-filing injunction restricting Klayman’s ability to file any related actions or claims for relief in any forum, state or federal.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit vacated the pre-filing injunction. The court affirmed on immunity grounds the district court’s dismissal of Klayman’s claims for damages, but it affirmed in part and reversed in part the district court’s dismissal of Klayman’s claims for injunctive relief. The court held that the Office of Disciplinary Counsel employees were entitled to absolute immunity from Klayman’s damages claims. However, the court found that there was no relevant pending state proceeding to support Younger abstention at the time of the dismissal, and thus reversed the district court’s dismissal of Klayman’s claims for injunctive relief. The court remanded the case to the district court for further proceedings on those injunctive-relief claims. View "Klayman v. Porter" on Justia Law