Justia Professional Malpractice & Ethics Opinion Summaries

The Alabama Peace Officers' Standards and Training Commission ("the Commission") petitioned the Alabama Supreme Court for mandamus relief to direct the circuit court to dismiss a complaint against it filed by Bryan Grimmett. The Commission revoked Grimmett's law-enforcement certification. The Court of Civil Appeals reversed that portion of the trial court's judgment fully reinstating Grimmett's law-enforcement certification because Grimmett had conceded in the record that he had not satisfied the 80-hour refresher-training course required for reinstatement of his certification. At the time the Court of Civil Appeals issued its May 2017 opinion, the Commission had in place a rule requiring a previously certified law-enforcement officer absent from employment as a law-enforcement officer for two years or more to successfully complete an approved 80-hour academy recertification course. In October 2017, the Commission amended its rule on certification to include, among other things, a provision that, if the Commission approves an application for admission to certification training of a law-enforcement officer absent from law enforcement for more than 10 years, that applicant must satisfactorily complete the regular basic-training academy, which is a 520-hour course. It was undisputed that Grimmett had been not employed as a law-enforcement officer since 2000. Grimmett filed his complaint with the circuit court seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against the Commission, asserting that he was provisionally offered a job in law enforcement in December 2017; that he attempted to enroll in the 80-hour refresher- training program; and that the Commission refused to allow him to enroll in the refresher-training program, instead requiring him to complete the full 520-hour basic-academy training course. The Commission moved the circuit court to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the Commission, as an agency of the State of Alabama, is entitled to sovereign immunity. Finding that the Commission established a clear legal right to mandamus relief, the Alabama Supreme Court granted its petition and directed the circuit court to dismiss Grimmett's complaint. View "Ex parte Ex parte Alabama Peace Officers' Standards and Training Commission." on Justia Law

The Board of Directors (the Board) of Bear Valley Community Hospital (Bear Valley) refused to promote Dr. Robert O. Powell from provisional to active staff membership and reappointment to Bear Valley's medical staff. Dr. Powell appealed the superior court judgment denying his petition for writ of mandate to void the Board's decision and for reinstatement of his medical staff privileges. Dr. Powell practiced medicine in both Texas and California as a general surgeon. In 2000, the medical executive committee of Brownwood Regional Medical Center (Brownwood), in Texas, found that Dr. Powell failed to advise a young boy's parents that he severed the boy's vas deferens during a hernia procedure or of the ensuing implications. Further, the committee found that Dr. Powell falsely represented to Brownwood's medical staff, on at least two occasions, that he fully disclosed the circumstances to the parents, behavior which the committee considered to be dishonest, obstructive, and which prevented appropriate follow-up care. Based on the committee's findings, Brownwood terminated Dr. Powell's staff membership and clinical privileges. In subsequent years, Dr. Powell obtained staff privileges at other medical facilities. In October 2011, Dr. Powell applied for appointment to the medical staff at Bear Valley. On his initial application form, Dr. Powell was given an opportunity to disclose whether his clinical privileges had ever been revoked by any medical facility. In administrative hearings generated by the Bear Valley Board’s decision, there was a revelation that Dr. Powell had not been completely forthcoming about the Brownwood termination, and alleged the doctor mislead the judicial review committee (“JRC”) about the circumstances leading to that termination. Under Bear Valley's bylaws, Dr. Powell had the right to an administrative appeal of the JRC's decision; he chose, however, to bypass an administrative appeal and directly petition the superior court for a writ of mandamus. In superior court, Dr. Powell filed a petition for writ of mandate under Code of Civil Procedure sections 1094.5 and 1094.6, seeking to void the JRC's/Board's decision and to have his medical privileges reinstated. The trial court denied the petition, and this appeal followed. On appeal of the superior court’s denial, Dr. Powell argued he was entitled to a hearing before the lapse of his provisional staff privileges: that the Board surreptitiously terminated his staff privileges, presumably for a medical disciplinary cause, by allowing his privileges to lapse and failing to act. The Court of Appeal determined the Bear Valley Board had little to no insight into the true circumstances of Dr. Powell’s termination at Brownwood or the extent of his misrepresentations, thus the Board properly exercised independent judgment based on the information presented. In summary, the Court of Appeal concluded Bear Valley provided Dr. Powell a fair procedure in denying his request for active staff privileges and reappointment to the medical staff. View "Powell v. Bear Valley Community Hospital" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit after StanCERA implemented several changes to the actuarial calculations used to determine how to amortize unfunded liabilities within the retirement system and chose to utilize so-called non-valuation funds, money not used to ensure the overall system was actuarially sound, to reduce or replace required employer contributions. Plaintiffs argued that these actions constituted a breach of the constitutional fiduciary duties placed on the board of a county retirement system. On appeal, plaintiffs challenged the trial court's grant of summary judgment to defendants. The court concluded that the trial court correctly determined that plaintiffs were not entitled to summary judgment, but the trial court erred in determining that no material issues of fact remained. The court explained that there remain material issues of fact regarding whether the resulting conduct violated the constitutionally mandated fiduciary duty of loyalty the board owed to StanCERA's members. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "O'Neal v. Stanislaus County Employees' Retirement Association" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was injured while working at a paper mill. Plaintiff hired Defendant, an attorney, to represent her in her workers’ compensation claim. The Workers’ Compensation Board awarded Plaintiff, still represented by Defendant, partial incapacity benefits. Plaintiff later settled with her employer. Plaintiff subsequently filed a complaint against Defendant, alleging that, due to Defendant’s failure to exercise due care and negligence, she was awarded partial incapacity benefits rather than total incapacity benefits. The superior court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendant. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that summary judgment was correctly granted where the jury could not assess damages without resorting to speculation. View "Allen v. McCann" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a New Jersey resident who was admitted to the practice of law in New York, maintained her only law office in New Jersey. When Plaintiff learned of the statutory requirement that nonresident attorneys must maintain an office within New York in order to practice in the State under N.Y. Jud. Law 470, Plaintiff commenced this action alleging that Judiciary Law 470 violated the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the U.S. Constitution. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit asked the New York Court of Appeals to set forth the minimum requirements necessary to satisfy the mandate that nonresident attorneys maintain an office within the State “for the transaction of law business” under Judiciary Law 470. The Court of Appeals answered by holding that the statute requires nonresident attorneys to maintain a physical office in New York. View "Schoenefeld v. State" on Justia Law

Petitioner was fired from her job at the Indiana Department of Workforce Development for alleged misconduct. After it was discovered that Petitioner kept several items of state property in her possession, Petitioner was charged with theft. The charges were later dismissed. Thereafter, the State filed an ethics proceeding against Petitioner, alleging that she violated 42 Ind. Admin. Code 1-5-12. After an adjudicative hearing, the Indiana State Ethics Commission found that Petitioner did commit the alleged violation and barred her from future State executive branch employment. The Supreme Court affirmed the Commission’s decision, holding (1) double jeopardy did not bar the proceeding before the Commission, and the criminal court’s probable cause determination was not binding upon the Commission; (2) there was sufficient evidence to support the Commission’s determination; and (3) the sanction imposed in this case was within the Commission’s discretion. View "Ind. State Ethics Comm’n v. Sanchez" on Justia Law

The Gallia County (Ohio) Public Defender Commission contracted with the non-profit Corporation for defense attorneys to represent indigent criminal defendants. The Corporation hired Bright, who represented R.G. before Evans, the county’s only trial judge. Bright negotiated a plea agreement, but R.G. hesitated during the plea colloquy. “Mere seconds” later, R.G. informed Bright and Evans that he would take the deal after all. Evans refused. Bright and the prosecutor met with Evans to convince the judge to accept R.G.’s plea. He refused. In pleadings, Bright criticized Evans’s policies as “an abuse of discretion,” “unreasonable,” “arbitrary … unconscionable.” Bright’s language did not include profanity and did not claim ethical impropriety. Evans subsequently contacted the Office of Disciplinary Counsel and filed a grievance against Bright and filed a public journal entry stating that Bright’s motion, although not amounting to misconduct or contempt, had created a conflict. He ordered that Bright be removed from the R.G. case. He then filed entries removing Bright from 70 other felony cases. The Corporation terminated Bright’s employment, allegedly without a hearing or other due process. Bright sued Evans, the Board, the Corporation, and the Commission. The district court concluded that Evans was “not entitled to absolute judicial immunity because his actions were completely outside of his jurisdiction.” The court held that Bright failed to sufficiently plead that the Board or the Commission retaliated against him for exercising his constitutional rights or that liability attached under the Monell doctrine, then dismissed claims against the Corporation. The Sixth Circuit reversed with respect to Evans. While Evans’s conduct was worthy of censure, it does not fit within any exception to absolute judicial immunity. The court affirmed dismissal of claims against the Board and Corporation; the First Amendment offers no protection to an attorney for his speech in court.View "Bright v. Gallia Cnty." on Justia Law

Carpenter sued Flint, a councilwoman and the mayor, based on Carpenter’s termination from his position as Director of Transportation, asserting age and political discrimination, breach of contract, wrongful discharge, gross negligence, defamation, and invasion of privacy. Defendants argued that the complaint failed to identify which claims were alleged against which defendants, and that the allegations were “excessively esoteric, compound and argumentative.” Carpenter did not respond by the court’s deadline, and about five weeks later, a stipulated order entered, permitting Carpenter to file an amended complaint by April 21, 2011. Counsel manually filed an amended complaint on May 20, 2011, violating a local rule requiring electronic filing. The clerk accepted the filing, but issued a warning. Carpenter failed to timely respond to a renewed motion to strike. Carpenter responded to a resulting show-cause order, but failed to abide by local rules. Another warning issued. Carpenter’s response to a second show-cause order was noncompliant. The court warned that “future failure to comply … will not be tolerated.” After more than five months without docket activity, the court dismissed. The Sixth Circuit reversed. Defendants bore some responsibility for delays and the length of delay does not establish the kind of conduct or clear record warranting dismissal; lesser sanctions were appropriate. View "Carpenter v. City of Flint" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, former Lehman employees, filed suit alleging that defendants, members of the Benefits Committee, and the company's Directors, breached their duties under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. 1001 et seq. In regards to plaintiffs' claims that the Benefits Committee Defendants breached their duty of prudence in managing the company's employee stock ownership plan (ESOP), the court concluded that plaintiffs have not rebutted the Moench v. Robertson presumption because they failed to allege facts sufficient to show that the Benefits Committee Defendants knew or should have known that Lehman was in a "dire situation" based on information that was publicly available during the class period. In regards to plaintiffs' claims that the Benefits Committee Defendants breached their duty of disclosure, the publicly-known information available to defendants did not give rise to an independent duty to investigate Lehman's SEC filings prior to incorporating their content into a summary plan description issued to plan-participants. The court affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiffs' remaining claims. View "In Re: Lehman Bros. ERISA Litig." on Justia Law

FINRA filed a complaint against petitioner, charging that he violated FINRA rules by submitting false expense reports for reimbursement of nonexistent business travel and for a fraudulently purchased cellular telephone. In his petition for review, petitioner argued that the SEC abused its discretion in upholding a lifetime bar based on his violation of the National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD) Conduct Rule 2110. The court remanded to the SEC for further consideration, agreeing with petitioner that the SEC abused its discretion in failing to adequately address all of the potentially mitigating factors that the agency should have considered when it determined the appropriate sanction. View "Saad v. SEC" on Justia Law