Justia Professional Malpractice & Ethics Opinion Summaries

Daniel’la Deering, an in-house lawyer for Lockheed Martin, was terminated and subsequently sued the company for discrimination and retaliation. While her discrimination claim was dismissed at the summary judgment stage, her retaliation claim was set to go to trial. However, during the litigation, Deering misled Lockheed Martin and the district court about her employment status and income. She falsely claimed to be employed by nVent and did not disclose her higher-paying job elsewhere, even submitting false information in a deposition, declaration, and settlement letters.The United States District Court for the District of Minnesota, presided over by Judge David S. Doty, found that Deering’s actions constituted intentional, willful, and bad-faith misconduct. Lockheed Martin discovered the deception shortly before the trial, leading to an emergency motion for sanctions. The district court dismissed Deering’s case with prejudice and awarded Lockheed Martin $93,193 in attorney fees. Deering’s motions for a continuance and reconsideration were also denied by the district court.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s decision. The appellate court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the case due to Deering’s prolonged and intentional deception. The court emphasized that dismissal was appropriate given the severity and duration of the misconduct. Additionally, the appellate court found no abuse of discretion in the district court’s denial of Deering’s motions for a continuance and reconsideration. However, the appellate court dismissed Deering’s appeal regarding the attorney fee award due to a premature notice of appeal. View "Deering v. Lockheed Martin Corp." on Justia Law

Ryan Haygood, a dentist in Louisiana, faced an investigation by the Louisiana State Board of Dentistry, which led to the revocation of his dental license in 2010. Haygood alleged that competing dentists conspired with Board members to drive him out of business by fabricating complaints and manipulating the Board's proceedings. In 2012, a Louisiana appellate court vacated the Board's revocation of Haygood's license, citing due process violations. Haygood then entered a consent decree with the Board, allowing him to keep his license.Haygood filed a civil action in state court in 2011, alleging due process violations and unfair competition. In 2013, he filed a similar federal lawsuit, claiming violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Louisiana Unfair Trade Practices Act (LUTPA). The federal district court dismissed the federal complaint, ruling that the § 1983 claim was time-barred and the LUTPA claim was not plausible. The court also awarded attorney’s fees to the defendants, deeming both claims frivolous.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's decision to award attorney’s fees for the frivolous § 1983 claim, agreeing that it was clearly time-barred. However, the appellate court found that the district court erred in calculating the fee amount. The district court had properly calculated $98,666.50 for the defendants' private attorneys but improperly awarded $11,594.66 for the Louisiana Attorney General’s office without using the lodestar method. Consequently, the Fifth Circuit remitted the fee award to $98,666.50 while affirming the decision to award fees. View "Haygood v. Morrison" on Justia Law

Jeffrey Neece sued the City of Chicopee, alleging that the mayor's decision not to renew his employment contract was retaliation for his testimony in a gender-discrimination case against the city. Neece claimed that his testimony undermined the city's defense, while the mayor argued that Neece was unproductive and unresponsive to his colleagues. The jury rejected Neece's retaliation claims. Neece appealed, arguing that he was entitled to a new trial because the district court limited the evidence he could present about a key event: a closed-door meeting between the city's attorneys and the city council about the merits of the gender-discrimination case and the impact of Neece's testimony.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit upheld the district court's decision, concluding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in limiting evidence about the meeting. The court found that the mayor, who did not attend the meeting, was the decision-maker in not renewing Neece's contract. Neece was unable to show that the mayor ever learned about the details of the meeting, making the meeting irrelevant to the mayor's state of mind or alleged retaliatory motive. The court also found that the city did not waive its attorney-client privilege regarding the mayor's private conversations with the city attorney about the settlement of the gender-discrimination case. Therefore, the court affirmed the jury's verdict in favor of the city. View "Neece v. City of Chicopee" on Justia Law

The case involves Sharon Lewis, an African-American woman who worked as an assistant athletic director for Louisiana State University’s (LSU) football team. Lewis alleges that she experienced and witnessed numerous instances of racist and sexist misconduct from former head football coach Les Miles and that she received complaints of sexual harassment from student workers that she oversaw. In 2013, LSU retained Vicki Crochet and Robert Barton, partners of the law firm Taylor, Porter, Brooks & Phillips LLP, to conduct a Title IX investigation of sexual harassment allegations made against Miles. The report and its contents were kept confidential, and allegations brought by the student complainants were privately settled.The district court dismissed Lewis's Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act (RICO) claims against Crochet and Barton because Lewis’s claims were time-barred and she failed to establish proximate causation. On appeal of the dismissal order, a panel of this court affirmed the district court on the grounds that Lewis knew of her injuries from alleged racketeering as early as 2013, and thus the four-year statute of limitations had expired before she filed suit in 2021.The district court ordered Lewis to file a motion to compel addressing the lingering “issues of discoverability and the application of [its Crime-Fraud Exception Order].” The district court denied Crochet and Barton’s motion for a protective order and compelled the depositions of Crochet and Barton and the disclosure of documents drafted during the 2013 investigation. Crochet and Barton timely appealed.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed the district court’s Crime-Fraud Exception Order and remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion. The court concluded that the district court clearly erred in holding that Lewis established a prima facie case that the Board violated La. R.S. 14:132(B) and that the alleged privileged communications were made in furtherance of the crime and reasonably related to the alleged violation. View "Lewis v. Crochet" on Justia Law

The case revolves around Viktoriya Usachenok, an employee of the Department of Treasury, who filed an internal complaint alleging sexual harassment and a hostile work environment created by her supervisor. As part of the investigation, Usachenok was directed not to discuss the investigation with others, a directive she was accused of violating when she consulted her husband, an attorney, about a document related to the investigation. Usachenok subsequently filed a complaint challenging the confidentiality directive.The Appellate Division rejected Usachenok’s constitutional challenge to the regulation, focusing on the change from a directive to a permissive “request” through an amendment. The court found that the plain language of the regulation did not restrict speech and did not constitute an improper prior restraint of speech.The Supreme Court of New Jersey, however, disagreed with the Appellate Division. The court held that the regulation, which requires state investigators to request that anyone interviewed not discuss any aspect of the investigation with others, is overbroad under the State Constitution. The court found that the regulation chills constitutionally protected speech, as it encompasses a significant amount of protected speech and its consequences are real. The court therefore struck the relevant part of the regulation, reversing the judgment of the Appellate Division and remanding the case to the trial court for further proceedings. View "Usachenok v. State of New Jersey Department of the Treasury" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court of Kentucky has removed Joseph “JS” Flynn from his position as Pulaski Circuit Court Clerk following allegations of inappropriate workplace behavior. Flynn was appointed in 2016 and elected in 2018. In March 2022, a complaint was lodged against Flynn by a former employee, alleging several incidents of inappropriate behavior. Flynn admitted to having a brief sexual relationship with the complainant, his subordinate, in 2021, which he did not report, and to physically poking and verbally abusing his employees.Other allegations against Flynn included pulling the complainant into a car back seat, forcefully kissing her, and exposing himself. Flynn denied these allegations, claiming physical impossibility due to two surgically inserted rods in his back. Furthermore, the complainant alleged that Flynn would regularly touch her inappropriately and put his hand up her dress. Another employee corroborated many of these allegations.Based on the evidence provided during a three-day hearing, the Supreme Court of Kentucky concluded that Flynn had created a hostile work environment and engaged in quid pro quo harassment. The Court noted that Flynn failed to perform his duties with courtesy and respect, thereby tarnishing the judiciary's reputation. As a result, Flynn was removed from his position, and the Office of the Pulaski Circuit Court Clerk was declared vacant. Flynn was ordered to pay the costs of the proceedings. View "IN RE: FLYNN, PULASKI CIRCUIT COURT CLERK" on Justia Law

In this case, the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho upheld a lower court's summary judgment in favor of the defendants, George and Jesse’s Les Schwab Tire Store, Inc., and two of its owners, Bruce and Richard Byram. The plaintiff, Adam Davis, had been employed as an assistant manager at Les Schwab from April 2016 till June 2019. In March 2019, there was a shortage in the cash deposits and surveillance footage showed Davis bending down out of camera view in the area where the cash deposits were kept while he was alone in the store. This led to Davis being arrested and charged with grand theft, and his employment was terminated. Although the charges against Davis were later dropped, he sued the defendants for breach of his employment contract, false arrest, defamation per se, and for knowingly giving a false report to the police. The district court granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment on all of Davis’s claims. The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's decision, finding no genuine issue of material fact that could support Davis’s claims. The court found that Davis was an at-will employee who could be terminated without cause and that there was no evidence to show that the defendants had acted with malice. The court also found that the plaintiff's attorney had violated Rule 11.2 by submitting arguments that were not well grounded in fact, and awarded a portion of the defendants' attorney fees to be paid by the plaintiff's counsel. View "Davis v. George and Jesse's Les Schwab Tire Store, Inc." on Justia Law

At issue before the Colorado Supreme Court in this matter was a trial court’s order denying immunity to Defendant New Century Hospice, Inc. and its subsidiaries, Defendants Legacy Hospice, LLC, d/b/a New Century Hospice of Denver, LLC, and Legacy Hospice of Colorado Springs, LLC (collectively, “New Century”). New Century argued it was entitled to immunity under four different statutes. Tana Edwards filed suit against New Century (her former employer) and Kathleen Johnson, the Director of Operations for New Century Castle Rock (collectively, “Defendants”). As part of her employment with New Century, Edwards provided in-home care to an elderly patient. In December 2019, Johnson began to suspect that Edwards was diverting pain medications from the patient. Defendants reported the suspected drug diversion to the Castle Rock Police Department and the Colorado Department of Public Health and Environment (“CDPHE”). Defendants also lodged a complaint against Edwards’s nursing license with the Colorado Board of Nursing (“the Board”). After investigations, no criminal charges were filed and no formal disciplinary actions were taken against Edwards. Edwards subsequently brought this action against Defendants, alleging claims for negligent supervision and negligent hiring against New Century, as well as claims for defamation and intentional infliction of emotional distress against New Century and Johnson. Defendants moved for summary judgment. The trial court granted the motion as to Edwards’s claims for negligent hiring, defamation, and intentional infliction of emotional distress, finding that the claims were either time-barred or could not be proven. Three of the statutes New Century cited for its immunity claim, 12-20-402(1), C.R.S. (2022) (“the Professions Act”), 12-255-123(2), C.R.S. (2022) (“the Nurse Practice Act”), and 18-6.5-108(3), C.R.S. (2022) (“the Mandatory Reporter statute”), only authorized immunity for a “person.” Relying on the plain meaning of “person,” the Supreme Court held that New Century was not entitled to immunity under these three statutes because it was a corporation, not a person. The fourth statute, 18-8-115, C.R.S. (2022) (“the Duty to Report statute”), explicitly entitled corporations to immunity, but only if certain conditions were met. Applying the plain language of the statute, the Supreme Court held that New Century was not entitled to summary judgment on the issue of immunity under this statute because it did not carry its burden of demonstrating that all such conditions were met. View "In re Edwards v. New Century Hospice" on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued her employer, Defendant Montefiore Medical Center, and two of its employees, asserting claims of sexual harassment during and retaliatory discharge from her employment. Following the district court’s grant of partial summary judgment in their favor, Defendants moved to dismiss Plaintiff’s remaining claims and sought sanctions against Plaintiff and her counsel, Appellant Daniel Altaras and his firm, Appellant Derek Smith Law Group, PLLC (“DSLG”), contending that Plaintiff’s text message evidence was a forgery. The district court found by clear and convincing evidence that Plaintiff had fabricated the text messages, falsely testified about their production, and spoliated evidence in an attempt to conceal her wrongdoing. The district court also found that Altaras had facilitated Plaintiff’s misconduct. The district court dismissed Plaintiff’s remaining claims with prejudice and imposed a monetary sanction of attorneys’ fees, costs, and expenses incurred by Defendants. On appeal, Appellants challenged various aspects of the district court’s conduct.   The court vacated the portion of the district court’s judgment imposing a sanction on Altaras and DSLG and remanded for further proceedings consistent. The court affirmed the judgment of the district court in all other respects. The court held that the district court erred by failing to expressly make the finding of bad faith required to support the sanction it imposed against Altaras and DSLG.  The court directed that on remand, the district court may assess in its discretion whether Altaras’s misconduct—including his insistence on defending a complaint founded on obviously fabricated evidence or other actions—amounted to bad faith. View "Rossbach et al. v. Montefiore Medical Center et al." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court awarding attorneys' fees after a medical doctor sued and lost against a hospital following its revocation of the doctor's medical staff and surgical privileges, holding that the circuit court did not err or abuse its discretion.Doctor, a surgeon, sued Hospital after his termination stemming from allegations that Doctor provided care that fell short of standard surgical practice. After a remand, all of Doctor's claims were dismissed. Thereafter, the circuit court awarded Hospital attorneys' fees and costs. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the motion for attorneys' fees was timely filed; and (2) Doctor was not entitled to relief on his remaining allegations of error. View "Williams v. Baptist Health" on Justia Law