Justia Professional Malpractice & Ethics Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court granting Defendant's motion to dismiss the underlying complaint filed by Port of Louisville for defamation and professional malfeasance, holding that Port of Louisville had no legally recognized relationship with R. Wayne Stratton, CPA and Jones, Nale & Mattingly PLC (collectively, Stratton), and therefore, Stratton did not owe the Port of Louisville any duty.Louisville and Jefferson County Riverport Authority filed a lawsuit seeking to terminate Port of Louisville's lease based on allegations that Port of Louisville breached the parties' lease The action was stayed while the claims were referred to an arbitrator, who found that Port of Louisville had not breached the lease. Based on what occurred during the arbitration the Port of Louisville brought a complaint against Stratton for defamation and professional malfeasance. The trial court granted Stratton's motion to dismiss, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Port of Louisville had no legally recognized relationship with Stratton that would cause Stratton to owe it a duty. View "New Albany Main Street Properties, LLC v. R. Wayne Stratton, CPA" on Justia Law

In this professional malpractice action, the Supreme Court overruled Alagia, Day, Trautwein & Smith v. Broadbent, 882 S.W.2d 121 (Ky. 1994), and its progeny insofar as they hold that, for a non-litigation legal malpractice claim, a claimant's damages are not irrevocable and non-speculative until the claimant knows the exact dollar amount of damages he or she incurred because of the malpractice, holding that Broadbent was wrongly decided.Plaintiff filed the underlying professional malpractice claim against Defendants for negligently providing her poor legal advice regarding a business she co-owned. The trial judge granted summary judgment for Defendants on the ground that Plaintiff's legal harm did not become "irrevocable and non-speculative" sufficient to trigger Ky. Rev. Code 413.245 until July 2017, and therefore, Plaintiff's complaint was time-barred. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed on slightly different grounds, holding (1) because Broadbent has led to inconsistencies in jurisprudence regarding when damages are considered irrevocable and non-speculative for a professional malpractice claim, Broadbent and its progeny are overruled; and (2) for a non-litigation legal malpractice claim, a claimant's damages are considered irrevocable and non-speculative when the claimant is reasonably certain that damages will indeed flow from the defendant's negligent act. View "Wolfe v. Kimmel" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the court of appeals denying a motion for writs of prohibition and mandamus, holding that there was no error.In the underlying medical negligence action, Petitioners filed a petition seeking a writ of prohibition in the court of appeals to prohibit the enforcement of a circuit court order directing them to provide Norton Healthcare with nine years of Facebook data. Alternatively, Petitioners sought a writ of mandamus directing the circuit court to enter a more constrained discovery order. The court of appeals denied the motion for writs of prohibition and mandamus. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Petitioners' series of general objections were without merit, and therefore, the court of appeals did not err in denying the writ. View "Leslie-Johnson v. Hon. Audra Eckerle" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals affirming the circuit court's judgment in favor of Defendants in this suit against healthcare providers seeking damages for alleged breach of duties, holding that there was no error.Plaintiff sued Baptist Healthcare System, Inc., Apogee Medical Group Kentucky, PSC and Subhose Bathing, M.D. alleging that Defendants breached their standards of care for by prescribing two antibiotics known to be linked to arrhythmias and cardiac arrest when taken by patients with low potassium. After a trial, the jury found that neither defendant had breached their standard of care. The court of appeals affirmed. On appeal to the Supreme Court, Plaintiff claimed eight errors in the proceedings below. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that there was no prejudicial error in this case. View "Kentucky Guardianship Administrators, LLC v. Baptist Health System, Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals that Ky. Rev. Stat. 413.245, the one-year statute of limitations applicable to the rendering of professional services, does not apply to claims against attorneys when malice is alleged, holding that, regardless of whether malice is alleged, claims arising from an act or omission in the rendering of, or failing to render, professional services are governed by section 413.245.Plaintiff filed a complaint against a law firm and three of its attorneys based upon their allegedly wrongful acts undertaken on behalf of the firm's clients. The circuit court dismissed all claims either for failure to state a claim or for failure to timely file under the applicable statute of limitations. The court of appeals reversed as to the slander of title, civil conspiracy, and Ky. Rev. Stat. 434.155 violation claims, finding that section 413.245 would not time bar the claims if malice were proven. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that the court of appeals erred in concluding that section 413.245 does not apply to claims against attorneys when malice is alleged. View "Seiller Waterman, LLC v. RLB Properties, Ltd." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court remanded this matter to the circuit court with directions to reinstate a default judgment granted to Bingham Greenebaum Doll, LLP and J. Richard Kiefer (collectively, Bingham) against Meredith Lawrence on its counterclaim to enforce a promissory note made by Lawrence in partial payment of attorney’s fees owed by Lawrence to Bingham, holding that the trial court erred in setting aside the default judgment and that the Court of Appeals erred in affirming that order.Specifically, the Court held that because Bingham’s counterclaim was a compulsory counterclaim to Lawrence’s action against Bingham for professional negligence and because the complaint called into question the validity of the promissory note at issue, Bingham’s counterclaim was justiciable even though it was filed three an a half months prior to the promissory note’s due date. View "Bingham Greenebaum Doll, LLP v. Lawrence" on Justia Law

In this fraud and professional negligence case the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals that a $80 million punitive damage award was unreasonable and reinstated the trial court’s award, otherwise affirming the appellate court’s judgment, holding that the $80 million award was not grossly excessive and was constitutionally acceptable.Plaintiffs participated in a tax shelter marketed by Defendant, their accounting firm. After the IRS disallowed the tax shelter, Plaintiffs settled with the IRS, paying a total of $20 million for back taxes, interest and penalties and amounts paid to Defendant for fees. Plaintiffs then commenced this action to recoup the $20 million. The trial court found Defendant liable for fraud and gross professional negligence and awarded $20 million in compensatory damages and $80 million in punitive damages. The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment on liability and compensatory damages but reduced the punitive damage award to equal the compensatory damage award. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the Court of Appeals’ decision that Defendant was liable for fraudulent conduct and the compensatory damage award; but (2) reversed the remittitur and reinstated the trial court’s punitive damage award, holding that the facts supported an $80 million punitive damage assessment and that an award of that magnitude was constitutionally acceptable. View "Yung v. Grant Thornton, LLP" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court adopted the Exoneration Rule, the majority rule across the nation providing that a criminal defense attorney may not be sued for legal malpractice in a case resulting in the conviction of his or her client unless the client has been exonerated by direct appeal or upon post-conviction relief, and affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of Plaintiffs’ legal malpractice claim against Defendants.The trial court dismissed Plaintiffs’ legal malpractice action against Plaintiff’s defense attorneys. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that a criminal defendant who has been convicted at trial and whose conviction has not been overturned on appeal or through other post-conviction proceedings may not bring a legal malpractice action against his defense attorneys for alleged negligence occurring during the representation. The Court of Appeals’ opinion was based on the Exoneration Rule, which the court had previously applied. The Supreme Court granted discretionary review to consider the merits of the rule, adopted the rule, and affirmed, holding that because Plaintiff failed to allege that he had been exonerated of his convictions through post-conviction proceedings, the trial court did not err in dismissing his legal malpractice action without prejudice. View "Lawrence v. Bingham, Greenebaum, Doll, LLP" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the holdings of the circuit court and court of appeals determining that public defenders, as employees of the Department of Public Advocacy (DPA), a statutorily-created agency of the Commonwealth, are entitled to assert the defense of qualified immunity within the proper context.After he was discharged from custody, Plaintiff filed a malpractice action against his former attorney, alleging that as a result of Defendants negligent advice regarding parole eligibility, Plaintiff had served longer in prison than he expected when entering his guilty plea. The circuit court granted Defendant’s motion to dismiss, finding that Defendant was entitled to qualified official immunity from suit as an employee of the DPA. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) public defenders performing discretionary tasks in good faith and within the scope of their employment are entitled to assert qualified immunity to any negligence claim; and (2) Defendant was entitled to the defense of qualified immunity under the circumstances of this case. View "Jacobi v. Holbert" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment of the court of appeals reversing the judgment of the trial court in this action arising from a construction dispute.Two subcontractors - the steel fabricator and the steel erector and installer - on a condominium project brought suit against the project owner, developer, and general contractor after the subcontractors proceeded with extra work outside the scope of the original bid documents but were never paid for either that work or the retainage amount owed under the steel fabricator’s contract with the general contractor. The circuit court entered judgment in favor of Plaintiff for the cost of the extra work and unpaid retainage. The general contractor prevailed on its indemnification cross-claim against the other two defendants and on the negligence cross-claim asserted against it by the other two defendants. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court held that the court of appeals (1) erred by reversing the trial court’s judgment against the owner for unjust enrichment; (2) properly reversed the trial court’s judgment against the general contractor for breach of contract; and (3) properly found that the trial court should have instructed the jury on the owner and developer’s breach of contract claim but erred in finding the negligence instruction deficient. View "Superior Steel, Inc. v. Ascent at Roebling’s Bridge, LLC" on Justia Law