Justia Professional Malpractice & Ethics Opinion Summaries

Ricky Ullman was convicted on three counts of distribution of a matter portraying a sexual performance by a minor and of being a second-degree persistent felony offender. He was sentenced to twelve years, probated for five years, with several conditions including completion of a community-based sex offender treatment program (SOTP). The court later revoked his probation due to his failure to complete the SOTP, among other violations. Nearly two years after his probation was revoked, Ullman filed a motion challenging the revocation order, arguing that he could not be legally required to complete the SOTP. The circuit court granted him relief and vacated its revocation order, a decision affirmed by the Court of Appeals.The Supreme Court of Kentucky reversed the lower courts' decisions, holding that Ullman’s challenge to the condition that he complete the SOTP was untimely and reinstated the circuit court’s revocation order. The court also held that a sentencing court may impose SOTP as a condition of probation for defendants who have not been convicted of a “sex crime” as defined by KRS 17.500. The court declined to address Ullman’s argument that the circuit court’s revocation order failed to comply with KRS 439.3106, as it was not properly preserved for review. However, the court agreed to remand the case for consideration of Ullman’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. View "COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY V. ULLMAN" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court of Kentucky has removed Joseph “JS” Flynn from his position as Pulaski Circuit Court Clerk following allegations of inappropriate workplace behavior. Flynn was appointed in 2016 and elected in 2018. In March 2022, a complaint was lodged against Flynn by a former employee, alleging several incidents of inappropriate behavior. Flynn admitted to having a brief sexual relationship with the complainant, his subordinate, in 2021, which he did not report, and to physically poking and verbally abusing his employees.Other allegations against Flynn included pulling the complainant into a car back seat, forcefully kissing her, and exposing himself. Flynn denied these allegations, claiming physical impossibility due to two surgically inserted rods in his back. Furthermore, the complainant alleged that Flynn would regularly touch her inappropriately and put his hand up her dress. Another employee corroborated many of these allegations.Based on the evidence provided during a three-day hearing, the Supreme Court of Kentucky concluded that Flynn had created a hostile work environment and engaged in quid pro quo harassment. The Court noted that Flynn failed to perform his duties with courtesy and respect, thereby tarnishing the judiciary's reputation. As a result, Flynn was removed from his position, and the Office of the Pulaski Circuit Court Clerk was declared vacant. Flynn was ordered to pay the costs of the proceedings. View "IN RE: FLYNN, PULASKI CIRCUIT COURT CLERK" on Justia Law

In this case, the Supreme Court of Kentucky reviewed a decision by the Court of Appeals that had remanded a case back to the Fayette Circuit Court over the perception of a jurisdictional error. The original plaintiff, Timothy Poole, had filed a lawsuit against Valetta Browne, Executive Director of the Kentucky Office of Bar Admissions (KYOBA), alleging she had negligently performed her duties and caused him damages. This allegation came after Poole was erroneously informed that he had passed the bar exam, only to be told three days later that he had not due to a data entry error. Browne had filed a motion to dismiss the case based on the Supreme Court's exclusive jurisdiction over the practice of law and her own immunity from Poole's claim.The Supreme Court of Kentucky reversed the Court of Appeals' decision and affirmed the trial court's dismissal of Poole's complaint, though on different grounds. The Supreme Court held that the Court of Appeals had failed to adequately consider the Supreme Court's full authority over bar admissions. The court also recognized that individuals who serve in a judicial capacity, such as Browne, are immune from civil liability for conduct and communications occurring in the performance of their duties. The court further clarified that Browne's actions, which Poole complained of, were the functional equivalent of judicial duties, thereby granting Browne absolute immunity. View "BROWNE V. POOLE" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court granting Defendant's motion to dismiss the underlying complaint filed by Port of Louisville for defamation and professional malfeasance, holding that Port of Louisville had no legally recognized relationship with R. Wayne Stratton, CPA and Jones, Nale & Mattingly PLC (collectively, Stratton), and therefore, Stratton did not owe the Port of Louisville any duty.Louisville and Jefferson County Riverport Authority filed a lawsuit seeking to terminate Port of Louisville's lease based on allegations that Port of Louisville breached the parties' lease The action was stayed while the claims were referred to an arbitrator, who found that Port of Louisville had not breached the lease. Based on what occurred during the arbitration the Port of Louisville brought a complaint against Stratton for defamation and professional malfeasance. The trial court granted Stratton's motion to dismiss, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Port of Louisville had no legally recognized relationship with Stratton that would cause Stratton to owe it a duty. View "New Albany Main Street Properties, LLC v. R. Wayne Stratton, CPA" on Justia Law

In this professional malpractice action, the Supreme Court overruled Alagia, Day, Trautwein & Smith v. Broadbent, 882 S.W.2d 121 (Ky. 1994), and its progeny insofar as they hold that, for a non-litigation legal malpractice claim, a claimant's damages are not irrevocable and non-speculative until the claimant knows the exact dollar amount of damages he or she incurred because of the malpractice, holding that Broadbent was wrongly decided.Plaintiff filed the underlying professional malpractice claim against Defendants for negligently providing her poor legal advice regarding a business she co-owned. The trial judge granted summary judgment for Defendants on the ground that Plaintiff's legal harm did not become "irrevocable and non-speculative" sufficient to trigger Ky. Rev. Code 413.245 until July 2017, and therefore, Plaintiff's complaint was time-barred. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed on slightly different grounds, holding (1) because Broadbent has led to inconsistencies in jurisprudence regarding when damages are considered irrevocable and non-speculative for a professional malpractice claim, Broadbent and its progeny are overruled; and (2) for a non-litigation legal malpractice claim, a claimant's damages are considered irrevocable and non-speculative when the claimant is reasonably certain that damages will indeed flow from the defendant's negligent act. View "Wolfe v. Kimmel" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the court of appeals denying a motion for writs of prohibition and mandamus, holding that there was no error.In the underlying medical negligence action, Petitioners filed a petition seeking a writ of prohibition in the court of appeals to prohibit the enforcement of a circuit court order directing them to provide Norton Healthcare with nine years of Facebook data. Alternatively, Petitioners sought a writ of mandamus directing the circuit court to enter a more constrained discovery order. The court of appeals denied the motion for writs of prohibition and mandamus. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Petitioners' series of general objections were without merit, and therefore, the court of appeals did not err in denying the writ. View "Leslie-Johnson v. Hon. Audra Eckerle" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals affirming the circuit court's judgment in favor of Defendants in this suit against healthcare providers seeking damages for alleged breach of duties, holding that there was no error.Plaintiff sued Baptist Healthcare System, Inc., Apogee Medical Group Kentucky, PSC and Subhose Bathing, M.D. alleging that Defendants breached their standards of care for by prescribing two antibiotics known to be linked to arrhythmias and cardiac arrest when taken by patients with low potassium. After a trial, the jury found that neither defendant had breached their standard of care. The court of appeals affirmed. On appeal to the Supreme Court, Plaintiff claimed eight errors in the proceedings below. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that there was no prejudicial error in this case. View "Kentucky Guardianship Administrators, LLC v. Baptist Health System, Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals that Ky. Rev. Stat. 413.245, the one-year statute of limitations applicable to the rendering of professional services, does not apply to claims against attorneys when malice is alleged, holding that, regardless of whether malice is alleged, claims arising from an act or omission in the rendering of, or failing to render, professional services are governed by section 413.245.Plaintiff filed a complaint against a law firm and three of its attorneys based upon their allegedly wrongful acts undertaken on behalf of the firm's clients. The circuit court dismissed all claims either for failure to state a claim or for failure to timely file under the applicable statute of limitations. The court of appeals reversed as to the slander of title, civil conspiracy, and Ky. Rev. Stat. 434.155 violation claims, finding that section 413.245 would not time bar the claims if malice were proven. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that the court of appeals erred in concluding that section 413.245 does not apply to claims against attorneys when malice is alleged. View "Seiller Waterman, LLC v. RLB Properties, Ltd." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court remanded this matter to the circuit court with directions to reinstate a default judgment granted to Bingham Greenebaum Doll, LLP and J. Richard Kiefer (collectively, Bingham) against Meredith Lawrence on its counterclaim to enforce a promissory note made by Lawrence in partial payment of attorney’s fees owed by Lawrence to Bingham, holding that the trial court erred in setting aside the default judgment and that the Court of Appeals erred in affirming that order.Specifically, the Court held that because Bingham’s counterclaim was a compulsory counterclaim to Lawrence’s action against Bingham for professional negligence and because the complaint called into question the validity of the promissory note at issue, Bingham’s counterclaim was justiciable even though it was filed three an a half months prior to the promissory note’s due date. View "Bingham Greenebaum Doll, LLP v. Lawrence" on Justia Law

In this fraud and professional negligence case the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals that a $80 million punitive damage award was unreasonable and reinstated the trial court’s award, otherwise affirming the appellate court’s judgment, holding that the $80 million award was not grossly excessive and was constitutionally acceptable.Plaintiffs participated in a tax shelter marketed by Defendant, their accounting firm. After the IRS disallowed the tax shelter, Plaintiffs settled with the IRS, paying a total of $20 million for back taxes, interest and penalties and amounts paid to Defendant for fees. Plaintiffs then commenced this action to recoup the $20 million. The trial court found Defendant liable for fraud and gross professional negligence and awarded $20 million in compensatory damages and $80 million in punitive damages. The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment on liability and compensatory damages but reduced the punitive damage award to equal the compensatory damage award. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the Court of Appeals’ decision that Defendant was liable for fraudulent conduct and the compensatory damage award; but (2) reversed the remittitur and reinstated the trial court’s punitive damage award, holding that the facts supported an $80 million punitive damage assessment and that an award of that magnitude was constitutionally acceptable. View "Yung v. Grant Thornton, LLP" on Justia Law