Justia Professional Malpractice & Ethics Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Kansas Supreme Court
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In 2004, Jason Mashaney was convicted by a jury of aggravated criminal sodomy and aggravated indecent liberties with a child, involving his then-five-year-old daughter. He was sentenced to 442 months in prison. The Kansas Court of Appeals affirmed his conviction. In 2008, Mashaney filed a motion arguing ineffective assistance of counsel, which led to a reversal and remand for a full evidentiary hearing. The district court found substantial prejudice from ineffective representation, vacated the 2004 convictions, and scheduled a new trial. Subsequently, Mashaney entered an Alford plea to amended charges of attempted aggravated battery and aggravated endangerment of a child, resulting in a 72-month sentence and his release for time served.The Sedgwick District Court awarded Mashaney nearly $414,595 in damages for wrongful conviction and imprisonment under K.S.A. 2023 Supp. 60-5004. The court concluded that the original charges were "effectively dismissed" when the State amended them to nonsexual charges involving the same victim. The district court found that Mashaney met the statutory elements for compensation, including that his judgment of conviction was vacated and the charges were dismissed. The court calculated the damages based on the duration of wrongful imprisonment and reduced the award by the amount received from a legal malpractice settlement.The Kansas Supreme Court reviewed the case and reversed the district court's judgment. The Supreme Court held that the phrase "the charges were dismissed" in K.S.A. 2023 Supp. 60-5004(c)(1)(B) means both terminating the criminal accusation and relieving the defendant of criminal liability. The court found that the original charges against Mashaney were not dismissed but amended, and he incurred criminal liability for the amended charges. Therefore, Mashaney did not meet the statutory requirement that the charges were dismissed, and his claim for wrongful conviction and imprisonment failed. View "In re Wrongful Conviction of Mashaney" on Justia Law

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On the evening of February 11, 2018, Deizmond C. Peters and three accomplices allegedly committed a series of crimes at a Wichita home, resulting in the death of Donte Devore. The group, armed with handguns, entered the home after assaulting Devore on the porch. During an altercation inside, Devore was shot and killed. Peters was later charged with first-degree felony murder, aggravated robbery, aggravated burglary, criminal possession of a weapon, and four counts of aggravated assault.The Sedgwick District Court held a jury trial where Peters was convicted on all charges. Peters filed a motion for a new trial, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel, which the court denied. He was sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole for 618 months plus an additional 332 months. Peters appealed his convictions, raising several claims of trial and sentencing errors.The Kansas Supreme Court reviewed the case and found merit in two of Peters' arguments. First, the court agreed that the evidence did not support his conviction for criminal possession of a weapon due to an error in the stipulation used to prove this charge. Second, the court noted that the sentencing journal entry of judgment improperly omitted Peters' jail credit award of 1,437 days. The court affirmed the remaining convictions, finding no error in the jury selection process, prosecutorial conduct, jury instructions, or the cumulative error doctrine. The court also upheld the method of determining Peters' criminal history under the Kansas Criminal Sentencing Guidelines, rejecting his constitutional challenge.The Kansas Supreme Court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded the case with directions to vacate Peters' sentence for criminal possession of a weapon, resentence him without the reversed conviction, and issue a nunc pro tunc order correcting the sentencing journal entry to include the jail credit award. View "State v. Peters" on Justia Law

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Larry D. Huggins III was convicted of felony murder, attempted aggravated robbery, aggravated burglary, and conspiracy to commit aggravated robbery following a series of events that led to the deaths of two young men. Huggins and his accomplices planned to rob O.H., a minor who sold marijuana, but the plan went awry, resulting in a shootout. Huggins was injured and later arrested. At trial, Huggins testified, denying any intent to rob and claiming he was merely trying to buy marijuana.The Shawnee District Court found Huggins guilty on all counts. He was sentenced to a hard 25 life sentence for felony murder, with additional consecutive sentences for the other charges, totaling a minimum of 25 years plus 103 months. Huggins was also ordered to pay $2,500 in attorney fees.The Kansas Supreme Court reviewed several issues on appeal. Huggins argued that the jury instructions were erroneous because they did not match the charging document, which listed two victims for the attempted aggravated robbery. The court found the instructions legally appropriate as they included all statutory elements of the crime. Huggins also claimed insufficient evidence for his convictions, but the court held that the State did not need to prove he intended to rob both victims named in the charging document.Huggins challenged the voluntariness of his statements to police, arguing he was under the influence of medication and fatigued. The court found his statements voluntary, noting he was coherent and calm during the interview. Huggins also contested the admissibility of Facebook messages obtained via a search warrant, but the court ruled he failed to preserve this issue for appeal.The court found no prosecutorial error in the prosecutor's comments during closing arguments and rejected Huggins' claim of cumulative error. However, the court vacated the imposition of attorney fees, remanding the case for reconsideration of Huggins' ability to pay. The Kansas Supreme Court affirmed the convictions but vacated and remanded the fee imposition. View "State v. Huggins" on Justia Law

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June R. Crow-Johnson, an attorney admitted to practice law in Kansas in 1990, faced disciplinary proceedings for multiple violations of the Kansas Rules of Professional Conduct (KRPC) and Supreme Court Rules. Crow-Johnson was appointed as trustee of a trust in 2019 and failed to perform her fiduciary duties, including failing to communicate with beneficiaries, safeguard trust property, and file necessary tax returns. Additionally, she misrepresented her actions to the court and failed to cooperate with disciplinary investigations. Crow-Johnson also neglected to file tax returns for the Topeka Bar Association (TBA) and misled them about the status of these filings.The Kansas Board for Discipline of Attorneys conducted an evidentiary hearing and found that Crow-Johnson violated several KRPC rules, including diligence, communication, safekeeping property, candor toward the tribunal, and misconduct prejudicial to the administration of justice. The Board recommended disbarment based on these findings.The Supreme Court of Kansas reviewed the case and found clear and convincing evidence supporting the Board's findings. The court noted Crow-Johnson's failure to appear at oral arguments and her lack of cooperation throughout the disciplinary process. The court agreed with the Board's recommendation and ordered Crow-Johnson's disbarment, effective immediately. The court also ordered her name to be stricken from the roll of attorneys licensed to practice law in Kansas and assessed the costs of the proceedings to her. View "In re Crow-Johnson" on Justia Law

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Grover D. James was convicted of first-degree premeditated murder and criminal possession of a firearm for a 2015 incident where he fatally shot Leon McClennon at a birthday party in Wichita. Surveillance footage showed James entering a store basement with McClennon and others, and later walking past McClennon's collapsed body. James admitted to firing two shots but claimed he did not intend to hit anyone. Witnesses testified that the shooting was deliberate, and the jury found James guilty, sentencing him to a hard 50 life sentence for murder and a concurrent 21-month sentence for firearm possession.James filed multiple petitions for relief in the Sedgwick District Court, including claims of newly discovered evidence and ineffective assistance of counsel. He argued that an affidavit from a witness, Rance Kindred, recanting his statements to police warranted a new trial. The district court denied these petitions, finding that the evidence could have been produced at trial and was unlikely to change the outcome. James also claimed ineffective assistance of both trial and appellate counsel, arguing that his attorneys failed to protect his speedy trial rights and did not adequately challenge continuances. The district court denied these claims without an evidentiary hearing.The Kansas Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decisions. The court held that James did not meet the burden of showing that the newly discovered evidence could not have been produced at trial or that it would likely result in a different outcome. The court also found no merit in James' ineffective assistance claims, noting that his speedy trial rights were not violated and that his appellate counsel's performance was not deficient. The court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying James' motions and affirmed the denial of relief. View "State v. James" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals remanding this case with instructions to enter judgment as a matter of law in favor of the Trust Company of Kansas (TCK) and reverse the jury's verdict finding TCK liable for negligent training, holding that the trial court's jury instructions were erroneous and that, therefore, the case must be remanded for a new trial on proper instructions.Marilyn Parsons sued TCK and its employee, Jon King, asserting various theories of liability. After a trial, the jury found JCK liable for negligent training and King liable for breach of fiduciary duty. The court of appeals reversed as to TCK, finding the evidence insufficient. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the district court's instructions failed to present the jury with an accurate statement of negligence law and improperly separated Parsons' negligence claim against TCK into two causes of action; and (2) the legal errors affected the verdict. View "Reardon v. King" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court granting Defendants' motions to dismiss Plaintiff's petition alleging that Defendants - medical providers and facilities - committed negligence and medical malpractice resulting in a patient's wrongful death, holding that Plaintiff failed to meet the evidentiary standard required when responding to a motion to dismiss with facts outside the pleadings.In dismissing Plaintiff's petition, the district court found that the petition was filed one day after the statute of limitations had expired. On appeal, Plaintiff argued that her attorney electronically submitted the petition for filing before the statute of limitations ran and promptly responded when the petition was returned because of an electronic filing issue. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that no evidence in the record supported Plaintiff's factual assertion that her counsel timely submitted the same petition as the one eventually file stamped by the clerk. Therefore, the Court could not reach the substance of Plaintiff's argument that a document is filed for purposes of the statute of limitations when uploaded to the electronic filing system rather than when the clerk of court accepts and file stamps it. View "Lambert v. Peterson" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court held that summary judgment was improperly granted to a title company on negligence and breach of fiduciary duty claims that arose out of the company’s omission of a reserved mineral interest in a deed and its handling of a later conveyance.In granting summary judgment, the district court determined that the relevant statute of limitations barred the claims. A court of appeals panel reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) as to the negligence claim, a genuine issue of material fact existed as to when the cause of action accrued, and the case must therefore be remanded for further proceedings; and (2) the breach of fiduciary duty claim was not excusable from further litigation because of the statute of limitations, as the claim was brought well within the allowable period. View "LCL, LLC v. Falen" on Justia Law

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The Kansas State Board of Healing Arts (Board) filed a formal disciplinary action against Dr. Amir Friedman that resulted in an order of the Board revoking Friedman's license to practice medicine and surgery in the state. The district court upheld the Board's order. Friedman appealed, raising several issues, including the question of whether the Board had jurisdiction to initiate a revocation proceeding after Friedman's license had expired. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the Board had jurisdiction to revoke Friedman's license because Friedman was practicing medicine under the authority of a license issued by the Board when he committed the misconduct at issue in the revocation proceeding; and (2) substantial evidence supported the administrative hearing officer's initial order and the Board's final order. View "Friedman v. State Bd. of Healing Arts" on Justia Law

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This case arose as an interpleader action to settle the rights to one-half of a brokerage commission resulting from a residential real estate transaction. Reece & Nicholas Realtors, Inc. (RAN), the listing broker, refused to split the brokerage commission with Patrick McGrath, who acted as the broker for the buyer. McGrath was a licensed Kansas attorney but was not licensed under the Kansas Real Estate Brokers' and Salespersons' License Act (KREBSLA). RAN contended it was statutorily prohibited from paying a commission to any person not licensed under the KREBSLA. McGrath maintained that, as an attorney, he was exempt from the requirements of the KREBSLA. The district court granted RAN's motion for summary judgment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) an attorney is exempt from the provisions of the KREBLA, including the prohibition against splitting a fee with a nonlicensee, only to the extent he or she is performing activities that are encompassed within or incidental to the practice of law; (2) this attorney exemption does not create an exception to the commission-splitting prohibition of KREBSLA; and (3) consequently, an attorney who is not licensed under the KREBSLA cannot share in a real estate brokerage commission. View "Stewart Title of the Midwest v. Reece & Nichols Realtors" on Justia Law