Justia Professional Malpractice & Ethics Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff sued Body Aesthetic and three of its surgeons, claiming that they invaded her privacy and breached the fiduciary duty of confidentiality they owed to her when they gave nude photographic images of her body to a newspaper, which published the images. A jury found in favor of plaintiff on her breach of fiduciary duty claim and awarded her compensatory damages. Plaintiff appealed and requested a new trial, claiming the magistrate judge abused the court's discretion by excluding certain critical evidence that would have likely increased the verdict amount. The court held that the district court abused its discretion in excluding testimony from the newspaper's writer and this abuse of discretion was substantially prejudicial to plaintiff's ability to show defendants' breach of fiduciary duty disregarded her privacy rights and adversely affected her claims for punitive damages. Therefore, the court vacated the district court's judgment on punitive damages and remanded for a new trial as to that issue. View "Doe v. Young, et al." on Justia Law

The issue before the court was whether Defendant John Rogers was "exonerated" when his conviction was reversed and his case remanded for trial, or on the day his indictment was dismissed. Defendant sued the Cape May Public Defender's office for malpractice. The date the case was reversed would subject Defendant's claim to a one-year time bar, but a dismissal would not. One year later, his attorney filed a motion for leave to file a late notice of tort claim, which was denied. The trial judge determined that Defendant's claim accrued in 2007, and because he filed his notice more than one year later, the court concluded it lacked jurisdiction to hear his case. The appellate court affirmed, finding that the late notice must be filed within one year after accrual of a claim; "exoneration" (and therefore accrual) occurred in 2007. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that Defendant was not "exonerated" until the indictment was dismissed with prejudice in 2008. His claim was thus not barred by the one year filing limitation. Nevertheless, because the claim was filed ten days beyond the ninety-day limit, the Court remanded the case for further proceedings to determine whether the "extraordinary circumstances" as defined by the governing statute was satisfied. View "Rogers v. Cape May County Office of the Public Defender" on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued defendants under Title VII, alleging claims of racial harassment and constructive discharge. Plaintiff subsequently appealed the district court's dismissal of his complaint based on a finding that plaintiff committed perjury and the district court's grant of defendants' motion for sanctions. Plaintiff argued that a less severe sanction was more appropriate and that the district court should have held an evidentiary hearing to allow plaintiff to explain his conflicting testimony. Plaintiff's counsel, who was separately sanctioned, also appealed the denial of his motion for recusal of the magistrate judge. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in deciding to dismiss plaintiff's complaint with prejudice where plaintiff plainly committed perjury; plaintiff's argument that the district court failed to hold a hearing was meritless where he made no effort to explain why he and his attorney failed to show at the hearing held by the district court to address objections to the magistrate judge's report; and the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying counsel's motion for recusal where a reasonable person would not question the magistrate judge's impartiality in this case. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Brown v. Oil States Skagit Smatco, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs sought to reopen a judgment entered in 2001 after the district judge that entered judgment for defendants in plaintiffs' person injury case was impeached and removed from office. Plaintiffs filed what they termed an independent action in equity on grounds that the judgment was procured by fraud involving the district judge. A new district judge dismissed the suit as barred by the doctrine of res judicata. The court reversed and remanded after applying a five-element analysis of an independent action in equity. View "Turner, et al. v. Pleasant, et al." on Justia Law

Defendants Springhill Hospitals, Inc., Dennis Rushing, Ashley Flemming and Janel Ostriehmerer appealed a judgment entered in favor of Plaintiff Dimitrios Critopoulos. Plaintiff was admitted to the hospital for a heart catheterization. While in the hospital's cardiac-intervention unit, Defendant Rushing noticed discoloration and blisters on Plaintiff's neck and spine. Nineteen days after he was admitted for cardiac care, Plaintiff was released from the hospital. Plaintiff was subsequently admitted to a different infirmary and treated for the discoloration and blisters, which were found to be ulcers. He filed a medical-malpractice action against Defendants for failing to treat the ulcers when he was under their care for the catheterization. Defendants alleged on appeal to the Supreme Court that errors at trial warranted a reversal of the outcome. The Supreme Court reviewed the trial court record and applicable authority, and concluded that the trial court exceeded its discretion when it ruled in favor of Plaintiff. The Court reversed the trial court's judgment and remanded the case for the entry of a judgment as a matter of law in favor of Defendants. View "Springhill Hospitals, Inc. v. Critopoulos " on Justia Law

Plaintiff Celeste Puppolo, executor of the Estate of Eva Puppolo, appealed a jury verdict in favor of Defendant Donovan & O'Connor, LLC stemming from a legal malpractice action. Plaintiff claimed that the trial court erred in denying a motion to withdraw her counsel, that she was denied a fair trial when the court allowed Defendant’s attorney to testify to the merits of the underlying medical malpractice action, and that the trial court improperly admitted expert testimony that exceeded the scope of the defendant’s expert disclosure. Plaintiff's was unpersuaded by the results of investigations into the death of her aunt Eva, and consulted with Defendant about bringing a wrongful death and survivorship claim against the aunt's nursing home and attending physicians. In light of the autopsy report, and the conclusions of the police, Defendant declined to take the case. Defendant told Plaintiff that the limitations period for the survival action began to accrue when she was appointed executor of the estate. Defendant conceded that this statement was incorrect and that the limitations period had actually begun to accrue two months earlier, when the original executor was appointed. Defendant also conceded that it failed to specifically notify Plaintiff of the two year limitations period for the wrongful death action. Plaintiff filed a complaint against the home and physicians through another attorney. Both claims were dismissed on summary judgment as time-barred. Plaintiff subsequently filed suit against Defendant, claiming that her reliance on its legal advice deprived her of the opportunity to pursue the wrongful death and survivorship claims for her aunt's death. Upon review, the Supreme Court found the trial court did not abuse its discretion in its decisions in Plaintiff's case. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the jury verdict against Plaintiff. View "Puppolo v. Donovan & O'Connor, LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Darrell Kasberg farmed piece of property leased from the Wheelers. The Wheelers agreed to loan Plaintiff money, using farmland he owned as collateral. When disagreements arose, the Wheelers threatened to evict Plaintiff from both his land and the leased land. On the day of the eviction trial, Plaintiff told his lawyer from Defendant firm Davis Wright Tremaine, LLP that he would be willing to give up his right to repurchase the leased farmland if the Wheelers would remove a crop lien placed on the land in time for him to meet a planting deadline. Plaintiff's lawyer met with the Wheelers' lawyer and they negotiated an oral settlement agreement. Plaintiff was not present at that meeting. The agreement required (amongst other things) that Plaintiff relinquish any interest or claim of interest in, and surrender possession of his collateral farmland. In exchange, the Wheelers agreed to dismiss their breach of contract action and to remove the lien. Plaintiff would later learn and inform his lawyer that the Wheelers had not removed the lien. This resulted in Plaintiff missing the planting deadline, and he lost an opportunity to receive both money from the sale of the crop and related government subsidies. Plaintiff wished to file an suit against the Wheelers for their handling of the crop lien, and approached his lawyer to handle the case. Though his lawyer lead Plaintiff to believe he would be successful in pursuit of the Wheelers, the lawyer had in reality given bad advice with regard to the statute of limitations that governed Plaintiff's suit. Plaintiff then initiated suit against his former lawyer and Defendant firm, alleging legal malpractice in handling the Wheeler lien dispute. The trial court decided that the facts did not present a genuine issue as to whether Plaintiff knew or should have known before he filed his action, that Defendant had negligently negotiated the oral settlement agreement. The court concluded that Plaintiff's action was thus time-barred. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded Plaintiff proffered evidence from which a jury could reasonably find that he did not have actual knowledge that his attorney's acts or omissions were a cause of his damages. As such, the Court reversed the trial court's holding and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Kaseberg v. Davis Wright Tremaine, LLP" on Justia Law

At issue before the Supreme Court was an order of the district court which held that the statute making peer review records privileged applied to a lawsuit brought by a doctor who claimed that a hospital acted in bad faith by refusing to renew a his attending privileges. After a series of reviews of Physician Petitioner Joseph Verska, M.D.'s (Physician) practice initiated in 2004 by St. Alphonsus Regional Medical Center (Hospital) and again in 2006 and 2007, Physician requested a hearing before a Fair Hearing Panel in 2008. In 2009, Physician and the Spine Institute of Idaho (a professional corporation he created) sued the Hospital and two of its doctors (Defendants) alleging that Defendants conspired to wrongfully harm them, intentionally and/or negligently interfered with their economic advantage, interfered with Physician’s prospective contractual relations and business expectations, defamed them, and intentionally and/or negligently inflicted emotional distress upon Physician. In addition to damages, Plaintiffs sought an injunction requiring Hospital to restore Physician’s privileges. During this litigation, Plaintiffs initiated discovery related to the process, activities, and decisions that led to Hospital’s decision to deny Physician’s application to be reappointed to the medical staff and to have his privileges renewed. Hospital objected on the ground that such information was protected by the peer review privilege. Plaintiffs filed a motion seeking to compel discovery, and Defendants sought a motion for a protective order. The district court denied the motion to compel and granted the protective order. The Supreme Court found the peer review statute unambiguous: "the statute states that 'all peer review records shall be confidential and privileged'" not subject to subpoena or discovery proceedings or be admitted as evidence. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the district court's denial of Physician's motion to compel the records' discovery. View "Verska v. St. Alphonsus Regional Med. Ctr." on Justia Law

Plaintiff Terrance White appealed a superior court's order in his wrongful death action that granted summary judgment to Defendant Fletcher Allen Health Care, Inc. This case arose from the suicide of Plaintiff's fourteen-year-old daughter. Plaintiff sued Defendant, which employed a psychiatrist who was briefly involved with the decedent's case through a telepsychiatry research study. Plaintiff argued that summary judgment was improperly granted on the issue of the duty owed to decedent by the psychiatrist. Ultimately, the trial court found that the psychiatrist's contact with decedent was "so minimal as to not establish a physician-patient relationship," and consequently found that no duty existed at the time of decedent's death. Even assuming that a doctor-patient relationship was established, the court concluded that it was terminated following the video-conference and, thus, any duty was extinguished by termination of the relationship and no duty existed at the time of decedent's death. The court thus granted defendant's summary judgment motion. Plaintiff argued that the court erred in finding that the doctor owed no duty to decedent. They maintained that the doctor had a duty to exercise reasonable care to protect decedent from the danger she posed to herself, and that the doctor did not effectively terminate the doctor-patient relationship prior to decedent's death. Upon review, the Supreme Court agreed with Plaintiff and thus reversed the trial court's decision and remanded the case for additional proceedings. View "White v. Harris" on Justia Law

The Bank of Commerce (Bank) brought an action against SouthGroup Insurance and Financial Services, LLC (SouthGroup) and Norman White, an agent of SouthGroup, for negligent misrepresentations made by White regarding the type of liability insurance coverage they would need to purchase. The trial court granted summary judgment for SouthGroup and White on two grounds: (1) that the Bank’s claims are barred by the statute of limitations; and (2) that the damages sought by the Bank constituted a voluntary payment which may not be recovered under Mississippi’s voluntary payment doctrine. The Bank appealed the trial court’s decision. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the three-year statute of limitations began to run when the Bank first received notice that it did not have entity coverage on January 18, 2005. When the Bank filed its claim against Defendants on July 17, 2008, the statute of limitations already had run, therefore barring the Bank’s claims against them. The Court affirmed the trial court's grant of summary judgment dismissing the Bank's case. View "Bank of Commerce v. Southgroup Insurance & Financial Services, LLC" on Justia Law