Justia Professional Malpractice & Ethics Opinion Summaries

The suit arose from Plaintiff's visit to the dentist for a routine tooth extraction, which Plaintiff alleged resulted in a broken jaw. The trial court granted Defendants' motions for summary judgment for Plaintiff's failure to comply with N.C. R. Civ. P. 9(j) in proffering her only expert witness. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the expert witness could have been reasonably expected to qualify under N.C. R. Evid. 702 as required by Rule 9(j). The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Plaintiff's proffered expert witness could have been "reasonably expected to qualify as an expert witness" under Rule 702, and therefore, Plaintiff satisfied the preliminary requirements of Rule 9(j). Remanded. View "Moore v. Proper" on Justia Law

A jury returned a verdict in favor of plaintiff on its claim of fraud and breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing against defendants. Defendants' misrepresentations induced plaintiff to settle the asbestos exposure claims of two former employees whom defendants represented in a state-court lawsuit. On appeal, defendants contended that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the instant case under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, and alternatively that the case called for Burford abstention. Defendants also contended that the evidence established their statute-of-limitations and waiver defenses as a matter of law. The court concluded, however, that defendants misconceived the legal authorities relevant to their jurisdiction, abstention, and waiver arguments. Regarding the statute of limitations issue, the court concluded that a reasonable jury could have found for plaintiff. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's judgment. View "Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. Guy, et al." on Justia Law

S&A sued Farms.com alleging that Farms.com violated the Commodity Exchange Act (CEA), 7 U.S.C. 1 et seq., breached its fiduciary duty, committed negligence, and made misrepresentations. The district court granted Farms.com's motion for summary judgment and S&A appealed. The court found that S&A did not sufficiently plead a fraudulent-inducement claim under 7 U.S.C. 6, but only alleged that Farms.com engaged in a fraudulent scheme under 7 U.S.C. 6o(1)(B). The court concluded that the district court did not err by granting Farms.com's motion for summary judgment on S&A's fraud claim where S&A's complaint alleged only a fraudulent scheme, not that Farms.com's failure to register caused it damages. The court also concluded that the district court did not err in granting Farms.com's motion for summary judgment on S&A's breach of fiduciary duty claim where S&A presented no evidence describing a commodity-trading advisor's standard of care or how Farms.com breached that standard of care. View "S & A Farms, Inc. v. Farms.com, Inc., et al." on Justia Law

A jury returned a verdict in favor of plaintiff on its claims of fraud and breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing against defendants where defendants' misrepresentations induced plaintiff to settle the asbestos exposure claims of two of plaintiff's employees whom defendants represented in a state-court lawsuit. On appeal, defendants contended that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the instant case under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, and alternatively that the case called for Burford v. Sun Oil Co. abstention. Defendants also contended that the trial evidence established their statute-of-limitations and waiver defenses as a matter of law. The court held that defendants misconceived the legal authorities relevant to their jurisdiction, abstention, and waiver arguments. Regarding the statute of limitations issue, the court concluded that a reasonable jury could have found for plaintiff. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's judgment. View "Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. Guy, et al." on Justia Law

Defendant Frank A. Louis, Esq. represented Plaintiff Julia Gere in connection with Plaintiff's divorce from Peter Ricker. Pursuant to the property settlement agreement, Plaintiff had a six month window, which ended in October 2000, to decide how she wished to proceed with respect to the parties' ancillary real estate investments. Plaintiff's understanding was that she would retain a one-half interest in those assets unless she affirmatively advised Ricker within six months that she did not wish to do so. One of those assets was Navesink Partners, which owned both the real estate and business operations of a marina. Based on Louis's interpretation of Plaintiff’s wishes after a discussion with her friend, Louis sent a letter dated October 11, 2000, to Ricker's attorney stating, "this will confirm that except for the Marina, Mrs. Ricker wishes to maintain one-half interest in all other properties." Subsequently, a dispute arose in which Ricker maintained that Plaintiff had waived any interest in Navesink Partners, and Plaintiff contended that she did not waive her interest, that she wanted to continue her ownership interest in the marina's real estate, and that she was entitled to fair value for her interest in the marina's business operations. Plaintiff ultimately sued Louis for malpractice over the purported waiver of her interests in the marina property. The issue before the Supreme Court on appeal was whether "Puder v. Buechel" (183 N.J. 428 (2005)) barred Plaintiff's malpractice action against her former attorney and whether that claim was time-barred. The appellate division affirmed the trial court decision that Plaintiff indeed was time barred, and that she voluntarily entered into a settlement agreement regarding the marina property which she testified was "fair and reasonable." Upon review, the Supreme Court found Plaintiff's case was materially distinguishable from "Puder," and that her legal malpractice claim was not barred. View "Gere v. Louis" on Justia Law

An 11-year-old child suffered long-term horrific abuse and, in 2005, was beaten nearly to death by her adoptive mother and stepfather. The child's legal guardian, brought suit against Carson Center and one of its employees, a licensed social worker, alleging that they failed to detect or report signs of ongoing physical abuse. The state court suit led to insurance coverage litigation in federal court. Insurers sought a declaratory judgment that the allegations fell within exclusions to coverage. The First Circuit affirmed entry of declaratory judgment for the insurers. The language of the policy exclusions precludes coverage for abuse that occurs to anyone in the insureds' "care, custody or control." At the time of the abuse the victim was not in the physical custody of the insureds, but had been receiving bi-weekly outpatient therapeutic services from them for 14 months covered by the policies in question. The exclusions are unambiguous. View "Valley Forge Ins. Co. v. Field" on Justia Law

Amy Hamilton, individually and on behalf of her stillborn son, sued Dr. John Blakely Isbell, Dr. Steven Coulter, Dr. Warren Scott, and the Isbell Medical Group (IMG), as well as several fictitiously named defendants, claiming that their negligent and wanton acts had wrongfully caused the death of her son and also caused her to suffer emotional distress. The DeKalb Circuit Court entered a summary judgment in favor of the defendants, holding that a wrongful-death action could not be maintained for the death of an unborn child who died before he was viable. The trial court also held that Hamilton was not in the "zone of danger" and, thus, could not recover damages for emotional distress. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed in part, and affirmed in part. The Court found that in applying "Mack v. Carmack," ([Ms. 1091040, Sept. 9, 2011] _So. 3d_ (Ala. 2011)), the Court concluded that summary judgment, insofar as it held that damages for the wrongful death of a previable unborn child were not recoverable "must be reversed" for reconsideration of the defendants' summary-judgment motions. View "Hamilton v. Scott" on Justia Law

In 2008, Rehab Solutions, PLLC (Rehab) received notice of tax liens assessed against its property. Thereafter, Chad Willis and Renee Willis (collectively, the Owners) employed the Nail McKinney Accounting firm to assess the financial viability of their business. As a result, numerous financial shortcomings of Rehab’s in-house accountant became apparent. When the inspection of Rehab’s finances began, the accountant left work and did not return. Rehab eventually sued the accountant in tort and in contract, seeking the return of one-half of his wages while employed by Rehab, as well as punitive damages. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Rehab and awarded Rehab $133,543.17 in compensatory damages and $50,000 in punitive damages. The accountant appealed the jury’s award, asserting that it was not supported by the evidence and that unjust enrichment was not the proper measure of damages. Additionally, the accountant contended that the trial court erred in finding that Rehab’s claims were not barred by the statute of limitations and for submitting the issue of punitive damages to the jury. After a thorough review of the record, the Supreme Court determined that there was not a viable cause of action against the accountant in this matter. Accordingly, the Court reversed the trial court and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Willis v. Rehab Solutions, PLLC" on Justia Law

Christine Angell filed a complaint against Renald Hallee and the Roman Catholic Bishop of Portland, alleging that Hallee sexually abused her during her childhood while he was a priest. Hallee and the Bishop asserted the statute of limitations as an affirmative defense and moved for judgment on the pleadings. The superior court granted the motions and entered judgment in Hallee's and the Bishop's favor. The Bishop was later dismissed, and Angell appealed. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the superior court, holding that the court erred in imposing on Angell a burden to allege and prove that the statute of limitations was tolled while Hallee was absent from and resided out of state but was potentially amenable to service of process by means other than publication. View "Angell v. Hallee" on Justia Law

SSW Holding filed a complaint against BDO Seidman and other defendants, asserting several causes of action and seeking damages arising from a tax-advantaged investment strategy involving investments in distressed debt that SSW entered into and utilized on its federal tax returns for the 2001-2005 tax years. BDO filed an amended motion to compel arbitration and stay the motion, asserting that it and SSW entered into two consulting agreements that provided for arbitration before the American Arbitration Association. The circuit court denied the motion. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) SSW's claims fell within the scope of the arbitration provisions; and (2) the circuit court erred in finding that the arbitration provisions were unenforceable and invalid due to fraud and procedural and substantive unconscionability. Remanded. View "BDO Seidman, LLP v. SSW Holding Co." on Justia Law