Justia Professional Malpractice & Ethics Opinion Summaries

Hernandez developed Parkinson’s disease, allegedly as the result of his exposure to chemicals at Central Steel, where he worked from 1968 to 1995. From 1995 to 1996, Hernandez was represented by a firm that filed a social security disability claim. From 1999 to 2002, he was represented by Bernstein, Grazian and Volpe, who filed a 1999 workers’ compensation claim, alleging chemical exposure at work. A third law firm was retained in 2004 and filed suit for civil damage recovery, strict product liability and negligence lawsuit against various companies involved in the manufacture and sale of those chemicals; that suit dismissed as time-barred. Hernandez alleged that the Bernstein firm should have advised him that he had other ways to recover beyond seeking workers’ compensation benefits and should have advised that he file a legal malpractice action against the first law firm for its failure to file a product liability suit. In 2009 the circuit court dismissed on grounds of res judicata. The appellate court reversed. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed, finding that the elements of res judicata had not been proven.View "Hernandez v. Pritikin" on Justia Law

After Plaintiff experienced dizziness and difficulty walking, she was admitted into a medical clinic (Clinic) and seen by the on-duty physician (Doctor). Doctor diagnosed Plaintiff with vertigo. Two days later, Plaintiff was unable to move her right arm or leg and was later diagnosed with having suffered a stroke. Defendant subsequently filed a complaint alleging negligence by Doctor and Clinic (collectively, Defendants) for the failure to diagnose a transient stroke. After a jury trial, the trial court entered judgment in favor of Plaintiff in the amount of $1.25 million but denied Plaintiff's motion for prejudgment interest. The court thereafter denied Defendants' motion for a new trial based upon the cumulative effect of Plaintiff's counsel's alleged unprofessional conduct during the trial. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not err in (1) denying Defendants' motion for a new trial, despite Plaintiff's counsel's dissatisfying behavior; and (2) denying the discretionary award of prejudgment interest. View "Wisner v. Laney" on Justia Law

HPD, LLC and TETRA Technologies Inc. entered into an agreement for HPD to supply equipment to be used in TETRA's future facility. The contract contained a provision for binding arbitration. After the construction of the plant was completed, TETRA filed a complaint against HPD, alleging that the equipment designed by HPD did not perform to expectations. TETRA also sought a declaratory judgment that the contract and the embedded arbitration clause were illegal and thus void because HPD performed engineering services without obtaining a certificate of authorization as allegedly required by Ark. Code Ann. 17-30-303. HPD moved to compel arbitration. After a hearing, the circuit court rule in TETRA's favor that it would determine the threshold issues of arbitrability before deciding whether the case must proceed to arbitration. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded for the entry of an order compelling arbitration, holding that the circuit court erred by not honoring the parties' clear expression of intent to arbitrate the existing disputes. View "HPD LLC v. TETRA Techs., Inc." on Justia Law

After Robert Allcock died at a hospital, his mother sued the hospital, the treating doctor, and the doctor's clinic. Allcock failed to designate an expert, and the trial court denied her motion to amend the pretrial order. Still, a jury found for Allcock, but the trial court granted the defendants' motion for a new trial because of a faulty jury instruction. Before the second trial, Allcock again moved to amend the pretrial order. The trial court again denied her motion, and the jury found for the defendants. Because the jury instruction stated an incorrect rule of law; and because Allcock was on sufficient notice of the defendants' expert testimony, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's rulings. View "Allcock v. Bannister" on Justia Law

After the estate of a former resident sued a nursing home for negligent care, the primary insurance carrier hired lawyers to defend the suit. Because the lawyers failed to timely designate an expert witness, the settlement value of the case greatly increased, causing the nursing home's primary carrier to pay its policy limits, and its excess insurance carrier to step in, defend the nursing home, and ultimately settle the suit. The excess carrier sued the law firm for professional negligence, both directly and under a theory of equitable subrogation. The trial court, finding the excess carrier and the lawyers had no direct attorney-client relationship, granted the law firm's motion to dismiss. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that under the facts of this case, the doctrine of equitable subrogation applied, and the excess carrier could, to the extent of its losses, pursue a claim against the lawyers to the same extent as the insured. Furthermore, the Court held that the excess carrier failed to allege a sufficient factual basis for a direct claim of professional negligence against the law firm. View "Great American E&S Ins. Co. v. Quintairos, Prieto, Wood & Boyer, P.A." on Justia Law

The issue on appeal in this case was one of first impression: whether a medical general practitioner who provides incidental mental health treatment to a patient, with whom he then engages in a sexual affair, may be held to a particularized "specialist duty," applicable to mental health professionals, that prohibits consensual sexual contact with patients, such that the defendant general practitioner may be subject to medical malpractice liability in tort. Upon review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court declined to impose such a duty as a matter of Pennsylvania common law. Accordingly, the Court vacated the Superior Court's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings on any preserved issues remain that were not addressed as a result of the Superior Court's disposition. View "Thierfelder v. Wolfert" on Justia Law

After its property sustained wind damage during Hurricane Katrina, a real-estate developer sued its insurance provider for coverage, and, in the alternative, its insurance agent for professional negligence. The district court decided that the insurance policy covered wind damage, and a jury decided that there had been no "mutual mistake" between the agent and the provider concerning wind coverage. As a consequence, the district court dismissed with prejudice the developer's negligence claim against its agent. The insurance provider appealed, and the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, deciding that the policy did not cover wind damage. On remand, the developer moved under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) to set aside the dismissal of its professional negligence claim against the agent in light of the reversal. The district court granted the motion and resurrected the negligence claim against the agent. The Fifth Circuit affirmed, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in granting the developer Rule 60(b) relief. View "Lowry Dev., LLC v. Groves & Assocs. Ins., Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff was the president and owner of Company. Plaintiff and Company were sued by an employee for sexual harassment, among other claims. Plaintiff retained Law Firm to represent him and Company. The district court entered judgment against Company. The court later granted Company's motion for a new trial, and the parties subsequently settled. Plaintiff was the personal guarantor on the loans and credit lines provided by lenders to Company. After the original jury verdict, banks and lenders refused to continue extending credit to Plaintiff. As a result, Plaintiff's real estate holdings crumbled, causing Plaintiff to lose dozens of commercial and residential properties. Plainiff then sued the attorney who acted as lead defense counsel and Law Firm (collectively, Appellees), contending that Appellees committed a series of negligent errors during their representation. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Appellees and dismissed Plaintiff's claims for legal malpractice and breach of fiduciary duty, holding that Plaintiff failed to show that his loss of net worth was proximately caused by the actions of Appellees. View "Hamilton v. Bangs, McCullen, Butler, Foye & Simmons, LLP" on Justia Law

This case required the Supreme Court to decide whether an airplane manufacturer owed a duty to a noncommercial pilot who, after purchasing an airplane from the manufacturer but failing to receive all of the flight training promised to him as part of that purchase, died when his airplane crashed. The district court found the manufacturer was negligent. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the manufacturer did not have a duty to provide training and that the claims were barred by the educational malpractice doctrine. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the manufacturer did not owe a duty to the pilot, and thus the district court erred in its judgment; and (2) accordingly, the Court did not reach, among other things, the issues of educational malpractice or causation. View "Glorvigen v. Cirrus Design Corp." on Justia Law

In this real estate dispute, some of the defendants filed a motion for sanctions, alleging Defendant brought the action to harass, cause unnecessary delay, and needlessly increase the cost of litigation. The district court ordered sanctions against Plaintiff's counsel for $1,000. The court of appeals affirmed the sanctions, ordering them payable to the jury and witness fund. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and vacated in part the court of appeals, holding (1) the district court did not abuse its discretion in fixing the amount of the sanction at $1,000; (2) the court abused its discretion by ordering the sanction be paid to the jury and witness fund; and (3) given Rule 1.413(1)'s preference of compensating victims, the district court should enter an order requiring Plaintiff's counsel to pay the sanction in equal sums to the defendants who sought the sanction as partial reimbursement of the legal fees they incurred in defending against the unfounded claims brought against them. Remanded. View "Rowedder v. Anderson" on Justia Law