Justia Professional Malpractice & Ethics Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Idaho Supreme Court - Civil
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In this case, the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho upheld a lower court's summary judgment in favor of the defendants, George and Jesse’s Les Schwab Tire Store, Inc., and two of its owners, Bruce and Richard Byram. The plaintiff, Adam Davis, had been employed as an assistant manager at Les Schwab from April 2016 till June 2019. In March 2019, there was a shortage in the cash deposits and surveillance footage showed Davis bending down out of camera view in the area where the cash deposits were kept while he was alone in the store. This led to Davis being arrested and charged with grand theft, and his employment was terminated. Although the charges against Davis were later dropped, he sued the defendants for breach of his employment contract, false arrest, defamation per se, and for knowingly giving a false report to the police. The district court granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment on all of Davis’s claims. The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's decision, finding no genuine issue of material fact that could support Davis’s claims. The court found that Davis was an at-will employee who could be terminated without cause and that there was no evidence to show that the defendants had acted with malice. The court also found that the plaintiff's attorney had violated Rule 11.2 by submitting arguments that were not well grounded in fact, and awarded a portion of the defendants' attorney fees to be paid by the plaintiff's counsel. View "Davis v. George and Jesse's Les Schwab Tire Store, Inc." on Justia Law

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The Idaho Supreme Court ruled in favor of the Idaho State Appellate Public Defender (SAPD) in a case involving the SAPD's statutory duty to arrange for substitute counsel for indigent defendants when a conflict of interest arises. The SAPD filed a direct action against the Fourth Judicial District Court, alleging that the court infringed on the SAPD’s statutory duty to arrange a new attorney for a defendant named Azad Abdullah. The SAPD had identified a conflict of interest in its own office and tried to substitute an attorney from Pennsylvania, but the district court refused the substitution and appointed a new attorney of its own choosing. The Idaho Supreme Court held that the district court had obstructed the SAPD's statutory duty and authority under Idaho Code section 19-5906. The Court ordered the district court's decisions to be vacated, restored the SAPD as attorney of record for the limited purpose of arranging for substitute counsel, and ordered the appointment of a new district judge to preside over Abdullah’s post-conviction proceeding. View "SAPD v. Fourth Judicial District" on Justia Law

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Holly Rich brought a legal malpractice action against her attorneys, Hepworth Holzer, LLP, and E. Craig Daue and Daue Buxbaum, PLLC (“Daue Buxbaum”) (collectively, “Respondents”), regarding their legal representation of Rich in an underlying medical malpractice action against Eastern Idaho Regional Medical Center (“EIRMC”), Dr. John Lassetter (a cardiologist), and Dr. Charles Phillips (an intensivist) (collectively, “EIRMC providers”). In that action, Rich's claims against the EIRMC providers failed because they were filed after the statute of limitations expired. Rich alleged in this action that those claims were not filed on time because of Respondents’ legal malpractice. Both sides filed substantive motions for summary judgment and the district court found that Rich could not prevail because she had “not disclosed any expert [medical] testimony which complies with the requirements of Idaho law for admissibility.” The district court concluded that, lacking evidence to “set out a prima facie case of medical malpractice,” in the underlying case, Rich’s claim against Respondents for legal malpractice failed. Rich appealed. The Idaho Supreme Court found no reversible error and affirmed. View "Rich v. Hepworth Holzer" on Justia Law

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The issue this case presented for the Idaho Supreme Court's review centered on a residence in the Boise foothills that was damaged by a landslide, which ultimately prevented the builder from obtaining a certificate of occupancy. BrunoBuilt, Inc., the general contractor of the project, sued multiple parties, including Erstad Architects, PA, the architectural firm for the project, Andrew Erstad, the principal architect, and Cheryl Pearse, the project manager from Erstad Architects, PA (collectively, Defendants), for professional negligence in connection with work completed for construction of the residence. Defendants successfully moved for summary judgment on the basis that the two-year statute of limitations in Idaho Code section 5-219(4) barred BrunoBuilt’s claim. Two years after the district court issued its memorandum decision and order granting summary judgment, BrunoBuilt moved the district court for reconsideration, citing new evidence and arguments. The district court denied the motion for reconsideration, concluding it was “untimely, lacking in diligence, and improper.” BrunoBuilt then appealed, challenging the decision of the district court on summary judgment and additionally asserting that the court erred in an earlier order deconsolidating the cases with other defendants. Prior to oral argument, Defendants moved the Supreme Court to sanction counsel for BrunoBuilt pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule 11.2 for non-disclosure of material procedural facts in its opening brief. After review, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s decision granting summary judgment against BrunoBuilt, and agreed that the conduct of BrunoBuilt’s attorney on appeal ran afoul of Rule 11.2, and imposed sanctions. View "BrunoBuilt, Inc. v. Erstad Architects, PA" on Justia Law

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BrunoBuilt, Inc., was constructing a custom home on a vacant lot in 2016 when a landslide occurred beneath the Terra Nativa subdivision in the Boise foothills. Following damage to the lot, BrunoBuilt filed a professional negligence suit against numerous engineers and engineering firms involved in the construction of the subdivision, arguing that they failed to identify preexisting landslide conditions and other geological circumstances that made residential development unsafe at this site. In the fall of 2018, BrunoBuilt discovered additional damage to the finished custom home itself. It then brought suit against additional defendants, including Briggs Engineering, Inc., and Erstad Architects. Briggs Engineering moved for summary judgment, which the district court granted. The court concluded that BrunoBuilt’s action was time barred by the two-year statute of limitations under Idaho Code section 5-219(4). BrunoBuilt appealed this decision, arguing that the malpractice claim did not begin to accrue until there was damage to the custom home, rather than just the land. To this the Idaho Supreme Court disagreed with BrunoBuilt’s analysis and affirmed the district court that BrunoBuilt’s claim was time barred. View "Brunobuilt, Inc. v. Briggs Engineering, Inc." on Justia Law

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The Idaho Board of Pharmacy (“Board”) filed an administrative complaint against pharmacist Cindy Chambers, alleging that she dispensed a controlled substance without a valid prescription. Chambers prevailed before the Board and it determined that she was entitled to recover her reasonable attorney fees and costs; however, she failed to comply with the 14-day deadline for requesting her award. When she filed a request almost seven months after the deadline had passed, the Board denied her request upon finding that she failed to show good cause for the late filing. Chambers then sought judicial review from the district court, which dismissed her petition. Chambers then appealed to the Idaho Supreme Court, maintaining that both the Board and the district court erred by applying the wrong legal standard. Finding no reversible error, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed. View "Chambers v. Idaho Board of Pharmacy" on Justia Law

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Janet Heath appealed a district court order and judgment that granted Angela Palmer and Taylor Real Estate’s motion for summary judgment and dismissing her claims for negligence and breach of contract. The events that brought about this case began in the fall of 2017 when Heath began looking to buy a house in Bingham County, Idaho. Heath and Palmer communicated back and forth via emails and text messages, arranging financing through a lender, and discussing property listings. They met to view several listings together, including a property owned by Donald and Shirley Ciccone. With Palmer's help, Heath made a written offer on the Ciccione property. The offer, titled "RE-21 Real Estate Purchase and Sale Agreement," indicated Palmer and Taylor Real Estate were acting as “nonagents” for Heath. Heath also signed an Agency Disclosure Brochure indicating that she was a “customer” of Palmer and Taylor Real Estate. The offer form further stated that Heath would remain a “customer” unless she entered into a written representation agreement. Heath and Palmer never signed such an agreement. The Ciccones made a counter-offer which Heath accepted. The Ciccones gave Palmer a property condition disclosure, which revealed the existence of a shared driveway agreement with a neighboring property owned by Walter and Wilma Wallace. At some point before the closing date, the title company contacted Palmer and informed her that the Driveway Agreement needed to be modified to “run with the land” before it would insure the title. Palmer contacted Mr. Wallace and informed him that Heath was trying to buy the Ciccone property but could not do so without a driveway agreement. The Wallaces and the Ciccones signed a 2018 Driveway Agreement, which was essentially the same as the 1998 Driveway Agreement except that it was “a covenant running with the land” and redefined the shared portion of the driveway. Heath and the Ciccones closed on the property, and the warranty deed and the 2018 Driveway Agreement were recorded with the Bingham County Recorder that afternoon. Heath stated in her declaration that she would not have gone through with the sale if she had known that the driveway easement had been shortened by approximately two-thirds of its original length, effectively cutting off access to the garages on her property and significantly reducing the property’s value. The proceedings in this case began in June 2018 when the Wallaces filed a petition to quiet title against Heath and another individual living in her home. The Wallaces filed their petition after a dispute with Heath regarding the dimensions and use of the shared driveway. Finding that the district court erred in concluding that there was no genuine dispute of material fact regarding whether Palmer and Taylor Real Estate violated the statutory duties owed to Heath as a “customer” under Idaho Code section 54-2086, the Idaho Supreme Court reversed the grant of summary judgment in favor of Palmer and Taylor Real Estate. View "Wallace v. Heath" on Justia Law

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Kirby Vickers filed a grievance letter with Idaho Board of Veterinary Medicine (the Board”) against a veterinarian requesting that they take various disciplinary actions. After an investigation, the Board declined to take any action against the veterinarian. Vickers then filed suit in district court, seeking to compel the Board to hold a hearing. The district court dismissed his suit for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. On appeal, Vickers argued his letter to the Board initiated a contested action for which he was entitled to judicial review. To this, the Idaho Supreme Court disagreed, finding that a private citizen could not initiate a "contested case" with a grievance letter. Vickers points to the language in caselaw: “[t]he filing of a complaint initiates a contested case,”to argue that any public citizen could file a complaint pursuant to Idaho Rule of Administrative Procedure of the Attorney General (“IDAPA”) 04.11.01.240.02 and begin a contested case. However, the Supreme Court found both the Administrative Procedures Act (APA) and the corresponding IDAPA rules, addressed only agency actions. "Vickers cannot apply these rules to his grievance letter, even if it was referred to as a “complaint” in correspondence from the Board, because it is not an agency action under the APA or IDAPA." The Court affirmed the district court's order dismissed this case for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. View "Vickers v. Idaho Bd of Veterinary Medicine" on Justia Law

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Jonathon Frantz appealed a district court’s award of attorney fees entered against him and his clients, jointly and severally, as a sanction for frivolous conduct. This appeal arose from an easement dispute among family members. The land at issue was split into multiple parcels: the Tracy Parcel, the Mathis/Roll Parcel, and the Osborn Parcel. Plaintiffs Brook Tracy and Travis Mathis owned the Tracy Parcel; Plaintiffs Gailord “Cowboy” Mathis, Brook Tracy, Laura Roll, and Rebecca Stafford owned the Mathis/Roll Parcel; and David and Naomi Osborn owned the Osborn Parcel. In 2018, Plaintiffs filed a complaint against the Osborns. Frantz was Plaintiffs’ attorney. Plaintiffs claimed that more than thirty years ago they “constructed/placed a home” on the Tracy Parcel, “constructed/placed a cabin” on the Mathis/Roll Parcel, and “created a driveway” through the Osborn Parcel to access their respective properties. Plaintiffs also claimed that for more than thirty years they had openly and continuously used the driveway over the Osborn Parcel for access to the nearest public right-of-way, Highland Drive, which was the only reasonable way to reach their respective properties. Based on this use, Plaintiffs claimed that they had an easement by necessity, an easement by implication, or a prescriptive easement across the Osborn Parcel along the existing driveway. Accordingly, Plaintiffs sought a judgment from the district court declaring their rights in the driveway. The trial court denied a preliminary injunction for two reasons: (1) “the allegations in the complaint and the motion contain[ed] gross exaggerations, if not falsehoods” and “the credibility of all of the plaintiffs” was questionable; and (2) Plaintiffs could not establish entitlement to the relief demanded because they came to the hearing unprepared to support the easement theories they advanced with any competent evidence. The Osborns moved for attorney fees, leaving it to the trial court's discretion to award Rule 11 sanctions "if the [c]ourt determines that this motion was pursued frivolously." On appeal, Frantz contended the district court abused its discretion in awarding attorney fees against him personally because it: (1) failed to follow the procedural requirements set out in Idaho Code section 12-123; and (2) erroneously found that he engaged in frivolous conduct. After review, the Idaho Supreme Court concluded this matter did not present a justiciable controversy because the judgment was satisfied and Frantz did not preserve his right to appeal pursuant to Idaho Code section 10-1115. Accordingly, the Court dismissed Frantz’s appeal because the issues before the Court were moot. View "Frantz v. Osborn" on Justia Law

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Sharon Walsh retained Swapp Law, PLLC, d/b/a Craig Swapp & Associates ("CS&A") after she was involved in two car accidents in 2013. In the negligence action stemming from the first accident, Walsh followed firm employee Stephen Redd’s advice and settled the case. Walsh then changed representation and, with her new counsel, settled the second case. On March 2, 2017, Walsh filed this action alleging, among other things, that CS&A was negligent in advising her to settle the first case while the second case was still pending and by failing to advise her of an underlying subrogation responsibility in the first case. CS&A moved for summary judgment. It argued that Walsh’s claim was time-barred under Idaho Code section 5-219(4)’s two-year statute of limitations because her malpractice claim began to accrue when she released the first claim. The district court agreed and granted the motion. Walsh timely appeals. Based on its review of the record, the Idaho Supreme Court determined the district court did not err in awarding summary judgment to CS&A. The district court properly determined that Walsh’s claim was time barred under Idaho Code section 5-219 because her cause of action accrued when she signed the release of claims for the First Collision case more than two years prior to her filing the action at hand. Further, the district court properly determined that the fraudulent-concealment provision of Idaho Code section 5-219(4) did not apply because Walsh was put on inquiry of CS&A’s alleged malpractice in June 2015, more than one year prior to filing this action. The district court’s decision granting CS&A’s motion for summary judgment and its final judgment were thus affirmed. View "Walsh v. Swapp Law" on Justia Law