Justia Professional Malpractice & Ethics Opinion Summaries

This case arose when appellant alleged claims of tortuous interference with contract or business expectancy and violation of the Arkansas Deceptive Trade Practices Act (ADTPA), Ark. Code Ann. 4-88-101, et seq. Appellant subsequently sought a temporary retraining order and preliminary injunction after appellee terminated appellant's patient privileges at a residential nursing home. The court held that appellant did not meet the factors in the Dataphase Syst. Inc. v. C.L. Syst., which evaluated whether to issue an injunction. Consequently, the court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion for a preliminary injunction and the judgment was affirmed. View "Roudachevski v. All-American Care Centers, Inc" on Justia Law

This case arose when Pauline Thomas brought her daughter, Jane Doe and four of her grandchildren, including John Doe and R.N.T. to the Emergency Room at the Hennepin County Medical Center and reported her concerns that Jane Doe might have been sexually abused by R.N.T. Appellants brought suit against appellees claiming that the 72-hour hold placed on John Doe, the internal examination of Jane Doe, and the examination of John Doe violated the children's rights under the Fourth Amendment and that the seizure and search of both children violated the Fourteenth Amendment rights of all appellants. At issue was whether the district court properly granted summary judgment in favor of appellees and denied appellants' motion for partial summary judgment on their claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The court rejected appellants' contention that appellees failed to move for summary judgment on all of appellants' claims; that the district court ignored questions of material fact; and that the district court at times used the wrong legal standards when analyzing the facts. The court also held that because it affirmed the district court's adverse grant of summary judgment against appellants, the court did not reach the denial of appellants' partial motion for summary judgment. View "Doe, et al. v. Dr. Al Tsai, M.D., et al." on Justia Law

In a medical malpractice case, alleging failure to diagnose apendicitis, the court gave Civil Jury Instruction 105.01 (2006), which refers to a "reasonably careful," as opposed to a "reasonably well-qualified" (the 2005 instruction) professional. The jury returned a verdict in favor of plaintiffs and the appellate court affirmed. The Illinois Supreme Court held that the jury instruction does not accurately state the law, but affirmed. The 2006 instruction eliminated the distinction between institutional negligence, which can be proven without expert testimony, and professional negligence, which requires expert testimony. The hospital was not prejudiced by the instruction because expert testimony was presented in connection with a vicarious liability claim. The court rejected the hospital's argument that the instruction was confusing and allowed jurors to consider personal knowledge in determining what is reasonable.

The doctor was convicted of conspiring to defraud the government and Medicare fraud (42 U.S.C. 1320a) for accepting a salary from the hospital in return for referring patients and sentenced to 72 months imprisonment followed by two years of supervision and to payment of $497,204 in restitution. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The court did not err in refusing to admit substantive reports from meetings or the minutes of the meetings, although it allowed the government to use the minutes to establish the doctor's non-attendance at meetings. The doctor was allowed to argue that certain reports concerning his services were made and tendered during the meetings. Upholding a jury instruction, the court stated that nothing in the Medicare fraud statute implies that only the primary motivation for remuneration is to be considered and that the conviction is valid even if the payments were, in part, compensation for services. Findings concerning the level of loss supported the sentence.