Justia Professional Malpractice & Ethics Opinion Summaries

The Labairs lost their newborn baby after an early delivery by C-section. The Labairs retained Steve Carey and Carey Law Firm (Carey) to pursue their medical malpractice claim against their obstetrician. More than two and a half years later, Carey filed a complaint against the obstetrician. However, Carey failed to file an application with the Montana Medical Legal Panel (MMLP) before filing a complaint with the district court as required by statute and further failed to file an MMLP application within the three-year statute of limitations applicable to medical malpractice claims. The district court later dismissed the Labairs' medical malpractice case with prejudice as time-barred by the statute of limitations. The Labairs subsequently filed a complaint for legal malpractice against Casey. The district court entered summary judgment for Carey, concluding that Carey's conduct of failing to file the application with the MMLP did not cause the Labairs injury or damages because the Labairs failed to show that the underlying medical malpractice claims would have succeeded but for the error. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding (1) the Labairs' loss of their medical malpractice case was an injury; and (2) the damages associated with that injury remained unproven. View "Labair v. Carey " on Justia Law

Defendants pleaded guilty to defrauding health-care insurers by billing for pain injections that they never administered. Defendants appealed the district court's order that they pay over $43 million in restitution to 32 victims defrauded by the scheme. The court concluded that the record did not support the entire restitution amount recommended and therefore the district court abused its discretion in adopting the unsupported figure. The court held, however, that the district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to apply a restitution credit. Accordingly, the court vacated the order of restitution and remanded for recalculation. As defendants' plea agreements stipulated to a forfeiture money judgment in the same amount as the restitution award, the court also vacated the amount of the forfeiture award and remanded for recalculation. The court further held that the government did not breach the plea agreements with defendants. View "United States v. Sharma" on Justia Law

This petition for writ of certiorari arose out of two pending nursing home malpractice cases alleging abuse and neglect at Bryant Healthcare Center (Bryant). The plaintiffs below served a subpoena on the Arkansas Foundation for Medical Care (AFMC) that demanded the production of all emails between the Arkansas Innovative Performance Program (AIPP) personnel and Bryant administrators. Petitioners, Bryant, AFMC, and others, filed a motion to quash, arguing the information was privileged and federally protected. The circuit court denied the motion to quash. The instant petition for writ of certiorari was then filed with the Supreme Court. The Court denied the petition because the order at issue was a mere discovery order in which an alleged discovery violation occurred and because an appeal would provide an adequate remedy. View "Ark. Found. for Med. Care v. Circuit Court " on Justia Law

Amy Hamilton, individually and on behalf of her stillborn son, sued Dr. John Blakely Isbell, Dr. Steven Coulter, Dr. Warren Scott, and the Isbell Medical Group (IMG), as well as several fictitiously named defendants, claiming that their negligent and wanton acts had wrongfully caused the death of her son and also caused her to suffer emotional distress. The DeKalb Circuit Court entered a summary judgment in favor of the defendants, holding that a wrongful-death action could not be maintained for the death of an unborn child who died before he was viable. The trial court also held that Hamilton was not in the "zone of danger" and, thus, could not recover damages for emotional distress. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed in part, and affirmed in part. The Court found that in applying "Mack v. Carmack," ([Ms. 1091040, Sept. 9, 2011] _So. 3d_ (Ala. 2011)), the Court concluded that summary judgment, insofar as it held that damages for the wrongful death of a previable unborn child were not recoverable "must be reversed" for reconsideration of the defendants' summary-judgment motions. View "Hamilton v. Scott" on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued Body Aesthetic and three of its surgeons, claiming that they invaded her privacy and breached the fiduciary duty of confidentiality they owed to her when they gave nude photographic images of her body to a newspaper, which published the images. A jury found in favor of plaintiff on her breach of fiduciary duty claim and awarded her compensatory damages. Plaintiff appealed and requested a new trial, claiming the magistrate judge abused the court's discretion by excluding certain critical evidence that would have likely increased the verdict amount. The court held that the district court abused its discretion in excluding testimony from the newspaper's writer and this abuse of discretion was substantially prejudicial to plaintiff's ability to show defendants' breach of fiduciary duty disregarded her privacy rights and adversely affected her claims for punitive damages. Therefore, the court vacated the district court's judgment on punitive damages and remanded for a new trial as to that issue. View "Doe v. Young, et al." on Justia Law

This was an action for judicial review of a final decision and order of the board suspending Stephen Chadwick's license to practice dentistry in Massachusetts. Because the court agreed that the United States Supreme Court's decision in Gade v. National Solid Wastes Mgt. Ass'n applied to the disciplinary proceeding, the court concluded that, while the board could mandate compliance with the Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA), 29 U.S.C. 651 et seq., standards in dental practices and sanction dentists for professional misconduct after OSHA determined that a violation had occurred, the board could not interpret, apply, and enforce OSHA standards regarding workplace safety on its own record. The court further concluded that the preemptive effect of OSHA articulated in Gade also barred the board from sanctioning Chadwick based on conduct it found to be violative of Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) guidelines and department regulations, where such action constituted the direct and substantial regulation of occupational safety and health issues for which Federal OSHA standards were in effect. The court further concluded that the board's one finding unrelated to a formal OSHA standard was supported by substantial evidence View "Chadwick v. Board of Registration in Dentistry" on Justia Law

The Board of Physicians sanctioned Petitioner, a medical doctor, upon finding that Petitioner violated several subsections of Md. Code Ann. Health Occ. 14-404 when he falsely indicated on an application for renewal of his medical license that he was not involved in a medical malpractice action. The circuit court and court of special appeals affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) the Board did not err in either its interpretation of Md. Code Regs. 10.32.02.03.C(7)(d) or its application of that regulation to the statement of Petitioner's counsel that Petitioner would be in court on a date proposed to conduct an unrelated case resolution conference; (2) the Board properly decided that Petitioner violated section 14-404(1)(3) by failing to include on his application the pendency of the malpractice action; and (3) the Board did not err in determining that the term "willful" means intentional for purposes of section 14-404, and the record contained substantial evidence that Petitioner willfully made false statements in connection with his involvement in a medical malpractice action in his application for license renewal. View "Kim v. Bd. of Physicians" on Justia Law

At the center of this case was a permissive appeal from the district court's interlocutory entry of a protective order, which held certain documents related to the suspension of Appellant Paul J. Montalbano’s privileges at Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical Center (SARMC) were not discoverable by Montalbano. The interlocutory order came from Dr. Montalbano’s lawsuit filed against SARMC in district court with ten causes of action including breach of fiduciary duties and defamation; this appeal dealt solely with the protective order. In 2009, Appellant filed suit and sought to discover an extensive list of documents "related to the processes, activities, and decisions that ultimately led to the suspension of his privileges." When SARMC asserted a peer review privilege, Appellant filed a motion to compel. SARMC then moved for a protective order. The court granted in part and denied in part the motion to compel. The district court concluded that the materials related to the peer review process were protected: "[t]here can be no discovery of the peer review records nor can any witness be questioned about any information provided to the peer review committees nor the interpretation nor analysis of any evidence submitted as part of this process." Appellant thereafter moved for leave to file a permissive appeal of the court’s interlocutory order. The Supreme Court granted the permissive appeal to review the applicability of I.C. 39-1392b in physician disciplinary proceedings because it posed a question of first impression. The Court found that the applicable peer review statute " cannot be reasonably construed to state that if a physician brings a lawsuit, the privilege is waived in order to permit the physician to use otherwise privileged records. … The physician cannot waive the right of the hospital or anyone else who is entitled to assert it." Accordingly, the Court affirmed the district court's ruling to deny Appellant discovery of the records. View "Montalbano v. St. Alphonsus Regional Med. Ctr. " on Justia Law

The Tennessee Board of Medical Examiners suspended Dr. Joseph Rich's medical license for one year and imposed other conditions after finding that, among other things, the physician had violated Tenn. Code Ann. 63-6-214(b)(1)(4) and (12). The chancery court affirmed the Board's judgment. The court of appeals reversed because the Board failed to articulate the applicable standard of care in its deliberations. The Supreme Court (1) held that the Board was required by Tenn. Code Ann. 63-6-214(g) to articulate the applicable standard of care in its deliberations; (2) vacated the ruling of the trial court to the extent that it affirmed the Board's decision that Rich had violated sections 63-6-214(b)(1)(4) and (12); (3) vacated the judgment of the court of appeals to the extent it reversed the Board's findings that Rich violated sections 63-6-214(b)(1)(4) and (12); and (4) rather than reversing the Board's findings of violations, remanded the matter to the Board with instructions to conduct deliberations based on the existing record and articulate the applicable standard of care as required by the statute. View "Rich v. Tenn. Bd. of Med. Exam'rs" on Justia Law

This case arose when appellant alleged claims of tortuous interference with contract or business expectancy and violation of the Arkansas Deceptive Trade Practices Act (ADTPA), Ark. Code Ann. 4-88-101, et seq. Appellant subsequently sought a temporary retraining order and preliminary injunction after appellee terminated appellant's patient privileges at a residential nursing home. The court held that appellant did not meet the factors in the Dataphase Syst. Inc. v. C.L. Syst., which evaluated whether to issue an injunction. Consequently, the court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion for a preliminary injunction and the judgment was affirmed. View "Roudachevski v. All-American Care Centers, Inc" on Justia Law