Justia Professional Malpractice & Ethics Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed the orders entered by the circuit court granting summary judgment to Defendants in the underlying action brought after investigators identified unsafe, non-sterile injection techniques, holding that the circuit court did not err.Plaintiffs, a pain management clinic and its physician, brought the underlying action alleging that the West Virginia Department of Health and Human Resources, West Virginia Bureau for Public Health, and its former Commissioner and State Health Officer (collectively, the DHHR Defendants) breached their duty of confidentiality when they issued a press release announcing that Defendants used unsafe injection practices and encouraging Plaintiffs' patients to be tested for bloodborne illnesses. Plaintiffs also sued the West Virginia Board of Ostseopathic Medicine and its executive director (together, the BOM Defendants), asserting a due process claim for failing to timely provide a hearing after their summary suspension of the physician's medical license. The circuit court concluded that the DHHR defendants were entitled to qualified immunity and that the claim against the BOM defendants was barred by res judicata. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that there was no error in the circuit court's judgment. View "Chalifoux v. W. Va. Dep't of Health & Human Resources" on Justia Law

In Louisiana v. Bartie, 14th Judicial District Court Case Number 12615-16, Div. G, Judge Michael Canaday presided over multiple hearings relating to the defendant’s indigency and his request for ancillary funding for defense experts. Because the hearings involved the disclosure of defense strategy, they were conducted without the district attorney, and the transcripts were sealed. Judge Canaday found the defendant was not indigent and denied his request for funding. The defense filed a writ application with the Third Circuit Court of Appeal challenging the indigency ruling. To facilitate filing the application, Judge Canaday granted defense counsel’s request for transcripts of the hearings. After defense counsel moved to obtain a missing transcript, Judge Canaday ordered the transcript be given to defense counsel and handwrote that it be “release[d] from seal.” Judge Canaday then received an email from the district attorney’s office asking whether his order gave the district attorney’s office access to the transcripts, or only defense counsel and the Third Circuit. Defense counsel was not copied with this email. Judge Canaday replied: “Since I don’t believe the state could appeal my granting relief to the defense on funding, I don’t think they can support the courts [sic] position to deny. The courts [sic] reasons will be sufficient for the 3rd to review. If the 3rd requests a states [sic] response obviously they could access the record.” Defense counsel was not included in these communications. The district attorney’s office then filed a “Motion to Unseal All Documents and Transcripts in Regards to Determining Indigency of the Defendant.” This motion was styled neither ex parte nor unopposed. Without a hearing, Judge Canaday signed an order granting the district attorney’s office the requested relief. Defense counsel did not have an opportunity to respond. The materials released by Judge Canaday included a transcript of a closed hearing where defense strategy specific to Bartie was discussed, including experts and their expected testimony. Defense counsel successfully argued for Judge Canaday’s recusal from the Bartie case. Writ applications seeking reversal of the recusal were denied by both the Third Circuit and the Louisiana Supreme Court. The recusal and subsequent related writ applications resulted in the expenditure of significant time, effort, and funds by both the state and defense counsel. There were negative media reports concerning Judge Canaday’s actions. Media reports prompted a Judiciary Commission investigation. The Commission found Judge Canaday engaged in improper ex parte communications and inappropriately granted a state motion to release documents from seal without holding a hearing or otherwise allowing defense counsel the opportunity to respond. The Commission recommended that he be publicly censured and pay costs. The Louisiana Supreme Court concurred with the censure recommendation. View "In re: JUDGE G. Michael Canaday" on Justia Law

A Special Tribunal was convened to impose discipline on former Colorado Supreme Court Chief Justice Nathan Coats. The Colorado Commission on Judicial Discipline recommended approval of an Amended Stipulation for Public Censure. The censure stems from a 2018 allegation against Mindy Masias, the Chief of Staff and second in command of the State Court Administrator’s Office (SCAO), for misconduct while she was employed by the SCAO. She resigned her position, but was still under consideration for a post-resignation services contract with the Court, valued at $2.6 to $2.7 million. After an anonymous letter raised significant allegations of wrongdoing by Masias, the Office of the State Auditor (OSA) opened an investigation. Undisputed evidence revealed that the Judicial Department entered into this contract with Masias before the anonymous letter was received, and Justice Coats asserted he had no knowledge of the execution of Masias’ contract at that time. Months after execution of the contract and receipt of the letter, Justice Coats learned Masias had surreptitiously recorded a conversation with former Chief Justice Rice concerning the reasons Masias was not elevated to become the State Court Administrator. Had Justice Coats exercised due diligence by obtaining and reviewing the Masias separation agreement, he could have learned about the surreptitious recording prior to execution of the services contract. The Court ultimately withdrew from the services contract. Disciplinary proceedings were started against Justice Coats for failing to “perform judicial and administrative duties competently and diligently” as required by the Colorado Code of Judicial Conduct. The Commission recommended, and the Special Tribunal adopted the recommendation that Justice Coats be publicly censured. View "Colorado v. Coats" on Justia Law

Relator John Hendrix and five public-agency exemplar plaintiffs claim that J-M Manufacturing Co. (“J-M”) violated the federal and various state False Claims Acts (“FCAs”) by representing that its polyvinyl chloride (“PVC”) pipes were compliant with industry standards. In Phase One of a bifurcated trial, a jury found that J-M knowingly made false claims that were material to the public agencies’ decisions to purchase J-M pipe. After the jury was unable to reach a verdict in Phase Two, the district court granted J-M judgment as a matter of law (“JMOL”) on actual damages and awarded one statutory penalty for each project involved in plaintiffs’ claims.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed. The panel held that sufficient evidence of falsity, materiality, and scienter supported the Phase One verdict. A reasonable jury could conclude that plaintiffs received some pipe not meeting industry standards. Further, the jury reasonably found that plaintiffs would not have purchased or installed J-M pipe had they been told the truth that J-M knew it had stopped producing pipes through processes materially similar to those used at the time of compliance testing and also knew that a significant amount of the pipe later produced did not meet industry standards. Plaintiffs’ failure to prove that any individual stick of pipe that they received was non-compliant did not mean that they failed to establish scienter. The panel held that the district court properly awarded JM judgment as a matter of law on actual damages under the federal False Claims Act. Plaintiffs did not establish actual damages by showing that they would not have bought the pipe had they known the truth. View "JOHN HENDRIX, ET AL V. J-M MANUFACTURING CO., INC., ET AL" on Justia Law

The North Dakota Department of Health and Human Services1 appealed a district court judgment reversing the Department’s order affirming the denial of Joseph Jahner’s application to enroll as a Medicaid provider. n December 2020, Jahner applied with the Department to be an enrolled provider with North Dakota Medicaid as a peer support specialist. In June 2021, the Department denied Jahner’s application. The Department stated its Medicare Provider Enrollment Screening Policy (“1915(i) Policy”) prohibited Jahner “from enrolling as a provider with ND Medicaid” because of his criminal history. Between 2002 and 2017, Jahner was convicted of 13 crimes, including negligent homicide, reckless endangerment, aggravated assault, assault, and menacing. After the hearing, the ALJ recommended reversing the Department’s decision, concluding the Department should have done a thorough review of Jahner’s criminal history to determine if any offenses had a direct bearing on the position of peer support specialist. The Department did not adopt the ALJ’s recommended decision, and affirmed its decision denying Jahner’s application. The Department concluded peer support specialists serve a vulnerable population, Jahner’s criminal offenses have a direct bearing on the position of peer support specialist, and he was not sufficiently rehabilitated. The Department’s decision prevented Jahner from becoming a Medicaid provider but did not affect his ability to work as a peer support specialist. The district court reversed the Department's decision, holding the Department’s decision was not in accordance with the law. The North Dakota Supreme Court concluded the Department’s findings of fact were supported by a preponderance of the evidence, and its conclusions of law were supported by its findings of fact. It therefore reversed the district court’s judgment and reinstated the Department’s order. View "Jahner v. NDDHS" on Justia Law

The Commission on Teacher Credentialing (Commission) and its Committee of Credentials (Committee) (collectively, defendants) appealed the grant of mandamus relief to petitioner Russell Earnest, setting aside the Committee’s disciplinary recommendation against him and enjoining the Commission from acting on that recommendation. Defendants argued the trial court erred in finding: (1) Earnest was excused from exhausting his administrative remedies; and (2) the Committee lacked jurisdiction to conduct a formal review pursuant to Education Code1 section 44242.5 (d). They further asserted the trial court should have denied the petition under the doctrine of judicial restraint. In the unpublished portion of the opinion, the Court of Appeal concluded all three factors outlined in Coachella Valley Mosquito & Vector Control Dist. v. California Public Employment Relations Bd., 35 Cal.4th 1072 (2005) weighed in favor of excusing Earnest from exhausting his administrative remedies. In the published portion of the opinion, the Court found that although section 44242.5 (b)(3) generally provided a jurisdictional basis for the Committee to commence initial reviews, as discussed post, the provision was also incorporated in section 44242.5 (d)(3) to provide a jurisdictional basis for the Committee to commence formal reviews. It was this jurisdictional provision the Committee relied upon in commencing a formal review of Earnest’s fitness to hold a credential. The Court thus concluded the plain language of section 44242.5(b)(3) imposed the onus on the employer to determine whether to provide a notifying statement to the Committee, and thus only the employer may determine whether an enumerated action was the “result of an allegation of misconduct,” triggering the Committee’s jurisdiction. Applying that interpretation to the facts of this case, the Court concluded the Committee did not have jurisdiction to commence a formal review of Earnest’s fitness to hold a credential. The grant of mandamus relief was thus affirmed. View "Earnest v. Com. on Teacher Credentialing" on Justia Law

An attorney appealed from orders of the Committee on Grievances of the Board of Judges of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York (the “Committee”) finding her liable for violating various provisions of the New York Rules of Professional Conduct and imposing sanctions for these violations, including a six-month suspension from practicing law in the Eastern District. On appeal, the attorney argued that the Committee (1) deprived her of due process by failing to afford her with reasonable notice of the charges and an adequate opportunity to defend against the charges, (2) failed to substantiate each element of the charges by clear and convincing evidence, and (3) imposed a punishment that was excessive in light of the putative lack of harm to the public. She has also requested that we maintain her appeal under seal, arguing that public disclosure of her identity would cause her reputational harm.   The Second Circuit affirmed the orders of the Committee and ordered that the docket in this appeal, and all its contents, be unsealed. The court explained that the attorney violated her most basic duty to the vulnerable clients who depended on her: to provide them with diligent, competent representation. Along the way, her neglectful and discourteous conduct harmed the administration of justice itself. The Committee’s evidence establishing as much was unassailable. Further, the court wrote that to the extent that the attorney’s sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenge relies on her contention that it was improper for the Committee to consider filings and transcripts from her non-disciplinary matters in the Eastern District, it fails. View "In re Demetriades" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court denying relief in this Administrative Procedure Act (APA) appeal of the Colonel William J. Bryant's denial of Appellant's application to obtain a license for his private security and investigations company, holding that there was no error.Col. Bryant, in his capacity as director of the Arkansas State Police, entered an administrative order finding that Appellant was ineligible to receive a license due to his prior convictions. Appellant filed a petition for judicial review. After a remand, the circuit court denied the petition finding that there was substantial evidence to support the agency's decision. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Appellant cited no authority for the proposition that it was reversible error for the circuit court to decide an APA appeal on a different ground than that found by the administrative agency; and (2) the director did not err in determining that Ark. Code Ann. 17-40-306 controlled over Ark. Code Ann. 17-1-103. View "Hackie v. Bryant" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment of a single justice of the court affirming the decision and order of the Board of Registration in Medicine suspending Petitioner's license to practice medicine, holding that the Board's decision was supported by the evidence and was not legally erroneous, procedurally defective, or arbitrary or capricious.A magistrate concluded that Petitioner was subject to discipline by the Board because his disruptive behavior on two separate occasions amounted to misconduct and demonstrated that Petitioner engaged in conduct that undermined the public confidence in the integrity of the medical profession. The Board adopted the findings and conclusions of the magistrate and concluded that Petitioner's actions warranted an indefinite suspension of his license to practice medicine. The single justice affirmed. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding (1) the Board's decision was supported by the evidence, and (2) Petitioner failed to demonstrate that the decision was legally erroneous, procedurally defective, or arbitrary and capricious. View "Schwartz v. Board of Registration in Medicine" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the decision of the Board of Registration suspending Physician's license to practice medicine on the basis that Physician violated 243 Code Mass. Regs. 2.07(11)(a)(1), holding that the Board's findings that Physician violated the Board's regulations were supported by substantial evidence and that the decision was not arbitrary or capricious.The Board initiated a formal adjudicatory proceeding against Physician, after which a magistrate found that Physician had violated 243 Code Mass. Regs. 2.07(11)(a), which prohibits advertising that is false, deceptive, or misleading, and also violated 243 Code Mass. Regs. 1.03(5)(a)(10). The Board adopted the magistrate's findings of fact and conclusions of law and issued an indefinite suspension of Physician's license to practice medicine. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding (1) the Board's regulations do not offend due process; (2) the Board's findings were supported by substantial evidence; and (3) neither the findings nor the sanction imposed were arbitrary or capricious. View "Welter v. Bd. of Registration in Medicine" on Justia Law