Justia Professional Malpractice & Ethics Opinion Summaries

Appellant, a Kentucky-licensed land surveyor, testified as a trial expert on behalf of defendants in a quiet-title action in circuit court. The trial court eventually ruled in favor of the plaintiffs. Alleging that Appellant gave misleading and inaccurate trial testimony during the trial, the Kentucky State Board of Licensure for Professional Engineers and Land Surveyors initiated disciplinary proceedings against Appellant. The Board ultimately suspended Plaintiff’s surveyor’s license, concluding that Plaintiff’s expert witness performance violated professional standards. Appellant sought judicial review. The Supreme Court held (1) a number of the statutes and regulations enforced by the Board against Appellant were impermissibly vague as applied to him; and (2) the Board’s decision to discipline Appellant was supported by substantial evidence. Remanded to the Board for reconsideration of Appellant’s sanction. View "Curd v. Ky. State Bd. of Licensure for Prof’l Eng’rs & Land Surveyors" on Justia Law

Dr. Obteen Nassiri owned and operated a chiropractic practice and employed Dr. Edward Johnson as a chiropractic physician. Both Appellants were licensed chiropractic physicians in Nevada at the time. Responding to allegations of unprofessional conduct, the Chiropractic Physicians’ Board of Nevada filed complaints for disciplinary action against Appellants. After an adjudicative hearing, the Board found Appellants had committed professional misconduct, revoked Nassiri’s license and mandated that Nassiri could not own any interest in a chiropractic practice until his license was restored, and suspended Johnson’s license for one year with conditions. On review, the district court entered judgment against Appellants. On appeal, Appellants argued that the Board improperly used a substantial evidence standard of proof to determine that Appellants committed professional misconduct. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) in the absence of a specific statutory mandate, agencies generally must utilize, at a minimum, the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard in adjudicative hearings as a standard of proof; and (2) because the Board applied at least the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard in this case, the Board did not err in finding that Appellants committed violations warranting professional discipline. View "Nassiri v. Chiropractic Physicians' Bd." on Justia Law

Appellant was terminated from his employment as a registered nurse at a community hospital after a patient under Appellant’s care departed from the hospital, unescorted, into blizzard-like conditions and died less than 500 feet from the hospital’s entrance. After a two-day disciplinary hearing, the State Board of Nursing found Appellant violated several statutes and Board rules and revoked Appellant’s professional nursing license for two years. Appellant subsequently filed a petition for de novo judicial review in the district court. The district court concluded that it would not rehear the evidence presented to the Board and, after finding “competent evidence” on the record to support the Board’s findings, affirmed the Board’s decision to revoke Appellant’s license. The Supreme Court vacated the district court’s judgment, holding that the court erred in its interpretation and application of “de novo judicial review.” Remanded. View "Zablotny v. State Bd. of Nursing" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs involved in, or wishing to be involved in the “death care industry” challenged Pennsylvania’s Funeral Director Law, 63 Pa. Stat. 479.1 provisions that: permit warrantless inspections of funeral establishments by the state Board of Funeral Directors; limit the number of establishments in which a funeral director may have an ownership interest or practice the provision; restrict the capacity of unlicensed individuals and certain entities to hold ownership interests in a funeral establishment; require every funeral establishment to have a licensed full-time supervisor; require funeral establishments to have a “preparation room”; prohibit service of food in a funeral establishment; prohibit use of trade names by funeral homes; govern the trusting of monies advanced under pre-need contracts for merchandise; and prohibit payment of commissions. The district court found several provisions unconstitutional. The Third Circuit reversed: invalidation of the warrantless inspection scheme; holdings on dormant Commerce Clause challenges to certain provisions; conclusions that disputed provisions violate substantive due process; a ruling that the Board’s actions unconstitutionally impair private contractual relations with third parties; and invalidation of the ban on payment of commissions to unlicensed salespeople. The court affirmed that the ban on the use of trade names in the funeral industry violates First Amendment protections. The court noted that antiquated provisions are not necessarily unconstitutional. View "Heffner v. Murphy" on Justia Law

Starr, AIG's former principal shareholder, filed suit against the FRBNY for breach of fiduciary duty in its rescue of AIG during the fall 2008 financial crisis. The district court dismissed Starr's claims and Starr appealed. The suit challenged the extraordinary measures taken by FRBNY to rescue AIG from bankruptcy at the height of the direst financial crisis in modern times. In light of the direct conflict these measures created between the private duties imposed by Delaware fiduciary duty law and the public duties imposed by FRBNY's governing statutes and regulations, the court held that, in this suit, state fiduciary duty law was preempted by federal common law. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Starr Int'l Co. v. Federal Reserve Bank of New York" on Justia Law

Carpenter sued Flint, a councilwoman and the mayor, based on Carpenter’s termination from his position as Director of Transportation, asserting age and political discrimination, breach of contract, wrongful discharge, gross negligence, defamation, and invasion of privacy. Defendants argued that the complaint failed to identify which claims were alleged against which defendants, and that the allegations were “excessively esoteric, compound and argumentative.” Carpenter did not respond by the court’s deadline, and about five weeks later, a stipulated order entered, permitting Carpenter to file an amended complaint by April 21, 2011. Counsel manually filed an amended complaint on May 20, 2011, violating a local rule requiring electronic filing. The clerk accepted the filing, but issued a warning. Carpenter failed to timely respond to a renewed motion to strike. Carpenter responded to a resulting show-cause order, but failed to abide by local rules. Another warning issued. Carpenter’s response to a second show-cause order was noncompliant. The court warned that “future failure to comply … will not be tolerated.” After more than five months without docket activity, the court dismissed. The Sixth Circuit reversed. Defendants bore some responsibility for delays and the length of delay does not establish the kind of conduct or clear record warranting dismissal; lesser sanctions were appropriate. View "Carpenter v. City of Flint" on Justia Law

Petitioner, an energy trader, challenged FERC's order to pay a $50,000 civil penalty because petitioner had made false statements and material omissions in forms he filed with the Commission and a market operator the Commission regulates. The court agreed with FERC that petitioner's admissions supported summary disposition without a hearing; because petitioner's actions were worse than careless, FERC reasonably concluded that he violated Market Behavior Rule 3; petitioner's arguments under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. 500 et seq., were without merit; and petitioner failed to show that FERC increased his penalty to promote general deterrence. Accordingly, the court denied the petition for review. View "Kourouma v. FERC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, an attorney, filed suit against the Judge Advocate General (JAG) of the Navy and others, alleging violation of his constitutional rights in an administrative decision which suspended him from practice before naval courts. The disciplinary proceedings stemmed from plaintiff's filing of an appellate brief containing statements he knew were false and misleading. The court concluded that the district court did not err in holding that the Navy JAG had authority to discipline plaintiff; plaintiff received ample due process and his Fifth Amendment rights were not violated during the proceedings against him; and the record did not support plaintiff's Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. 551, 701, and 706, claim. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's claims and denied his request for mandamus review. View "Partington v. Houck, et al." on Justia Law

In this case, a federal jury found that the defendant properties were subject to civil forfeiture. The jury found that each property derived from the proceeds of a health care fraud and money laundering scheme committed by Dr. Mert Kivanc - the son of Turan and Duygu Kivanc (Claimants). The court concluded that the district court correctly denied Claimants' motion to dismiss based on the statute of limitations; the district court did not err in denying Claimants' motions to permit Turan and Dr. Kivanc to testify remotely from Turkey; the district court did not abuse its discretion by admitting Dr. Kivanc's statements and two documents at issue; the district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to give Claimants' proposed jury instructions; and Dr. Kivanc's statements and transfer of defendant properties to Claimants and money to Turan were sufficient evidence of his intent to conceal his unlawful activities to withstand Claimants' Rule 50 motion. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Kivanc" on Justia Law

While employed as a physician at Quincy Valley Medical Center (QVMC), Gaston Cornu-Labat was the subject of several complaints that raised doubts as to his competency to practice medicine. QVMC conducted two investigations that ended after the charges against Dr. Cornu-Labat were not substantiated. Nevertheless, QVMC requested that Dr. Comu-Labat be psychologically evaluated and ended the doctor's employment when he failed to consult the recommended provider. Dr. Cornu-Labat filed a Public Records Act (PRA) request asking for records related to the hospital's investigations. QVMC claimed the documents were exempt from disclosure. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Dr. Cornu-Labat, holding none of the PRA exemptions invoked by QVMC applied. The court concluded that the records of a peer review committee that contained nonphysicians could not qualify for the exemption. Upon review, the Supreme Court determined that was error. The Court remanded because questions of material fact remained as to whether the records at issue were prepared for a regularly constituted peer review body. Further, questions remained as to whether any records were generated during a confidential meeting of agents of the QVMC board concerning Dr. Cornu-Labat's clinical or staff privileges. View "Cornu-Labat v. Hosp. Dist. No. 2 of Grant County" on Justia Law