Justia Professional Malpractice & Ethics Opinion Summaries

This matter comes before the court on the recommendation of the Judiciary Commission of Louisiana that Judge Sheva M. Sims of the Shreveport City Court, Caddo Parish, be suspended without pay for 90 days and ordered to reimburse the Commission's costs. The charge arose from an incident that occurred between Judge Sims and an assistant city prosecutor, Katherine Gilmer, on April 24, 2012, wherein Judge Sims stated that Ms. Gilmer was “held in contempt” of court and then ordered the dismissal of fifteen criminal cases on the docket that day. After reviewing the record and applicable law, the Supreme Court found that the charge against Judge Sims was supported by clear and convincing evidence. However, the Court rejected the recommended discipline and instead ordered Judge Sims be suspended without pay for a period of 30 days. Furthermore, the Court ordered Judge Sims to reimburse the Commission’s costs incurred relative to its investigation and prosecution of this case. View "In re: Judge Sheva M. Sims, Shreveport City Court, Caddo Parish" on Justia Law

In March 2011, the Chief Judge of the Clayton Judicial Circuit, at the request of the Clayton County District Attorney, issued an order authorizing the impaneling of a special purpose grand jury to investigate certain alleged public corruption. The special purpose grand jury issued subpoenas to various witnesses, including appellee John Lampl, who testified before it in June 2011. In July 2011, the special purpose grand jury returned a 16-count bill of indictment against Lampl on charges of conspiracy in restraint of free and open competition, false statements and writings, and perjury. The indictment was subsequently nolle prossed in the aftermath of the Court of Appeals’ holding in "Kenerly v. Georgia," (715 SE2d 688) (2011)), that the authority of a special purpose grand jury is limited to conducting investigations and does not include the power to issue indictments. Shortly thereafter, in September 2011, Lampl was indicted by a regular Clayton County grand jury on eight counts, including one perjury count, similar to those charged in the special purpose grand jury’s initial indictment. The conspiracy and false statements counts all pertain to alleged conduct by Lampl in his capacity as City Manager for the City of Morrow, in connection with a City real estate development project known as "Olde Towne Morrow." The Georgia Supreme Court granted the State’s petition for a writ of certiorari in this case to determine whether the Court of Appeals properly affirmed the superior court’s order dismissing a particular count of the indictment and suppressing statements made by the defendant before the special purpose grand jury. While the Supreme Court agreed with the superior court’s conclusion that the special purpose grand jury exceeded the scope of its authority in its investigation, the Court held that the relief granted was improper. The Court therefore reversed. View "Georgia v. Lampl" on Justia Law

Idaho's Bureau of Occupational Licenses (Bureau) investigated and initiated disciplinary proceedings against petitioner-appellant Timothy Williams after it received complaints that he had engaged in various forms of professional misconduct as a licensed real estate appraiser. Ultimately, Idaho's Board of Real Estate Appraisers (Board) revoked Williams' license, imposed $4,000 in fines, and required Williams to pay the Board's attorney fees and costs. The district court, acting in an appellate capacity, affirmed the Board's decision to revoke Williams' license and to impose fines, but reversed the Board's order that Williams pay its attorney fees and costs. Williams appealed and the Board cross-appealed. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court. View "Williams v. Idaho State Board of Real Estate Appraisers" on Justia Law

Petitioner was fired from her job at the Indiana Department of Workforce Development for alleged misconduct. After it was discovered that Petitioner kept several items of state property in her possession, Petitioner was charged with theft. The charges were later dismissed. Thereafter, the State filed an ethics proceeding against Petitioner, alleging that she violated 42 Ind. Admin. Code 1-5-12. After an adjudicative hearing, the Indiana State Ethics Commission found that Petitioner did commit the alleged violation and barred her from future State executive branch employment. The Supreme Court affirmed the Commission’s decision, holding (1) double jeopardy did not bar the proceeding before the Commission, and the criminal court’s probable cause determination was not binding upon the Commission; (2) there was sufficient evidence to support the Commission’s determination; and (3) the sanction imposed in this case was within the Commission’s discretion. View "Ind. State Ethics Comm’n v. Sanchez" on Justia Law

This was an interlocutory appeal of superior court decision, on appeal from a decision of an appellate officer, remanding this disciplinary case to the Board of Nursing to determine whether the Board intended that the case be continued. The central question for the Supreme Court's review was whether an attorney for the Office of Professional Regulation (OPR) within the office of the Vermont Secretary of State has the power to appeal a Board of Nursing decision vacating an earlier consent order suspending from practice appellee, David Shaddy. The Court concluded that the attorney had this power and reinstated the decision of the appellate officer. View "Shaddy v. State of Vermont Office of Professional Regulation" on Justia Law

David Bunch, a real estate appraiser holding a license issued by the West Virginia Real Estate Licensing and Certification Board, filed a petition for a writ of prohibition in the Circuit Court of Cabell County seeking to halt an administrative disciplinary proceeding initiated against him. The Board filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that it was a state agency, and, pursuant to W. Va. Code 14-2-2(a)(1), venue for the action was proper only in the Circuit Court of Kanawha County. The circuit court denied the motion, concluding that it was unclear whether the Board was a “state agency” for purposes of the venue statute. The Supreme Court granted the requested writ, holding that the Board is a state agency entitled to the special venue provisions of section 14-2-2(a)(1), and therefore, the circuit court erred when it allowed the action to proceed in the Circuit Court of Cabell County. View "State ex rel. W. Va. Real Estate Licensing & Cert. Bd. v. Hon. Christopher D. Chiles" on Justia Law

Respondent R. Eric Bloomfield, DVM, appealed a decision of the New Hampshire Board of Veterinary Medicine which reprimanded respondent based upon its findings that he failed to do a physical examination of a puppy prior to demonstrating a restraint technique, that his restraint of the puppy was excessive, and that he failed to respect the opinion of the puppy's owners. A couple took their five-month old puppy to respondent for a routine checkup. Respondent determined that the male puppy was "dominant" and proceeded to demonstrate a dominance-submission technique, which included picking the dog up by the scruff of the neck and pinching his snout. The dog responded by urinating on the examination table, then defecating, struggling briefly, then laid still. The dog was pronounced dead later that day. The couple filed a formal complaint against respondent regarding his treatment of their puppy. The Board found that respondent did not engage in misconduct, but that he failed to respect the couple's opinion to demonstrate the submission technique. On appeal, respondent argued that the evidence did not support the Board’s finding that he failed to do a physical examination of the puppy prior to demonstrating a restraint technique, and that his restraint of the puppy "was excessive, especially given the breed." He also argued that RSA 332-B:14, II(c) was "impermissibly vague," and, therefore, violates his procedural due process rights. Finally, he argued that the Board erred by not requiring expert testimony on the standard of care. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "In the Matter of R. Eric Bloomfield, DVM " on Justia Law

On February 14, 2013, the Attorney General received an ethics complaint, alleging possible violations of the Ethics Act by the Speaker of the House of Representatives, Robert W. Harrell, Jr. The complaint was originally submitted by a private citizen to the House Legislative Ethics Committee. That same day, the Attorney General forwarded the complaint to South Carolina Law Enforcement Division (SLED), and SLED carried out a 10-month criminal investigation into the matter. At the conclusion of the investigation, the Chief of SLED and the Attorney General petitioned the presiding judge of the state grand jury to impanel the state grand jury on January 13, 2014. Acting presiding judge of the state grand jury, the Honorable L. Casey Manning, subsequently impaneled the state grand jury. On February 24, 2014, the Speaker filed a motion to disqualify the Attorney General from participating in the grand jury investigation. On March 21, 2014, a hearing was held on the motion after which the court sua sponte raised the issue of subject matter jurisdiction. Another hearing was held, and the court found, as presiding judge of the state grand jury, it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to hear any matter arising from the Ethics Act, and refused to reach the issue of disqualification. The court discharged the grand jury and ordered the Attorney General to cease his criminal investigation. The Attorney General appealed that order to the Supreme Court. After its review, the Supreme Court concluded the circuit court erred in concluding that the House Ethics Committee had exclusive jurisdiction over the original complaint. While the crime of public corruption could include violations of the Ethics Act, the state grand jury's jurisdiction is confined to the purposes set forth in the constitution and the state grand jury statute, as circumscribed by the impaneling order. While the Court reversed the circuit court's order, it "in no way suggest[ed] that it was error for the presiding judge to inquire whether the state grand jury was 'conducting investigative activity within its jurisdiction or proper investigative activity.'" The case was remanded for a decision on whether the Attorney General should have been disqualified from participating in the state grand jury proceedings. View "Harrell v. Attorney General of South Carolina" on Justia Law

The Certified Professional Guardianship Board (Board) has petitioned the Supreme Court to suspend guardian Lori Petersen for actions stemming from her guardianship of D.S. and J.S. Petersen has been a certified professional guardian since 2001. She owned and operated Empire Care and Guardianship, a large agency serving over 60 wards. From December 2009 until April 2010, the Board received a number of grievances and complaints regarding Petersen's treatment of three wards who were all, at one point, housed at Peterson Place, an adult family home. Petersen contended that suspension was improper and suggested:(1) the Board ran afoul of separation of powers principles; (2) violated the appearance of fairness doctrine; (3) impermissibly lowered the evidentiary standard; and (4) failed to consider the proportionality of the sanction. The Supreme Court agreed with Petersen as to her last contention: "She has questioned, albeit obliquely, the proportionality of the sanction, and so the Board should have considered the sanction's magnitude relative to those imposed in other cases. Accordingly, we remand to the Board to conduct a consistency analysis pursuant to its internal regulations" and the Court's opinion. View "In re Disciplinary Proceeding Against Petersen" on Justia Law

The Judicial Tenure Commission (JTC) filed a formal complaint against Wayne Circuit Court Judge Bruce Morrow, alleging 10 counts of judicial misconduct that arose out of criminal cases over which he had presided. After hearing argument on objections to the master’s report, a majority of the JTC concluded that the evidence established judicial misconduct in eight of the ten allegations and recommended that respondent be suspended for 90 days without pay. After review of the entire record and due consideration of the parties’ arguments, the Supreme Court agreed with the JTC’s conclusion that respondent committed judicial misconduct, but the Court was not persuaded that the recommended sanction was appropriate in this case. Instead, the Court held that a 60-day suspension without pay was proportionate to the body of judicial misconduct established by the record. View "In re Hon. Bruce Morrow" on Justia Law