Justia Professional Malpractice & Ethics Opinion Summaries

Dr. Stephanie Taylor appealed Vermont Medical Practice Board decision denying her request to vacate the provisions of a 2005 consent order in which she agreed to a “final and irrevocable” surrender of her medical license. Dr. Taylor contended the Board erroneously: (1) failed to determine whether there were “less restrictive means available to regulate [her] conduct”; (2) violated her right to due process by “shift[ing] the burden onto [her] . . . to guess at the Board’s requirements for reinstatement;” (3) relied on the specification of charges that led to the earlier consent order; and (4) considered a Massachusetts decision revoking her medical license in that state. Finding no reversible error, the Vermont Supreme Court affirmed. View "In re Stephanie H. Taylor, M.D." on Justia Law

Chad Bostick petitioned for a writ of certiorari seeking review of the Court of Civil Appeals' opinion reversing a circuit court judgment that reversed the administrative order issued by the Alabama Board of Examiners of Landscape Architects ("the Board") suspending Bostick's license for one year and imposing a $250 fine against him. Bostick had been employed by GRC Design Group, Inc. (GRC), a landscaping business owned and operated by Greg Curl. A dispute between Bostick and GRC arose, and Bostick resigned from GRC in 2010. Bostick started his own landscaping firm. In February 2010, Curl filed a written complaint with the Board alleging that Bostick had, while employed with GRC, "misrepresented himself to clients as part owner in [GRC] and as a result had clients write checks payable to him which he cashed for his own personal use." Curl claimed that Bostick "admitted to stealing these design fees and eventually to several more acts of fraud." Bostick denied these accusations. Bostick argued on appeal of the circuit court's adoption of the Board's findings, among other things, that the Board's decision was not supported by evidence presented and that the Board acted beyond its jurisdiction and authority in suspending his license to practice landscape architecture and in imposing a fine. After review of the record, the Supreme Court agreed and reversed the circuit court's judgment. View "Ex parte Chad Bostick." on Justia Law

Robert Mena was licensed to practice medicine and surgery in Idaho in 2003. In 2007, staff members at the hospital in Jerome where he had privileges reported behaviors that suggested to them that Dr. Mena might have been abusing drugs or alcohol. Dr. Mena was evaluated and tested negative for chemical dependency. But staff, still concerned about Dr. Mena's psychological status, opined that he was not then currently fit to practice medicine. After further evaluation, it was recommended that Dr. Mena curtail his work-weeks to 40 to 50 hours. The Idaho State Board of Medicine ("Board") also had begun an investigation regarding Dr. Mena's training and ability to perform certain medical procedures. The Board and Dr. Mena entered into a Stipulation and Order in 2009, in which he admitted that he had violated the Medical Practice Act by failing to provide health care that met the required standard and in which he agreed to specific conditions of probation and restrictions on his license to practice medicine. On September 26, 2011, the Board issued an order terminating the Stipulation and Order. That same day, the hospital in Jerome gave Dr. Mena written notification that it had granted him limited medical privileges on the condition that he obtain additional training, that he had failed to do so, and that his privileges were forfeited. A month later, the Board sent Dr. Mena a letter asking him to respond to the hospital's action. He eventually submitted a thirteen-page written response that was rambling with many obscure references, grammatical and syntax errors, and vague sentences. More evaluations were ordered. The Board issued its Final Order in early 2014, finding that Dr. Mena suffered from "some level of impairment," and it stated that "sanctions were necessary upon [Dr. Mena's] license." Dr. Mena filed a petition for judicial review to the district court, arguing: (1) the Board initiated proceedings pursuant to the Disabled Physician Act and then imposed sanctions that were not permitted by that Act; (2) the Board's order was not supported by substantial evidence; and (3) the hearing officer erred in holding that certain evidence was inadmissible. The district court upheld the Board's action, and Dr. Mena then appealed to the Idaho Supreme Court. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, finding that Board's own evaluation of the evidence showed that there was insufficient evidence to support the Board's order. View "Mena v. Idaho Bd. of Medicine" on Justia Law

In 1988, Department of Professional Regulation investigator visited Gekas, a Springfield, Illinois dentist, and expressed concern that Gekas had administered nitrous oxide to a child. He ordered Gekas to provide information on all prescriptions on a continuing basis. Gekas contacted Deputy Governor Riley for assistance. After a meeting, the Department imposed less onerous requirements. In 2002, a Department investigator raided Gekas’ offices, with the assistance of the Federal Drug Enforcement Agency. After failed negotiations, the Department issued a cease and desist order against Gekas for the unlicensed practice of medicine and prescribing controlled substances while not a licensed physician and sought to have his license suspended, on grounds that Gekas had prescribed 4,600 doses of Hydrocodone and Vicoprofen to a patient. Gekas contacted his Senator. In 2008, the cease-and-desist was vacated and the complaint dismissed. Gekas submitted a FOIA request concerning the administrative complaint. The Department responded that no public documents were available. In 2009, Gekas filed suit; it was dismissed by stipulation in 2010. Meanwhile, a Chairman on the Illinois Board of Dentistry issued subpoenas against Gekas, stating that there was reasonable cause to believe that Gekas had violated the Illinois Dental Practice Act. Gekas filed suit, alleging First Amendment retaliation. The district court granted defendants summary judgment, finding no evidence of retaliatory motive. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Gekas v. Vasiliades" on Justia Law

The Arkansas State Medical Board found Dr. Mahmood Ahmad in violation of the Arkansas Medical Practices Act. While Ahmad’s administrative appeal was pending in the circuit court, Ahmad filed a complaint for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief against the Board and the Board’s chairman (collectively, the Board), alleging that portions of the Chronic Intractable Pain Treatment Act and certain Board regulations were unconstitutional. The Board moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that, because Ahmad’s exclusive remedy was an administrative appeal of the Board’s order, Ahmad’s complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief was barred as a matter of law. Ahmad responded by filing a motion for temporary restraining order seeking an order prohibiting the Board from pursuing any administrative action against him until both his administrative appeal and his declaratory and injunctive action were concluded. The circuit court granted the Board’s motion to dismiss and denied Ahmad’s motion for a restraining order. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the circuit court did not err in dismissing Ahmad’s complaint for failure to exhaust administrative remedies; and (2) the circuit court did not err in denying, on jurisdictional grounds, Ahmad’s request for a temporary restraining order. View "Ahmad v. Beck" on Justia Law

Petitioner, who worked as a registered nurse at a Hospital, was terminated for allegedly violating the Hospital’s narcotic waste policies. Petitioner self-reported her termination to the West Virginia Board of Registered Professional Nurses. The Board issued a notice of complaint on April 2, 2013. On August 14, 2013, the Board issued an interim status report to the Hospital. A hearing was eventually set for January 20, 2015 but was continued until February 19, 2015. Petitioner filed this petition for a writ of prohibition asserting that the Board’s failure to resolve the complaint against her within one year from the date of the status report pursuant to W. Va. Code 30-1-5(c) divested it of jurisdiction to proceed on the complaint. The Supreme Court granted Petitioner’s requested relief, holding that the Board exceeded its jurisdiction in this case by failing to comply with the statutory mandates of section 30-1-5(c). View "State ex rel. Miles v. W. Va. Bd. of Registered Prof’l Nurses" on Justia Law

Through the adoption of Nev. Rev. Stat. 630.356(2), the Legislature gave physicians the right to contest and the district courts the power to review final decisions of the Nevada State Board of Medical Examiners. In this case, the Board suspended the license of Appellant, a surgeon licensed in Nevada, for rendering services to a patient while under the influence of alcohol and in an impaired condition. The Board also issued a public reprimand and imposed additional sanctions. Appellant petitioned for judicial review of the Board’s decision and requested a preliminary injunction to stay the sanctions and prevent the Board, while judicial review was pending, from filing a report with the National Practitioner Data Bank. The district court denied Appellant’s injunction request, concluding that section 630.356(2), which prohibits district courts from entering a stay of the Board’s decision pending judicial review, precluded such an action. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that section 630.356(2) impermissibly acts as a legislative encroachment on the district court’s power to do what is reasonably necessary to administer justice, and this is a violation of the separation of powers doctrine. View "Tate v. State Bd. of Med. Exam'rs" on Justia Law

Mark Colafranceschi brought this action for defamation and professional malpractice against Shawn Briley and Ashley Robinson after a magistrate court appointed Robinson to perform child custody evaluations in two separate cases in which Colafranceschi was a party. Colafranceschi was the plaintiff in two actions against the mothers of his children. Robinson was a licensed masters social worker. Briley was a licensed clinical social worker and was Robinson’s supervisor. In both reports in the two cases, Robinson's evaluations (as Colafranceschi's claim suggested) "did not cast him in a positive light." The district court dismissed the action, finding that quasi-judicial immunity barred Colafranceschi’s claims. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Colafranceschi v. Briley" on Justia Law

"This is a case of egregious attorney misconduct." Because of the cumulative effect of the attorney's misconduct, the Court of Appeal felt compelled to reverse the judgment she obtained on behalf of her client, Caltrans. "While Judge Di Cesare showed the patience of Job – usually a virtue in a judge – that patience here had the effect of favoring one side over the other. He allowed [the attorney] to emphasize irrelevant and inflammatory points concerning the plaintiff's character so often that he effectively gave CalTrans an unfair advantage." View "Martinez v. Dept. of Transportation" on Justia Law

Richard Pines, D.O. appealed the district court’s decision on a disciplinary order of the Idaho Board of Medicine. The Board brought disciplinary proceedings against Pines following reports that he had induced young men into sexual contact by saying he was required to give full-body massages to naked practice patients in order to be relicensed as a doctor of osteopathy. Following a hearing, the Board found Pines committed four counts of professional misconduct. It revoked Pines’ license and ordered that he pay costs and attorney fees. The district court affirmed the four counts of misconduct but vacated the award of costs and attorney fees. Pines appealed and the Board cross-appealed. Before the Supreme Court, Pines argued: (1) that he was disciplined for uncharged conduct, resulting in a violation of his due process rights; (2) that evidence in the record was insufficient to support certain alleged violations made against him; (3) that as applied, his due process rights were violated by the Board's conclusion that four individuals were Pines' patients. The Board argued that the district court erred in vacating the Board's order on attorney fees and costs. Upon review of the record, the Supreme Court found that two of the "patients" were not, indeed, Pines' patients, and that Pines' due process rights were not violated. The Court affirmed the Board's decision on Counts I and II, but vacated the district court's decision on Counts III and V (which pertained to the two "patients"). The case was remanded for further proceedings, including additional consideration of the issue of costs and fees. View "Pines v. Idaho Board of Medicine" on Justia Law