Licensed nurses may be disciplined if they engage in “unprofessional conduct.” The applicable Delaware statute did not define “unprofessional conduct,” so the Board of Nursing adopted a rule to flesh the term out. Two nurses who held supervisory roles at a correctional facility were disciplined by the Board under that rule after they participated in the retrieval of medication from a medical waste container for eventual administration to an inmate. The nurses appealed to the Superior Court, and the court set their discipline aside. The court read the Board’s rule to require not just proof that the nurses breached a nursing standard, but also proof that in doing so, they put the inmate or the public at risk. And in the court’s view, the State had not made that showing. Because the Board applied the correct standard and its decision was supported by substantial evidence, the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed its decision and reversed the Superior Court. View "Delaware Board of Nursing v. Francis" on Justia Law
Posted in: Civil Procedure, Delaware Supreme Court, Government & Administrative Law, Professional Malpractice & Ethics
Family Court Judge Arlene Minus Coppadge was subject to disciplinary proceedings for failing to properly report matters held under advisement. Specifically, this matter arose from two instances of delay in the disposition of cases pending before the judge and her subsequent failure to include those cases on the "90 day report" required by Administrative Directive 175. Upon review of the complaint, the Supreme Court concluded that the judge violated Rule 2.5(C) of the Delaware Judges' Code of Judicial Conduct, and was accordingly sanctioned. View "In Re: The Honorable Arlene Minus Coppadge" on Justia Law
DTC filed a complaint with the Court of Chancery against the Union and Harry Bruckner, a para-transit driver, in the nature of a declaratory judgment action (Complaint) pursuant to Title 1, Chapter 65. The Complaint sought an order vacating or modifying a labor arbitration award issued by a certain arbitrator pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement between DTC and the Union. The award reinstated Bruckner, who was terminated by DTC, with back pay less interim earnings. The Court of Chancery granted the Union's motion for summary judgment. DTC's sole argument on appeal was that the arbitrator's decision should be vacated due to the appearance of bias or partiality on the part of the arbitrator. The court held that the alleged bias or partiality which DTC attributed to the arbitrator failed to meet the "evident partiality" standard where the mere fact that an arbitrator may share a personal life experience with a party or a party's agent was legally insufficient to constitute a substantial relationship that a reasonable person would conclude was powerfully suggestive of bias. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed. View "Delaware Transit Corp. v. Amalgamated Transit Union Local 842" on Justia Law
Posted in: Contracts, Delaware Supreme Court, Labor & Employment Law, Legal Ethics, Professional Malpractice & Ethics
A real estate agent served as the seller's agent for two sales of the same house. The initial purchaser submitted a bid for the house and, the same day, hired the initial seller's agent to serve as seller's agent for the second sale. A few days later, the agent convinced the initial seller to accept the initial purchaser's bid without disclosing his conflict of interest or the purchaser's interest in flipping the house. After one day of trial concerning the initial seller's complaint against the agent alleging, inter alia, breach of fiduciary duties, the trial judge granted defendant's motion for a directed verdict. The court held that because plaintiff raised issues of material fact concerning whether defendant breached his fiduciary duties to the seller, the court remanded the case for a new trial. View "Estate of Eller v. Bartron" on Justia Law
Appellants in this derivative action, who are shareholders of Primedia, Inc., appealed the Court of Chancery's decision granting the Primedia Special Litigation Committee's ("SLC") Motion to Dismiss claims arising out of a series of alleged violations of fiduciary duty by defendants. As a preliminary matter, the court invoked the exception to mootness doctrine in this case because it was a matter of public importance that was capable of repetition yet could evade review where other litigants have raised the Brophy v. Cities Co. issue in actions now pending before the Court of Chancery. The court held that Brophy did not require an element of harm to the corporation before disgorgement was an available remedy and to the extent Pfeiffer v. Toll conflicted with this holding, it was wrong. In Brophy, the court relied on the principles of restitution and equity and as the Brophy court recognized, it was inequitable to permit the fiduciary to profit from using confidential corporate information. The court also held that the Vice Chancellor's analysis of the SLC's Motion to Dismiss under Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado's second prong could not be affirmed in the shadow of Pfeiffer's incorrect holding. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Chancery was reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings.
Posted in: Business Law, Corporate Compliance, Delaware Supreme Court, Professional Malpractice & Ethics