Justia Professional Malpractice & Ethics Opinion Summaries

This case involved serious allegations against Robert E. Stark, the auditor-controller of Sutter County where the Sutter County District Attorney's Office claimed that Stark violated statutes, county rules, and Sutter County Board of Supervisors (Board) resolutions detailing the requirements of his office. At issue were four provisions of Penal Code section 424, all of which proscribe general intent offenses. Three of those provisions criminalize acting without authority or failing to act as required by law or legal duty. The court held that those offenses additionally required that defendant knew, or was criminally negligent in failing to know, the legal requirements that governed the act or omission. The court also held that a claim of misinstruction on the mens rea of a crime could be challenged under Penal Code section 995, subdivision (a)(1)(B) where it raised the possibility that, as instructed, the grand jury could have indicted on less than reasonable or probable cause. The court further held that based on the record, the court need not decide the question of whether willful misconduct under Government Code section 3060 required a knowing and purposeful refusal to follow the law. Stark did not disagree with the instruction on mental state given by the district attorney and accompanying PowerPoint slides invalidated the instruction on mental state, requiring that the accusation be set aside. The court addressed these claims as to the district attorney's argument and PowerPoint slides and concluded that it was without merit. The court finally held that, in a motion to set aside an indictment or accusation, a defendant claiming that the district attorney suffered from a conflict of interest during the grand jury proceeding must establish that his right to due process was violated. Accordingly, the judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "Stark v. Superior Court of Sutter County" on Justia Law

This criminal appeal arose from a "finite reinsurance" transaction between American International Group, Inc. (AIG) and General Reinsurance Corporation (Gen Re). Defendants, four executives of Gen Re and one of AIG, appealed from judgments convicting them of conspiracy, mail fraud, securities fraud, and making false statements to the Securities and Exchange Commission. Defendants appealed on a variety of grounds, some in common and others specific to each defendant, ranging from evidentiary challenges to serious allegations of widespread prosecutorial misconduct. Most of the arguments were without merit, but defendants' convictions must be vacated because the district court abused its discretion by admitting the stock-price data and issued a jury instruction that directed the verdict on causation. View "United States v. Ferguson, et al." on Justia Law

Petitioner, convicted of a non-fatal shooting, was sentenced as a habitual offender to 29-1/2 to 60 years for assault with intent to commit murder, to run concurrently with a sentence of 40 to 60 months for a felon-in-possession conviction, and a consecutive term of two years for a felony firearm conviction. He claims that his Sixth Amendment right to counsel was violated because his attorney fell asleep while he was being cross-examined. Michigan state courts rejected appeals. The district court denied habeas relief. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. At most, the attorney was asleep for part of a single cross-examination; a petitioner must show that his attorney slept through a substantial portion of the trial for the "Cronic" presumption of prejudice to attach. Noting the overwhelming evidence, the court stated that petition did not show a reasonable probability that counsel could have prevented prejudicial events from occurring had he been awake, much less that it would have affected the outcome of the trial. Although the attorney was later arrested for cocaine use, there was no evidence that he was using cocaine during the trial.. View "Muniz v. Smith" on Justia Law

When prosecutor Charles Graves was not prepared to proceed to trial and had not produced a video to defense counsel, a circuit court judge held him in criminal contempt and ordered him to be incarcerated. Upon review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court found that the trial judge denied the prosecutor due process of law and that the record contained insufficient evidence of criminal contempt. The Court reversed the prosecutor's convictions and the order of the circuit court was vacated. View "Graves v. Mississippi" on Justia Law

After Appellant Donald Brandt produced a fraudulent document in a civil proceeding, a circuit court held Appellant in civil and criminal contempt.  In turn, the court dismissed Appellant's legal malpractice action with prejudice and ordered him to serve six months in jail and pay the defendants' attorneys' fees. In 1998, Appellant sued Elizabeth Gooding and her law firm Gooding & Gooding, P.A. for legal malpractice based on Gooding's representation of him in a real estate transaction.  During the course of discovery, Appellant presented to his attorney a document which appeared to have been sent the lender in the transaction to Appellant on September 18, 1995.  Appellant also provided the letter to his malpractice expert.  The letter was then introduced in the expert's deposition and used by him to opine that Gooding had committed malpractice. The document, if authentic, would have imputed knowledge to Gooding of a conflict of interest related to the representation of Appellant in the real estate transaction.  Gooding, however, claimed the document was fraudulent.  As a result, Gooding requested a hearing to determine whether the document was authentic.  Additionally, Gooding requested the court hold Appellant in contempt and award costs if such authenticity could not be established. Subsequently, based on the fraudulent document, the State indicted Appellant for forgery.  After a jury found Appellant guilty of the indicted offense, the trial judge sentenced Brandt to ten years' imprisonment, suspended upon the service of four years, followed by five years' probation and payment of restitution. On appeal to the Supreme Court, Appellant contended that the trial judge erred in failing to dismiss the forgery indictment and in failing to grant his motion for a directed verdict on the ground that Double Jeopardy barred the forgery prosecution.  Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the State presented sufficient evidence to support a forgery conviction.  Because the forged document did not involve a dollar amount and the State did not present evidence of a definitive dollar amount, the Court held that the trial judge erred in sentencing Appellant for felony forgery. The Court remanded the case back to the circuit court for resentencing. View "South Carolina v. Brandt" on Justia Law

Petitioners appealed from a Memorandum and Order and Final Order of Forfeiture entered by the district court dismissing their petition for an ancillary hearing and rejecting their claim as beneficiaries of a putative constructive trust in defendant's forfeiture assets. At issue was whether the remission provision of 21 U.S.C. 853(i) precluded the imposition of a constructive trust in petitioners' favor and whether imposing a constructive trust would be consistent with a forfeiture statutory scheme provided by section 853. Because the court concluded that section 853(i) did not preclude, as a matter of law, recognizing a constructive trust and because a constructive trust was not inconsistent with the forfeiture statute, the court vacated the Final Order of Forfeiture and remanded the case to the district court to consider whether, pursuant to Vermont law, a constructive trust should be recognized in favor of petitioners. View "United States v. MacKay, et al." on Justia Law

After a violation report was filed against defendant Ramondo Howard alleging defendant had violated the terms and conditions of his probation, defendant filed a pro se motion indicating that he wished to release his attorney and wanted new counsel to be appointed, confirming on the record he had filed a complaint against his attorney with the court's disciplinary board. The hearing justice excused defendant's attorney. Defendant then filed motions to recuse and change venues, both of which the hearing justice denied. At the violation hearing, the hearing justice found defendant to be a violator of the terms and conditions of his probation. Before the hearing began, however, the hearing justice expressed his belief that defendant needed to be "warehoused" and was "beyond rehabilitation." Defendant appealed, arguing the hearing justice erred by failing to recuse himself from the case because the justice lacked the objectivity and impartiality to fairly hear and render judgment. The Supreme Court reversed, finding that because the hearing justice chose to express his opinions prior to the commencement of the violation hearing, the justice displayed a clear inability to render fair judgment and erred by declining to recuse under the circumstances. Remanded.

Barbara Roberts sued Steve Lanier and his firm Steve Lanier, PC, and Rodney Stallings and his firm Coggin & Stallings, LLC. In 2006, Ms. Roberts was arrested on murder charges and sent to the Cherokee County jail. She contacted Attorney Lanier, who then met with her and agreed to represent her in her criminal proceedings. The contract between them provided that Ms. Roberts would pay a "nonrefundable retainer" of $50,000. At that time, Ms. Roberts executed a power-of-attorney authorizing Mr. Lanier to withdraw the retainer from her bank accounts. Ms. Roberts testified at trial that she first learned that Mr. Lanier was not licensed to practice law in Alabama when she appeared for her first hearing at the district court. It was then that she was introduced to Mr. Stallings, who "associated" on her case. Seeing no need for two lawyers, she tried to terminate Mr. Lanier's representation. Mr. Stallings eventually managed Ms. Roberts' case, having all her mail sent to his office so that he could "oversee every aspect" of her personal life, including payment of all outstanding bills and expenses. Ms. Roberts alleged that instead of using her money for the purposes she intended, Mr. Stallings misappropriated approximately $100,000 of her funds. Ms. Roberts was eventually convicted of capital murder and sentenced to life without parole. She later learned that the "nonrefundable retainer" language in her contract with Mr. Lanier was unenforceable under Alabama law, and sued her former lawyers for legal malpractice. The circuit court granted summary judgment to the lawyers. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed the circuit court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the lawyers only with respect to employment contract and the "nonrefundable retainer" and the misappropriation of Ms. Roberts' money for expenses while she awaited trial. The Court remanded the case for further proceedings.

Plaintiffs Michael Ashby and Randy O'Brien, inmates at the state department of correction, asserted professional malpractice complaints against attorney C. Bruce Davidson to The Bar Plan Mutual Insurance Company, Davidson's professional liability carrier. Bar Plan then intervened in consolidated actions for damages filed on behalf of plaintiffs against Davidson, asserting a cross-claim that it was not obligated to indemnify Davidson for the claims of plaintiffs because Davidson had failed to notify Bar Plan of any claims against him pursuant to Bar Plan's policy. The trial court granted summary judgment to Bar Plan. The Supreme Court held that Davidson's failure to comply with Bar Plan's policy was not dispositive because plaintiffs opposed summary judgment on grounds of waiver and estoppel. The Court then reversed summary judgment, holding that genuine issues of fact remained regarding whether Bar Plan's misrepresentation of valid coverage resulted in plaintiffs sustaining actual detriment. Remanded.

Plaintiff sued defendant, a county judge in Mississippi, under 42 U.S.C. 1983 for allegedly causing plaintiff to be prosecuted without probable cause. At issue was whether the district court properly denied defendant's motion, concluding that genuine issues of material fact precluded summary judgment. The court held that defendant was entitled to qualified immunity where the district court did not explain the constitutional right that he had purportedly violated and, under the circumstances of the case, plaintiff had not shown that defendant's actions tainted the deliberations of the magistrate who issued the arrest warrant or the grand jury that returned the indictment. The court also held that, because the appeal was resolved on grounds of qualified immunity, the court need not address whether defendant was entitled to judicial immunity. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's denial of summary judgment.