Justia Professional Malpractice & Ethics Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Criminal Law
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Fourteen plaintiffs, including pilots, a physician, a nurse, and an attorney, were required to undergo alcohol testing to maintain their employment and professional licenses. The tests, developed by United States Drug Testing Laboratories, Inc. (USDTL), indicated positive results for alcohol consumption, leading to significant professional harm. The plaintiffs alleged that the tests were unreliable and sued USDTL and its officers under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) and state law. They also sued Choice Labs Services (CLS) and its owners, who provided the tests to the administrators.The plaintiffs initially filed suit in the Southern District of Florida, asserting claims for fraud and negligence. The district court dismissed the case without prejudice, finding the complaint insufficient. The plaintiffs then filed a second amended complaint, adding CLS as defendants. The case was transferred to the Northern District of Illinois, where the district court dismissed the RICO claims under Rule 12(b)(6) and denied supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims. The plaintiffs' motion to alter or amend the judgment was also denied.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case de novo and affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that the plaintiffs failed to establish proximate causation for their RICO claims, as they did not adequately allege a direct link between USDTL's alleged misrepresentations and their professional injuries. The court also found that the plaintiffs did not meet the heightened pleading requirements for fraud under Rule 9(b). Consequently, the RICO claims were dismissed with prejudice, and the state law claims were dismissed without prejudice. View "Ratfield v United States Drug Testing Laboratories, Inc." on Justia Law

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The defendant was convicted of second-degree murder for the fatal stabbing of a 20-year-old in August 2007, when he was 16 years old. The prosecution presented police-arranged single photo identifications made the day after the crime. The defendant moved to suppress these identifications, arguing they were conducted in a suggestive manner. The Supreme Court ordered a Rodriguez/Wade hearing to determine the admissibility of the identifications, but the hearing was never held. During the trial, the prosecution called an eyewitness who identified the defendant as the perpetrator, despite earlier stating they would not call this witness. The defense counsel did not object to the witness being called or request a Rodriguez/Wade hearing.The Supreme Court convicted the defendant, and he appealed, arguing that the missing transcript of jury deliberation proceedings constituted a mode of proceedings error and that his trial counsel was ineffective. The Supreme Court summarily denied the defendant's CPL 440.10 motion without an evidentiary hearing and denied his motion for a reconstruction hearing. The Appellate Division modified the judgment by reducing the defendant's sentence but affirmed the order denying the CPL 440.10 motion, rejecting the defendant's claims.The New York Court of Appeals reviewed the case and rejected the defendant's mode of proceedings claim, holding that a missing transcript alone does not entitle a defendant to vacatur of their conviction. The court stated that the proper remedy for a missing transcript is a reconstruction hearing, provided the defendant's conduct shows a good faith effort to obtain prompt and effective reconstruction. The court also held that the Supreme Court abused its discretion by summarily denying the CPL 440.10 motion without an evidentiary hearing, as the defendant's ineffective assistance claim could not be resolved without resolving questions of fact. The case was remitted to the Supreme Court for an evidentiary hearing on the CPL 440.10 motion. View "People v Salas" on Justia Law

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A man was charged with six counts of statutory rape involving his eleven-year-old daughter, who lived with him after her mother was incarcerated. The daughter testified that her father raped her on multiple occasions, providing detailed accounts of the assaults. Evidence included her birth certificate, which established both her and her father’s ages, and testimony from family members and investigators. The defendant denied the allegations, suggesting the accusations were fabricated due to disciplinary issues.The Circuit Court of Yazoo County conducted a jury trial, during which the defendant’s counsel submitted jury instructions that omitted the statutory requirement that the defendant be at least twenty-four months older than the victim. The State agreed to use the defense’s instructions. The jury convicted the defendant on all counts, and he was sentenced to thirty years’ imprisonment. On appeal, the Mississippi Court of Appeals reversed the conviction, holding that the omission of the age-gap element from the jury instructions constituted reversible error.The Supreme Court of Mississippi reviewed the case on certiorari. It held that, under the invited-error doctrine, a defendant cannot complain on appeal about an error in jury instructions that he himself requested and received. The Court found that the defendant was estopped from challenging the omission of the age-gap element, as he had submitted the instructions and the State and trial court had accepted them. The Court also rejected the defendant’s other claims, including ineffective assistance of counsel, sufficiency of the evidence regarding venue, improper admission of hearsay, and a Batson challenge. The Supreme Court of Mississippi reversed the Court of Appeals’ decision and reinstated and affirmed the conviction and sentence imposed by the Circuit Court of Yazoo County. View "Allen v. State" on Justia Law

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Shawn Russell Sorensen was convicted of conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine and sentenced to mandatory life imprisonment based on prior state convictions for drug offenses. He filed a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence, arguing ineffective assistance of counsel for not contesting the qualification of his prior convictions as "felony drug offenses" under 21 U.S.C. § 841’s sentencing enhancement scheme.The United States District Court for the District of South Dakota dismissed Sorensen's motion. The court found that his counsel's performance was not deficient, as the argument regarding the categorical approach to his prior convictions was considered novel at the time of sentencing. Sorensen appealed, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit granted a certificate of appealability on the ineffective assistance of counsel claim.The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that even if counsel's performance was deficient, Sorensen failed to demonstrate prejudice. The court applied the categorical and modified categorical approaches to determine that Sorensen's prior convictions under Arizona and South Dakota statutes qualified as felony drug offenses. The Arizona statute was found to be divisible, and Sorensen's conviction for possession of methamphetamine matched the federal definition of a felony drug offense. Similarly, the South Dakota statute was also deemed divisible, and Sorensen's conviction for possession of methamphetamine under this statute qualified as a felony drug offense. Therefore, Sorensen's sentence was upheld, and the district court's judgment was affirmed. View "Sorensen v. United States" on Justia Law

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A criminal defendant was charged with operating while intoxicated after being pulled over for speeding. The arresting officer used radar to determine the defendant's speed. The assistant county attorney, Theron Christensen, prosecuted the case. After the defense exposed weaknesses in the State's case during depositions, Christensen filed a motion in limine to exclude certain evidence. The defendant resisted and moved for sanctions against Christensen, arguing the motion was frivolous and in bad faith. Christensen later withdrew the motion and dismissed the case, allegedly to avoid the officer testifying about radar calibration issues.The Iowa District Court for Story County dismissed the charges and later imposed a $2,072 monetary sanction on Christensen under Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 1.413 and Iowa Code § 619.19, finding his actions sanctionable. Christensen filed a petition for writ of certiorari, challenging the sanctions.The Iowa Supreme Court reviewed the case and determined that neither Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 1.413 nor Iowa Code § 619.19 applies to criminal cases. The court emphasized that these rules and statutes are intended for civil cases only and that the rules of civil procedure do not apply to criminal proceedings unless explicitly stated. The court held that the district court erred in imposing monetary sanctions on Christensen based on these civil rules and statutes. Consequently, the Iowa Supreme Court sustained the writ and reversed the sanctions order and the monetary sanction imposed on Christensen. View "Christensen v. Iowa District Court For Story County" on Justia Law

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Terry Break was convicted in 2021 of multiple child sexual abuse offenses, including rape, second-degree sexual assault, and sexual indecency with a child, involving three minor victims. He received six life sentences plus 488 years in prison and $425,000 in fines. His convictions were affirmed on direct appeal. Break then filed a Rule 37 petition for postconviction relief, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel on several grounds.The Boone County Circuit Court denied Break's petition. The court found that the State had provided sufficient evidence of "sexual gratification or desire" for the offenses, and thus, trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to challenge this element. The court also found that the prosecutor's comment during closing arguments, referring to Break as a "proven liar," was based on Break's own admissions and was not improper. Additionally, the court determined that the prosecutor's opening statement did not shift the burden of proof, as it referred to Break's demeanor during a recorded interview rather than his silence at trial. Lastly, the court acknowledged that the prosecutor's biblical reference during closing arguments was improper but concluded that Break failed to show that trial counsel's failure to object constituted ineffective assistance.The Arkansas Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the circuit court's decision. The court held that Break failed to demonstrate that his trial counsel's performance was deficient or that any alleged deficiencies prejudiced the outcome of his trial. The court emphasized that Break did not provide sufficient evidence to support his claims of ineffective assistance and that the decisions made by his trial counsel fell within the range of reasonable professional judgment. View "BREAK v. STATE OF ARKANSAS" on Justia Law

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Mitchell Rivers was convicted of Homicide by Child Abuse (HCA) following the death of his four-month-old adoptive child, who died from asphyxiation. During the trial, the State introduced evidence of the child's prior injuries, which were unrelated to the cause of death. Rivers' trial attorney objected to this evidence pretrial but failed to renew the objection during the trial, leaving the issue unpreserved for appeal. Rivers subsequently filed for post-conviction relief (PCR), claiming ineffective assistance of counsel.The PCR court denied relief, finding that Rivers was not prejudiced by his attorney's failure to renew the objection. However, the court of appeals reversed this decision, holding that Rivers was prejudiced by his attorney's errors, as there was no nexus between the collateral injury evidence and the circumstances surrounding the child's death.The Supreme Court of South Carolina reviewed the case and reversed the court of appeals' decision. The Supreme Court found that even if the collateral injury evidence had been excluded, there was no reasonable probability that the jury's verdict would have been different. The court noted that Rivers' actions, including his failure to seek medical assistance after the child resumed wheezing and his inability to perform CPR, demonstrated a conscious disregard for the risk of the child's death, thus establishing extreme indifference beyond a reasonable doubt. Consequently, Rivers failed to satisfy the prejudice prong of the Strickland test for ineffective assistance of counsel. The decision of the court of appeals was reversed. View "Rivers v. State" on Justia Law

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Ray Eugene Pollard was convicted of malice murder for the shooting death of Jonathon McAfee. The incident occurred on October 3, 2020, and Pollard was indicted on multiple charges, including malice murder and aggravated assault. During the trial, evidence showed that Pollard had a history of threatening behavior towards McAfee and had been at the scene of the shooting. Pollard's vehicle was found with damage consistent with evidence collected near the crime scene. Additionally, Pollard's inconsistent statements to police and his admission of being at the scene further implicated him.The Baldwin County trial court entered a nolle prosequi for one count and a jury found Pollard guilty of the remaining charges. Pollard was sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole for malice murder. His conviction for aggravated assault merged with the malice murder conviction for sentencing purposes. Pollard filed a motion for a new trial, which was denied by the trial court.The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case on appeal. Pollard argued that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the admission of cell-site location information (CSLI) obtained without a search warrant. The court assumed, without deciding, that the trial counsel's performance was deficient. However, the court found that Pollard did not demonstrate that the outcome of the trial would have been different without the CSLI evidence. The court noted that the other evidence against Pollard was strong, including his presence at the scene, physical evidence, and his threatening behavior. Consequently, the court affirmed Pollard's conviction, concluding that he did not suffer prejudice from the alleged deficiency in his counsel's performance. View "POLLARD v. THE STATE" on Justia Law

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Colton Jerrod Sims and Monte Glover were convicted of malice murder and other crimes related to the shooting death of DeCoby Barlow and the aggravated assault of Landon Brown. The incident occurred on December 8-9, 2018, following a dispute at a nightclub. Sims and his friend Colby Toles had a confrontation with Glover and co-defendant Jalon Edwards, which escalated into a gunfight outside the club. Barlow was fatally shot during the crossfire, and Brown, a security guard, was also assaulted.A Henry County grand jury indicted Sims, Glover, and Edwards on multiple charges, including malice murder and aggravated assault. Sims and Glover were tried together and found guilty on all counts. The trial court sentenced them to life in prison for malice murder, with additional concurrent and consecutive sentences for other charges. Sims and Glover filed motions for new trials, which were denied by the trial court.The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case. Sims and Glover challenged the sufficiency of the evidence, claiming it did not support their convictions. Sims also raised four claims of trial court error and argued that his trial counsel was ineffective. Glover similarly argued ineffective assistance of counsel. The court held that the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions, as eyewitness testimony and ballistics evidence confirmed their involvement in the gunfight. The court also found no merit in Sims' claims of trial court error and ineffective assistance of counsel, noting that strategic decisions by trial counsel were reasonable and did not prejudice the defendants.The Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed the convictions and sentences of Sims and Glover, concluding that the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to support the jury's verdicts and that there was no reversible error in the trial proceedings. View "SIMS v. THE STATE" on Justia Law

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Edwin Leo Brown was indicted in October 2016 on four counts of possession with intent to distribute cocaine base and one count of being a felon in possession of a firearm. The government had evidence of Brown selling cocaine base and discovered a firearm upon his arrest. Brown faced up to 90 years in prison. His attorney, Frank Harper, initially advised him that he was likely facing up to 120 months’ imprisonment and presented two plea agreements limiting his prison exposure to ten years. Brown, skeptical of Harper’s advice, did not trust him and Harper withdrew as counsel. Brett Wentz then became Brown’s attorney and erroneously advised him that his sentencing exposure would be the same whether he accepted a plea deal or not. Brown rejected the plea offers and later pleaded guilty to all counts, receiving a 210-month sentence.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina found that Brown’s attorney performed deficiently but concluded that Brown failed to demonstrate he was prejudiced by his attorney’s advice. The magistrate judge recommended denying Brown’s motion to vacate his sentence, stating that Brown presented no contemporaneous evidence to support his claim that he would have accepted the plea agreement if properly advised. The district court adopted this recommendation and denied Brown’s motion.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case de novo and found that the district court erred in applying the standard from Lee v. United States, which concerns accepted plea deals, to Brown’s case involving a rejected plea deal. The Fourth Circuit held that Brown demonstrated a reasonable probability that he would have accepted the plea offer if properly advised, given the significant disparity between the plea offer and the sentence he received. The court reversed the district court’s denial of relief, remanded the case, and required the government to re-offer Brown the same plea agreements. View "United States v. Brown" on Justia Law