Justia Professional Malpractice & Ethics Opinion Summaries

In this case, Jerome Wesseh Koon, Jr. appealed from a district court judgment that denied his application for postconviction relief. Koon had been convicted of reckless endangerment, tampering with physical evidence, unlawful possession of a firearm, and terrorizing. His postconviction relief application was based on two main claims. Firstly, he argued that the district court erred by considering evidence outside the record, specifically the clerk's trial notes. Secondly, he claimed that he received ineffective assistance of counsel.The Supreme Court of the State of North Dakota affirmed the district court's judgment. The court rejected Koon's first argument, finding that the district court did not err in considering the clerk's trial notes. The court noted that the district court had provided notice to the parties of its intent to judicially notice the clerk's trial notes, and ultimately did not rely on the notes in its findings. The court also rejected Koon's argument that the district court's review of the clerk's notes automatically created a biased factfinder.Regarding Koon's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the Supreme Court found that Koon had failed to show that there was a reasonable probability that the result of his trial would have been different had his counsel acted differently. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's denial of postconviction relief. View "Koon v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed the conviction of Roy Lee Waters for felony murder related to the shooting death of his longtime girlfriend, Melvina Dunlap. Waters appealed on the grounds that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction, the trial court wrongly denied his motion for a new trial, and his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by not adequately investigating his insanity defense.The court found that the jury was authorized to reject Waters’s insanity defense based on its assessment of the credibility of the witnesses and of any conflicts in the evidence, including the testimony of a forensic psychologist who evaluated Waters and determined he was criminally responsible at the time of the shooting. The court also found that the trial court did not err in denying Waters's motion for a new trial based on "general grounds".On the issue of ineffective assistance of counsel, the court found that Waters's trial counsel was not deficient for failing to further investigate the insanity defense by procuring an expert to testify about Waters’s criminal responsibility at the time of the shooting, and even assuming that counsel was deficient in failing to procure an expert to testify about the side effects of Waters’s prescription medications, Waters failed to establish prejudice. Hence, the conviction was affirmed. View "WATERS v. THE STATE" on Justia Law

In the Supreme Court of Georgia, Raymond Chambliss was convicted of felony murder for the shooting death of his girlfriend, Tonia Herring, during an argument. On appeal, Chambliss raised several claims. He argued that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction, the court erred in its instructions to the jury on simple assault and lesser offenses, and his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to request charges for these lesser offenses.The Supreme Court of Georgia, however, disagreed with Chambliss's arguments. The court found that the evidence was sufficient to support Chambliss's felony murder conviction. Regarding the instructional errors, the court concluded that Chambliss had not shown that the given instruction on simple assault contained any obvious legal error and had not established that the trial court obviously erred by failing to charge the lesser offenses of felony or misdemeanor involuntary manslaughter. Lastly, the court found no merit in Chambliss's claims of ineffective assistance since he had not established that counsel performed deficiently by failing to request charges on lesser offenses that were not available to him.Consequently, the court affirmed Chambliss's conviction. View "CHAMBLISS v. THE STATE" on Justia Law

In this case, the defendant, Michael Angelo Tovar, was found guilty of various drug and firearm charges and was sentenced to 101 months in prison. He appealed his sentence, raising three issues: one surrounding his attempts to withdraw his guilty plea for the firearm charges and two concerning the calculation of his sentence.Tovar had sold cocaine to a confidential source twice and was arrested with cocaine and a large amount of cash on his person. A subsequent search of his home found further cash, a firearm, ammunition, and more drugs. Tovar pleaded guilty to all charges but later attempted to withdraw his guilty plea for possessing a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, arguing that his counsel had provided ineffective assistance. The district court denied these motions but removed his counsel from the case.Tovar also contested the district court's calculation of his sentence. The court had applied a "controlled substance offense" enhancement based on Tovar's prior Illinois cannabis conviction and had converted the cash found on Tovar's person and in his home to its equivalent marijuana weight as suspected drug proceeds.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's ruling. It found no error in the district court's denial of Tovar's motions to withdraw his guilty plea and the calculation of his sentence, including the application of the "controlled substance offense" enhancement and the conversion of the cash to its equivalent marijuana weight. The court also held that the district court did not err in denying Tovar's request for an evidentiary hearing on his motion to withdraw the guilty plea. View "USA v. Tovar" on Justia Law

The Idaho Supreme Court ruled in favor of the Idaho State Appellate Public Defender (SAPD) in a case involving the SAPD's statutory duty to arrange for substitute counsel for indigent defendants when a conflict of interest arises. The SAPD filed a direct action against the Fourth Judicial District Court, alleging that the court infringed on the SAPD’s statutory duty to arrange a new attorney for a defendant named Azad Abdullah. The SAPD had identified a conflict of interest in its own office and tried to substitute an attorney from Pennsylvania, but the district court refused the substitution and appointed a new attorney of its own choosing. The Idaho Supreme Court held that the district court had obstructed the SAPD's statutory duty and authority under Idaho Code section 19-5906. The Court ordered the district court's decisions to be vacated, restored the SAPD as attorney of record for the limited purpose of arranging for substitute counsel, and ordered the appointment of a new district judge to preside over Abdullah’s post-conviction proceeding. View "SAPD v. Fourth Judicial District" on Justia Law

In a case heard by the Supreme Court of Minnesota, the defendant, Christian Portillo, was charged with two counts of second-degree criminal sexual conduct. During the trial, the prosecutor elicited testimony from the State’s witnesses regarding evidence that the district court had previously ruled as inadmissible. The defendant's motion for a mistrial was denied by the district court. During the closing-argument rebuttal, the prosecutor told the jury that the defendant no longer held the presumption of innocence based on the evidence presented during the trial. The defendant did not object to this statement. The jury found the defendant guilty of one count of second-degree criminal sexual conduct.The defendant appealed, arguing that he was denied a fair trial due to prosecutorial errors committed by the State. The court of appeals affirmed the district court's decision, concluding that the prosecutor's misstatement of the law did not affect the defendant's substantial rights.Upon review, the Supreme Court of Minnesota reversed the decision of the court of appeals. The Supreme Court found that the prosecutor’s misstatement of the law during the closing-argument rebuttal was a plain error that affected the defendant’s substantial rights. The court held that the defendant is entitled to a new trial as the error must be addressed to ensure the fairness and integrity of the judicial proceedings. View "State of Minnesota vs. Portillo" on Justia Law

The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the ruling of the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio, which had denied Adam Carson's motion to vacate his sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Carson had been convicted of robbing a bank and tampering with a witness, and was sentenced to 20 years in prison. In his motion, Carson argued that his trial attorney had provided ineffective assistance by failing to initiate plea negotiations and by committing several mistakes during the trial. He also claimed that he did not knowingly waive his right to testify. The Court of Appeals held that Carson's ineffective-assistance claims failed because they lacked grounds for prejudice. The court ruled there was no reasonable probability that the outcome of Carson's case would have been different if his attorney had acted differently. The court also held that Carson had not demonstrated that he was deprived of his right to testify, as he did not object on the record to his attorney's statement that he did not want to testify. View "Carson v. United States" on Justia Law

In this case, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit upheld a conviction against Richard Lee David Brown for possession with intent to distribute a controlled substance. Law enforcement found Brown in an apartment during the execution of a search warrant, along with drugs, drug paraphernalia, and a cell phone that Brown admitted was his. Brown appealed his conviction, alleging multiple pre-trial and trial-related errors. However, the court affirmed the conviction, rejecting Brown's claims that he was improperly denied a jury instruction regarding "mere presence," that the court erred in admitting evidence of his prior convictions, and that he received ineffective assistance of counsel, among other issues. The court held that the instructions given to the jury were adequate and that the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction. The court also found that Brown's claims of ineffective assistance were best left for a post-conviction relief proceeding, such as a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. The court concluded that none of the alleged errors either individually or cumulatively warranted reversal of the conviction. View "United States v. Brown" on Justia Law

In this case, defendant Joseph James Tippet was initially charged with first-degree murder for allegedly shooting and killing his father. However, due to a series of discovery violations by the Eleventh Judicial District Attorney's Office, Tippet's charge was reduced to second-degree murder by the district court as a deterrent sanction. The Supreme Court of the State of Colorado was asked to review this decision.The People (prosecution) had a history of neglecting their discovery obligations, leading to multiple discovery violations in Tippet's case and others. Despite several warnings from various judges, the District Attorney's Office continued to neglect its discovery obligations. As a result, Tippet's defense counsel was unable to effectively prepare for his preliminary hearing.The Supreme Court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion by reducing Tippet's charge as a sanction for the District Attorney's Office's consistent neglect of its discovery obligations. The court emphasized the importance of the discovery process in advancing the search for truth and protecting the integrity of the truth-finding process. The court affirmed the sanction as a necessary deterrent to encourage the District Attorney's Office to modify its discovery practices. The court also rejected the People's argument that the district court lacked the authority to reduce the charge as a discovery sanction, explaining that the decision to impose sanctions for discovery violations was within the court's discretion.In conclusion, the court discharged the rule to show cause, upholding the district court's decision to reduce Tippet's charge from first-degree murder to second-degree murder as a deterrent sanction for the District Attorney's Office's discovery violations. View "People v. Tippet" on Justia Law

In this case, the defendant, Manegabe Chebea Ally, was convicted of first-degree manslaughter for the death of a 16-month-old child. He was sentenced to a 45-year prison term with 20 years suspended. Following his conviction, Ally appealed, alleging that his trial counsel was ineffective in several respects. After a series of evidentiary hearings, the habeas court granted him relief, determining that his counsel was indeed ineffective and that the cumulative effect of these deficiencies prejudiced his defense. The habeas court determined that Ally's right to a fair trial was violated.The Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota, however, reversed the decision of the habeas court. The Supreme Court found that while Ally's counsel's opening statement included an imprecise remark, this mistake did not undermine the adversarial process or deprive Ally of a fair trial. The Court also found that Ally's defense counsel made a reasonably strategic decision to exclude parts of Ally's three interviews with a detective and to not elicit additional testimony from a medical expert. Although the Court acknowledged that the defense counsel's failure to disclose a certain video to the prosecutor deviated from prevailing professional norms, it did not result in significant prejudice to Ally. The Court therefore concluded that Ally did not receive ineffective assistance of counsel at his 2012 trial, and the decision of the habeas court was reversed. View "Ally V. Young" on Justia Law