Justia Professional Malpractice & Ethics Opinion Summaries

Timothy Robert Ronk, who was convicted of armed robbery and capital murder and sentenced to death, sought post-conviction relief for a second time. He claimed his post-conviction counsel was ineffective. The State of Mississippi, in response, requested an overruling of Grayson v. State, which held that ineffective-assistance-of-post-conviction-counsel claims are an exception to the bars in the Mississippi Uniform Post-Conviction Collateral Relief Act (UPCCRA). The Supreme Court of Mississippi agreed with the State, citing a recent decision (Howell v. State) which invalidated all cases in which Mississippi courts had applied a "judicially crafted fundamental-rights exception" to the UPCCRA’s bars. Therefore, the court partially overruled Grayson and denied Ronk's request for post-conviction relief. The court determined that Ronk's claims, including that his trial counsel failed to investigate his case thoroughly and that the State suppressed evidence, lacked arguable basis, were insufficient to overcome the statutory bars, and did not meet the "newly-discovered-evidence" exception. View "Ronk v. State of Mississippi" on Justia Law

In 1993, Anthony Mungin was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to death. Mungin argued that his lawyer was ineffective during the guilt phase of his trial. In the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, Mungin presented four claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. Two were initially raised in his federal habeas petition, while the other two were added later. The court found that the first two claims failed under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), and habeas caselaw. The other two claims were deemed inadmissible in federal court because they did not relate back to the initial habeas petition and were therefore barred by the statute of limitations. The court corrected its precedent on the standard of review, stating that under Krupski v. Costa Crociere S.p.A, 560 U.S. 538 (2010), they review those decisions de novo. The district court's denial of Mungin’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus was affirmed. View "Mungin v. Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections" on Justia Law

In the case at hand, the Supreme Court of New Jersey considered whether the safeguards relating to eyewitness identification evidence should apply when lawyers meet with witnesses to prepare for trial. The case involved Brandon Washington, who was charged with two counts of attempted murder after shooting two people at a "Ladies Night" event. During the initial investigation, several witnesses selected Washington's picture from a photo array. Later, during trial preparation, an assistant prosecutor showed some witnesses the same photo array they had seen before or a single photo of Washington from Facebook. The witnesses later identified Washington in court. One witness identified Washington for the first time at trial.The Supreme Court held that witnesses who have made a prior identification should not be shown photos of the defendant during trial preparation, neither new photos of the defendant for the first time nor, absent good reason, the same photos they previously reviewed. If a party can demonstrate a good reason to show witnesses a photo of the defendant they previously identified, the party must prepare and disclose a written record of what occurred. If, however, a witness has not previously identified a suspect, investigators can conduct an identification procedure during pretrial preparation in accordance with the principles set forth in State v. Henderson. In this case, the court remanded the case to the trial court to conduct a hearing under United States v. Wade to determine the admissibility of the identification evidence. View "State v. Washington" on Justia Law

In the case, the Nebraska Supreme Court upheld the conviction of Bernard R. Turner for first degree murder. The court found no error in the trial court’s decision to grant the state’s motion to continue the trial due to the discovery of new evidence, a cell phone, a week prior to the original trial date. The Supreme Court stated that the timing of the state’s disclosure of the cell phone and its admission at trial did not violate Turner’s right to due process under Brady v. Maryland or Nebraska Revised Statute § 29-1912. The court also found that Turner waived his right to relief from the state’s belated disclosure by failing to request a continuance.The court further determined that the evidence presented at trial, including the testimony of a key witness who claimed Turner confessed to him, was sufficient to support Turner’s conviction. The court noted that a voluntary confession, with slight corroboration, can establish the corpus delicti as well as the defendant’s guilty participation.Finally, the court rejected Turner’s claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. Turner claimed his trial counsel failed to zealously advocate for him and did not present an adequate defense. However, the court found these claims were insufficiently specific and that Turner failed to show that his trial counsel’s performance was deficient or that this deficient performance actually prejudiced his defense. View "State v. Turner" on Justia Law

In this case from the Supreme Court of South Dakota, the defendant, Matthew Allan Carter, was convicted of first-degree rape of a minor. The victim, referred to as E.W., was the five-year-old daughter of Carter's then-girlfriend, Nycole Morkve. E.W. disclosed to her mother and grandmother that Carter, known as “Daddy Matt," had “licked” her “lady parts.” Medical examination revealed that E.W. had gonorrhea, a sexually transmitted infection, and a subsequent test showed that Carter also had gonorrhea. Additionally, a search of Carter's residence uncovered a hard drive containing videos of child pornography.On appeal, Carter argued that the trial court erred in its rulings related to evidence, his motion for acquittal, and his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. The Supreme Court of South Dakota reviewed these issues and affirmed the trial court's decisions. The court found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the jury to view brief clips of the child pornography videos found on Carter's hard drive, as they were relevant to proving Carter's intent and motive. The court also found that the trial court did not err in admitting E.W.'s statements about the abuse, as they were reliable and corroborated by other evidence. Additionally, the court held that there was sufficient evidence for a rational trier of fact to have found beyond a reasonable doubt that Carter orally penetrated E.W. Finally, the court declined to address Carter's ineffective assistance of counsel claims, as the record on that issue was not sufficiently developed.The court, therefore, affirmed Carter's conviction for first-degree rape. View "State V. Carter" on Justia Law

In this case, the Supreme Court of the State of Montana upheld the decision of the Montana First Judicial District Court, Lewis and Clark County, committing the appellant, C.M., a youth, to the custody of the Department of Corrections for placement in a state youth correctional facility until the age of 18. The appellant was charged with sex offenses against three of his high school classmates and he appealed the decision on the grounds that he was denied the right to effective assistance of counsel when his attorney failed to make objections to the admission of various hearsay statements.The court concluded that the appellant's counsel's failure to object to the admission of hearsay statements did not result in substantial prejudice. The court noted that the state presented sufficient admissible evidence to the jury that proved the same facts as the prior consistent statements and bus records. Furthermore, the court found that the appellant's counsel vigorously challenged the complaining witnesses' testimony by highlighting inconsistencies and gaps in their testimony, as well as aspects of the investigation. As a result, the court found that the appellant failed to demonstrate that he was prejudiced by any alleged deficient performance by his counsel and affirmed the lower court's decision. View "Matter of C.M" on Justia Law

In this case, Jerome Wesseh Koon, Jr. appealed from a district court judgment that denied his application for postconviction relief. Koon had been convicted of reckless endangerment, tampering with physical evidence, unlawful possession of a firearm, and terrorizing. His postconviction relief application was based on two main claims. Firstly, he argued that the district court erred by considering evidence outside the record, specifically the clerk's trial notes. Secondly, he claimed that he received ineffective assistance of counsel.The Supreme Court of the State of North Dakota affirmed the district court's judgment. The court rejected Koon's first argument, finding that the district court did not err in considering the clerk's trial notes. The court noted that the district court had provided notice to the parties of its intent to judicially notice the clerk's trial notes, and ultimately did not rely on the notes in its findings. The court also rejected Koon's argument that the district court's review of the clerk's notes automatically created a biased factfinder.Regarding Koon's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the Supreme Court found that Koon had failed to show that there was a reasonable probability that the result of his trial would have been different had his counsel acted differently. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's denial of postconviction relief. View "Koon v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed the conviction of Roy Lee Waters for felony murder related to the shooting death of his longtime girlfriend, Melvina Dunlap. Waters appealed on the grounds that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction, the trial court wrongly denied his motion for a new trial, and his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by not adequately investigating his insanity defense.The court found that the jury was authorized to reject Waters’s insanity defense based on its assessment of the credibility of the witnesses and of any conflicts in the evidence, including the testimony of a forensic psychologist who evaluated Waters and determined he was criminally responsible at the time of the shooting. The court also found that the trial court did not err in denying Waters's motion for a new trial based on "general grounds".On the issue of ineffective assistance of counsel, the court found that Waters's trial counsel was not deficient for failing to further investigate the insanity defense by procuring an expert to testify about Waters’s criminal responsibility at the time of the shooting, and even assuming that counsel was deficient in failing to procure an expert to testify about the side effects of Waters’s prescription medications, Waters failed to establish prejudice. Hence, the conviction was affirmed. View "WATERS v. THE STATE" on Justia Law

In the Supreme Court of Georgia, Raymond Chambliss was convicted of felony murder for the shooting death of his girlfriend, Tonia Herring, during an argument. On appeal, Chambliss raised several claims. He argued that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction, the court erred in its instructions to the jury on simple assault and lesser offenses, and his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to request charges for these lesser offenses.The Supreme Court of Georgia, however, disagreed with Chambliss's arguments. The court found that the evidence was sufficient to support Chambliss's felony murder conviction. Regarding the instructional errors, the court concluded that Chambliss had not shown that the given instruction on simple assault contained any obvious legal error and had not established that the trial court obviously erred by failing to charge the lesser offenses of felony or misdemeanor involuntary manslaughter. Lastly, the court found no merit in Chambliss's claims of ineffective assistance since he had not established that counsel performed deficiently by failing to request charges on lesser offenses that were not available to him.Consequently, the court affirmed Chambliss's conviction. View "CHAMBLISS v. THE STATE" on Justia Law

In this case, the defendant, Michael Angelo Tovar, was found guilty of various drug and firearm charges and was sentenced to 101 months in prison. He appealed his sentence, raising three issues: one surrounding his attempts to withdraw his guilty plea for the firearm charges and two concerning the calculation of his sentence.Tovar had sold cocaine to a confidential source twice and was arrested with cocaine and a large amount of cash on his person. A subsequent search of his home found further cash, a firearm, ammunition, and more drugs. Tovar pleaded guilty to all charges but later attempted to withdraw his guilty plea for possessing a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, arguing that his counsel had provided ineffective assistance. The district court denied these motions but removed his counsel from the case.Tovar also contested the district court's calculation of his sentence. The court had applied a "controlled substance offense" enhancement based on Tovar's prior Illinois cannabis conviction and had converted the cash found on Tovar's person and in his home to its equivalent marijuana weight as suspected drug proceeds.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's ruling. It found no error in the district court's denial of Tovar's motions to withdraw his guilty plea and the calculation of his sentence, including the application of the "controlled substance offense" enhancement and the conversion of the cash to its equivalent marijuana weight. The court also held that the district court did not err in denying Tovar's request for an evidentiary hearing on his motion to withdraw the guilty plea. View "USA v. Tovar" on Justia Law