Justia Professional Malpractice & Ethics Opinion Summaries

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed and remanded a district court's denial of Lucas James Tighe's habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. After being convicted and sentenced for possession of stolen firearms, possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, and conspiracy to possess stolen firearms, Tighe alleged ineffective assistance of counsel. He claimed that his trial attorney, Sharon Diaz, did not consult with him about filing an appeal. The Court of Appeals, applying the Strickland test, found that Diaz failed to adequately consult with Tighe about the potential appeal, which was considered professionally unreasonable. Furthermore, the court found that Tighe demonstrated a reasonable interest in appealing, given the unexpected severity of his sentence and his request to Diaz to ask the court to run his federal sentence concurrently with his forthcoming state sentence. The court also determined that Tighe had shown there was a reasonable probability that he would have timely appealed, but for Diaz's deficient performance. As a result, the court found that Tighe had successfully made an ineffective assistance of counsel claim which entitled him to an appeal. The case was remanded to the district court with instructions to grant an out-of-time appeal and reenter Tighe's criminal judgment. View "United States v. Tighe" on Justia Law

In the State of Maine v. Dale F. Thistle, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court upheld the conviction of Dale Thistle, an attorney, for theft by misapplication of property. Thistle was hired by Donna Friend, personal representative of the estate of Gilman Friend, to explore a potential wrongful death suit against emergency responders. Thistle negotiated a settlement of $390,000, which he deposited into his Interest on Lawyer’s Trust Account (IOLTA). Thistle then misappropriated the funds, failing to distribute the owed amount to Gilman's children, and instead frequently withdrawing money for personal expenses.Thistle appealed his conviction on several grounds, including that the trial court erred by not granting his motion for acquittal due to a statute of limitations defense, the court erred in its instructions to the jury on the Maine Rules of Professional Conduct, the State committed prosecutorial error, and that the evidence was insufficient to convict him.The Supreme Judicial Court rejected all of Thistle's arguments. The court found that Thistle had waived his statute of limitations defense by admitting facts that tolled the limitations period. The court also held that the prosecutor's statements during closing arguments did not constitute error. Finally, the court ruled that there was sufficient evidence to support the jury's finding that Thistle intentionally or recklessly failed to pay the settlement funds to Gilman's children and used the money as his own, thereby committing theft by misapplication of property. View "State v. Thistle" on Justia Law

David Abraham Lorenz was convicted in 2003 for operating an illegal drug lab and possessing illegal drugs in the state of Montana. His initial sentence was partially suspended, but multiple violations led to the suspension being lifted and further sentencing in 2005 and 2014. In 2020, the State sought to revoke his suspended sentences again. Lorenz, who initially represented himself, requested counsel in July 2021. However, prior to the dispositional hearing in August 2021, his attorney, Michael Haase, filed a motion to withdraw. Lorenz consented to this but then indicated he did not want to proceed without a lawyer. Despite a perceived conflict, Haase continued to represent Lorenz in the hearing, and Lorenz was resentenced after his suspended sentences were revoked.Lorenz appealed, arguing that the District Court had not adequately investigated his complaint about his lawyer. The Supreme Court of the State of Montana disagreed, ruling that Lorenz had not directly raised any issues about Haase's effectiveness or requested a substitution of counsel. The court further noted that Lorenz had agreed to Haase's motion to withdraw, then reaffirmed his desire for Haase's representation during the dispositional hearing. The Supreme Court thus affirmed the District Court's decision. View "State v. Lorenz" on Justia Law

In the case before the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, the defendant, Jonathan Kearn, was initially indicted on three child pornography offenses involving his own children. He faced up to 30 years’ imprisonment for these charges. However, the government offered a plea agreement for a 10-year sentence if Kearn pled guilty to one of the counts. Following a six-minute conversation with his trial counsel about the plea agreement, Kearn decided to reject the offer and proceed to trial. He was then convicted on all three counts and sentenced to 24 years in prison. After exhausting his appeals, Kearn filed a pro se motion arguing that his trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective during the plea-bargaining phase.The district court granted Kearn's motion, finding that his trial counsel provided deficient advice about the proposed plea deal, and that there was a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, Kearn would have pleaded guilty. The court ordered the government to reoffer the plea. It then accepted Kearn’s guilty plea, vacated the prior judgment, and resentenced him to 10 years’ imprisonment.On appeal, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court found that Kearn's trial counsel's brief discussion with him was inadequate to explain the complexities of the plea and that counsel had given Kearn inaccurate and misleading information. The court also found that given the substantial difference in sentencing exposure—20 years—and the evidence suggesting Kearn was amenable to pleading guilty if he had been adequately advised, the district court reasonably found that Kearn would have accepted a properly presented plea deal and avoided trial. View "United States v. Kearn" on Justia Law

In this appeal from the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, the defendant, John Miguel Swan, appealed the district court’s denial of his presentence motion to withdraw his guilty plea. The case originated from a grand jury indictment of Swan for being a felon in possession of ammunition. Swan initially plead guilty, but five months later, the district court allowed Swan's plea counsel to withdraw and appointed new counsel. Swan later wrote a pro se letter to the district court asserting his factual innocence and indicating that his plea counsel had compelled him to plead guilty. This appeal focuses on the claim that plea counsel materially misrepresented the nature of Swan's right to a jury trial, which, Swan argued, rendered his guilty plea unknowing and involuntary.The court found that Swan’s plea counsel informed him that all minorities would be removed from his jury and his case would be tried before exclusively white jurors. This was seen as a material misrepresentation about Swan’s right to an impartial jury selected through racially nondiscriminatory means. The court determined that under these circumstances, Swan’s plea was unknowing and involuntary, and the district court abused its discretion in denying Swan’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Accordingly, the court reversed the lower court's decision and remanded the case back to the district court to allow Swan to withdraw his guilty plea for further proceedings. View "United States v. Swan" on Justia Law

In the case before the Supreme Court of the State of Colorado, the court had to decide whether Anthony Robert Smith had waived some of the claims he had raised in a pro se Crim. P. 35(c) motion by not pursuing certain claims in later briefings and at a postconviction hearing. The court also had to consider whether counsel could abandon some of a defendant’s pro se Crim. P. 35(c) claims without first obtaining the defendant’s informed consent, and whether abandonment of individual postconviction claims requires a showing of intent to do so.Smith was convicted of multiple counts of sexual assault on a child and promotion of obscenity to a minor. After his conviction was affirmed by the court of appeals, Smith filed a pro se Crim. P. 35(c) motion, asserting several claims of ineffective assistance of counsel and prosecutorial misconduct. After appointed counsel filed a Supplemental Motion for Post-Conviction Relief that did not include some of Smith's pro se claims, the postconviction court found that Smith had waived those omitted claims.On appeal, a division of the court of appeals reversed the postconviction court’s decision, concluding that Smith’s claims were preserved because they were not superseded by counsel’s motion. The Supreme Court of the State of Colorado disagreed and reversed the judgment of the court of appeals.The Supreme Court of the State of Colorado held that Smith abandoned the claims he stopped pursuing. The court also decided that counsel, as the “captain of the ship,” has the authority to make strategic decisions, including which claims to pursue. Therefore, counsel may abandon some of a defendant’s pro se Crim. P. 35(c) claims without the client’s informed consent. The court did not rule on whether abandonment of individual postconviction claims requires a showing of intent to abandon such claims. View "People v. Smith" on Justia Law

The case involves the Commonwealth's appeal of a judgment by a single justice of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, which upheld a lower court judge's decision to disqualify a prosecutor, Matthew Green, from a murder case. The defendant, Blake Scanlon, had been indicted on murder charges and was also later charged with soliciting to commit witness intimidation and murder. One of the solicitation targets was Green, the prosecutor for the initial murder indictment. The basis for Green's disqualification was not because he was a victim in the solicitation case, but because he made himself a potential witness at trial. This was due to his interactions with a jailhouse informant, with whom Scanlon was incarcerated and who claimed Scanlon solicited him for a murder-for-hire plot. In exchange for the informant's cooperation, Green advocated for lighter sentences and bail conditions for him in separate legal proceedings. The defendant argued that these actions made Green a potential witness, either to confirm or dispute the informant's claims, or to question the informant's credibility due to bias in favor of the Commonwealth. The lower court judge agreed and disqualified Green from the case. The Commonwealth appealed, arguing that Green's disqualification was an error, as he was only a potential witness, and that other means could be used to present the necessary information at trial. The Commonwealth also argued that the disqualification raised separation of powers concerns by interfering in the executive branch's discretion to choose a prosecutor. The Supreme Judicial Court disagreed, affirming the lower court judge's decision. It found that the level of Green's involvement with the informant's legal proceedings was extensive, making him more than just a potential witness, and that the judge's decision did not constitute an intolerable interference in the executive branch. View "Commonwealth v. Scanlon" on Justia Law

In this case, defendant Samuel Arce-Ayala, a leader of a drug trafficking organization, pled guilty to federal charges related to drug trafficking and firearm possession. He believed, based on his plea agreement and statements made by his lawyer and the district court, that his federal sentence would reflect "credit" for the prison time he served for related non-federal criminal convictions. However, after entering his guilty plea, Arce-Ayala discovered that such credit could not reduce his sentence below the applicable mandatory minimum terms of imprisonment. He moved to withdraw his plea before sentencing, arguing that he didn't understand the consequences of his guilty plea, but the district court denied the motion.The United States Court of Appeals For the First Circuit vacated Arce-Ayala's criminal judgment of conviction. The court held that Arce-Ayala did not have sufficient "knowledge of the consequences of the guilty plea" because he was told by his defense counsel and the district court that the time he spent in Commonwealth custody would be credited toward his federal sentence. He did not know that the mandatory minimum prison sentence set an inviolable floor as to the amount of credit he could receive for time served on the Commonwealth sentences. As such, his plea violated a "core concern" of Rule 11, which requires a defendant to understand the consequences of a guilty plea, and must be set aside. The case was remanded back to the district court for further proceedings. View "United States v. Arce-Ayala" on Justia Law

In the Supreme Court of Georgia, Justice Ellington delivered the opinion on the case of Isaiah Adams who was found guilty by a Fulton County jury of malice murder and other offenses in connection with the shooting death of Laron Lowe and the aggravated assault of Ronda Dobson. Isaiah and his co-defendants were charged with murder, felony murder, aggravated assault, criminal damage to property in the first degree, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. The jury found the Adams brothers guilty on all counts, and Isaiah was sentenced to life in prison for malice murder, among other sentences for the other charges. Isaiah filed a motion for a new trial, which was denied by the trial court. On appeal, Isaiah argued that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions, the trial court erred in admitting certain evidence, and that his trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective. The Supreme Court of Georgia rejected all of Isaiah's arguments and affirmed the trial court’s order denying his motion for a new trial. The Court found that the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to support the jury’s finding that Isaiah participated in the crimes and that the trial court did not err in its evidentiary rulings or in denying Isaiah’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. View "ADAMS v. STATE" on Justia Law

In 2019, Justin Remler was convicted for felony murder and aggravated assault related to the death of Tristan Mitchell, a two-year-old child. Remler, who was alone with Tristan in the hours prior to his death, challenged his conviction, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support the jury's verdict, that the trial court erred in its instructions to the jury, and that his trial counsel was ineffective. The Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed the trial court's judgment, stating that the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction, the trial court did not err in its instructions to the jury, and Remler's trial counsel was not ineffective. The court highlighted that Remler's argument that alternative hypotheses, such as the child's father causing the injuries or the child's death being caused by an enlarged heart, were reasonable was a question for the jury. The court concluded that it was within the jury’s purview to reject these alternative hypotheses as unreasonable given the evidence presented. The court also found that Remler's trial counsel's focus on one defense theory was objectively reasonable professional conduct, and thus did not constitute ineffective assistance. View "REMLER v. STATE" on Justia Law