Justia Professional Malpractice & Ethics Opinion Summaries

Ramel Ortiz was convicted of six counts of sexual assault and other felonies after breaking into M.P.'s house and forcing her to engage in multiple sexual acts. Four of these sexual assault counts arose from an incident during which Ortiz subjected M.P. to intercourse in different sexual positions. Ortiz appealed his conviction, arguing that his appellate counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to support multiple sexual assault convictions.Ortiz's case was first reviewed by the Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County, which denied his postconviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Ortiz then appealed to the Supreme Court of the State of Nevada.The Supreme Court of the State of Nevada found that appellate counsel's omission of a sufficiency challenge to the multiple convictions fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. The court concluded that because the sufficiency challenge stood a reasonable probability of success had it been raised on appeal from the judgment of conviction, Ortiz was prejudiced by appellate counsel's omission of that challenge. The court therefore reversed in part and remanded for the district court to vacate three of Ortiz's sexual assault convictions. However, the court affirmed the district court's decision as to Ortiz's remaining claims, which it found to lack merit. View "Ortiz v. State" on Justia Law

Jeffrey Roads was convicted of transporting and accessing child pornography, and received a 324-month prison sentence. He appealed, alleging conflicts of interest among his defense counsel and the presiding judge. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit previously vacated Roads's sentence and ordered a lower court to determine whether a conflict of interest among Roads's defense counsel may have affected his substantial rights. After re-assignment of the case to a different judge and changes in counsel, Roads's motions for disclosure of information and recusal were denied. His motion to withdraw his guilty plea was also denied, and he was re-sentenced to the same term of imprisonment.On appeal to the Eighth Circuit, Roads argued that the district court erred in denying his motions and in applying a two-level obstruction enhancement during sentencing. He claimed that a reasonable person may question the impartiality of the court due to perceived personal relationships with federal officials or court employees who had been threatened by another individual, Justin Fletcher.However, the Appeals Court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Roads's motions. It found that Roads had failed to provide any information suggesting the court could not be impartial. The court also found that Roads's reasons for recusal were based on inaccurate "facts" and mere speculation. The court denied Roads's motion to withdraw his guilty plea as he failed to show a fair and just reason for withdrawal. It concluded that the district court was correct in applying the obstruction enhancement, as Roads had attempted to destroy evidence. Therefore, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court, upholding Roads's sentence. View "United States v. Roads" on Justia Law

The case arose from appellant Khamal Fooks' claim that his attorney misled him about the parole eligibility related to his plea agreement. Fooks had pleaded guilty to third-degree murder, conspiracy, and carrying an unlicensed gun in a Pennsylvania state court. He later alleged that his lawyer incorrectly assured him he would be eligible for parole after ten years, when in reality, he had to serve at least twenty. His allegations, if true, would demonstrate that his lawyer’s advice was ineffective.Both the state and the federal district courts dismissed his claims without providing an opportunity for an evidentiary hearing. Fooks then appealed this decision to the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. The Circuit Court found that Fooks' allegations, if proven, would indeed establish ineffective assistance of counsel, thereby warranting habeas relief.The Circuit Court held that the district court erred in not affording Fooks an evidentiary hearing to substantiate his allegations. The court emphasized the importance of giving petitioners a fair chance to prove their allegations and remanded the case for an evidentiary hearing. The court did not rule on Fooks' entitlement to relief, instead emphasizing the need for a fair opportunity to present evidence supporting his claims. View "Khamal Fooks v. Superintendent Smithfield SCI" on Justia Law

Charles Robinson, the defendant, was convicted of first-degree murder in connection with the shooting death of Edward Figueroa. Following his conviction, Robinson appealed and also filed a motion for a new trial citing multiple errors by trial counsel. Despite his appeal and the motion for a new trial, the conviction was affirmed.Later, Robinson appealed from the denial of his motion for a new trial, arguing that he was not competent to stand trial due to mental health issues and that he had received ineffective assistance of counsel. However, the court upheld the ruling, stating that Robinson had not shown any evidence that his mental health issues had influenced the jury's conclusion or prevented an adequate defense.Robinson's contention that his counsel failed "reasonably to communicate with him" during and after a conversation in the lockup was also dismissed, as the court found no evidence of a breakdown in the attorney-client relationship that warranted a new trial.The court concluded that the defendant did not present a substantial issue meriting an evidentiary hearing and dismissed his request for relief under G. L. c. 278, § 33E for a new trial. View "Commonwealth v. Robinson" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court of North Carolina was tasked with reviewing the decision of the Court of Appeals related to a defendant's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. The defendant was convicted of first-degree murder in 1999 and sentenced to life imprisonment without parole. Over two decades later, the defendant filed a motion for appropriate relief (MAR), arguing that his trial counsel did not inform him of his right to testify and prevented him from testifying. He also claimed that his appellate counsel was ineffective because they filed an Anders brief.The Supreme Court concluded that the Court of Appeals correctly disposed of the defendant's claims. The record demonstrated that the defendant was aware of his right to testify, and there was no evidence to support his claim that his trial counsel prevented him from testifying. Furthermore, the defendant's claim that his appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge limitations on an expert witness’s testimony was without merit because the trial court had appropriately restricted the expert from using legal terminology. Therefore, the defendant's claims of ineffective assistance of both trial and appellate counsel were deemed baseless.The Supreme Court also held that the standard of review set forth in a previous case, State v. Allen, which involved reviewing MARs in the light most favorable to defendants, was a departure from the court's longstanding standard of review. Thus, the court returned to the previous standard of review, which involves a statutory review pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 15A-1420(c). View "State v. Walker" on Justia Law

In this case from the Supreme Court of Georgia, Marquavious Howard was appealing his felony murder conviction for the 2017 shooting death of Jacorbin King. Howard was accused of participating in a robbery at King's apartment that resulted in King's death. Howard was indicted along with four others, and at trial, he was found not guilty of malice murder and firearm possession, but guilty of felony murder and aggravated assault. He was sentenced to life with the possibility of parole.Howard appealed to the Supreme Court of Georgia, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his convictions, his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to move to suppress evidence of a photo identification, and the trial court erred in excusing a juror for cause. The Supreme Court of Georgia rejected all of Howard's arguments and affirmed the lower court's decision.The Court found that there was enough evidence to support the conviction, including testimonies from several witnesses and a confession Howard allegedly made to a jail bunkmate. As for the claim of ineffective counsel, the Court ruled that Howard didn't prove that a motion to suppress the photo identification would have been granted. Regarding the excused juror, the Court stated that Howard didn't have a right to a specific juror and didn't prove that the selected jury was biased or incompetent. View "HOWARD v. THE STATE" on Justia Law

This case involved defendant Julie A. Corey who was convicted of first-degree murder on the grounds of deliberate premeditation, extreme atrocity or cruelty, and felony-murder with the underlying felony of aggravated kidnapping. Following her conviction, Corey filed a motion for a new trial, arguing that she received ineffective assistance of counsel due to her attorney's failure to call a cell phone expert to testify about her location on the night of the murder. She also requested that the court enter a required finding of not guilty. The trial judge, who was also the motion judge, denied Corey's motion for a new trial but vacated her conviction of murder in the first degree on a theory of felony-murder, finding that the evidence was insufficient to prove that Corey committed the predicate felony of aggravated kidnapping.On appeal, the Supreme Judicial Court disagreed with Corey’s argument that she received ineffective assistance of counsel. The court found that her trial counsel's decision not to call a cell phone expert was not ineffective and would not have likely influenced the jury's conclusions. Furthermore, the court agreed with the Commonwealth that there was sufficient evidence to find Corey guilty of felony-murder with a predicate felony of aggravated kidnapping. Consequently, the court reinstated that conviction. The court also declined to exercise its powers under G. L. c. 278, § 33E to reduce Corey's conviction. View "Commonwealth v. Corey" on Justia Law

In this case, Andre Pugh appealed his conviction for the murder of his wife and the possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. Pugh challenged the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress evidence obtained via a search warrant for his cell phone records. He also alleged that his trial counsel was ineffective for not challenging the search warrant's specificity and that his counsel during his motion for a new trial was ineffective in various respects.The Supreme Court of Georgia disagreed with Pugh's claims and affirmed his conviction. The court found that the search warrant in question was supported by probable cause. The warrant was based on Pugh's unusual behavior at the crime scene, his relationship with the victim, inconsistencies between his statements and the evidence at the scene, and evidence suggesting that the crime was committed by someone familiar with the residence.The court also rejected Pugh's claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. It found that the claims Pugh wanted his trial counsel to raise would not have been successful. Additionally, it determined that Pugh's claims of ineffective assistance of counsel during his motion for a new trial were procedurally barred. View "PUGH v. THE STATE" on Justia Law

The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of a federal habeas corpus petition by Raymond Anthony Lewis, who was sentenced to death in 1991 after a California jury convicted him of the first-degree murder of Sandra Simms. Lewis argued that the state trial court's admission of his juvenile confession to a prior murder was unconstitutional and that his trial counsel was ineffective in failing to present evidence of his innocence of the prior murder. The court concluded that the California Supreme Court's affirmance of the trial court's admission of Lewis's juvenile confession was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of federal law and that Lewis's trial counsel’s litigation of the evidence of the prior murder did not fall below an objective standard of reasonableness.Lewis also contended that his trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective by failing to investigate, develop, and present certain mitigating evidence during the penalty phase of the trial. The court found that Lewis failed to show that his trial counsel’s performance fell below an objectively reasonable standard. His counsel made reasonable strategic decisions to ask for the jury’s mercy and to appeal to any lingering doubt the jurors may have had about Lewis’s guilt. The court also concluded that much of the evidence Lewis argued his trial counsel was ineffective in not introducing would have been cumulative of evidence his counsel did introduce.Lewis also raised uncertified claims on appeal, but the court denied a certificate of appealability on these claims. View "LEWIS V. ANDES" on Justia Law

Claude P. Lacombe appealed the United States District Court for the District of Delaware's denial of habeas relief, arguing that the Delaware Supreme Court wrongfully denied his claims that the State breached its plea agreement and that his counsel was ineffective for failing to demand specific performance of the plea agreement. Lacombe had pleaded guilty to several counts, including second-degree murder, in exchange for the State's agreement to recommend a sentence of 22 years. Instead, Lacombe received a life sentence. The Third Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court's denial of habeas relief. The Court held that even if the State breached its plea agreement and Lacombe's counsel was ineffective, any constitutional error was harmless under Brecht, Strickland, and Puckett v. United States, as Lacombe could not establish that he suffered "actual prejudice" as a result of the State's rhetoric and his counsel's failure to object. The court did not decide whether the State actually breached the plea agreement, citing that a failure to show either deficient performance or sufficient prejudice defeats an ineffectiveness claim. View "Lacombe v. Warden" on Justia Law