Justia Professional Malpractice & Ethics Opinion Summaries

Duane Burchill was convicted of two counts of robbery, one count of conspiracy to commit deceptive practices, and one count of possession of dangerous drugs in 2017. Following his conviction, Burchill filed a petition for postconviction relief, asserting that his counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to object to the prosecutor’s misconduct during his trial. The Supreme Court of the State of Montana affirmed the denial of Burchill's petition for postconviction relief.Burchill's claim of ineffective assistance centered on two main arguments. First, he argued that the prosecutor repeatedly asked him to comment on the credibility of other witnesses by asking "were they lying" questions. Second, he alleged that the prosecutor posed questions suggesting his personal opinion that Burchill's testimony was not truthful.The court, however, found that the "were they lying" questions were not improper because they had probative value in evaluating the credibility of a defendant who is claiming that everyone else is lying. The court also disagreed that the prosecutor had expressed personal opinions on Burchill's credibility. The court concluded that the prosecutor's questions were within the scope of permissible questions allowed on cross-examination. Therefore, the court found that Burchill's counsel's failure to object did not constitute ineffective assistance.The court did not find it necessary to address Burchill's claim of prejudice due to the failure of his counsel to object, as it had already determined that his counsel's performance was not deficient. Thus, Burchill's petition for postconviction relief was denied. View "Burchill v. State" on Justia Law

A man, David Wayne Eady, who was charged with multiple robberies in Nashville over a month, appealed the decision of the Court of Criminal Appeals which denied his motion to disqualify the District Attorney General’s Office from prosecuting his case. Eady argued that the District Attorney General's office should be disqualified because the District Attorney had represented him in a previous case approximately thirty years earlier. The Supreme Court of Tennessee disagreed, finding that the District Attorney did not have an actual conflict of interest under the Rules of Professional Conduct because the current case and the previous case were not "substantially related." The court also rejected the defendant’s argument that the appearance of impropriety should disqualify the District Attorney General’s Office, noting that the Rules of Professional Conduct did not retain the concept of appearance of impropriety.Eady also argued that his trial was improperly conducted as a single trial for multiple offenses under the theory that the separate crimes were all parts of a larger, continuing plan. The Supreme Court of Tennessee agreed with Eady on this point, finding that the trial court erred in denying his motion to sever the offenses. The court held that the evidence did not support a finding that the offenses were parts of a larger, continuing plan, and remanded the case for a new trial on one of the counts. View "State v. Eady" on Justia Law

In the case under review, the appellant, David Wallace Lee, was convicted of two counts of malice murder related to the shooting deaths of Meghan Bowen and James Harden. The appellant argued on several grounds, including insufficiency of evidence, trial court errors, and ineffective assistance of counsel.The Supreme Court of Georgia concluded that the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to support the appellant's convictions. The evidence demonstrated a history of abuse, jealousy, and threats by the appellant towards Bowen, which escalated in the months leading up to the murders. The appellant's claims of trial court errors were also rejected, as the court found no abuse of discretion in the admission of testimony regarding the appellant's possession of a gun similar to the murder weapon and found no actual conflict of interest necessitating the disqualification of an assistant district attorney.Further, the appellant's claims of ineffective assistance of counsel were also rejected. The court held that the appellant failed to demonstrate that his counsel’s performance was professionally deficient and that he suffered prejudice as a result.Therefore, the court affirmed the appellant's convictions and sentence. View "LEE v. STATE" on Justia Law

The defendant, Luis Vendrel, was convicted for malice murder and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony in connection with the shooting death of Nova Jill Saffles. Vendrel appealed his convictions, arguing that he suffered a constructive denial of his right to counsel or otherwise received ineffective assistance of trial counsel. He claimed that his counsel failed to interview defense witnesses before trial, failed to prepare him to testify, and failed to conduct factual research or consult with experts to prepare to challenge the prosecution’s forensic evidence. The Supreme Court of Georgia found that Vendrel failed to establish that any of these alleged deficiencies in counsel's performance prejudiced his defense. Therefore, the court affirmed Vendrel's convictions. The court held that the defendant did not meet the stringent standard to raise a presumption of prejudice under United States v. Cronic, as he did not demonstrate that his counsel entirely failed to subject the State’s case to adversarial testing. Instead, the court applied the two-part Strickland test and found that Vendrel failed to show that his counsel's performance was constitutionally deficient or that this deficient performance prejudiced him. View "VENDREL v. STATE" on Justia Law

In 2018, Hassan Shareef Rashad was indicted for numerous charges including the malice murder of two-year-old Adrian Mitchell. The Supreme Court of Georgia upheld Rashad's conviction. The evidence presented at trial showed that Rashad, who was in a romantic relationship with Adrian's mother, Sydney Dean, was the only adult present when Adrian suffered fatal injuries. Witnesses reported observing concerning behavior between Rashad and Adrian, including verbal abuse and physical punishment. In October 2017, Adrian was taken to the hospital with a fractured leg, which doctors concluded was likely caused by non-accidental trauma. In April 2018, Adrian was found unresponsive and later died from what doctors concluded were non-accidental, significant force injuries. The Supreme Court of Georgia held that the evidence was sufficient to authorize a jury to find Rashad guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the malice murder of Adrian. Rashad's claims of ineffective assistance of counsel were also rejected. View "RASHAD v. STATE" on Justia Law

In the Supreme Court of Georgia, Dedric Jackson and Dimitrius Castle were found guilty of felony murder and other related crimes after the fatal shooting of Norman Ray Moore, Jr. at a party. Jackson appealed, arguing that he received ineffective legal assistance in several ways. He alleged that his trial lawyer withdrew a request for a jury charge on justification, failed to request a charge on defense of habitation, did not object to evidence of a prior crime and bad character, and did not object to specific witness testimonies and jury instructions. Jackson also argued that the trial court should have given a jury charge on justification, even though he withdrew the request. Castle argued that the evidence at trial was insufficient to sustain his conviction for battery, his trial counsel was ineffective by failing to request certain jury instructions and by calling a defense witness, and that the trial court erred by not merging the aggravated assault verdict into the felony murder conviction. The court rejected all these arguments and affirmed the convictions in both cases. View "JACKSON v. STATE" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court of New Hampshire affirmed the conviction of Gregory M. Collins for selling a controlled drug resulting in death. Collins had appealed the conviction, arguing that the Superior Court erred by not recusing the Strafford County Attorney’s Office due to a conflict of interest and by denying his motions to dismiss the charge based on insufficient evidence. The conflict of interest arose from Collins' prior romantic relationship with a legal assistant in the Strafford County Attorney’s Office. The Supreme Court ruled that any conflict of interest from this relationship could not be attributed to the entire county attorney’s office, and the measures taken by the office were sufficient to avoid any appearance of conflict. Regarding the sufficiency of evidence, the court found that Collins had not met his burden of demonstrating that the evidence was insufficient to prove his guilt. The court held that there was enough evidence to support the finding that the decedent died of acute fentanyl toxicity and that Collins was the source of the lethal dose. View "State v. Collins" on Justia Law

In this case, Richard Huff, a convicted murderer serving a life sentence, filed a pro se postconviction petition alleging that his life sentence was unconstitutional under Apprendi v. New Jersey. The petition was automatically advanced to the second stage due to the time limit, and counsel was appointed. However, appointed counsel did not amend the pro se petition and instead stood on the allegations in the petition. The Cook County circuit court dismissed the petition, and the appellate court affirmed. Huff argued that his postconviction counsel provided unreasonable assistance by standing on a meritless petition, rather than moving to withdraw or amending the pro se petition. The Supreme Court of the State of Illinois held that Huff failed to rebut the presumption of reasonable assistance and affirmed the dismissal of the pro se petition. The court found no indication that Huff's postconviction counsel knew that his claim was frivolous or patently without merit. The court also noted that while Huff's claim was ultimately unsuccessful, there was no duty for his counsel to withdraw under these circumstances. View "People v. Huff" on Justia Law

Ivan Reyes-Arzate, the defendant-appellant, appealed his conviction and sentence after pleading guilty to a drug offense before the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York. He was sentenced to 120 months' imprisonment, four years of supervised release, and was also subjected to a special assessment and forfeiture. His defense counsel filed an Anders brief seeking to withdraw from the appeal on the basis that any appeal would be frivolous due to the defendant's plea agreement, which included a valid waiver of the right to appeal any sentence of 293 months or less. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, however, deferred a decision on the motion to withdraw and ordered the defense counsel to submit a supplemental brief. The court found that the defense counsel's brief only addressed the validity of Reyes-Arzate's appeal waiver and did not discuss the scope of the waiver, particularly as it related to non-imprisonment components of the sentence such as the term and conditions of supervised release. The court clarified that when filing Anders briefs, defense counsels should address all aspects of a defendant’s conviction and sentence that are not unambiguously waived. The court deferred decision on the motions and ordered the defendant-appellant's counsel to file a supplemental brief addressing whether the non-imprisonment components of the sentence, which are not unambiguously covered by the appeal waiver, present any non-frivolous issues for appeal. View "United States v. Reyes-Arzate" on Justia Law

The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit vacated the conviction of John Miguel Swan, who had pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of ammunition. Swan appealed the district court's denial of his motion to withdraw his guilty plea, arguing that his plea was unknowing and involuntary due to a material misrepresentation made by his plea counsel. His counsel had told him, just before he decided to plead guilty, that all minorities would be removed from his jury, and his case would be tried before exclusively white jurors. The court held that this misrepresentation about Swan's right to an impartial jury selected through racially nondiscriminatory means rendered his plea unknowing and involuntary. The court found that the misrepresentation was not corrected during the district court’s plea colloquy nor negated by Swan’s prior experience in the criminal-justice system. As such, the court held that the district court abused its discretion in denying Swan’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea, vacated Swan's conviction, and remanded for the district court to allow Swan to withdraw his guilty plea and for further proceedings. View "United States v. Swan" on Justia Law