Justia Professional Malpractice & Ethics Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Criminal Law
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Larry D. Huggins III was convicted of felony murder, attempted aggravated robbery, aggravated burglary, and conspiracy to commit aggravated robbery following a series of events that led to the deaths of two young men. Huggins and his accomplices planned to rob O.H., a minor who sold marijuana, but the plan went awry, resulting in a shootout. Huggins was injured and later arrested. At trial, Huggins testified, denying any intent to rob and claiming he was merely trying to buy marijuana.The Shawnee District Court found Huggins guilty on all counts. He was sentenced to a hard 25 life sentence for felony murder, with additional consecutive sentences for the other charges, totaling a minimum of 25 years plus 103 months. Huggins was also ordered to pay $2,500 in attorney fees.The Kansas Supreme Court reviewed several issues on appeal. Huggins argued that the jury instructions were erroneous because they did not match the charging document, which listed two victims for the attempted aggravated robbery. The court found the instructions legally appropriate as they included all statutory elements of the crime. Huggins also claimed insufficient evidence for his convictions, but the court held that the State did not need to prove he intended to rob both victims named in the charging document.Huggins challenged the voluntariness of his statements to police, arguing he was under the influence of medication and fatigued. The court found his statements voluntary, noting he was coherent and calm during the interview. Huggins also contested the admissibility of Facebook messages obtained via a search warrant, but the court ruled he failed to preserve this issue for appeal.The court found no prosecutorial error in the prosecutor's comments during closing arguments and rejected Huggins' claim of cumulative error. However, the court vacated the imposition of attorney fees, remanding the case for reconsideration of Huggins' ability to pay. The Kansas Supreme Court affirmed the convictions but vacated and remanded the fee imposition. View "State v. Huggins" on Justia Law

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In December 1974, Peter Sulfaro was shot and killed during an armed robbery at his shoe repair shop. His son, Paul Sulfaro, was the only witness. Three men, including Raymond Gaines, were convicted of the crime. Decades later, Gaines filed a motion for a new trial, citing new evidence and issues with the original trial.Gaines's convictions were affirmed by the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts in 1978. He made several unsuccessful attempts for postconviction relief. In 2021, he filed his fourth motion for a new trial, which was granted by a Superior Court judge. The Commonwealth appealed this decision to the Supreme Judicial Court for the county of Suffolk.The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts reviewed the case and upheld the decision to grant a new trial. The court found that new scientific research on eyewitness identification, which was not available at the time of the original trial, could have significantly impacted the jury's deliberations. Additionally, the court found that the Commonwealth failed to disclose exculpatory evidence, including a note about a leg injury Gaines sustained before the crime and the arrest of a key witness, David Bass, which could have been used to challenge his credibility. The court also noted that the Commonwealth had an ethical duty to disclose any witness recantations, regardless of their credibility or timing.The court concluded that the combination of these factors indicated that justice may not have been done in the original trial, and therefore, a new trial was warranted. The decision to grant a new trial was affirmed. View "Commonwealth v. Gaines" on Justia Law

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Four appellants sought post-conviction relief in Elkhart County, Indiana, alleging systemic police and prosecutorial misconduct that led to wrongful convictions. They argued that the judge, who had recused herself in a similar prior case involving Andrew Royer, should also recuse herself from their cases due to similar concerns about impartiality. The judge had previously recused herself in Royer's case because she had characterized Royer's attorney's comments as "defamatory" and had worked with many of the witnesses Royer intended to call, raising questions about her impartiality.In the lower courts, the Elkhart Circuit Court judge denied the appellants' motions for recusal, reasoning that her prior employment as a deputy prosecutor did not necessitate recusal and that her comments in Royer's case were misunderstood. The Indiana Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decisions, agreeing with the judge's reasoning.The Indiana Supreme Court reviewed the case and concluded that the judge's prior decision to recuse in Royer's case should have compelled her to recuse in these cases as well. The Court held that an objective observer, aware of the judge's prior recusal and the similar concerns raised in these cases, would reasonably question her impartiality. The Court emphasized that the judge's entanglement with the evidence had only deepened, and there was no change in circumstances that would eliminate the concerns leading to her initial recusal.The Indiana Supreme Court reversed the trial court's orders denying the motions for recusal and remanded the cases with instructions to grant the motions, ensuring that the judge recuses herself from these proceedings. View "Seabolt v. State" on Justia Law

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The case involves a motor vehicle collision near the entrance to Hickam Air Force Base in Honolulu, where Charles Yuen allegedly rear-ended another car. Military police (MPs) arrived at the scene, identified Yuen as the driver, and conducted field sobriety tests and a preliminary alcohol screening. They then detained Yuen until Honolulu Police Department (HPD) officers arrived, who conducted their own tests and arrested Yuen for operating a vehicle under the influence of an intoxicant (OVUII).The District Court of the First Circuit of the State of Hawai'i adjudicated Yuen guilty of OVUII based on the testimony of HPD officers. The Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA) affirmed the conviction, finding that there was substantial evidence to support it. However, the ICA did not find sufficient evidence in the record to establish ineffective assistance of counsel due to the failure to file a motion to suppress evidence based on a violation of the Posse Comitatus Act (PCA).The Supreme Court of the State of Hawai'i reviewed the case and held that Yuen's trial counsel was ineffective for not filing a motion to suppress evidence obtained by the MPs, which could have been considered a violation of the PCA. The court found that this failure constituted ineffective assistance of counsel as it potentially impaired a meritorious defense. The court also agreed with the ICA that there was substantial evidence to support Yuen's conviction. Consequently, the Supreme Court vacated Yuen's OVUII conviction and remanded the case to the district court for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "State v. Yuen" on Justia Law

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In 2018, Brevan Bringhurst Baugh was charged with two counts of aggravated sexual abuse of a child. The prosecution presented evidence of three instances of alleged abuse, distinguished by location, while the charges were distinguished by date. During closing arguments, the prosecution told the jury they could use any two of the three instances to fulfill the elements of the charged counts. The jury convicted Baugh on one count and acquitted him on the other.Baugh appealed to the Utah Court of Appeals, arguing that the jury might not have unanimously agreed on which instance of abuse supported the conviction. He also claimed his counsel was ineffective for not requesting specific jury instructions on unanimity. The court of appeals agreed, finding that the jury instructions were ambiguous and could have led to a non-unanimous verdict. The court vacated Baugh’s conviction.The Utah Supreme Court reviewed the case on certiorari. The court affirmed the court of appeals' decision, holding that Baugh’s counsel performed deficiently by failing to request more specific unanimity instructions. The court noted that the risk of a non-unanimous verdict was significant due to the way the evidence and charges were presented. The court also found that there was a reasonable probability that the jury would not have convicted Baugh if proper unanimity instructions had been given. Therefore, the court concluded that Baugh’s counsel was ineffective, and the conviction was vacated. View "State v. Baugh" on Justia Law

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A Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department deputy entered the curtilage of Harson Chong’s home without a warrant, leading to the discovery of drugs, guns, and money. Chong and Tac Tran, who was present at the home, were subsequently charged with federal drug and gun offenses. They claimed ineffective assistance of counsel because their attorneys did not object to the search on Fourth Amendment grounds.The United States District Court for the Central District of California initially denied their suppression motions, ruling the search justified by the parole-search exception. However, after the Ninth Circuit’s decision in United States v. Grandberry, the district court reversed, finding insufficient probable cause that Tran resided at Chong’s home. Despite this, the court upheld the search based on exigent circumstances. Chong and Tran were convicted, and their convictions were affirmed on direct appeal. They then filed post-conviction motions under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, which the district court denied, finding no ineffective assistance of counsel.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the deputy’s entry onto the curtilage without a warrant, consent, or exigency was unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment. The court found Chong’s counsel ineffective for not moving to suppress the evidence, as the search was clearly unlawful. However, Tran lacked standing to challenge the search, as he did not reside at Chong’s home and was merely a visitor. Consequently, the court reversed the district court’s denial of Chong’s § 2255 motion and remanded for relief, but affirmed the denial of Tran’s motion. View "Chong v. United States" on Justia Law

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The defendant, Otto Keller, was involved in a car accident after falling asleep while driving, resulting in a collision with an unoccupied car and a house. He admitted to using heroin and being involved in a methadone clinic. A blood test revealed multiple drugs in his system. Keller was charged with aggravated driving while intoxicated (ADWI) for causing a collision resulting in serious bodily injury, specifically a broken right humerus.The Superior Court denied Keller's motion in limine to exclude the testimony of Colleen Scarneo, the State’s expert in human performance forensic toxicology, and his motion to dismiss the ADWI charge for insufficient evidence of serious bodily injury. The court found Scarneo’s methodology reliable under RSA 516:29-a and Daubert standards. At trial, Scarneo testified that Keller exhibited signs of impairment consistent with the drugs found in his system. The jury found Keller guilty of ADWI.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reviewed the case and concluded that the trial court erred in admitting Scarneo’s testimony because her methodology was not sufficiently reliable. The court found that her methodology had not been tested, subjected to peer review, had no known error rate, and was not generally accepted in the scientific community. Additionally, the court determined that the evidence was insufficient to prove that Keller’s broken arm constituted a serious bodily injury as defined by RSA 625:11, VI.The Supreme Court reversed Keller’s ADWI conviction due to insufficient evidence of serious bodily injury and the prejudicial admission of unreliable expert testimony. The case was remanded for proceedings consistent with the opinion, specifically for a new trial on the lesser-included charge of driving under the influence of drugs or alcohol (DWI). View "State v. Keller" on Justia Law

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James Edward Meuret II was sentenced to two years with the Department of Corrections, all time suspended, for criminal possession of dangerous drugs. Meuret appealed, arguing that his attorney at the District Court rendered ineffective assistance of counsel (IAC) and requested the court to vacate the judgment and allow him to withdraw his plea of no contest. The case arose from a traffic stop on July 22, 2019, where police found methamphetamine and paraphernalia in Meuret's vehicle after arresting him on an outstanding warrant.Initially, Meuret was represented by Casey Moore from the Office of State Public Defender (OPD). Meuret pleaded not guilty to both charges but reserved the right to file a motion to suppress evidence, which was never filed. On the morning of his trial, Meuret decided to enter a plea of nolo contendere to the drug possession charge in exchange for the dismissal of the paraphernalia charge. He acknowledged waiving his constitutional rights and expressed no issues with his counsel. Later, Meuret considered withdrawing his plea, but no motion was filed by the deadline. A new attorney, Mark Epperson, was assigned and filed a motion to suppress evidence instead of a motion to withdraw the plea, which the District Court rejected as untimely.The Montana Supreme Court reviewed the case and applied the two-pronged test from Strickland v. Washington to assess IAC claims. The court found that the record did not sufficiently demonstrate the reasons behind Moore's and Epperson's actions. The court noted that IAC claims require a developed record, which was lacking in this case. Consequently, the court affirmed the District Court's judgment but allowed Meuret the option to pursue his IAC claims through a petition for postconviction relief. View "State v. Meuret" on Justia Law

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Rendell Russell was convicted in 2022 for malice murder and related crimes after killing Gregory James with a machete. The incident occurred on October 27, 2020, following Russell's breakup with his girlfriend, Kenisha Shepherd. On the night of the crime, Russell entered Shepherd's apartment uninvited, where James, Shepherd's new boyfriend, was staying. Despite being asked to leave, Russell returned with a machete, confronted James, and ultimately attacked him, resulting in James's death from multiple sharp and blunt force injuries.A Cobb County grand jury indicted Russell on several charges, including malice murder, felony murder, and aggravated assault. The trial court bifurcated the firearm possession count. In March 2022, a jury found Russell guilty on all counts. The trial court sentenced him to life without parole for malice murder and additional concurrent and consecutive terms for other charges. Russell's motion for a new trial was denied by the trial court in December 2023, leading to this appeal.The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court's decision. The court held that the evidence was sufficient to support the jury's verdict, rejecting Russell's claim of self-defense. The court found that Russell was the aggressor and that the State had disproved his justification defense beyond a reasonable doubt. Additionally, the court rejected Russell's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, concluding that his trial counsel's decision not to file a pretrial motion for immunity was a reasonable strategic choice. The court determined that there was little chance such a motion would have been successful given the evidence against Russell. View "Russell v. State" on Justia Law

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Heraclio Osorio-Arellanes was involved in a firefight with U.S. Customs and Border Patrol agents in Arizona, resulting in the death of Agent Brian Terry. Osorio fled to Mexico, where he was later arrested and interrogated by U.S. officials in a Mexico City prison. During this interrogation, he confessed to key elements of the government's case on the advice of a Mexican attorney, Juan Salvador Pimentel. Osorio's confession was later used against him in court.The District Court for the District of Arizona initially suppressed Osorio's confession on Sixth Amendment grounds but later reversed this decision following a government motion for reconsideration. Consequently, the confession was admitted at trial, leading to Osorio's conviction on multiple charges, including first- and second-degree murder, conspiracy to interfere with commerce by robbery, and assault on a federal officer.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that Pimentel's advice during the interrogation was deficient and prejudicial under the framework established in Strickland v. Washington. Specifically, Pimentel erroneously advised Osorio that robbing drug smugglers was not a crime, leading Osorio to confess. The court held that this advice was legally unjustifiable and that there was a reasonable probability that, absent this advice, Osorio would not have been convicted.The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's order reconsidering the suppression of Osorio's confession, vacated his convictions and sentences, and remanded the case for further proceedings. The court did not address Osorio's Fifth Amendment claim, as the Sixth Amendment claim was sufficient to decide the case. The dissenting judge would have affirmed the conviction and required Osorio to pursue his ineffective assistance of counsel claim through a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion in the district court. View "United States v. Osorio-Arellanes" on Justia Law