Justia Professional Malpractice & Ethics Opinion Summaries

Karsen H. Rezac was involved in a vehicular collision on December 23, 2022, in Lincoln, Nebraska, which resulted in the shooting death of Kupo Mleya. Rezac, who was identified as a suspect based on vehicle debris and witness reports, admitted to firing shots at Mleya's vehicle after the collision. Rezac was charged with second-degree murder and use of a firearm to commit a felony. He later pled no contest to second-degree murder as part of a plea agreement, and the firearm charge was dropped.The district court for Lancaster County, Nebraska, denied Rezac's motion to continue his sentencing hearing, which he requested to allow more time to gather and review his mental health records. The court proceeded with the sentencing, considering the presentence investigation report and supplemental items. Rezac was sentenced to 60 years to life imprisonment. Rezac appealed, arguing that the court abused its discretion in denying the continuance and imposing an excessive sentence, and that his trial counsel was ineffective in several respects.The Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed the case and found that Rezac forfeited his argument regarding the denial of the continuance by failing to raise the issue at the sentencing hearing. The court also found no abuse of discretion in the sentencing, as the district court had considered the relevant mitigating factors. The court rejected Rezac's claims of ineffective assistance of counsel related to the failure to move to suppress his statement to law enforcement and the failure to explain the penalties for second-degree murder, finding that the record refuted these claims.However, the court found the record insufficient to address Rezac's claims that his trial counsel was ineffective for advising him that self-defense was not a viable argument, failing to explain the difference between second-degree murder and involuntary manslaughter, and failing to provide his mental health records to probation or the court. The court affirmed Rezac's conviction and sentence but noted that these claims of ineffective assistance of counsel could not be resolved on direct appeal due to the insufficient record. View "State v. Rezac" on Justia Law

In 2017, John Cridler-Smith was convicted of possession with intent to distribute more than five pounds of marijuana. The case began when a postal worker in Loudoun County, Virginia, noticed a suspicious parcel from California, a known source state for marijuana trafficking. Law enforcement obtained a search warrant and found over six pounds of marijuana in the parcel. A controlled delivery was conducted to Cridler-Smith’s brother’s residence, where Cridler-Smith was later seen. Inside the residence, officers found drug paraphernalia and another parcel containing marijuana. Cridler-Smith admitted to shipping the marijuana during an interview with Detective Chris Staub.The Loudoun County Circuit Court denied Cridler-Smith’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus, which claimed ineffective assistance of counsel. Cridler-Smith argued that his pre-trial counsel advised him to cooperate with law enforcement without adequate investigation and that his trial counsel failed to move to suppress his incriminating statements. The circuit court found that counsel’s advice was tailored to Cridler-Smith’s objectives of protecting his brother and minimizing jail time. The court initially found that Cridler-Smith had stated a claim regarding the failure to suppress his confession but later dismissed the claim upon reconsideration.The Supreme Court of Virginia reviewed the case and found that counsel’s initial advice regarding cooperation was reasonable given Cridler-Smith’s stated objectives. However, the court determined that the failure to seek suppression of Cridler-Smith’s confession might constitute ineffective assistance. The court noted that the applicability of Rule 3A:8(c)(6) to the confession required resolution of a factual question that the circuit court did not definitively address. The Supreme Court of Virginia reversed the circuit court’s judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings to resolve whether the statements were made in connection with an offer to plead guilty. View "Cridler-Smith v. Clarke" on Justia Law

In this case, the defendant, a local attorney, was contracted by Theory Wellness, a marijuana dispensary operator, to assist in obtaining a host community agreement from the City of Medford, Massachusetts. Instead of legitimate lobbying, the defendant attempted to bribe Medford's chief of police through the chief's brother. This led to the defendant's convictions on two counts of honest-services wire fraud and one count of federal programs bribery.The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts presided over the trial, where a jury convicted the defendant on all counts. The defendant was sentenced to concurrent twenty-four-month terms of imprisonment. The defendant appealed, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence, the admission of certain testimony, and the jury instructions.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. The court vacated the honest-services wire fraud convictions, finding that the district court erroneously admitted the only evidence establishing the jurisdictional element of those counts. However, the court affirmed the federal programs bribery conviction, concluding that the evidence was sufficient to support the jury's finding that the defendant intended to bribe the chief of police.The court held that the defendant's actions constituted a bribery scheme under 18 U.S.C. § 666, even if the defendant did not believe the chief had accepted the bribe. The court also found that the district court's failure to instruct the jury on the requirement of an "official act" was harmless, as the evidence overwhelmingly supported the conclusion that the defendant sought official acts from the chief. The court rejected the defendant's entrapment defense, finding no improper inducement by the government and that the defendant was predisposed to commit the crime. View "United States v. O'Donovan" on Justia Law

Larenzo Burnett pleaded guilty to possession of a firearm by a prohibited person. During sentencing, a dispute arose regarding whether Burnett’s prior conviction under Iowa Code § 708.6(2) was a "crime of violence," which would increase his base offense level. The probation office recommended the increase, but Burnett objected. The parties reached a sentencing agreement where Burnett withdrew his objection and stipulated that the prior conviction was for a crime of violence. The district court imposed a sentence of 99 months and 14 days in prison.Burnett later filed a motion to vacate his sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel because his attorney failed to file a notice of appeal. The district court held an evidentiary hearing and found that Burnett had not asked his attorney to file a notice of appeal within the 14-day period allowed by rule. Consequently, the court denied Burnett’s motion to vacate his sentence.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case. To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, Burnett needed to show that his counsel’s performance was deficient and that the deficiency prejudiced his defense. The court found that Burnett’s defense counsel testified credibly that Burnett never requested an appeal. The district court’s credibility determination was not clearly erroneous, as it was based on the observation of witness demeanor and the consistency of the testimony. The appellate court affirmed the district court’s judgment, concluding that there was no clear error in the finding that Burnett did not ask his attorney to file a notice of appeal. View "Burnett v. United States" on Justia Law

Berry Alexander Davis was involved in the kidnapping and murder of Monique Baugh and the attempted murder of her boyfriend, Jon, on New Year’s Eve in 2019. Baugh was abducted, placed in a U-Haul truck, and fatally shot. Davis and a co-defendant, Cedric Lamont Berry, were charged with first-degree premeditated murder, attempted first-degree premeditated murder, and kidnapping. The State's theory was that Davis and Berry attacked Jon on behalf of Lyndon Wiggins, who had a falling out with Jon. Detective Briana Johnson testified about the relationship between Davis, Berry, and Wiggins, indicating they were involved in drug dealing together. Davis waived his right to testify, and the jury found him guilty on all counts. He was sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of release.On direct appeal, Davis argued that the district court erred in joining his trial with Berry’s and that Detective Johnson’s testimony was inadmissible and prejudicial. The Minnesota Supreme Court rejected these arguments and affirmed his conviction and sentence. Davis also filed a pro se supplemental brief raising several claims, including that his sentence violated his constitutional right to a sentencing jury under Blakely v. Washington. The court found these claims lacked merit.Davis subsequently filed a postconviction petition alleging ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel and constitutional violations in his sentencing. The district court summarily denied the petition without an evidentiary hearing, concluding that even if Davis proved the facts alleged, he would not be entitled to relief as a matter of law.The Minnesota Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s decision. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Davis’s postconviction petition without an evidentiary hearing, as his claims failed on their merits as a matter of law. View "Davis vs. State" on Justia Law

Correctional officers at an Illinois state prison brutally beat inmate Larry Earvin, who later died from his injuries. Todd Sheffler and two others were charged with various federal crimes related to the killing and its cover-up. After a mistrial, Sheffler was retried and found guilty by a jury.In the United States District Court for the Central District of Illinois, Sheffler was convicted on five counts, including conspiracy to deprive civil rights, deprivation of civil rights, conspiracy to engage in misleading conduct, obstruction-falsification of documents, and obstruction-misleading conduct. Sheffler argued that there was no reasonable likelihood that his incident report and interview with state police would reach federal officials, challenging his convictions under 18 U.S.C. § 1512 and § 1519. He also contended that the district court erred in ruling he breached a proffer agreement and allowed a biased juror to sit on his trial. Additionally, he claimed prosecutorial misconduct during the rebuttal closing argument.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that sufficient evidence supported Sheffler’s convictions, as it was reasonably likely that his false statements would reach federal officials, given the severity of the crime and the cooperation between state and federal authorities. The court also found no clear error in the district court’s conclusion that Sheffler breached the proffer agreement by making false statements during FBI interviews. Furthermore, the court determined that the district court did not abuse its discretion in handling the juror bias issue or in denying Sheffler’s motion for a new trial based on alleged prosecutorial misconduct.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of Sheffler’s motion for a new trial and upheld his convictions. View "USA v Sheffler" on Justia Law

In 2005, James E. Cooke, Jr. was convicted of the rape and murder of Lindsey Bonistall, a University of Delaware student. Cooke's first conviction was overturned in 2009 due to his defense counsel's strategy, which conflicted with Cooke's plea of not guilty. Cooke was retried in 2012, where he represented himself initially but was later replaced by standby counsel due to his disruptive behavior. He was again convicted and sentenced to death, which was affirmed by the Delaware Supreme Court in 2014.Cooke filed a motion for postconviction relief in 2015, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel and other errors. The Superior Court denied his motion, leading to this appeal. Cooke argued that his second-trial counsel failed to explore his competency to stand trial, did not adequately investigate the case, and failed to object to the State's peremptory challenges during jury selection. He also claimed cumulative errors and procedural issues with the court's denial of his continuance requests and discovery limitations.The Delaware Supreme Court reviewed the claims and found that Cooke's counsel acted reasonably given Cooke's insistence on testifying and his refusal to cooperate with mental health evaluations. The court also found that Cooke was competent to stand trial, and his counsel's decisions were within the bounds of reasonable professional assistance. The court held that Cooke's claims of cumulative error and procedural issues were without merit and affirmed the Superior Court's denial of postconviction relief. View "Cooke v. State" on Justia Law

Enrique Sanchez, the petitioner, sought a writ of mandate to vacate a trial court order directing the San Bernardino County Public Defender to assign a new attorney to represent him. This order was issued after evidence suggested that the deputy public defender currently assigned to Sanchez's case made racially charged remarks during plea negotiations, potentially violating the Racial Justice Act (RJA). Sanchez argued that the trial court's decision was an abuse of discretion.The trial court received a motion from the prosecutor to disclose exculpatory evidence and evaluate the deputy public defender's conflict of interest. The motion included a declaration from the prosecutor detailing the deputy public defender's remarks, which implied racial bias. During a closed hearing, the trial court read the prosecutor's declaration to Sanchez and asked if he wanted the current public defender to continue representing him. Sanchez expressed his desire to retain his current counsel. However, the trial court later ordered the public defender's office to assign a new attorney, citing potential RJA issues and the risk of ineffective assistance of counsel.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Two, reviewed the case. The court concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in removing the deputy public defender. The appellate court noted that the RJA's provisions and the potential for implicit bias created an actual conflict of interest that the deputy public defender could not objectively investigate. Additionally, the trial court's decision to prevent potential future RJA claims and ensure adequate representation was within its discretion. The petition for writ of mandate was denied, and the stay on trial court proceedings was vacated. View "Sanchez v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

In September 2017, Attorney Karolyn Kovtun held a meeting with Jennifer Shenefield and her client Mark Shenefield, despite a criminal protective order prohibiting Mark from contacting Jennifer. During the meeting, Mark and Kovtun verbally and emotionally abused Jennifer, and Kovtun threatened to remove their daughter from Jennifer’s custody if she did not sign a custody agreement. Jennifer signed the agreement under duress and contacted the police. Kovtun continued to represent Mark, who was later convicted of violating the protective order. Kovtun then sued Jennifer for recording the meeting without consent, prompting Jennifer to file a cross-complaint against Kovtun.The Superior Court of San Diego County denied Kovtun’s two anti-SLAPP motions and sustained her demurrer to two of Jennifer’s six causes of action. After a bench trial, the court found Kovtun liable for negligence, intentional infliction of emotional distress, intentional misrepresentation, and negligent misrepresentation, awarding Jennifer $50,000 in damages. Mark did not appear at trial, and the court entered judgment against him, awarding Jennifer $250,000 in damages.The Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, State of California, reviewed the case. Kovtun argued that Jennifer’s claims were barred by the statute of limitations under Code of Civil Procedure section 340.6 and the litigation privilege under Civil Code section 47, subdivision (b). The court concluded that Kovtun waived the statute of limitations defense by failing to timely and properly plead it. Additionally, the court determined that the litigation privilege did not apply to Kovtun’s communications. The judgment against Kovtun was affirmed. View "Shenefield v. Kovtun" on Justia Law

The case involves Lewis Leon Bryson, who was convicted of sexual intercourse without consent (SIWOC) following a jury trial. On May 2, 2020, Bryson's neighbor observed him spraying a naked and screaming Valerie Moreni with a hose in his backyard. When police arrived, Moreni was found unresponsive and covered by a blanket. She later claimed Bryson had raped her. Medical examination revealed she was highly intoxicated and had injuries consistent with her allegations. Bryson was arrested and charged with aggravated sexual intercourse without consent (ASIWOC), SIWOC, tampering with evidence, and obstructing a peace officer.The Eighth Judicial District Court, Cascade County, presided over the trial. Bryson and Moreni provided conflicting testimonies about their relationship and the events leading up to the incident. Bryson claimed their interactions were consensual and that Moreni was aware of their sexual activities. The jury found Bryson guilty of SIWOC and obstructing a peace officer.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case. Bryson argued that his trial counsel was ineffective for not proposing correct jury instructions and that the District Court erred by excluding evidence about Moreni’s drinking habits and alcohol withdrawal symptoms. The Supreme Court held that the jury instructions were correct and that Bryson’s counsel was not deficient. The court also found that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in excluding certain evidence about Moreni’s past drinking habits, as it allowed sufficient evidence regarding her condition and credibility.The Supreme Court affirmed Bryson’s conviction, concluding that the instructions and evidentiary rulings were appropriate and did not prejudice Bryson’s defense. View "State v. Bryson" on Justia Law