Justia Professional Malpractice & Ethics Opinion Summaries

Enrique Sanchez, the petitioner, sought a writ of mandate to vacate a trial court order that directed the San Bernardino County Public Defender to assign a new attorney to represent him. This order was issued after the current deputy public defender made remarks during plea negotiations that invoked Sanchez's race, potentially violating the Racial Justice Act (RJA). Sanchez argued that the trial court abused its discretion in ordering the reassignment.The trial court received a motion from the prosecutor to disclose exculpatory evidence and evaluate a conflict of interest after the deputy public defender made racially charged comments. During a closed hearing, Sanchez expressed his desire to retain his current counsel. However, the trial court ordered the reassignment of the deputy public defender, citing potential issues under the RJA and the risk of ineffective assistance of counsel.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Two, reviewed the case. The court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in removing the deputy public defender. The appellate court noted that the RJA's provisions and the potential for implicit bias created an actual conflict of interest that the deputy public defender could not objectively investigate. Additionally, the court found that the trial court's decision to prevent a potential future RJA claim was within its discretion to avoid substantial impairment of the proceedings.The appellate court concluded that Sanchez's arguments regarding constitutional violations and the necessity of an actual conflict were without merit. The court emphasized that the trial court's order was narrowly tailored and did not violate Sanchez's rights. Consequently, the petition for writ of mandate was denied, and the stay on trial court proceedings was vacated. View "Sanchez v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

DeRon Edrias Gude was convicted of felony murder and other charges related to the shooting death of Nyyokokie Hendley. On October 11, 2016, Gude called 911 to report a shooting at his home, claiming it was an accident during a fight. Police found Hendley dead from a gunshot wound to the head, with a 9-millimeter handgun near her feet and marijuana in an unlocked safe. Gude was indicted on multiple charges, including malice murder and felony murder. At trial, Gude testified that Hendley had threatened him and pointed a gun at him, leading him to shoot her in self-defense. The jury found Gude guilty of felony murder predicated on aggravated assault and other charges.The DeKalb County Superior Court granted Gude’s motion for a directed verdict of acquittal on the marijuana charge, and the jury found him not guilty of malice murder but guilty on the remaining counts. Gude was sentenced to life in prison for felony murder predicated on aggravated assault, plus five years for possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. Gude’s motion for a new trial was denied by the trial court.The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case and addressed Gude’s claims of plain error in the jury charge on aggravated assault and ineffective assistance of counsel. The court assumed, without deciding, that the trial court committed an obvious error in the jury instruction but found that Gude failed to show the error likely affected the trial's outcome. The court noted that the jury was properly instructed on the burden of proof and provided with a copy of the indictment. Additionally, Gude’s defense was self-defense, and the jury’s verdict indicated they found he intended to shoot Hendley. Consequently, the court affirmed the trial court’s judgment, concluding that Gude did not demonstrate plain error or ineffective assistance of counsel. View "GUDE v. THE STATE" on Justia Law

The appellant was charged with four counts of first-degree sexual assault, alleged to have occurred between January 1, 2004, and June 1, 2008. He filed a motion to quash and dismiss the charges, arguing that the statute of limitations had expired. The district court denied the motion, stating that the statute of limitations likely had not run but required a preliminary hearing to determine the ages of the victims. Before the preliminary hearing, the State amended the charges to include offenses from January 1, 2000, to June 1, 2008. The appellant eventually pled no contest to one count of first-degree sexual assault under a plea agreement.The district court accepted the plea after confirming that the appellant understood the charges, the penalties, and his rights. The court also confirmed that the appellant was competent to plead, despite his PTSD and not taking medication on the day of the plea hearing. The appellant was sentenced to 40 to 50 years in prison, with credit for time served. His trial counsel did not appeal, leading the appellant to file a pro se motion for postconviction relief, which was granted, allowing him to file a direct appeal.On appeal to the Nebraska Supreme Court, the appellant argued that his trial counsel was ineffective for various reasons, including failing to file a motion to quash the amended information, not disclosing a health condition that impaired counsel’s ability, and not properly advising him of the consequences of his plea. The court found that the record did not support claims of ineffective assistance regarding the motion to quash, as the statute of limitations had not expired, and there was no ex post facto violation. The court also found that the appellant was adequately informed of the consequences of his plea and that his counsel was not deficient in this regard.The Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s acceptance of the plea and the sentence, finding no abuse of discretion or merit in the claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. View "State v. Haas" on Justia Law

In this case, Jimmy Davis, Jr., an Alabama prisoner sentenced to death for the 1993 murder of Johnny Hazle during a gas station robbery, appealed the district court’s denial of his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 federal habeas petition. Davis argued that his trial counsel was ineffective during the penalty phase of his trial for failing to investigate and present mitigating evidence of childhood abuse and the circumstances of his prior conviction for third-degree robbery.The Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed Davis’s conviction and sentence on direct appeal. Davis then filed a state postconviction petition, which was denied after an evidentiary hearing. The state court found that Davis’s trial counsel did not perform deficiently and that Davis was not prejudiced by the alleged deficiencies. The Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the denial of the postconviction petition, concluding that the investigation conducted by Davis’s attorneys was reasonable and that Davis failed to show prejudice.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama denied Davis’s § 2254 petition, concluding that the state court’s decision was not an unreasonable application of Supreme Court precedent or based on an unreasonable determination of the facts. The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s denial of the habeas petition.The Eleventh Circuit held that the state court’s conclusion that Davis was not prejudiced by his counsel’s alleged deficiencies was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. The court noted that the additional mitigating evidence presented during the postconviction proceedings, including evidence of childhood abuse and the non-violent nature of the prior robbery, did not create a reasonable probability of a different outcome. The court emphasized that the state court’s decision was not so obviously wrong that it lay beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement. View "Davis v. Commissioner, Alabama Department of Corrections" on Justia Law

Kay Ellison, co-founder of a charter airline, was convicted of federal wire fraud, bank fraud, and conspiracy. The airline, Direct Air, faced cash flow issues and Ellison siphoned millions from an escrow account through fictitious reservations and falsified records. She was charged alongside Judy Tull and chose not to testify or present a defense at trial. The jury convicted her on all counts, and she was sentenced to ninety-four months in prison and ordered to pay over $19 million in restitution. Her convictions were affirmed on direct appeal.Ellison filed a motion to vacate her sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel. She argued her attorney incorrectly advised her that if she did not testify, she could not present other evidence, which she claimed prejudiced her defense. The United States District Court for the District of New Jersey denied her motion without an evidentiary hearing, concluding that even if her counsel was ineffective, she could not show prejudice because there was no reasonable probability that the jury would have acquitted her if she had testified or presented other witnesses.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the District Court's decision. The Third Circuit applied the Strickland v. Washington standard, which requires showing a reasonable probability that the result of the proceeding would have been different but for the attorney's errors. The court found that Ellison failed to demonstrate such a probability, as her proposed testimony and that of her witnesses would not have likely changed the jury's verdict given the strong evidence against her. Thus, the denial of her habeas corpus petition was upheld. View "Ellison v. USA" on Justia Law

Jonathon Neuhard was convicted by a jury of producing, receiving, and possessing child pornography. The evidence included testimony from his niece, MV1, who identified herself in the images and stated that Neuhard had taken them. Law enforcement found the images on a laptop and memory card in Neuhard's trailer, with metadata linking the images to his phone. Neuhard sought to vacate his sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, claiming ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan denied Neuhard's motion but granted a certificate of appealability. Neuhard argued that his trial counsel, Richard Korn, failed to adequately investigate and present evidence of his autism and did not request an evidentiary hearing regarding a government witness's mention of polygraph tests. He also contended that his appellate counsel was ineffective for not appealing the denial of his mistrial motion.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that Korn had conducted a reasonable investigation into Neuhard's autism and made a strategic decision not to present this evidence at trial, fearing it would harm Neuhard's case. The court also determined that Neuhard did not suffer prejudice from Korn's failure to request an evidentiary hearing about the polygraph testimony, as the district court had issued a clear and immediate instruction to the jury to disregard the comment.Regarding appellate counsel, the court held that the decision not to appeal the mistrial denial was within the bounds of reasonable professional judgment. The court noted that appellate counsel had raised six other issues on appeal, and the mistrial claim was not clearly stronger than the issues presented.The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of Neuhard's § 2255 motion. View "Neuhard v. U.S." on Justia Law

In 2004, Jason Mashaney was convicted by a jury of aggravated criminal sodomy and aggravated indecent liberties with a child, involving his then-five-year-old daughter. He was sentenced to 442 months in prison. The Kansas Court of Appeals affirmed his conviction. In 2008, Mashaney filed a motion arguing ineffective assistance of counsel, which led to a reversal and remand for a full evidentiary hearing. The district court found substantial prejudice from ineffective representation, vacated the 2004 convictions, and scheduled a new trial. Subsequently, Mashaney entered an Alford plea to amended charges of attempted aggravated battery and aggravated endangerment of a child, resulting in a 72-month sentence and his release for time served.The Sedgwick District Court awarded Mashaney nearly $414,595 in damages for wrongful conviction and imprisonment under K.S.A. 2023 Supp. 60-5004. The court concluded that the original charges were "effectively dismissed" when the State amended them to nonsexual charges involving the same victim. The district court found that Mashaney met the statutory elements for compensation, including that his judgment of conviction was vacated and the charges were dismissed. The court calculated the damages based on the duration of wrongful imprisonment and reduced the award by the amount received from a legal malpractice settlement.The Kansas Supreme Court reviewed the case and reversed the district court's judgment. The Supreme Court held that the phrase "the charges were dismissed" in K.S.A. 2023 Supp. 60-5004(c)(1)(B) means both terminating the criminal accusation and relieving the defendant of criminal liability. The court found that the original charges against Mashaney were not dismissed but amended, and he incurred criminal liability for the amended charges. Therefore, Mashaney did not meet the statutory requirement that the charges were dismissed, and his claim for wrongful conviction and imprisonment failed. View "In re Wrongful Conviction of Mashaney" on Justia Law

Christopher Schocker was convicted of aggravated assault against a law enforcement officer. The incident occurred when Officer Blake Swanson, a Game, Fish, and Parks conservation officer, received a tip about a poached deer and went to investigate. At the scene, Schocker, his mother Doris, and two other individuals were present. During the encounter, Schocker picked up a knife and moved towards Officer Swanson, who then arrested him. Schocker claimed he intended to cut a tag off the deer, not assault the officer.The Circuit Court of the Fifth Judicial Circuit in Roberts County, South Dakota, found Schocker guilty. Schocker appealed, arguing ineffective assistance of counsel. His attorney, Robert Doody, did not interview key witnesses or adequately prepare for trial. The court-appointed new counsel for Schocker, who then filed for habeas corpus relief. The habeas court found that Doody’s performance was deficient and prejudicial, as he failed to interview witnesses who could have supported Schocker’s defense.The Supreme Court of South Dakota reviewed the case. The court affirmed the habeas court’s decision, agreeing that Doody’s failure to interview witnesses, particularly Jeffry Hopkins, who could testify that Schocker intended to cut the tag off the deer, constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. This failure was deemed prejudicial because it deprived Schocker of a fair trial. The court concluded that there was a reasonable probability that the outcome would have been different if the jury had heard Hopkins’s testimony. View "Schocker v. Fluke" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of possession of heroin with intent to sell and possession of cocaine after police recovered drugs and paraphernalia during a search of an apartment where he and others were arrested. Defense counsel sought to suppress the seized items, arguing the warrant was inaccurate and unreliable but did not claim the warrant was executed without notice, violating CPL 690.50 (1). Defendant argued on appeal that this omission constituted ineffective assistance of counsel.The Appellate Division, Third Department, reviewed the case and rejected the ineffective assistance claim, noting that the record did not conclusively show a knock-and-announce violation. The court found that the defendant's argument was speculative and unsupported by the record, which was silent on whether the officers announced themselves before entry. The Appellate Division concluded that the defendant failed to establish a no-knock violation.The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division's decision. The court held that defense counsel's failure to raise the knock-and-announce issue did not constitute ineffective assistance because the argument was not so clear-cut and dispositive that no reasonable defense attorney would have failed to assert it. The court noted that the United States Supreme Court's decision in Hudson v. Michigan, which held that a knock-and-announce violation does not require the exclusion of evidence, had not been contradicted by any New York appellate decision. Therefore, the issue was not sufficiently clear to mandate its assertion by defense counsel. The court also found that the defendant's legal sufficiency contention was unpreserved for appellate review and upheld the trial court's admission of evidence regarding an uncharged drug sale. The order of the Appellate Division was affirmed. View "People v Hayward" on Justia Law

Louis Mercado was charged with three counts of capital sexual battery in Florida. During his trial, the court granted judgments of acquittal on two counts and declared a mistrial on the third count due to prosecutorial error. The trial court then barred a retrial, citing the Double Jeopardy Clause. The State appealed this decision, but Mercado's attorney, mistakenly believing he had withdrawn from the case, failed to file a response brief. The appellate court reversed the trial court's decision, leading to Mercado's retrial, conviction, and life sentence.The Fifth District Court of Appeal summarily denied Mercado's state habeas petition, in which he argued ineffective assistance of counsel due to his attorney's failure to file a response brief. Mercado contended that this failure should be presumed prejudicial under United States v. Cronic, rather than requiring proof of prejudice under Strickland v. Washington. The appellate court's decision was based on the reasoning that the failure to file a brief did not constitute a complete denial of counsel.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's denial of Mercado's federal habeas petition. The court held that the state court's decision was not an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. The Eleventh Circuit noted that the Supreme Court has never applied the Cronic presumption of prejudice to a situation where counsel failed to file an appellee's brief. Therefore, the state court's requirement for Mercado to prove actual prejudice under Strickland was deemed reasonable. View "Mercado v. Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections" on Justia Law