Justia Professional Malpractice & Ethics Opinion Summaries

Edward Mero was convicted of two counts of second-degree murder and two counts of tampering with physical evidence. The first murder involved his roommate, who was found dead in their apartment after a fire in 2013. The second murder involved a woman he hired for a date in December 2014, whose body was found in a shallow grave in May 2015. Mero was arrested in 2017 and charged with both murders and related tampering charges.The trial court joined the charges in a single indictment and denied Mero's motion to sever them, reasoning that the distinct evidence for each murder would allow the jury to consider each charge separately. During the trial, a juror was dismissed after overhearing derogatory comments made by defense counsel. Mero later moved to vacate his convictions, arguing that his trial counsel had a conflict of interest due to an undisclosed business relationship with an Assistant District Attorney (ADA). The trial court denied the motion, finding that the potential conflict did not affect the defense.The Appellate Division affirmed the trial court's decisions, including the denial of the severance motion and the motion to vacate. The court found that the evidence for each murder was distinct enough for the jury to consider separately and that the potential conflict of interest did not impact the defense. Two Justices dissented, arguing that the proof for the second murder was significantly stronger and that the jury would likely be prejudiced by the joinder.The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division's decision. The court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to sever, as the jury was capable of considering the evidence for each charge separately. The court also found that the potential conflict of interest did not operate on the defense, and Mero's other claims were either without merit or unreviewable. View "People v Mero" on Justia Law

Steven M. Hohn, the defendant, was convicted of multiple drug and firearm charges. While awaiting trial, he was detained at CoreCivic, where the Kansas U.S. Attorney’s Office (Kansas USAO) obtained and listened to his attorney-client phone calls. Hohn later discovered this and filed a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 petition to vacate his judgment or reduce his sentence, arguing that the government’s intrusion violated his Sixth Amendment rights.The United States District Court for the District of Kansas denied Hohn’s § 2255 petition. The court found that Hohn did not have a reasonable expectation of confidentiality in his attorney-client call because he knew the call would be recorded and did not follow the proper steps to privatize it. The court also concluded that Hohn waived the attorney-client privilege by making the call despite knowing it would be recorded. Consequently, the court did not reach a direct Sixth Amendment analysis, as it determined that the privilege was a necessary underpinning of Hohn’s Sixth Amendment right.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case en banc. The court overruled its precedent in Shillinger v. Haworth, which had established a structural-error rule presuming prejudice when the government intentionally intrudes into the attorney-client relationship without a legitimate law-enforcement purpose. The Tenth Circuit held that a Sixth Amendment violation of the right to confidential communication with an attorney requires the defendant to show prejudice. Since Hohn conceded that he suffered no prejudice from the prosecution’s obtaining and listening to his six-minute call with his attorney, his claim failed. The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision denying Hohn’s § 2255 petition. View "United States v. Hohn" on Justia Law

Jaimen Anthony Scott Aisenbrey pled guilty to two counts of possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver as part of a plea agreement. The agreement stipulated that the State would not argue against probation if the presentence investigation (PSI) recommended it. The PSI recommended a split sentence, but at sentencing, the State requested incarceration. The district court sentenced Aisenbrey to concurrent terms of eight to ten years in prison. Aisenbrey appealed, claiming the State breached the plea agreement and that his counsel was ineffective for not objecting to the State's recommendation.The District Court of Platte County accepted Aisenbrey's guilty plea and the plea agreement terms. However, at sentencing, the State argued for incarceration despite the PSI's split sentence recommendation. Aisenbrey's counsel did not object to this recommendation. The district court imposed the prison sentence as requested by the State.The Wyoming Supreme Court reviewed the case. The court held that the State did not breach the plea agreement because a split sentence, which includes a period of confinement, is not equivalent to probation, which does not involve confinement. Therefore, the State's recommendation for incarceration did not violate the plea agreement. The court also found that Aisenbrey's counsel was not ineffective for failing to object to the State's recommendation, as there was no breach of the plea agreement to object to. The court affirmed the district court's decision. View "Aisenbrey v. State" on Justia Law

Clarence Bonds, serving a 71-month sentence for transporting a firearm in interstate commerce as a felon, sought a reduced sentence based on Amendment 821 to the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines. This amendment, which applies retroactively, reduced Bonds's criminal history category from IV to III, thereby lowering his advisory Guidelines range from 57–71 months to 46–57 months. Bonds requested the district court to reduce his sentence accordingly. The district court acknowledged the amendment's impact but declined to reduce his sentence, citing the need for deterrence, incapacitation, public protection, and Bonds's extensive criminal history, which included numerous violent crimes with firearms.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Indiana denied Bonds's motion for a sentence reduction. The court recognized the amendment's effect on Bonds's criminal history category and advisory range but exercised its discretion to maintain the original sentence. The court emphasized Bonds's long criminal history and the serious nature of his offenses as reasons for not reducing the sentence.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's decision, finding no abuse of discretion in denying Bonds's motion for a sentence reduction. The appellate court agreed that the district court had adequately considered the relevant factors under 28 U.S.C. § 3553(a) and provided a sufficient explanation for its decision. Additionally, the appellate court addressed whether the Criminal Justice Act authorized the appointment of appellate counsel for Bonds in his effort to challenge the district court's ruling. The panel was divided on this issue, with each judge providing a separate opinion. Ultimately, the court affirmed the district court's denial of Bonds's motion on the merits. View "United States v. Bonds" on Justia Law

In September 2017, Attorney Karolyn Kovtun held a meeting with Jennifer Shenefield and her client Mark Shenefield, despite a criminal protective order prohibiting Mark from contacting Jennifer. During the meeting, Mark and Kovtun verbally and emotionally abused Jennifer, and Kovtun threatened to remove their daughter from Jennifer’s custody if she did not sign a custody agreement. Jennifer signed the agreement under duress and contacted the police. Kovtun continued to represent Mark, who was later convicted of violating the protective order. Kovtun then sued Jennifer for recording the meeting without consent, prompting Jennifer to file a cross-complaint against Kovtun.The Superior Court of San Diego County denied Kovtun’s two anti-SLAPP motions and sustained her demurrer to two of Jennifer’s six causes of action. After a bench trial, the court found Kovtun liable for negligence, intentional infliction of emotional distress, intentional misrepresentation, and negligent misrepresentation, awarding Jennifer $50,000 in damages. Kovtun appealed, arguing that Jennifer’s claims were barred by the statute of limitations and the litigation privilege.The Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, California, reviewed the case. The court concluded that Kovtun waived the statute of limitations defense by failing to timely and properly plead it. Additionally, the court determined that the litigation privilege did not apply to Kovtun’s communications during the meeting, as they were not made in good faith contemplation of litigation. The court affirmed the judgment against Kovtun, upholding the $50,000 damages award to Jennifer. View "Shenefield v. Kovtun" on Justia Law

Enrique Sanchez, the petitioner, sought a writ of mandate to vacate a trial court order that directed the San Bernardino County Public Defender to assign a new attorney to represent him. This order was issued after the current deputy public defender made remarks during plea negotiations that invoked Sanchez's race, potentially violating the Racial Justice Act (RJA). Sanchez argued that the trial court abused its discretion in ordering the reassignment.The trial court received a motion from the prosecutor to disclose exculpatory evidence and evaluate a conflict of interest after the deputy public defender made racially charged comments. During a closed hearing, Sanchez expressed his desire to retain his current counsel. However, the trial court ordered the reassignment of the deputy public defender, citing potential issues under the RJA and the risk of ineffective assistance of counsel.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Two, reviewed the case. The court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in removing the deputy public defender. The appellate court noted that the RJA's provisions and the potential for implicit bias created an actual conflict of interest that the deputy public defender could not objectively investigate. Additionally, the court found that the trial court's decision to prevent a potential future RJA claim was within its discretion to avoid substantial impairment of the proceedings.The appellate court concluded that Sanchez's arguments regarding constitutional violations and the necessity of an actual conflict were without merit. The court emphasized that the trial court's order was narrowly tailored and did not violate Sanchez's rights. Consequently, the petition for writ of mandate was denied, and the stay on trial court proceedings was vacated. View "Sanchez v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

DeRon Edrias Gude was convicted of felony murder and other charges related to the shooting death of Nyyokokie Hendley. On October 11, 2016, Gude called 911 to report a shooting at his home, claiming it was an accident during a fight. Police found Hendley dead from a gunshot wound to the head, with a 9-millimeter handgun near her feet and marijuana in an unlocked safe. Gude was indicted on multiple charges, including malice murder and felony murder. At trial, Gude testified that Hendley had threatened him and pointed a gun at him, leading him to shoot her in self-defense. The jury found Gude guilty of felony murder predicated on aggravated assault and other charges.The DeKalb County Superior Court granted Gude’s motion for a directed verdict of acquittal on the marijuana charge, and the jury found him not guilty of malice murder but guilty on the remaining counts. Gude was sentenced to life in prison for felony murder predicated on aggravated assault, plus five years for possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. Gude’s motion for a new trial was denied by the trial court.The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case and addressed Gude’s claims of plain error in the jury charge on aggravated assault and ineffective assistance of counsel. The court assumed, without deciding, that the trial court committed an obvious error in the jury instruction but found that Gude failed to show the error likely affected the trial's outcome. The court noted that the jury was properly instructed on the burden of proof and provided with a copy of the indictment. Additionally, Gude’s defense was self-defense, and the jury’s verdict indicated they found he intended to shoot Hendley. Consequently, the court affirmed the trial court’s judgment, concluding that Gude did not demonstrate plain error or ineffective assistance of counsel. View "GUDE v. THE STATE" on Justia Law

The appellant was charged with four counts of first-degree sexual assault, alleged to have occurred between January 1, 2004, and June 1, 2008. He filed a motion to quash and dismiss the charges, arguing that the statute of limitations had expired. The district court denied the motion, stating that the statute of limitations likely had not run but required a preliminary hearing to determine the ages of the victims. Before the preliminary hearing, the State amended the charges to include offenses from January 1, 2000, to June 1, 2008. The appellant eventually pled no contest to one count of first-degree sexual assault under a plea agreement.The district court accepted the plea after confirming that the appellant understood the charges, the penalties, and his rights. The court also confirmed that the appellant was competent to plead, despite his PTSD and not taking medication on the day of the plea hearing. The appellant was sentenced to 40 to 50 years in prison, with credit for time served. His trial counsel did not appeal, leading the appellant to file a pro se motion for postconviction relief, which was granted, allowing him to file a direct appeal.On appeal to the Nebraska Supreme Court, the appellant argued that his trial counsel was ineffective for various reasons, including failing to file a motion to quash the amended information, not disclosing a health condition that impaired counsel’s ability, and not properly advising him of the consequences of his plea. The court found that the record did not support claims of ineffective assistance regarding the motion to quash, as the statute of limitations had not expired, and there was no ex post facto violation. The court also found that the appellant was adequately informed of the consequences of his plea and that his counsel was not deficient in this regard.The Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s acceptance of the plea and the sentence, finding no abuse of discretion or merit in the claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. View "State v. Haas" on Justia Law

In this case, Jimmy Davis, Jr., an Alabama prisoner sentenced to death for the 1993 murder of Johnny Hazle during a gas station robbery, appealed the district court’s denial of his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 federal habeas petition. Davis argued that his trial counsel was ineffective during the penalty phase of his trial for failing to investigate and present mitigating evidence of childhood abuse and the circumstances of his prior conviction for third-degree robbery.The Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed Davis’s conviction and sentence on direct appeal. Davis then filed a state postconviction petition, which was denied after an evidentiary hearing. The state court found that Davis’s trial counsel did not perform deficiently and that Davis was not prejudiced by the alleged deficiencies. The Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the denial of the postconviction petition, concluding that the investigation conducted by Davis’s attorneys was reasonable and that Davis failed to show prejudice.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama denied Davis’s § 2254 petition, concluding that the state court’s decision was not an unreasonable application of Supreme Court precedent or based on an unreasonable determination of the facts. The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s denial of the habeas petition.The Eleventh Circuit held that the state court’s conclusion that Davis was not prejudiced by his counsel’s alleged deficiencies was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. The court noted that the additional mitigating evidence presented during the postconviction proceedings, including evidence of childhood abuse and the non-violent nature of the prior robbery, did not create a reasonable probability of a different outcome. The court emphasized that the state court’s decision was not so obviously wrong that it lay beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement. View "Davis v. Commissioner, Alabama Department of Corrections" on Justia Law

Kay Ellison, co-founder of a charter airline, was convicted of federal wire fraud, bank fraud, and conspiracy. The airline, Direct Air, faced cash flow issues and Ellison siphoned millions from an escrow account through fictitious reservations and falsified records. She was charged alongside Judy Tull and chose not to testify or present a defense at trial. The jury convicted her on all counts, and she was sentenced to ninety-four months in prison and ordered to pay over $19 million in restitution. Her convictions were affirmed on direct appeal.Ellison filed a motion to vacate her sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel. She argued her attorney incorrectly advised her that if she did not testify, she could not present other evidence, which she claimed prejudiced her defense. The United States District Court for the District of New Jersey denied her motion without an evidentiary hearing, concluding that even if her counsel was ineffective, she could not show prejudice because there was no reasonable probability that the jury would have acquitted her if she had testified or presented other witnesses.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the District Court's decision. The Third Circuit applied the Strickland v. Washington standard, which requires showing a reasonable probability that the result of the proceeding would have been different but for the attorney's errors. The court found that Ellison failed to demonstrate such a probability, as her proposed testimony and that of her witnesses would not have likely changed the jury's verdict given the strong evidence against her. Thus, the denial of her habeas corpus petition was upheld. View "Ellison v. USA" on Justia Law