Justia Professional Malpractice & Ethics Opinion Summaries

The case involves defendant Prospero Guadalupe Serna, who was found guilty by a jury of two misdemeanors: knowingly resisting arrest and willfully resisting, delaying, or obstructing a peace officer. The incident occurred when a California Highway Patrol officer encountered Serna walking within traffic lanes. Despite the officer's attempts to guide Serna to safety, Serna resisted multiple times, leading to his eventual detention with the help of additional officers. Serna's defense argued that his mental health issues should have been considered to negate the knowledge requirement for the offenses.The Superior Court of San Bernardino County reviewed the case, where Serna claimed ineffective assistance of counsel. He argued that his attorney failed to introduce his mental health records and did not request a jury instruction regarding mental defects affecting intent. The appellate division held that since the crimes were of general intent, evidence of mental disease was not admissible to show lack of specific intent. The court also noted a split in authority regarding whether the offense required actual knowledge that the person resisted was a peace officer.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, reviewed the case to resolve whether Penal Code section 148(a)(1) requires actual knowledge that the person being resisted is a peace officer. The court found the analysis in People v. Mackreth persuasive, which held that section 148(a)(1) does not require actual knowledge. Instead, it is sufficient for the jury to find that the defendant knew or reasonably should have known the person was a police officer. Consequently, the court affirmed the judgment, concluding that the statute does not necessitate the defendant's actual knowledge of the officer's status. View "People v. Serna" on Justia Law

The appellant was charged with first-degree sexual assault and false imprisonment after an incident involving a 17-year-old victim, A.S., who alleged that the appellant, while intoxicated, forcibly removed her clothes and penetrated her vaginally. The incident occurred after a Fourth of July party at the home of the appellant's then-fiancée, who is also A.S.'s cousin. A.S. reported the assault the next day and underwent a forensic medical examination.The District Court for Hamilton County admitted evidence of the appellant's prior sexual assault conviction involving a 13-year-old victim, M.Z., under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 27-414, which allows evidence of prior sexual offenses to prove propensity. The court found similarities between the two incidents, including the ages of the victims, the use of force, and the presence of alcohol. The court also admitted a Sexual Assault Nurse Examiner (SANE) report prepared during A.S.'s examination, which included statements made by A.S. for medical diagnosis and treatment.The Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court's decisions. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence of the prior sexual assault conviction, as the probative value was not outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. The court also found that the SANE report was admissible under the business records exception and the medical treatment exception to the hearsay rule. The appellant's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to object to the SANE report was rejected, as any objection would have been meritless.The Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed the appellant's convictions for first-degree sexual assault and false imprisonment. View "State v. Swartz" on Justia Law

Charvez Ryals was convicted of malice murder and other crimes related to the beating and fatal shooting of Daniel Wise. The incident occurred on March 10, 2018, in DeKalb County, Georgia. Ryals and his girlfriend, Regina Welch, had a history of domestic violence involving Wise, who was Regina's ex-boyfriend and the father of her three children. On the night before the murder, Wise confronted Regina and Ryals, demanding money and threatening them. The next morning, Wise returned to Regina's apartment, leading to a confrontation where Ryals shot Wise multiple times, resulting in his death.The case was initially tried in the Superior Court of DeKalb County, where a jury found Ryals guilty on all counts, including malice murder, felony murder, aggravated assault, cruelty to children, and firearm possession. The trial court sentenced Ryals to life in prison for malice murder, along with additional concurrent and consecutive sentences for the other charges. Ryals filed a motion for a new trial, which was denied by the trial court in March 2024.The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case, focusing on Ryals' claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. Ryals argued that his trial counsel failed to subpoena a key witness, obtain phone records, introduce the criminal histories of Wise and another victim, and request a jury charge on voluntary manslaughter. The court found that these claims did not demonstrate deficient performance or resulting prejudice. The court held that the decisions made by Ryals' counsel were reasonable and strategic, and that any potential deficiencies did not affect the outcome of the trial. Consequently, the Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed the lower court's judgment, upholding Ryals' convictions and sentences. View "RYALS v. THE STATE" on Justia Law

Brendan Riley was charged and convicted of murder and other crimes related to the shooting death of Glentis Wheeler. The State appealed the trial court's decision to grant Riley's amended motion for a new trial on the grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel, except for one count. Riley argued that his trial counsel was ineffective for not challenging the charging document, which he claimed was ambiguous and could have led to the dismissal of most charges if a general demurrer had been filed.The trial court found that the charging document did not meet the statutory requirements for an indictment and instead met the requirements of an accusation. Since certain crimes Riley was charged with could not be brought by accusation, the trial court ruled that his trial counsel was deficient for not challenging the document, resulting in prejudice to Riley. Consequently, the trial court granted Riley a new trial for most counts but did not address other arguments in his motion for a new trial.The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case and determined that the charging document, while ambiguous, contained indications that it could be considered an indictment. The court found no binding precedent that would have required the trial court to dismiss the charges if a general demurrer had been filed. Therefore, the court concluded that Riley's trial counsel did not perform deficiently by failing to challenge the document. The Supreme Court of Georgia reversed the trial court's decision to grant a new trial for most counts and remanded the case for consideration of the remaining arguments in Riley's amended motion for a new trial. View "THE STATE v. RILEY" on Justia Law

Duane Gary Underwood, II was convicted of possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine, possession of a stolen firearm, and possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime. Underwood appealed his conviction on ten grounds, including the constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A), the legality of his detention and search, the validity of a search warrant for his phone, the admissibility of certain evidence, voir dire procedures, the sufficiency of the evidence, jury instructions, and the licensure status of the prosecuting Assistant U.S. Attorney (AUSA).The United States District Court for the Western District of Michigan denied Underwood's pretrial motions to suppress evidence and dismiss charges. The court admitted evidence from Underwood's phone and grand jury testimony under Rule 803(5). The jury convicted Underwood on all counts, and he was sentenced to 180 months' imprisonment. Post-trial, Underwood moved to dismiss his conviction, arguing that the AUSA's administrative suspension for nonpayment of bar dues constituted prosecutorial misconduct and a jurisdictional defect. The district court denied this motion.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's judgment. The court held that 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A) is constitutional, the officers had reasonable suspicion to detain and search Underwood, and the search warrant for Underwood's phone was valid. The court found no abuse of discretion in admitting the contested evidence or in the voir dire procedures. The evidence was deemed sufficient to support the convictions, and the jury instructions were appropriate. The court also ruled that the AUSA's administrative suspension did not constitute prosecutorial misconduct or create a jurisdictional defect, and there was no Brady violation. View "United States v. Underwood" on Justia Law

In 1985, Terry D. Bemore was arrested and later convicted for the murder of a liquor store clerk. He was sentenced to death in 1989. Bemore's trial counsel was found to have provided ineffective assistance, and evidence of racial bias by his lead counsel was presented. In 2015, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed Bemore's death sentence, and he was resentenced to life without parole in 2016. In 2020, the California Legislature enacted the Racial Justice Act (RJA), allowing defendants to challenge convictions based on racial discrimination. Bemore sought to use this new law to challenge his conviction.The trial court appointed the San Diego Office of the Primary Public Defender to represent Bemore in his RJA claim, despite his request to have his previous habeas counsel, Sayasane and Cotterill, appointed. Bemore filed a petition for writ of mandate, arguing that the trial court should have appointed his preferred counsel due to their extensive prior representation and familiarity with his case.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court held that section 987.2 of the Penal Code governs the selection and assignment of counsel in noncapital postconviction habeas proceedings, including those under the RJA. The court found that the trial court erred in placing the burden on Bemore to demonstrate the Public Defender's unavailability and in failing to recognize the good cause shown for appointing Sayasane and Cotterill. Additionally, the court determined that the Public Defender had created a conflict of interest by opposing Bemore's petition, thus disqualifying itself from representing him.The Court of Appeal granted Bemore's petition, vacated the trial court's order appointing the Public Defender, and directed the trial court to appoint one or both of Bemore's requested attorneys. View "Bemore v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

The appellant, Jamie Alexander Washington, was convicted of felony murder and related crimes connected to the aggravated assault of Desmond Carter and the shooting death of James Hawkins in Dougherty County. The crimes occurred on July 5, 2015. Washington, along with co-defendants Mylan Mahoney and Malcolm Bernard Offord, Jr., was indicted on October 1, 2015, and reindicted on February 8, 2017. Mahoney and Offord pled guilty and testified against Washington. Washington was tried before a jury in February 2020, found guilty, and sentenced to life in prison without parole for felony murder, with additional concurrent and consecutive sentences for other charges.Washington filed a motion for a new trial, which was denied by the trial court on March 11, 2024. He then appealed to the Supreme Court of Georgia, raising several claims of trial-court error and ineffective assistance of counsel.The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case and found the evidence sufficient to support Washington's conviction for felony murder, rejecting his argument that the evidence was insufficient under Georgia’s accomplice-corroboration statute. The court also found no plain error in the trial court's questioning of a witness, which Washington claimed expressed an opinion on the evidence. Additionally, the court concluded that any error in allowing the State to cross-examine Washington about his criminal history was harmless given the strong evidence against him.Regarding ineffective assistance of counsel claims, the court determined that Washington's trial counsel was not deficient in failing to locate a witness, object to hearsay testimony, request an alibi instruction, or object to certain prosecutorial comments during closing arguments. The court also found no cumulative prejudice from the alleged errors and instances of ineffective assistance.The Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed Washington's convictions. View "WASHINGTON v. THE STATE" on Justia Law

Coby Edwards was charged with class AA felony gross sexual imposition for allegedly engaging in a sexual act with a five-year-old child. The State intended to use statements made by the child during a recorded interview and a forensic medical examination, which were admitted under an exception to the hearsay rule. During the trial, various witnesses, including the child, testified. Edwards's counsel mentioned difficulties in communication due to Edwards's pretrial detention and failed to call an expert witness. The jury found Edwards guilty, and the conviction was affirmed on appeal.Edwards then filed for postconviction relief, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel. He argued that his counsel's references to the child as "the victim," failure to object to hearsay, and failure to call an expert witness constituted ineffective representation. The district court held an evidentiary hearing and denied the application, finding that the counsel's decisions were strategic and that Edwards did not demonstrate how an expert witness would have changed the outcome. The court also found that the references to the child as a victim were deficient but did not prejudice the trial's outcome.The North Dakota Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that Edwards failed to show a reasonable probability that the trial outcome would have been different without the alleged deficiencies in his counsel's performance. The court noted that the evidence against Edwards, including the child's testimony and statements, was substantial and that the counsel's errors did not undermine confidence in the trial's outcome. View "Edwards v. State" on Justia Law

Robert Sylvester Kelly, also known as R. Kelly, was convicted in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York of racketeering and Mann Act violations. The evidence presented at trial showed that Kelly, with the help of his associates, exploited his fame to lure and abuse young girls and women over a period of twenty-five years. Kelly isolated his victims, controlled their lives, and subjected them to verbal, physical, and sexual abuse.The district court sentenced Kelly to 360 months' imprisonment for racketeering and additional concurrent sentences for the Mann Act violations. Kelly was also fined and ordered to pay restitution to two victims. Kelly appealed his convictions, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence, the constitutionality of the state laws underlying his federal convictions, the empaneling of certain jurors, ineffective assistance of counsel, and the district court's evidentiary rulings and restitution orders.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed Kelly's appeal. The court found that there was sufficient evidence to support Kelly's convictions, including the underlying state and federal violations. The court also held that the New York state law was constitutional as applied to Kelly and that Kelly's challenges to the California state law were untimely. The court found no evidence of juror bias or ineffective assistance of counsel during voir dire. The court also upheld the district court's evidentiary rulings and restitution orders, finding no abuse of discretion.The Second Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court, concluding that Kelly's arguments on appeal were without merit. View "United States v. Kelly" on Justia Law

William Hudson was convicted in Wisconsin state court of conspiracy to commit first-degree intentional homicide and conspiracy to commit arson. The convictions stemmed from an agreement Hudson made with another inmate, Scott Seal, to kill Seal’s ex-girlfriend and commit arson in exchange for payment. Seal, however, was an informant. After Hudson was released, he met with an undercover officer posing as Seal’s defense attorney, accepted an envelope with $6,000 and the targets' addresses, and was arrested. Hudson claimed he never intended to commit the crimes but was trying to scam Seal to support himself and his sister, Dana Hudson.Hudson filed a direct appeal alleging outrageous governmental conduct and ineffective assistance of trial counsel for not arguing the government’s conduct. The Wisconsin circuit court denied postconviction relief, and the Court of Appeals of Wisconsin affirmed. The Supreme Court of Wisconsin denied review. Hudson then filed a postconviction motion under Section 974.06, claiming ineffective assistance of trial counsel for not calling Dana as a witness and not investigating her testimony. The Wisconsin circuit court held evidentiary hearings and denied relief, finding counsel’s performance was not deficient. The Court of Appeals of Wisconsin affirmed, and the Supreme Court of Wisconsin denied review.Hudson filed a habeas petition in federal court, claiming ineffective assistance of trial counsel and postconviction counsel. The district court denied the petition, holding that the state court had not misapplied Strickland v. Washington and that trial counsel’s performance satisfied Strickland’s deferential standard. The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision, concluding that even if counsel’s performance was deficient, Hudson failed to demonstrate that the deficiencies prejudiced the outcome of the case. View "Hudson v DeHaan" on Justia Law