Justia Professional Malpractice & Ethics Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff retained Defendant, a law firm, to represent Plaintiff in an action against other parties. After Plaintiff settled the underlying suit, Plaintiff filed a breach of contract action against Defendant, alleging that Defendant breached its duty of undivided loyalty and failed to follow Plaintiff’s instructions in the underlying lawsuit. The trial court characterized the allegations against Defendant as sounding in legal malpractice and granted Defendant’s motion for summary judgment on the ground that Plaintiff’s claim was barred by the statute of limitations applicable to legal malpractice claims. At issue on appeal was whether Plaintiff’s cause of action was one for malpractice, to which a three-year statute of limitation applied, or contract, to which a six-year statute of limitations applied. The appellate court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court correctly characterized Plaintiff’s claim as sounding in legal malpractice. View "Meyers v. Livingston, Adler, Pulda, Meiklejohn & Kelly, P.C." on Justia Law

Thomas Konrad accepted a loan from Bob Law upon the advice of attorney Douglas Kettering. Law and Kettering had been partners in at least one of Law's business ventures and had an attorney-client relationship. Thomas's parents (the Konrads) provided their land as collateral for Thomas's loan. Thomas later defaulted on the note. Seven months after Kettering passed away, Law brought suit to enforce the note and mortgage against Thomas and the Konrads. Law settled with Thomas and the Konrads. Law then sought to recover from the Kettering Estate the amounts outstanding on the note, claiming that Kettering's acts - including his conflict of interest with Law and his alleged fraudulent inducement of the Konrads into signing the note and mortgage - voided the note and mortgage, and therefore, the Estate was liable to Law for the interest due on the note. The circuit court granted summary judgment for the Estate. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the contract between Law and Thomas did not contravene public policy because it was drafted by an attorney who failed to disclose a conflicting attorney-client relationship; and (2) the theory that Kettering fraudulently induced the Konrads into signing the note and mortgage rested on mere speculation.View "Law Capital, Inc. v. Kettering" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs-appellees Jackie and Marcia Ellison, along with Richard M. Healy, P.C., Jayne Jarnigan Robertson, P.C., and Michael J. Blascheke, P.C., sued defendants-appellants, Michael D. Campbell and M.D. Campbell & Associates, L.P., for breach of contract. Plaintiffs alleged that Campbell failed to render a defensible expert opinion in underlying litigation in Canadian County, and subsequently abandoned the task for which he was hired. Campbell counterclaimed for "uncompensated professional services." A jury returned a verdict in plaintiffs' favor. Based on the jury's verdict, the trial court entered judgment for the plaintiffs for $408,748.68, plus statutory interest. Campbell filed a motion for new trial or, in the alternative, a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. After hearing argument, the trial court overruled the motions and Campbell appealed. The Court of Civil Appeals reversed, finding that the breach of contract cause of action failed because plaintiffs did not prove their case by presenting an expert witness. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that in this case the expert witness indicted his own performance in the underlying matter: "Supporting testimony made it clear that Campbell did not produce a document which accurately represented the state of the groundwater underlying the Ellisons' property or the source of its pollution. Any lay person could consider the testimony presented and conclude that the Ellisons did not receive the services for which they contracted. The expert witness's testimony was such that any reasonable juror might question his candidness." Under these unique facts, it was unnecessary for plaintiffs to rely upon expert testimony to prevail in their breach of contract claim. View "Ellison v. Campbell" on Justia Law

Petitioner, which operated an animal crematory, filed an action against Respondent, a planning and engineering firm, alleging breach of contract and professional negligence. The complaint failed to attribute Respondent's alleged failings to a licensed engineer and was not accompanied by a certificate of a qualified expert. The circuit court dismissed the complaint for failure to file a certificate within the required time period. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that where the allegations of Petitioner's complaint did not fault a licensed engineer, it was premature to conclude that an expert certificate was required, as the certificate requirement applies only to a cause of action based on a licensed engineer's negligent act or omission in rendering engineering services within the scope of the engineer's license.View "Heavenly Days Crematorium, LLC v. Harris, Smariga & Assocs." on Justia Law

Sierra International purchased a manufacturing facility's operations. Sierra later filed for bankruptcy. Appellants, the facility and its president, hired Respondent (MCW) to represent them in Sierra's bankruptcy action. Sierra's bankruptcy case closed in 2008. In 2006, Appellants filed an action against MCW, alleging professional malpractice arising from its representation of Appellants in the bankruptcy action. The district court dismissed the lawsuit for failure to comply with Nev. R. Civ. P. 16.1(e)(2). In 2010, Appellants filed a second complaint against MCW, reasserting the claims in their first complaint. MCW filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the case was time-barred under the relevant statute of limitations because the appropriate accrual date was 2006, the date of the filing of the first complaint. Appellants responded by asserting that Hewitt v. Allen, which provides that the statutory limitation period of a claim of legal malpractice involving the representation of a client during litigation does not commence until the underlying litigation is concluded, governed. The district court held that 2006 was the appropriate accrual date and that Hewitt was inapplicable because a bankruptcy proceeding does not constitute litigation. The Supreme Court affirmed, holing that Sierra's bankruptcy action did not constitute an adversarial proceeding under Hewitt. View "Moon v. McDonald, Carano & Wilson, LLP" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs brought legal malpractice claims against Jeffrey Daniels, American Guarantee & Liability Insurance Company’s insured. American Guarantee wrongly refused to defend the claims. A default judgment was entered against Daniels, who assigned his rights against American Guarantee to Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs then brought the present action seeking to enforce American Guarantee’s duty to indemnify Daniels for the judgment. Summary judgment was awarded in favor of Plaintiffs. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, concluding that American Guarantee’s breach of its duty to defend barred it from relying on policy exclusions as a defense to the present lawsuit. The Court later granted reargument, vacated its prior decision, and reversed the Appellate Division’s order, holding (1) under controlling precedent, American Guarantee was not barred from relying on policy exclusions as a defense; and (2) the applicability of the exclusions American Guarantee relied on presented an issue of fact sufficient to defeat summary judgment. View "K2 Inv. Group, LLC v. Am. Guar. & Liab. Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Appellant sued the trustee of his deceased wife's estate, claiming that the trustee improperly transferred Appellant's assets into the trust. Appellant also sought to disqualify the attorney who prepared the trust documents (Attorney) from representing the trustee based on the district court's conclusion that a prior attorney-client relationship existed between Appellant and Attorney, creating a conflict of interest. After the trust litigation settled, Appellant sued Attorney for legal malpractice due to Attorney's failure to verify Appellant's intentions before preparing he documents for his signature. Before trial, Appellant sought to preclude Attorney from arguing that an attorney-client relationship did not exist because, under the doctrine of issue preclusion, Attorney could not deny the existence of an attorney-client relationship. The district court denied Appellant's motion. During trial, the district court ruled that evidence of Appellant's intent in executing the documents was precluded by the parol evidence rule. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court properly refused to apply the doctrine of issue preclusion because the issue of an attorney-client relationship between Appellant and Attorney was not necessarily litigated in the trust action; and (2) the district court did not err in applying the parol evidence rule.View " Frei v. Goodsell" on Justia Law

In 2000, Gregory T. Ludlow, S. Reid Ludlow, and Jean E. Cowles entered into an exclusive listing agreement with real estate brokerage firm Gibbons-White, Inc. for the sale of approximately 131 acres of vacant land in Boulder County. Over the next seven years, the Sellers received offers from at least three different buyers to purchase portions of the land; none of the offers resulted in a completed sale. In 2007, Actis, LLC made an offer to purchase half of the land. The issue before the Supreme Court in this matter stemmed from that offer. The Court concluded that to sustain a professional malpractice claim against a transactional real estate broker, a plaintiff must show that but for the alleged negligent acts of the broker he either:(1) would have been able to obtain a better deal in the underlying transaction; or (2) would have been better off by walking away from the underlying transaction. The Court concluded that the Sellers here failed to present evidence of damages because they did not establish beyond mere speculation they suffered a financial loss because of the transactional brokers' professional negligence. View "Gibbons v. Ludlow" on Justia Law

Appellants decided to sell 850 acres of farmland but wanted to retain the mineral rights. Summit Title Services prepared the deeds for the sale, but he deeds did not reserve the minerals. Appellants were made aware of the omission at closing, insisted that the deeds be corrected, and were assured by Summit’s employee that the problem had been rectified. Six years later, Appellants learned that the minerals had been transferred with the land. Appellants filed suit against Summit, its general counsel Olen Snider, and Kuzma Success Realty, a brokerage firm involved in the transaction. The district court granted summary judgment for Appellees on all claims, concluding that Appellants failed to exercise due diligence to discover the error so as to extend the statute of limitation as a matter of law. The Supreme Court reversed the grant of summary judgment to Summit and Snider, concluding that there were genuine issues of material fact as to whether Appellants exercised due diligence to discover errors allegedly made by Summit and that Snider failed to present a prima facie case that he was entitled to summary judgment. View "Moats v. Prof’l Assistance, LLC " on Justia Law

These appeals arose out of LJL's exercise of its contractual option to purchase Pitcairn's ownership stake in a jointly owned high-rise luxury residential building in New York City, after which the parties pursued an arbitration to determine the value of the property. Both parties subsequently appealed from the district court's judgment. In LJL's appeal, the court agreed with its contention that the arbitrator's exclusion of Pitcairn's hearsay exhibits was within the arbitrator's authorized discretion and, therefore, vacated the district court's order overturning the arbitrator's determination of the Stated Value. The court agreed with the district court's conclusion that the arbitrator acted in accordance with the terms of the arbitration agreement in refusing to determine the Purchase Price and, therefore, remanded with instructions to confirm the arbitration award in its entirety. In Pitcairn's appeal, the court found no error in the district court's dismissal of Pitcairn's claims for breach of fiduciary duties and breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "LJL 33rd Street Associates, LLC v. Pitcairn Properties Inc." on Justia Law