Justia Professional Malpractice & Ethics Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Contracts
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Tom Smith Masonry (Smith Masonry) and WIPI Group USA, Inc. (WIPI) entered into a contract for Smith Masonry to construct a fence on WIPI’s property. After completing most of the work, Smith Masonry requested final payment, which WIPI withheld due to a dispute over the installation of a gate operator. Smith Masonry filed a mechanic’s lien and subsequently a lawsuit to foreclose on the lien, seeking the unpaid balance. WIPI counterclaimed for breach of contract and other issues, seeking damages for alleged faulty workmanship.The Circuit Court of the Second Judicial Circuit, Lincoln County, South Dakota, denied relief to both parties, finding that Smith Masonry’s work was defective and that WIPI’s damages were not established with exactitude. Smith Masonry appealed, and the South Dakota Supreme Court reversed and remanded, directing the lower court to enter a judgment of foreclosure in favor of Smith Masonry for the full amount of the lien and to reconsider Smith Masonry’s request for attorney fees.On remand, the circuit court entered a judgment in favor of Smith Masonry on the lien but denied the request for attorney fees. Smith Masonry appealed again. The South Dakota Supreme Court found that the circuit court violated the law of the case doctrine by revisiting issues already settled in the first appeal and by speculating on what might have occurred had the trial resumed. The Supreme Court also held that the circuit court abused its discretion by denying attorney fees based on irrelevant factors and an overly narrow interpretation of the statute governing attorney fees in mechanic’s lien cases.The South Dakota Supreme Court reversed the circuit court’s denial of attorney fees and remanded for a determination of an appropriate award of attorney fees consistent with its opinion. The court also awarded Smith Masonry $30,000 for appellate attorney fees. View "Smith Masonry v. Wipi Group Inc." on Justia Law

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Dr. Jeffery Weisman filed a lawsuit after resigning from Washington University’s residency program, alleging that he was forced to resign due to hostile treatment and that Washington University and Barnes Jewish Hospital prevented him from transferring to another residency program. Weisman brought claims for breach of contract, tortious interference, fraudulent inducement, and defamation under Missouri law. Washington University and Barnes Jewish Hospital counterclaimed for a violation of the Missouri Computer Tampering Act (MCTA).The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri dismissed Weisman’s tortious interference and fraudulent inducement claims, and some of his breach of contract claims. The court granted summary judgment in favor of Barnes Jewish Hospital on the remaining breach of contract claims and the defamation claim. The court also dismissed the MCTA counterclaims and the defendants’ request for attorneys’ fees. Weisman appealed the adverse judgments on his claims, and the defendants cross-appealed the dismissal of the MCTA counterclaims and denial of attorneys’ fees.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decisions. The appellate court held that the statute of frauds barred Weisman’s breach of contract claim related to the Lab-Residency Contract, as it was an oral agreement for a term of five years. The court also affirmed the dismissal of the tortious interference claims, concluding that Evers and Benzinger, as agents of Washington University, were not third parties to the contracts. Additionally, the court upheld the dismissal of the fraudulent inducement claims, as the alleged Separation Agreement did not exist. Finally, the court affirmed the dismissal of the MCTA counterclaims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, as Weisman’s tender of full payment rendered the claims moot. View "Weisman v. Barnes Jewish Hospital" on Justia Law

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Cheryl Butler was hired as an assistant law professor at Southern Methodist University (SMU) in 2011. After a mandatory third-year performance review, her contract was renewed, and she became eligible for tenure consideration in the fall semester of 2015. Due to illness, Butler requested an extension of the tenure vote, which was denied, but she was later granted leave under the Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA) for the spring semester of 2016. Her tenure committee, chaired by Professor Roy Anderson, concluded that Butler met tenure standards for scholarship and service but not teaching. Consequently, the law faculty voted not to recommend tenure, and Butler's appeals to the SMU Law School Dean and the Provost were unsuccessful. Butler completed the 2016-2017 academic year without teaching any classes.Butler filed a lawsuit against SMU and several of its employees, alleging racially discriminatory tenure standards and processes, and retaliation for her internal complaints about race, disability, and FMLA discrimination. She brought federal statutory claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, the Americans with Disabilities Act, Title IX, and the FMLA. Additionally, she asserted state-law discrimination and retaliation claims under Texas Labor Code Chapter 21, along with state common law claims for breach of contract and negligent supervision. Against the employee defendants, she claimed defamation, conspiracy to defame, and fraud.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas dismissed Butler's defamation and fraud claims against the employee defendants, citing preemption by Chapter 21 of the Texas Labor Code. The court held that the gravamen of these claims was unlawful employment discrimination and retaliation, which Chapter 21 specifically addresses. Butler appealed, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit certified a question to the Supreme Court of Texas regarding whether Chapter 21 preempts common law defamation and fraud claims against employees based on the same conduct as discrimination claims against the employer.The Supreme Court of Texas held that Chapter 21 does not preempt common law defamation and fraud claims against employees. The court reasoned that Chapter 21 subjects only employers to liability for discriminatory and retaliatory conduct and does not immunize individuals from liability for their own tortious actions. Therefore, Butler's defamation and fraud claims against the employee defendants are not foreclosed by Chapter 21. View "BUTLER v. COLLINS" on Justia Law

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A creditor and a debtor’s law firm both claimed settlement funds held by the superior court. The creditor had a charging order against the debtor’s distributions from a limited liability company (LLC), while the law firm had an attorney’s lien on the funds. In a previous appeal, the attorney’s lien was deemed valid, but the case was remanded to determine if the funds were LLC distributions subject to the charging order and the value of the attorney’s lien.The superior court ruled that the funds were LLC distributions and subject to the charging order. It also found that the debtor failed to prove any money was owed to the law firm for work performed, thus invalidating the attorney’s lien. The court mistakenly released the funds to the creditor, who returned them within two days, but was sanctioned with attorney’s fees for temporarily keeping the funds.The debtor appealed, and the creditor cross-appealed the attorney’s fee award. The Supreme Court of Alaska affirmed the superior court’s rulings on the merits but reversed the attorney’s fee award. The court held that the funds were indeed LLC distributions subject to the charging order and that the debtor and law firm failed to prove the value of the attorney’s lien. The court also vacated the second final judgment and the attorney’s fee award against the creditor, finding no rule violation by the creditor. View "Baker v. Duffus" on Justia Law

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Two Texas lawyers, Michael A. Pohl and Robert Ammons, represented out-of-state clients in personal injury cases filed outside Texas. The clients, from Louisiana and Arkansas, alleged that they were solicited by individuals on behalf of the lawyers, which led to the signing of legal-services contracts. The clients later sued the lawyers in Texas, seeking to void the contracts under Texas Government Code Section 82.0651(a), which allows clients to void contracts procured through barratry, and to recover fees and penalties.The trial court dismissed all claims, granting summary judgment in favor of the lawyers. The clients appealed, and the Court of Appeals for the First District of Texas reversed the trial court's decision, concluding that Section 82.0651(a) applied because part of the lawyers' conduct occurred in Texas. The court also rejected the lawyers' arguments regarding limitations and res judicata and allowed Reese's intervention in the case.The Supreme Court of Texas reviewed the case and held that Section 82.0651(a) does not extend to the nonresident clients' claims because the core conduct targeted by the statute—solicitation of a legal-services contract through barratry—occurred outside Texas. The court reversed the Court of Appeals' judgment to the extent it allowed the clients to proceed with their claims under Section 82.0651(a) and rendered judgment that they take nothing on those claims. However, the court affirmed the Court of Appeals' judgment regarding the breach of fiduciary duty claims and remanded those claims to the trial court for further proceedings. View "POHL v. CHEATHAM" on Justia Law

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The Borough of Englewood Cliffs filed a complaint and an amended complaint against its former attorneys and a builder, alleging professional malpractice, breach of contract, unjust enrichment, civil conspiracy, and aiding and abetting. The Borough's actions followed a previous affordable housing litigation where the Borough did not prevail and subsequently settled with the builder. The Borough's new council, elected after a municipal election, pursued the litigation despite warnings from the defendants that the claims were frivolous.The trial court dismissed the Borough's complaints with prejudice, finding that the Borough acted in bad faith to harass, delay, and cause malicious injury. The court awarded the defendants attorney fees and costs under New Jersey’s Frivolous Litigation Statute (FLS), totaling $216,484.45. The Appellate Division affirmed the trial court's decision, concluding that a public entity is not immune from sanctions under the FLS.The Supreme Court of New Jersey reviewed the case and held that municipalities and municipal corporations that engage in frivolous litigation are subject to sanctions under the FLS. The Court found that the FLS does not provide immunity to municipalities and that the doctrine of sovereign immunity does not protect municipalities from liability under the FLS. The Court emphasized that the FLS aims to deter frivolous litigation and compensate the victims of such actions. The judgment of the Appellate Division was affirmed as modified, holding the Borough liable for the sanctions imposed. View "Borough of Englewood Cliffs v. Trautner" on Justia Law

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InfoDeli, LLC and Breht C. Burri (collectively, InfoDeli) brought a lawsuit against Western Robidoux, Inc. (WRI), Engage Mobile Solutions, LLC, and other defendants, including members of the Burri family and several companies. InfoDeli alleged copyright infringement, tortious interference, and violations of the Missouri Computer Tampering Act (MCTA). The dispute arose from a joint venture between InfoDeli and WRI, where InfoDeli created webstores for clients, and WRI provided printing and fulfillment services. The relationship deteriorated when WRI hired Engage to replace InfoDeli's webstores, leading to the lawsuit.The United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri granted summary judgment to the defendants on the copyright infringement claim, dismissed or tried the remaining claims before a jury, which found in favor of the defendants. The district court also granted in part and denied in part InfoDeli's sanctions motion and awarded attorney’s fees and costs to the defendants. InfoDeli appealed these decisions.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment on the copyright infringement claim, finding that InfoDeli failed to show that the nonliteral elements of its webstores were protected by copyright. The court also upheld the district court's denial of InfoDeli's motion for summary judgment on CEVA's conversion counterclaim, finding it was timely under Missouri law. Additionally, the court affirmed the district court's denial of InfoDeli's posttrial motions for judgment as a matter of law and a new trial as untimely.The Eighth Circuit also reviewed the sanctions imposed by the district court and found no abuse of discretion in the amount awarded or the decision not to impose additional sanctions under Rule 37(e). Finally, the court upheld the award of attorney’s fees and costs to the defendants, finding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in its assessment. The court affirmed the district court's decisions in all respects. View "InfoDeli, LLC v. Western Robidoux, Inc." on Justia Law

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An executive at a litigation funding company, Signal, resigned to start a competing business and sought legal advice from Signal’s outside counsel, Sugar Felsenthal Grais & Helsinger LLP. Signal sued the law firm and several of its attorneys, alleging legal malpractice, breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, and fraud. The district court dismissed some claims and granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants on the remaining claims. Signal appealed these rulings.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois dismissed Signal’s breach of fiduciary duty claim and part of its fraud claim, allowing the legal malpractice, breach of contract, and fraudulent misrepresentation claims to proceed. The court also struck Signal’s request for punitive damages. During discovery, the court denied Signal’s motion to compel production of a memorandum prepared by one of the defendants. The district court later granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants on all remaining claims.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s rulings. The appellate court agreed that Signal failed to establish proximate cause and damages for its legal malpractice and breach of contract claims. The court also found that Signal waived its challenge to the summary judgment ruling on the fraudulent misrepresentation claim by not adequately addressing it on appeal. Additionally, the court upheld the district court’s decision to deny Signal’s motion to compel production of the memorandum, as Signal did not demonstrate that the document influenced the witness’s testimony. The appellate court concluded that the district court’s dismissal of the fraudulent concealment theory was harmless error and denied Signal’s motion to certify a question to the Illinois Supreme Court as moot. View "Signal Funding, LLC v Sugar Felsenthal Grais & Helsinger LLP" on Justia Law

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AMTAX Holdings 227, LLC ("AMTAX") filed a lawsuit against CohnReznick LLP ("CohnReznick") in federal court, alleging breach of fiduciary duty, professional negligence, unjust enrichment, and fraud. The dispute arose from CohnReznick's calculation of a purchase price for a property under a right of first refusal agreement, which AMTAX claimed excluded exit taxes required by Section 42 of the Internal Revenue Code. AMTAX argued that this exclusion violated the agreement and federal law.The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York dismissed AMTAX's complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The court applied the Grable-Gunn test to determine whether the state-law claims presented a substantial federal issue that would warrant federal jurisdiction. The district court concluded that AMTAX's claims did not meet the criteria for federal question jurisdiction, as they did not necessarily raise a substantial federal issue and allowing federal jurisdiction would disrupt the federal-state balance.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the district court's decision de novo. The appellate court agreed with the lower court's application of the Grable-Gunn test, finding that AMTAX's claims were primarily based on contract interpretation rather than federal tax law. The court held that the federal issue was not substantial enough to warrant federal jurisdiction and that exercising jurisdiction would disrupt the balance of state and federal judicial responsibilities. Consequently, the Second Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. View "AMTAX Holdings 227, LLC v. CohnReznick LLP" on Justia Law

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A Texas attorney, Robert M. Roach, claimed to have an oral agreement with Fred Schrader, the former owner of Schrader Cellars, LLC, regarding the creation of another company, RBS LLC, which Roach asserted had an ownership interest in Schrader Cellars. After Fred Schrader sold Schrader Cellars to Constellation Brands, Roach sued Fred and Constellation in Texas state court, claiming the sale was improper. Schrader Cellars then filed the current action, seeking declaratory relief that Roach had no ownership interest in Schrader Cellars, and Roach counterclaimed.The United States District Court for the Northern District of California granted summary judgment in favor of Schrader Cellars on its claim for declaratory relief and dismissed Roach’s counterclaims. The court concluded that the oral agreement violated California Rule of Professional Responsibility 3-300 and that Roach did not rebut the presumption of undue influence. The case proceeded to trial on Schrader Cellars’s claim for breach of fiduciary duty, where the jury found that Roach’s breach caused harm but did not award damages due to the litigation privilege defense.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s summary judgment in favor of Schrader Cellars on its claim for declaratory relief and Roach’s counterclaims, finding triable issues of fact regarding whether Roach rebutted the presumption of undue influence. The appellate court also held that the district court erred in concluding and instructing the jury that Roach breached his fiduciary duties. However, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment after trial, concluding that the erroneous jury instruction had no effect on the outcome because the jury found that the gravamen of the breach of fiduciary duty claim was based on Roach’s filing of the Texas lawsuit, which was barred by the California litigation privilege. View "SCHRADER CELLARS, LLC V. ROACH" on Justia Law