Justia Professional Malpractice & Ethics Opinion Summaries

The defendant, Donald L. Garcia, was convicted of first-degree motor vehicle theft by a jury. On appeal, Garcia argued that the judge who presided over his case was disqualified due to her previous involvement as a managing public defender, where she briefly covered for his lawyer in a pretrial proceeding. The court of appeals agreed with Garcia and reversed his conviction.The Supreme Court of the State of Colorado, however, disagreed with the court of appeals. The Supreme Court agreed that the judge was disqualified, but concluded that the defendant waived his claim of judicial disqualification by failing to object. The court reasoned that the defendant's attorneys were likely aware of the judge's disqualification, and their failure to object amounted to the intentional relinquishment of a known right. Therefore, the court concluded that the defendant's claim of judicial disqualification was waived.Consequently, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals, reinstating Garcia's conviction and sentence. The court did not need to decide whether it is structural error requiring automatic reversal for a statutorily disqualified judge to preside over a case under the circumstances presented here, as it concluded that the defendant had waived his claim. View "People v. Garcia" on Justia Law

The case revolves around Khalil Jamandre Sanders, who was charged with first-degree assault, illegal discharge of a firearm, menacing, possession of a weapon by a previous offender, and two counts of violence after shooting and injuring Jamie Vasquez during a road-rage incident. Sanders requested the presiding judge to recuse herself from the case, arguing that she had experienced a similar incident of criminal conduct, which could potentially bias her judgment. The trial court denied Sanders's motions, and the case proceeded to trial, resulting in Sanders's conviction.The Colorado Court of Appeals upheld the trial court's decision, concluding that the trial judge's recusal was not required under the Due Process Clauses of the United States and Colorado Constitutions, section 16-6-201(1)(d), C.R.S. (2023), and Crim. P. 21(b), or the Colorado Code of Judicial Conduct (“C.J.C.”) 2.11. The division determined that disqualification was not necessary because Sanders failed to demonstrate actual bias on the part of the judge.The Supreme Court of the State of Colorado affirmed the division's judgment but on somewhat different grounds. The court concluded that the division applied too strict a standard by requiring a showing of actual bias to support a disqualification motion. However, the court agreed that disqualification was not warranted on the facts of this case. The court also concluded that Sanders had not established an appearance of partiality that might have required the trial court to recuse itself under C.J.C. 2.11(A). View "Sanders v. The People of the State of Colorado" on Justia Law

In this case, the Supreme Court of Colorado considered a petition from GHP Horwath, P.C., Nadine Pietrowski, Bohn Aguilar, LLC, Michael G. Bohn, and Armando Y. Aguilar, asking the court to permanently enjoin Nina H. Kazazian from proceeding pro se in Colorado state courts. Over the past eleven years, Kazazian, a pro se litigant and former attorney, had initiated at least ten lawsuits and twice as many appeals, most of which were found to be duplicative, meritless, or frivolous. Her actions led to her disbarment and multiple sanctions. The court noted that while every person has the right to access Colorado courts, this right is not absolute and may be curtailed when a pro se party persistently disrupts judicial administration by filing meritless and duplicative claims. The court found that Kazazian's actions placed a strain on judicial resources and were harmful to the public interest. Therefore, the court granted the petitioners' requested relief and ordered that Kazazian be permanently enjoined from proceeding pro se in Colorado state courts. View "GHP Horwath, P.C. v. Kazazian" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court of the State of Colorado ruled in favor of the petitioners, GHP Horwath, P.C.; Nadine Pietrowski; Bohn Aguilar, LLC; Michael G. Bohn; and Armando Y. Aguilar, in their request to permanently enjoin respondent Nina H. Kazazian from proceeding without legal representation (pro se) in Colorado state courts. The court found that Kazazian, a disbarred attorney, had consistently abused the legal system by pursuing numerous frivolous lawsuits and appeals, often targeting the attorneys involved in her cases. This behavior, the court held, caused unnecessary strain on judicial resources and was often aimed at harassing the opposing parties. Therefore, while Kazazian retained the right to access the courts, she could only do so through an attorney. View "Horwath v. Kazazian" on Justia Law

In the case before the Supreme Court of the State of Colorado, the court had to decide whether Anthony Robert Smith had waived some of the claims he had raised in a pro se Crim. P. 35(c) motion by not pursuing certain claims in later briefings and at a postconviction hearing. The court also had to consider whether counsel could abandon some of a defendant’s pro se Crim. P. 35(c) claims without first obtaining the defendant’s informed consent, and whether abandonment of individual postconviction claims requires a showing of intent to do so.Smith was convicted of multiple counts of sexual assault on a child and promotion of obscenity to a minor. After his conviction was affirmed by the court of appeals, Smith filed a pro se Crim. P. 35(c) motion, asserting several claims of ineffective assistance of counsel and prosecutorial misconduct. After appointed counsel filed a Supplemental Motion for Post-Conviction Relief that did not include some of Smith's pro se claims, the postconviction court found that Smith had waived those omitted claims.On appeal, a division of the court of appeals reversed the postconviction court’s decision, concluding that Smith’s claims were preserved because they were not superseded by counsel’s motion. The Supreme Court of the State of Colorado disagreed and reversed the judgment of the court of appeals.The Supreme Court of the State of Colorado held that Smith abandoned the claims he stopped pursuing. The court also decided that counsel, as the “captain of the ship,” has the authority to make strategic decisions, including which claims to pursue. Therefore, counsel may abandon some of a defendant’s pro se Crim. P. 35(c) claims without the client’s informed consent. The court did not rule on whether abandonment of individual postconviction claims requires a showing of intent to abandon such claims. View "People v. Smith" on Justia Law

This case involves attorney Grant Bursek's departure from Johnson Family Law, P.C. (MFL). When Bursek left MFL, 18 clients chose to continue their representation with him, prompting MFL to enforce an agreement that required Bursek to pay a per-client fee. Bursek argued that this fee violated the Colorado Rules of Professional Conduct, which prohibit attorneys from making employment agreements that restrict the right to practice after the termination of the relationship. The Supreme Court of the State of Colorado agreed with Bursek, holding that while a firm may seek reimbursement of specific client costs when a client leaves the firm to follow a lawyer, a firm cannot require a departing attorney to pay a non-specific fee in order to continue representing clients who wish to retain their relationship with that attorney. The court found that such an agreement constitutes an impermissible restriction on the attorney's right to practice and on the clients' right to choose their counsel. The court also held that this provision of the employment agreement was unenforceable, as it violated public policy as expressed in the Colorado Rules of Professional Conduct. The court affirmed in part and reversed in part the Court of Appeals' decision. It affirmed the decision that the per-client fee was unenforceable but reversed the Court of Appeals' decision to sever and attempt to enforce other parts of the agreement. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the opinion. View "Johnson Family Law v. Bursek" on Justia Law

In this case, defendant Joseph James Tippet was initially charged with first-degree murder for allegedly shooting and killing his father. However, due to a series of discovery violations by the Eleventh Judicial District Attorney's Office, Tippet's charge was reduced to second-degree murder by the district court as a deterrent sanction. The Supreme Court of the State of Colorado was asked to review this decision.The People (prosecution) had a history of neglecting their discovery obligations, leading to multiple discovery violations in Tippet's case and others. Despite several warnings from various judges, the District Attorney's Office continued to neglect its discovery obligations. As a result, Tippet's defense counsel was unable to effectively prepare for his preliminary hearing.The Supreme Court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion by reducing Tippet's charge as a sanction for the District Attorney's Office's consistent neglect of its discovery obligations. The court emphasized the importance of the discovery process in advancing the search for truth and protecting the integrity of the truth-finding process. The court affirmed the sanction as a necessary deterrent to encourage the District Attorney's Office to modify its discovery practices. The court also rejected the People's argument that the district court lacked the authority to reduce the charge as a discovery sanction, explaining that the decision to impose sanctions for discovery violations was within the court's discretion.In conclusion, the court discharged the rule to show cause, upholding the district court's decision to reduce Tippet's charge from first-degree murder to second-degree murder as a deterrent sanction for the District Attorney's Office's discovery violations. View "People v. Tippet" on Justia Law

At issue before the Colorado Supreme Court in this matter was a trial court’s order denying immunity to Defendant New Century Hospice, Inc. and its subsidiaries, Defendants Legacy Hospice, LLC, d/b/a New Century Hospice of Denver, LLC, and Legacy Hospice of Colorado Springs, LLC (collectively, “New Century”). New Century argued it was entitled to immunity under four different statutes. Tana Edwards filed suit against New Century (her former employer) and Kathleen Johnson, the Director of Operations for New Century Castle Rock (collectively, “Defendants”). As part of her employment with New Century, Edwards provided in-home care to an elderly patient. In December 2019, Johnson began to suspect that Edwards was diverting pain medications from the patient. Defendants reported the suspected drug diversion to the Castle Rock Police Department and the Colorado Department of Public Health and Environment (“CDPHE”). Defendants also lodged a complaint against Edwards’s nursing license with the Colorado Board of Nursing (“the Board”). After investigations, no criminal charges were filed and no formal disciplinary actions were taken against Edwards. Edwards subsequently brought this action against Defendants, alleging claims for negligent supervision and negligent hiring against New Century, as well as claims for defamation and intentional infliction of emotional distress against New Century and Johnson. Defendants moved for summary judgment. The trial court granted the motion as to Edwards’s claims for negligent hiring, defamation, and intentional infliction of emotional distress, finding that the claims were either time-barred or could not be proven. Three of the statutes New Century cited for its immunity claim, 12-20-402(1), C.R.S. (2022) (“the Professions Act”), 12-255-123(2), C.R.S. (2022) (“the Nurse Practice Act”), and 18-6.5-108(3), C.R.S. (2022) (“the Mandatory Reporter statute”), only authorized immunity for a “person.” Relying on the plain meaning of “person,” the Supreme Court held that New Century was not entitled to immunity under these three statutes because it was a corporation, not a person. The fourth statute, 18-8-115, C.R.S. (2022) (“the Duty to Report statute”), explicitly entitled corporations to immunity, but only if certain conditions were met. Applying the plain language of the statute, the Supreme Court held that New Century was not entitled to summary judgment on the issue of immunity under this statute because it did not carry its burden of demonstrating that all such conditions were met. View "In re Edwards v. New Century Hospice" on Justia Law

A Special Tribunal was convened to impose discipline on former Colorado Supreme Court Chief Justice Nathan Coats. The Colorado Commission on Judicial Discipline recommended approval of an Amended Stipulation for Public Censure. The censure stems from a 2018 allegation against Mindy Masias, the Chief of Staff and second in command of the State Court Administrator’s Office (SCAO), for misconduct while she was employed by the SCAO. She resigned her position, but was still under consideration for a post-resignation services contract with the Court, valued at $2.6 to $2.7 million. After an anonymous letter raised significant allegations of wrongdoing by Masias, the Office of the State Auditor (OSA) opened an investigation. Undisputed evidence revealed that the Judicial Department entered into this contract with Masias before the anonymous letter was received, and Justice Coats asserted he had no knowledge of the execution of Masias’ contract at that time. Months after execution of the contract and receipt of the letter, Justice Coats learned Masias had surreptitiously recorded a conversation with former Chief Justice Rice concerning the reasons Masias was not elevated to become the State Court Administrator. Had Justice Coats exercised due diligence by obtaining and reviewing the Masias separation agreement, he could have learned about the surreptitious recording prior to execution of the services contract. The Court ultimately withdrew from the services contract. Disciplinary proceedings were started against Justice Coats for failing to “perform judicial and administrative duties competently and diligently” as required by the Colorado Code of Judicial Conduct. The Commission recommended, and the Special Tribunal adopted the recommendation that Justice Coats be publicly censured. View "Colorado v. Coats" on Justia Law

The Colorado Commission on Judicial Discipline (“the Commission”) recommended public censure and thirty-day unpaid suspension of former district court Judge Mark Thompson of the Fifth Judicial District. These sanctions stemmed from former Judge Thompson’s guilty plea to a reduced charge of disorderly conduct in Summit County District Court. Former Judge Thompson’s plea reflected his admission to having “recklessly” displayed an AR-15 style assault rifle during a dispute with his adult stepson. View "In the Matter of: Former Judge Mark D. Thompson" on Justia Law