Justia Professional Malpractice & Ethics Opinion Summaries

Enrique Sanchez, the petitioner, sought a writ of mandate to vacate a trial court order that directed the San Bernardino County Public Defender to assign a new attorney to represent him. This order was issued after the current deputy public defender made remarks during plea negotiations that invoked Sanchez's race, potentially violating the Racial Justice Act (RJA). Sanchez argued that the trial court abused its discretion in ordering the reassignment.The trial court received a motion from the prosecutor to disclose exculpatory evidence and evaluate a conflict of interest after the deputy public defender made racially charged comments. During a closed hearing, Sanchez expressed his desire to retain his current counsel. However, the trial court ordered the reassignment of the deputy public defender, citing potential issues under the RJA and the risk of ineffective assistance of counsel.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Two, reviewed the case. The court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in removing the deputy public defender. The appellate court noted that the RJA's provisions and the potential for implicit bias created an actual conflict of interest that the deputy public defender could not objectively investigate. Additionally, the court found that the trial court's decision to prevent a potential future RJA claim was within its discretion to avoid substantial impairment of the proceedings.The appellate court concluded that Sanchez's arguments regarding constitutional violations and the necessity of an actual conflict were without merit. The court emphasized that the trial court's order was narrowly tailored and did not violate Sanchez's rights. Consequently, the petition for writ of mandate was denied, and the stay on trial court proceedings was vacated. View "Sanchez v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

In this case, Jimmy Davis, Jr., an Alabama prisoner sentenced to death for the 1993 murder of Johnny Hazle during a gas station robbery, appealed the district court’s denial of his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 federal habeas petition. Davis argued that his trial counsel was ineffective during the penalty phase of his trial for failing to investigate and present mitigating evidence of childhood abuse and the circumstances of his prior conviction for third-degree robbery.The Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed Davis’s conviction and sentence on direct appeal. Davis then filed a state postconviction petition, which was denied after an evidentiary hearing. The state court found that Davis’s trial counsel did not perform deficiently and that Davis was not prejudiced by the alleged deficiencies. The Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the denial of the postconviction petition, concluding that the investigation conducted by Davis’s attorneys was reasonable and that Davis failed to show prejudice.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama denied Davis’s § 2254 petition, concluding that the state court’s decision was not an unreasonable application of Supreme Court precedent or based on an unreasonable determination of the facts. The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s denial of the habeas petition.The Eleventh Circuit held that the state court’s conclusion that Davis was not prejudiced by his counsel’s alleged deficiencies was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. The court noted that the additional mitigating evidence presented during the postconviction proceedings, including evidence of childhood abuse and the non-violent nature of the prior robbery, did not create a reasonable probability of a different outcome. The court emphasized that the state court’s decision was not so obviously wrong that it lay beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement. View "Davis v. Commissioner, Alabama Department of Corrections" on Justia Law

Louis Mercado was charged with three counts of capital sexual battery in Florida. During his trial, the court granted judgments of acquittal on two counts and declared a mistrial on the third count due to prosecutorial error. The trial court then barred a retrial, citing the Double Jeopardy Clause. The State appealed this decision, but Mercado's attorney, mistakenly believing he had withdrawn from the case, failed to file a response brief. The appellate court reversed the trial court's decision, leading to Mercado's retrial, conviction, and life sentence.The Fifth District Court of Appeal summarily denied Mercado's state habeas petition, in which he argued ineffective assistance of counsel due to his attorney's failure to file a response brief. Mercado contended that this failure should be presumed prejudicial under United States v. Cronic, rather than requiring proof of prejudice under Strickland v. Washington. The appellate court's decision was based on the reasoning that the failure to file a brief did not constitute a complete denial of counsel.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's denial of Mercado's federal habeas petition. The court held that the state court's decision was not an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. The Eleventh Circuit noted that the Supreme Court has never applied the Cronic presumption of prejudice to a situation where counsel failed to file an appellee's brief. Therefore, the state court's requirement for Mercado to prove actual prejudice under Strickland was deemed reasonable. View "Mercado v. Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections" on Justia Law

Thomas Eugene Creech, who has been on death row for over four decades for the 1981 murder of fellow inmate David Dale Jensen, filed a petition for a writ of mandamus. Creech alleged that the Ada County Prosecutor’s Office introduced fabricated or misleading evidence at his clemency hearing. He sought to recuse U.S. District Judge Amanda K. Brailsford from presiding over his underlying § 1983 suit, arguing that Judge Brailsford and Ada County Prosecutor Jan Bennetts are close friends, which could affect the judge's impartiality.The U.S. District Court for the District of Idaho denied Creech’s motion to preliminarily enjoin his execution, and the Ninth Circuit affirmed. Creech continued to litigate his § 1983 claim, alleging prosecutorial misconduct. He then moved to disqualify Judge Brailsford, citing her friendship with Bennetts. Judge Brailsford denied the recusal motion, stating that although she and Bennetts were close during their clerkship, they had since lost touch and a reasonable person would not question her impartiality.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed Creech’s petition for a writ of mandamus. The court found that the longstanding friendship between Judge Brailsford and Bennetts, combined with the allegations of prosecutorial misconduct involving Bennetts, could lead a reasonable person to question the judge’s impartiality. The court emphasized that public confidence in the judiciary requires that any appearance of bias be addressed promptly. Consequently, the Ninth Circuit granted the petition for a writ of mandamus and remanded the case for reassignment to a different judge. View "Creech v. United States District Court for the District of Idaho, Boise" on Justia Law

Ryan Haygood, a dentist in Louisiana, faced an investigation by the Louisiana State Board of Dentistry, which led to the revocation of his dental license in 2010. Haygood alleged that competing dentists conspired with Board members to drive him out of business by fabricating complaints and manipulating the Board's proceedings. In 2012, a Louisiana appellate court vacated the Board's revocation of Haygood's license, citing due process violations. Haygood then entered a consent decree with the Board, allowing him to keep his license.Haygood filed a civil action in state court in 2011, alleging due process violations and unfair competition. In 2013, he filed a similar federal lawsuit, claiming violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Louisiana Unfair Trade Practices Act (LUTPA). The federal district court dismissed the federal complaint, ruling that the § 1983 claim was time-barred and the LUTPA claim was not plausible. The court also awarded attorney’s fees to the defendants, deeming both claims frivolous.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's decision to award attorney’s fees for the frivolous § 1983 claim, agreeing that it was clearly time-barred. However, the appellate court found that the district court erred in calculating the fee amount. The district court had properly calculated $98,666.50 for the defendants' private attorneys but improperly awarded $11,594.66 for the Louisiana Attorney General’s office without using the lodestar method. Consequently, the Fifth Circuit remitted the fee award to $98,666.50 while affirming the decision to award fees. View "Haygood v. Morrison" on Justia Law

A Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department deputy entered the curtilage of Harson Chong’s home without a warrant, leading to the discovery of drugs, guns, and money. Chong and Tac Tran, who was present at the home, were subsequently charged with federal drug and gun offenses. They claimed ineffective assistance of counsel because their attorneys did not object to the search on Fourth Amendment grounds.The United States District Court for the Central District of California initially denied their suppression motions, ruling the search justified by the parole-search exception. However, after the Ninth Circuit’s decision in United States v. Grandberry, the district court reversed, finding insufficient probable cause that Tran resided at Chong’s home. Despite this, the court upheld the search based on exigent circumstances. Chong and Tran were convicted, and their convictions were affirmed on direct appeal. They then filed post-conviction motions under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, which the district court denied, finding no ineffective assistance of counsel.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the deputy’s entry onto the curtilage without a warrant, consent, or exigency was unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment. The court found Chong’s counsel ineffective for not moving to suppress the evidence, as the search was clearly unlawful. However, Tran lacked standing to challenge the search, as he did not reside at Chong’s home and was merely a visitor. Consequently, the court reversed the district court’s denial of Chong’s § 2255 motion and remanded for relief, but affirmed the denial of Tran’s motion. View "Chong v. United States" on Justia Law

Kathleen Saurman, who had mobility impairments, fell on a small stairway at a restaurant while celebrating her 60th birthday. She subsequently died from an infection following surgery for a broken hip. Her husband, Robert, filed a wrongful death lawsuit against the restaurant's former owner and later sued the current owner, Peter’s Landing Property Owner LLC, alleging violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), the Unruh Civil Rights Act, and the Disabled Persons Act (DPA).The Superior Court of Orange County granted summary judgment in favor of the current owner, finding that Robert lacked standing to bring an ADA claim for injunctive relief and had not provided evidence of any act or omission by the current owner. The court also imposed nearly $100,000 in sanctions against Robert’s attorney for pursuing what it deemed a frivolous lawsuit.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. The court held that under California law, a successor in interest has standing to bring an ADA claim for injunctive relief in state court, even if federal standing requirements are not met. The court also found that there was a triable issue of fact regarding the current owner’s compliance with the Unruh Act and the DPA, as the property remained in the same condition as when Kathleen fell. Consequently, the court reversed the summary judgment on the ADA, Unruh Act, and DPA claims but affirmed the summary judgment on the claims for injunctive and declaratory relief. The court also reversed the sanctions against Robert’s attorney and denied the current owner’s motion for sanctions for a frivolous appeal. View "Saurman v. Peter's Landing Property Owner, LLC" on Justia Law

The defendant was convicted by a jury in the Allegan Circuit Court of multiple counts of criminal sexual conduct. During the trial, the presiding judge exchanged emails with the county prosecutor, expressing concerns about the police investigation. The defendant later discovered these communications and moved for a new trial, alleging judicial and prosecutorial misconduct, and ineffective assistance of counsel. The case was reassigned to a different judge, who granted the motion for a new trial due to the appearance of impropriety created by the emails. The prosecution appealed this decision.The Michigan Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's decision, holding that the trial court had abused its discretion in granting a new trial. The appellate court concluded that the trial judge's ex parte communications were permissible for administrative purposes under the judicial conduct code and did not influence the jury's verdict. The defendant then sought leave to appeal to the Michigan Supreme Court.The Michigan Supreme Court reviewed the case and held that the trial judge's ex parte communications violated the Michigan Code of Judicial Conduct. The court found that these communications were not for administrative purposes and created an appearance of impropriety. However, the court concluded that the communications did not show actual bias or a high probability of bias that would violate the defendant's constitutional rights. The court also determined that the trial judge's failure to recuse herself did not result in a miscarriage of justice, as the jury was unaware of the communications and the trial prosecutor did not alter her strategy in response to them. Therefore, the court affirmed the Court of Appeals' decision, holding that the trial court had no legal basis to grant a new trial. View "People of Michigan v. Loew" on Justia Law

Marcellus Williams was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to death following a jury trial. His conviction and sentence were affirmed by the Supreme Court of Missouri, and his postconviction relief was denied. Williams sought additional DNA testing through a habeas corpus petition, which led to a temporary stay of execution and the appointment of a special master to oversee the testing. The results did not demonstrate his innocence, and his habeas petition was denied. Subsequent petitions for writs of habeas corpus and declaratory judgment were also denied.The St. Louis County prosecutor filed a motion to vacate Williams' conviction and death sentence, citing potential actual innocence based on DNA evidence, ineffective assistance of counsel, and racial discrimination in jury selection. This motion remains pending in the circuit court. Despite this, the Supreme Court of Missouri issued a warrant of execution for Williams, setting a new execution date.The Supreme Court of Missouri reviewed Williams' motion to withdraw the warrant of execution, arguing that the prosecutor's motion constituted a state postconviction motion, which should bar setting an execution date. The court found that Rule 30.30(c) only refers to postconviction motions filed by the defendant, not the prosecutor. Since Williams had already exhausted his state postconviction remedies, the court held that the execution date was properly set. The court also noted that the pending prosecutor's motion did not automatically warrant a stay of execution and that Williams had not demonstrated the necessary factors for equitable relief. Consequently, the court overruled Williams' motion to withdraw the warrant of execution. View "State v. Williams" on Justia Law

A defamation lawsuit was filed by Dana Cheng, a New York resident and political commentator, against Dan Neumann and Beacon, a Maine news outlet, for characterizing Cheng as "far-right" and a "conspiracy theorist" in an article. Neumann and Beacon sought dismissal of the case under both federal law and a New York anti-SLAPP law, which applies to meritless defamation lawsuits. The district court conducted a choice-of-law analysis, decided that New York law applied, and granted the motion to dismiss under New York's anti-SLAPP statute.The district court's decision was appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit. The appellate court agreed with the district court's ruling but for a different reason: it decided that Cheng's lawsuit had to be dismissed under binding First Amendment principles protecting free speech by the press. Back at the district court, Neumann requested attorneys' fees under the fee-shifting provision of New York's anti-SLAPP law. The district court denied Neumann's request after determining that Maine, not New York, law applied to the specific issue of attorneys' fees.Neumann appealed again, arguing that the district court erred in its choice-of-law analysis. The appellate court, noting the lack of clear controlling precedent on the issue, certified to the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine the question of which state's law applies to the attorneys' fees issue. View "Cheng v. Neumann" on Justia Law