Justia Professional Malpractice & Ethics Opinion Summaries

In a legal malpractice case in North Dakota, a couple, Kenneth and Carol Pinks, sued attorney Alexander Kelsch and his professional corporation, along with associated partners, alleging negligence in representing them in a quiet title action against the State of North Dakota. The District Court, South Central Judicial District, bifurcated the malpractice action to first determine the element of causation, specifically whether the Pinks would have achieved a more favorable outcome in the quiet title action but for the alleged negligence of the defendants. The court denied cross-motions for summary judgment, finding there were genuine issues of material fact.Following a bench trial on the causation element, the district court concluded that had the evidence of the Pinks’ ownership of the disputed land been presented in the quiet title action, they would have established their ownership claim was prior and superior to the State’s claim of title. The court concluded the Pinks proved the element of causation and ordered a jury trial be set on the remaining issues of the legal malpractice claim. The defendants appealed this decision.The Supreme Court of North Dakota, however, dismissed the appeal, ruling that the defendants were attempting to appeal from an interlocutory order, and the defendants did not seek certification under Rule 54(b) of the North Dakota Rules of Civil Procedure. The rule requires that, in cases with more than one claim or multiple parties, a final judgment on one or more, but fewer than all, claims or parties can only be directed if the court expressly determines there is no just reason for delay. The court found that the district court only ruled on the causation element of the legal malpractice claim, and other elements, such as the existence of an attorney-client relationship, a duty by the attorney to the client, a breach of that duty by the attorney, and damages were still left to be adjudicated. The defendants' failure to comply with Rule 54(b) led to the dismissal of the appeal. The court also denied the Pinks' request for costs and attorney’s fees, determining that the defendants' appeal was not frivolously made. View "Pinks v. Kelsch" on Justia Law

In this case, the plaintiff, Laura Mullen, claimed that the defendants, a youth volleyball club and its owners, fraudulently concealed previous sexual abuse allegations. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants, but also imposed sanctions against them and their lawyer for improperly interfering with the class notice process. The defendants appealed the sanctions.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that the district court did not abuse its discretion or commit clear error in imposing the sanctions. The court found that the defendants had intentionally interfered with the class notice and opt-out process and that their communications with class members during the notice period were potentially coercive. The court also upheld the decision of the district court to impose monetary sanctions against the defendants, which included the plaintiff’s reasonable attorney’s fees and expenses, as well as a civil penalty for each defendant.The court also affirmed the non-monetary sanctions imposed against the defendants' lawyer, who had contacted a class member directly and made a false statement to the court. Although the defendants argued that the lawyer had acted in good faith and did not knowingly or intentionally violate the rules of ethics, the court found that she had taken deliberate action to avoid confirming a high probability of wrongdoing.Finally, the court rejected the defendants' argument that the plaintiff should have been sanctioned. The defendants claimed that the plaintiff’s use of the term “rape” was inaccurate and irrelevant, that her actions before and after filing the complaint were inconsistent, that she did not have a proper basis for bringing the suit, and that she misrepresented evidence. The court found no merit in these arguments and affirmed the district court’s decision to deny sanctions against the plaintiff. View "Mullen v. Butler" on Justia Law

The Minnesota Supreme Court reversed a decision by the Court of Appeals, ruling that the district court did not abuse its discretion in certifying an order as a final partial judgment under Minnesota Rule of Civil Procedure 54.02. The case arose from a dispute between the City of Elk River and Bolton & Menk, Inc. over a large construction contract for a wastewater treatment plant improvement project. The City sued Bolton for alleged breach of contract and professional negligence. Bolton responded by filing a third-party complaint against three other parties involved in the contract. The district court dismissed Bolton's third-party complaint and Bolton sought to have the dismissal order certified as a final judgment for immediate appeal. The district court granted this certification, but the Court of Appeals dismissed Bolton's appeal, determining that the district court had abused its discretion in certifying the order as a final judgment. The Minnesota Supreme Court disagreed, finding that the district court had offered valid reasons for its certification, including that the third-party claims presented distinct issues from the principal claims and that the case was in its early stages at the time of certification. The Supreme Court therefore reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "City of Elk River vs. Bolton & Menk, Inc." on Justia Law

In this case, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the dismissal of Minhye Park’s case against David Dennis Kim by the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York. The District Court dismissed the case due to Park’s persistent and knowing violation of court orders, specifically regarding discovery. The Court of Appeals found that Park’s noncompliance amounted to "sustained and willful intransigence" despite repeated warnings that continued refusal to comply would result in dismissal.Additionally, the Court of Appeals addressed the conduct of Park's attorney, Jae S. Lee. Lee cited a non-existent court decision in her reply brief to the court, which she admitted she generated using an artificial intelligence tool, ChatGPT. The court deemed this action as falling below the basic obligations of counsel and referred Lee to the court’s Grievance Panel. The court also ordered Lee to provide a copy of the decision to her client. The court emphasized that attorneys must ensure that their submissions to the court are accurate and that they have conducted a reasonable inquiry to confirm the existence and validity of the legal authorities on which they rely. View "Park v. Kim" on Justia Law

This case arises from an automobile accident involving Lauren Barnes and Nancy Hodys, where both parties sustained serious injuries and neither has any memory of the accident. A syringe was found in Barnes' car and her urine later tested positive for opioids and benzodiazepines. Barnes filed a complaint against Hodys alleging her negligence caused the collision, while Hodys filed a complaint against Barnes alleging her negligence and intoxication caused the accident.Barnes engaged Dr. David M. Benjamin as an expert witness, who concluded that it was "not possible to determine" whether Barnes' post-accident impairment was caused by head trauma, controlled substances, or medication. However, during deposition, Dr. Benjamin changed his previous opinion, stating that a combination of drugs and brain injury was the most likely explanation for Barnes' impairment. After the deposition, Barnes' counsel learned that Dr. Benjamin had a type of cancer, which along with the medication he was taking, caused him confusion, memory issues, and fatigue. Barnes then filed a motion to replace Dr. Benjamin due to his medical unavailability, which was denied by the lower court.The Supreme Court of Rhode Island found that the trial court erred by not providing a rationale for its decision denying Barnes' motion to modify the scheduling order and replace her expert witness. The Supreme Court held that a reasoned exercise of discretion requires some explanation, which was not provided in this case. Therefore, the court quashed the order of the lower court and remanded the case back to that tribunal with instructions to conduct a meaningful analysis of the issues raised, consistent with the Supreme Court's opinion. View "Barnes v. Hodys" on Justia Law

In the case at hand, the Court of Appeals of the State of Nevada reversed and remanded a district court order that had dismissed a professional negligence action for being time-barred. The case was brought by Gina Engelson, as the special administrator of the estate of Lenore Meyer, against Dignity Health (doing business as St. Rose Dominican Hospital-Siena Campus) and Grape Holdings LLC (doing business as Sage Creek Post-Acute). Lenore Meyer had developed a severe bedsore while being treated at these facilities. Meyer's family alleged that the care provided by the facilities fell below the standard of care in multiple ways, including failing to timely and adequately treat the bedsore. Meyer eventually died, and exactly one year after her death, Engelson filed a professional negligence complaint against the facilities. The district court dismissed the complaint as time-barred, finding that the complaint was filed more than a year after the estate and its special administrator knew or should have known about the relevant legal injury.Upon review, the Court of Appeals found that the district court erred in dismissing the complaint as time-barred. The Court of Appeals clarified that an affidavit of merit, which is required to support a professional negligence-based wrongful death claim, need not opine as to the element of causation. The Court of Appeals concluded that the evidence did not irrefutably demonstrate that the estate or its special administrator discovered or should have discovered the legal injury more than a year before the filing of the complaint. Therefore, the Court of Appeals reversed the district court's order and remanded for further proceedings. View "Engelson v. Dignity Health" on Justia Law

In this case, Lindsay Burns Barbier contested the validity of the 2016 will of her father, Horatio Burns, alleging that her brother Cameron and his wife Alison exerted undue influence over Horatio. The Supreme Court of the State of Montana upheld the validity of the will and the awarding of attorney fees to Horatio’s Estate, but reversed the awarding of attorney fees to Alison and the calculation of interest on the attorney fees. The court found that the lower court did not err in allowing Alison to file a response to Lindsay's petition contesting the will, despite Lindsay's objection that it was untimely and that Alison's interests were fully represented by the Estate. The court also found that Lindsay was not entitled to a new trial based on juror misconduct. In terms of attorney fees, the court determined that Alison was not entitled to an award of fees under state law as she was defending her own interest in the will and her participation was not required to defend the validity of the will. Finally, the court found that the lower court incorrectly calculated the applicable interest rate on the attorney fees awarded to the Estate. View "In re Burns" on Justia Law

In this case, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit examined the constitutionality of Cook County, Illinois's use of cameras to record holding cell toilets in courthouses throughout the county. The plaintiffs, pretrial detainees, claimed that the cameras infringed upon their Fourth Amendment privacy interests and also constituted an intrusion upon seclusion under Illinois law. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants, Cook County and Sheriff Thomas J. Dart, and the plaintiffs appealed.The Court of Appeals held that the plaintiffs did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy when using the toilets in courthouse holding cells. While it acknowledged that there are questions around the extent to which detainees have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their bodies while in a holding cell, it found that any privacy rights are substantially diminished. The court further held that Cook County's use of cameras in courthouse holding cells was reasonable due to the security risks inherent in the setting. The court also determined that one of the plaintiffs, Alicea, had standing to sue, but the other plaintiffs did not.Furthermore, the court affirmed the district court's decision to grant summary judgment on the plaintiffs' claim for intrusion upon seclusion. It held that the plaintiff had not met his burden on the fourth element of the claim, anguish and suffering.Lastly, the court affirmed the district court's decisions related to discovery and attorneys' fees. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in these decisions. Thus, the judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "Alicea v. County of Cook" on Justia Law

In this legal malpractice claim, Rachel Breal sued her former attorneys, the Downs Law Group and others, for allegedly negligent representation in a dismissed BP Deepwater Horizon oil-spill claim. The case was filed in the Circuit Court of the First Judicial District of Hinds County, Mississippi, but was then removed to the United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi by Downs Law. The case was later remanded back to the Hinds County Circuit Court. During a hearing, the trial court raised, on its own initiative, a forum-selection clause in Breal's retainer agreement with Downs Law, which stated that the proper forum and venue for any litigation relating to the agreement should be in the court of the 11th Judicial Circuit of Miami-Dade County. Based on this clause, the trial court dismissed the case for improper venue, and Breal appealed.The Supreme Court of Mississippi reversed the trial court's decision, holding that the trial court could not sua sponte enforce the forum-selection clause a year into the litigation. The court reasoned that improper venue could be waived if not timely raised, and therefore, the trial court could not enforce the forum-selection clause when Downs Law had failed to do so. The court found that Downs Law had waived any claim of improper venue by actively participating in the litigation in both federal and state courts in Mississippi without ever raising the issue of the forum-selection clause until prompted by the trial court. Therefore, the court concluded that the trial court erred by dismissing the case due to improper venue and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Breal v. The Downs Law Group" on Justia Law

In this case, the Supreme Court of Kentucky reviewed a decision by the Court of Appeals that had remanded a case back to the Fayette Circuit Court over the perception of a jurisdictional error. The original plaintiff, Timothy Poole, had filed a lawsuit against Valetta Browne, Executive Director of the Kentucky Office of Bar Admissions (KYOBA), alleging she had negligently performed her duties and caused him damages. This allegation came after Poole was erroneously informed that he had passed the bar exam, only to be told three days later that he had not due to a data entry error. Browne had filed a motion to dismiss the case based on the Supreme Court's exclusive jurisdiction over the practice of law and her own immunity from Poole's claim.The Supreme Court of Kentucky reversed the Court of Appeals' decision and affirmed the trial court's dismissal of Poole's complaint, though on different grounds. The Supreme Court held that the Court of Appeals had failed to adequately consider the Supreme Court's full authority over bar admissions. The court also recognized that individuals who serve in a judicial capacity, such as Browne, are immune from civil liability for conduct and communications occurring in the performance of their duties. The court further clarified that Browne's actions, which Poole complained of, were the functional equivalent of judicial duties, thereby granting Browne absolute immunity. View "BROWNE V. POOLE" on Justia Law