Justia Professional Malpractice & Ethics Opinion Summaries

This case involves a dispute between a lawyer, George Fleming, and his former clients, referred to as the "Wilson plaintiffs". Fleming had represented over 8,000 plaintiffs in a mass-tort action against the manufacturer of a diet pill known as "fen-phen". The Wilson plaintiffs are about 4,000 of Fleming’s former clients. Fleming had spent roughly $20 million to medically screen over 40,000 potential claimants, about 20% of whom became his clients. In 2006, Fleming settled the case for $339 million and reimbursed himself for the costs of the screenings by deducting that amount from the settlement funds. He charged his clients not just for their own medical-screening costs but also for those of approximately 32,000 people who never became his clients and who did not participate in the underlying case. This financial choice led to further litigation, with Fleming as the defendant in various actions brought by his former clients.In the lower courts, Fleming successfully opposed a motion for class certification in a federal court case brought by two of his former clients, arguing that the claims of his former clients were not sufficiently common for aggregate treatment. After the denial of class certification, another group of about 650 former clients sued Fleming for breaches of contract and fiduciary duty. Following a verdict against Fleming in this case, the Wilson plaintiffs moved for summary judgment on the ground that the verdict collaterally estopped Fleming from contesting the merits of their claims against him. Fleming successfully opposed that motion, arguing that the issues presented by the other plaintiffs were not identical to those of the Wilson plaintiffs. The trial court denied the Wilson plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment without explanation. Later, Fleming moved for summary judgment, asserting defensive collateral estoppel against the Wilson plaintiffs.The Supreme Court of Texas affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals, but for a different reason. The court concluded that Fleming was judicially estopped from establishing an essential component of his summary-judgment motion. The court found that Fleming's assertions in prior litigation clearly and unequivocally contradicted his summary-judgment motion’s assertions regarding whether the Wilson plaintiffs’ legal and factual positions were materially identical to those of the other plaintiffs. The court held that Fleming was estopped from asserting that the thousands of remaining plaintiffs’ claims were materially indistinguishable. View "FLEMING v. WILSON" on Justia Law

The case involves two attorneys, Jeffrey Peterzalek and Molly Weber, who sought to quash subpoenas for their depositions in a civil rights case brought by Charis Paulson against her employers, the State of Iowa and the Iowa Department of Public Safety (DPS). Paulson alleged gender-motivated discrimination and retaliation. Weber had represented DPS in its response to Paulson's civil rights complaint before the Iowa Civil Rights Commission (ICRC), while Peterzalek had represented DPS and its leaders in various other matters over the years. The district court declined to quash the subpoenas but ordered that the depositions be sealed. The attorneys then filed a petition for writ of certiorari with the Supreme Court of Iowa.The Supreme Court of Iowa granted the writ and retained the case. The attorneys argued that the court should adopt the Shelton test, which narrowly limits the circumstances in which opposing counsel may be deposed. They also argued that they should not be deposed or, alternatively, that substantial limitations should be imposed if their depositions were allowed.The Supreme Court of Iowa agreed with the attorneys' argument to adopt the Shelton test. Applying the test, the court concluded that Weber's deposition should be quashed as she was opposing counsel in the ongoing dispute and the information sought could be obtained by other means and was protected by the work-product doctrine. However, the court affirmed the district court's refusal to quash the subpoena for Peterzalek's deposition, as he was not opposing counsel in the ongoing dispute. The court remanded the case for further proceedings, including the entry of an order quashing the subpoena for Weber's deposition. View "Peterzalek v. Iowa District Court for Polk County" on Justia Law

Glenn Solberg, representing himself, appealed against orders denying his motions for relief from judgment and for reconsideration. He also moved for a jury trial and disqualification of the Court, alleging bias and conflict of interest. Solberg's claims of bias were based on prior decisions that were adverse to him. Greg Hennessy, the defendant, argued that the appeal was frivolous and requested attorney’s fees and double costs.The District Court of Williams County had denied Solberg's motions for relief from judgment and for reconsideration. Solberg then appealed these decisions to the Supreme Court of North Dakota.The Supreme Court of North Dakota denied Solberg's motion for a jury trial and disqualification, stating that the law presumes a judge is unbiased and not prejudiced. The court also noted that adverse or erroneous rulings do not, by themselves, demonstrate bias. For recusal to be warranted, a judge must be partial or there must be some external influence that creates an appearance of impropriety. The court found that Solberg failed to allege facts showing bias or the existence of an external influence creating an appearance of impropriety. The court also concluded that Solberg's request for a jury trial was frivolous as the Supreme Court reviews the rulings of the district court and does not engage in fact finding. The court affirmed the orders of the district court under N.D.R.App.P. 35.1(a)(1) and (4), finding the appeal to be frivolous and completely without merit. The court also awarded Hennessy double costs and attorney’s fees in the amount of $15,697.50 for defending this frivolous appeal. View "Solberg v. Hennessy" on Justia Law

The case revolves around the appellant, Jeffery Woods, who filed a legal malpractice lawsuit in the Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas. The defendant in the lawsuit filed a motion to dismiss the suit. Woods then attempted to remove the lawsuit to the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio. However, a United States magistrate judge recommended denying Woods's petition for removal and remanding the matter back to the state court. The federal court eventually adopted this recommendation. Meanwhile, before the federal court had ruled on Woods's objections, Judge Heekin of the Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas granted the motion to dismiss Woods's legal malpractice lawsuit.Woods then filed a complaint for a writ of mandamus against Judge Heekin in the First District Court of Appeals, arguing that the common pleas court lacked jurisdiction over his legal malpractice lawsuit once he filed his notice of removal to federal court. He sought an order for Judge Heekin to vacate the judgment of dismissal. Judge Heekin filed a motion to dismiss Woods's mandamus complaint, arguing that Woods did not perform the necessary steps for effecting removal to federal court, and thus the common pleas court still had jurisdiction. The court of appeals dismissed Woods's mandamus complaint, but not for the reasons set forth in Judge Heekin’s motion. Instead, the court of appeals dismissed the complaint on the basis that “mandamus cannot be used to compel a particular ruling from a judge.”The Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed the court of appeals' judgment, but disagreed with its reasoning. The Supreme Court held that if Woods was correct that Judge Heekin patently and unambiguously lacked jurisdiction to dismiss the legal-malpractice action, a writ of mandamus would be an appropriate remedy. However, the Supreme Court found that Woods did not complete all the necessary steps for removal to federal court, and thus the common pleas court did not patently and unambiguously lack jurisdiction to dismiss the legal-malpractice action. Therefore, the dismissal of Woods's mandamus complaint was correct. View "State ex rel. Woods v. Heekin" on Justia Law

The case revolves around a lawsuit filed by Masimo Corporation against John Bauche, BoundlessRise, LLC (Boundless), and Skyward Investments, LLC (Skyward), represented by The Vanderpool Law Firm (Vanderpool). The lawsuit was based on Bauche's misappropriation of corporate funds while he was a Masimo employee. Bauche had fraudulently engaged Boundless, a company he solely owned, as an "outside vendor" for Masimo, and later transferred the money paid for fraudulent vendor services to Skyward, another company he solely owned. Masimo's attempts to obtain substantive discovery responses from the defendants were met with boilerplate objections, leading to a motion to compel responses and a request for discovery sanctions.The case was stayed twice, first due to Bauche's appeal from the denial of an anti-SLAPP motion, and then to allow a federal criminal case against him to be resolved. The referee supervising discovery recommended that the motion to compel be granted and Masimo be awarded $10,000 in discovery sanctions. The trial court agreed and entered an order to that effect, awarding sanctions against Vanderpool and the three defendants.In the Court of Appeal of the State of California Fourth Appellate District Division Three, Vanderpool appealed the order, arguing that it had substituted out of the case as counsel before the motion to compel was filed and was therefore unsanctionable. The court rejected this argument, stating that it is not necessary to be counsel of record to be liable for monetary sanctions for discovery misuse. The court affirmed the order, concluding that Vanderpool and its clients were liable for discovery misuse. The court also criticized Vanderpool for its lack of civility in the proceedings. View "Masimo Corporation v. The Vanderpool Law Firm, Inc." on Justia Law

Levi Rudder, a non-lawyer, was sanctioned by the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas for engaging in unauthorized practice of law. Rudder had contacted a detainee facing federal firearm charges and attempted to involve himself in the case, despite being told not to by the defense counsel. He held an unprivileged, monitored video meeting with the detainee, offered legal advice, and encouraged the detainee to sign a form appointing him as additional counsel. The district court found Rudder guilty of unauthorized practice of law and imposed a monetary sanction of $500. He was also barred from filing documents in the Northern District of Texas without the court's permission.Rudder appealed the decision, arguing that the district court lacked the authority to impose these sanctions. He contended that the Constitution does not afford federal courts inherent powers to sanction individuals for engaging in unauthorized practice of law.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit disagreed with Rudder's argument. The court cited previous cases that established federal courts' inherent power to police the conduct of litigants and attorneys who appear before them. The court also noted that a party cannot be represented by a non-lawyer and that a minimum level of competence is required to protect the client, their adversaries, and the court from poorly drafted, inarticulate, or vexatious claims. Therefore, the court concluded that a federal court's power to regulate and discipline attorneys extends to conduct by non-lawyers amounting to practicing law without a license. The court found that the district court did not abuse its discretion in imposing the sanctions on Rudder and affirmed the lower court's decision. View "In re: Rudder" on Justia Law

The case involves a group of appellants who allegedly purchased luxury vehicles with funds provided by Dilmurod Akramov, the owner of CBC and D&O Group. The appellants would then transfer the vehicle titles back to Akramov's D&O Group without receiving cash or equivalent in exchange. They would then claim a "trade-in credit" against the sales tax due on the purchase of a vehicle. The Arkansas Department of Finance and Administration (DFA) argued that these were not valid sales as required by Arkansas law and denied the sales-tax-refund claims.The appellants challenged the DFA's decision through the administrative review process, which affirmed the DFA's decision. The appellants then appealed to the Pulaski County Circuit Court for further review. The circuit court found that the appellants' attorney, Jason Stuart, was a necessary witness and therefore disqualified him from further representing the appellants. The court also held the appellants in contempt for failing to provide discovery per the court's order.The Supreme Court of Arkansas affirmed the circuit court's decision. The court held that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in disqualifying Stuart. The court applied the three-prong test from Weigel v. Farmers Ins. Co., which requires that the attorney's testimony is material to the determination of the issues being litigated, the evidence is unobtainable elsewhere, and the testimony is or may be prejudicial to the testifying attorney’s client. The court found that all three prongs were satisfied in this case. The court also affirmed the circuit court's decision to strike the third amended and supplemental complaint filed by Stuart after his disqualification. View "STUART v. WALTHER" on Justia Law

In this case, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed a district court's decision to impose sanctions on attorney Gregory Leyh and his law firm under Missouri Supreme Court Rule 55.03 and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 for filing frivolous claims. The sanctions were requested by Martin Leigh, P.C., a party that Leyh had included in a series of lawsuits filed on behalf of Gwen Caranchini, who had defaulted on her home loan and was seeking to stop foreclosure proceedings.The district court had imposed sanctions after Leyh failed to respond to a warning letter and motion for sanctions served by Martin Leigh. On appeal, Leyh argued that the sanctions imposed were inappropriate because Martin Leigh had not complied with Rule 11(c)(2)'s safe harbor provision, which requires that a party be given an opportunity to withdraw or correct the offending document before a motion for sanctions is filed.The appellate court agreed with Leyh, finding that Martin Leigh had not adhered to the strict procedural requirements of Rule 11(c)(2). The court also noted that while Leyh's legal tactics were an abuse of the system, Martin Leigh had not pursued other possible avenues for sanctions, such as Rule 11(c)(3), 28 U.S.C. § 1927, or the court's inherent powers. The court thus reversed the sanctions and remanded the case to the district court with instructions to vacate the award. View "Martin Leigh PC v. Leyh" on Justia Law

In this case handled by the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, the plaintiff, Alexis Marquez, an attorney who represented herself, claimed that an Acting New York State Supreme Court Justice harassed her and subjected her to inappropriate behavior during her service as his court attorney. Marquez challenged two interlocutory rulings that dismissed the complaint as to one defendant and denied reconsideration. However, the district court dismissed the case as a penalty for Marquez's failure to comply with discovery orders, which Marquez did not challenge in this appeal.The Court of Appeals held that it lacked jurisdiction to consider Marquez's challenge to the interlocutory orders as it was not an appeal from a final decision of the district court. The Court explained that the merger rule, which allows an interlocutory order to merge into the final judgment, does not apply when a district court enters a dismissal as a sanction. If Marquez successfully challenges the sanction dismissal, she would then have the opportunity to challenge the interlocutory orders as part of any appeal from a final judgment on the merits. In this situation, however, the Court dismissed the appeal without prejudice due to lack of jurisdiction. View "Marquez v. Silver" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court of Mississippi reviewed a case where a city was sued for negligence due to its failure to disclose a juror's potential conflict of interest during a trial. The City of Picayune had originally sued Landry Lewis Germany Architects, alleging defects in an addition to the Picayune City Hall. A juror, Lorenzo Breland, was the son of a Picayune city councilman. The City's representative informed the City's counsel of this relationship, but took no further action. At the end of the trial, the court was informed of this relationship, leading to the dismissal of Breland and a mistrial. Landry Lewis then counter-sued the City for negligence due to its failure to disclose this familial relationship.The trial court found in favor of Landry Lewis, awarding them $210,000 in damages. However, on appeal, the Supreme Court of Mississippi reversed this decision. The court held that the City of Picayune did not owe a duty of care in tort to Landry Lewis that was breached by its failure to inform the trial court of the potential juror's familial relationship. The court reasoned that trials and voir dire are adversarial processes, and that it is incumbent upon both sides to perform their due diligence in identifying potential conflicts of interest. The court further noted that there were other mechanisms, such as sanctions or bar complaints, to address any perceived misconduct. Therefore, the award of damages for negligence was reversed and rendered. View "City of Picayune v. Landry Lewis Germany Architects, P.A." on Justia Law