Justia Professional Malpractice & Ethics Opinion Summaries

This case arose out of a professional negligence claim relating to a life insurance policy. Bill Gailey purchased the life insurance policy from Kim Whiting in 2010. In August 2011, Gailey cashed in the life insurance policy after receiving advice from Whiting to that end. Gailey suffered negative tax consequences from cashing in the policy and subsequently filed a complaint against Whiting alleging Whiting was negligent when he advised Gailey to cash in his policy without warning him of the potential tax consequences. Whiting subsequently moved the court to dismiss the action for lack of personal jurisdiction because Whiting no longer lived in Idaho, Gailey was a resident of Oregon, and the alleged tort did not occur in Idaho. The district court granted Whiting’s motion and Gailey appealed to this Court. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Gailey v. Whiting" on Justia Law

P&C filed suit on behalf of Penn, LLC against Prosper Corporation, Prosper’s owners, and their counsel, the Arnold Firm, alleging violations of the Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, fraud, conversion, unjust enrichment, and breach of fiduciary duty in connection with the management of Penn and Prosper’s joint venture, BIGresearch. There had been court and arbitration proceedings since 2004, but Penn never before named the Arnold Firm as a defendant. The Arnold Firm served P&C with a letter purporting to satisfy the obligations of Fed. R. Civ. P. 11, threatening to seek sanctions if the matter was not dismissed, and claiming that the action was frivolous and had been filed for the “improper and abusive purpose” of disrupting the Arnold Firm’s attorney-client relationship with Prosper and its owners. The district court ultimately dismissed the Arnold Firm from the action, but denied a motion for Rule 11 sanctions against P&C. The Sixth Circuit affirmed on the alternative ground that the Arnold Firm’s failure to comply with Rule 11’s safe-harbor provision made sanctions unavailable. The Arnold Firm’s warning letter expressly reserved the firm’s right to assert additional grounds for sanctions in its actual motion. View "Penn, LLC v. Prosper Bus. Dev. Corp." on Justia Law

Christian Westby, James Westby, and Kristina Westby appealed the district court’s denial of their motion to reconsider the court’s protective order granted to Mercy Medical Center and Dr. Gregory Schaefer. This case arose from the Westbys’ claim that Dr. Schaefer’s and Mercy Medical’s negligence resulted in lifelong brain damage to Christian Westby. Near the end of discovery, the district court granted Mercy Medical and Dr. Schaefer’s protective order motion to prohibit the Westbys from deposing Mercy Medical and Dr. Schaefer’s expert witnesses. The district court later denied the Westbys’ motion to reconsider that protective order. The Westbys argued on appeal to the Supreme Court that the district court abused its discretion by not requiring any showing of good cause or unreasonable delay and basing its decision on a mistaken belief that the Westbys were dilatory. The Supreme Court agreed that the trial court erred, vacated the order and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Westby, et al v. Schaefer, M.D." on Justia Law

In 2009 the doctor was hired by a small rural Wisconsin critical access hospital, as the director of its emergency room. Fired just months after being hired, he sued the hospital in under Title VII, claiming that the hospital had discriminated against him because of his Indian ethnicity. He alleged that a hospital employee said to him “you must be that Middle Eastern guy whom they hired as ER director” and accused him of taking her job, spat at him, and told him he belonged to a terrorist class of people and was a danger to the hospital. Hospital personnel complained to the plaintiff’s superior that he was incompetent—that he had poor patient skills, behaved unprofessionally, misdiagnosed patient ailments, and couldn’t get along with staff. His superior urged him to resign after he had worked only 12 shifts. After delays because the plaintiff initially acted pro se, and filings that were inadequate or nonresponsive, the judge dismissed the case for failure to respond to a motion for summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting that “the pratfalls of a party’s lawyer are imputed to the party” and that plaintiff offered no excuse for missing the deadline. View "Sheikh v. Grant Reg'l Health Ctr." on Justia Law

In August 2002, plaintiff William Vaughan went to the emergency room at St. Vincent Hospital complaining of symptoms that included abdominal pain. In this medical negligence case, Vaughan alleged that, as the result of a communication failure between a surgeon and a contract radiologist, St. Vincent failed to tell Vaughan about a cancer diagnosis. The district court granted summary judgment for St. Vincent because Vaughan did not specifically plead vicarious liability relating to the radiologist, St. Vincent's apparent agent, and failed to establish a genuine issue of material fact through expert testimony. After review, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding that Vaughan's complaint adequately notified St. Vincent that one or more of its employees or agents was negligent and that genuine issues of material fact required resolution at a trial on the merits. View "Vaughan v. St. Vincent Hospital" on Justia Law

In 2008, defendants K. William Clauson and the law firm of Clauson, Atwood & Spaneas, represented plaintiff James Yager in an action against D.H. Hardwick & Sons, Inc. (Hardwick), which alleged that Hardwick was the party who "trespassed on Plaintiff's land and cut timber belonging to Plaintiff." The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Hardwick because the action was filed more than three years after the timber cutting ceased and, therefore, was barred by the statute of limitations. The trial court also concluded that plaintiff had failed to demonstrate that the discovery rule applied to toll the statute of limitations. The trial court denied plaintiff's motion for reconsideration, and the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's decision. Plaintiff subsequently filed a malpractice action against defendants, alleging that they "breached the duty of care owed to [plaintiff] by failing to file the D.H. Hardwick action within the timeframe allowed by the applicable statute of limitations, and by otherwise failing to represent [plaintiff's] interests with reasonable professional care, skill, and knowledge." Defendants moved to dismiss the case, alleging that plaintiff: (1) failed to provide requested discovery information; and (2) failed to disclose the experts required to prove his case. The trial court granted the defendants' motion. Plaintiff filed a motion for reconsideration, arguing that expert testimony was not required to prove legal malpractice where defendants failed to file a claim within the applicable statute of limitations. The trial court denied the motion, and this appeal followed. In granting the defendants' motion to dismiss, the trial court did not examine the specific facts of the case to determine whether the nature of the case was such that expert testimony was required. Accordingly, the Supreme Court vacated the trial court's dismissal order and remand for further proceedings. View "Yager v. Clauson" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was Nev. Rev. Stat. 11.207’s limitations period, which the Supreme Court has stated in the past does not commence for a malpractice action until the conclusion of the litigation in which the malpractice occured. Claimants filed suit against New Albertson’s, Inc. for damages. New Albertson’s hired Brady, Vorwerck, Ryder & Caspino (BVRC) for legal representation, and BVRC assigned attorney W. Dennis Richardson to the case. New Albertson’s eventually settled the case. Over two years after New Albertson’s settlement with the claimants, New Albertson’s filed an attorney malpractice action against BVRC and Richardson. The suit was removed to the federal district court, which concluded that New Albertson’s action against BVRC was timely. The federal district court then granted BVRC’s motion to certify the question to the Supreme Court of whether 1997 amendments to section 11.207(1) rendered the litigation malpractice tolling rule obsolete. The Supreme Court answered that the two-year statute of limitations in section 11.207, as revised by the Legislature in 1997, is tolled against a cause of action for attorney malpractice pending the outcome of the underlying lawsuit in which the malpractice allegedly occurred. View "Brady, Vorwerck, Ryder & Caspino v. New Albertson’s, Inc." on Justia Law

Lightspeed operates online pornography sites and sued a defendant, identified only Internet Protocol address, which was allegedly associated with unlawful viewing of Lightspeed’s content, using a “hacked” password. Lightspeed identified 6,600 others (by IP addresses only) as “co‐conspirators” in a scheme to steal passwords and content. Lightspeed, acting ex parte, served subpoenas on the ISPs (then non‐parties) for the personally identifiable information of each alleged coconspirator, none of whom had been joined as parties. The ISPs moved to quash and for a protective order. The Illinois Supreme Court ultimately ruled in favor of the ISPs. Lightspeed amended its complaint to name as co‐conspirator parties the ISPs and unidentified “corporate representatives,” alleging negligence, violations of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 18 U.S.C. 1030 and 1030(g), and deceptive practices. Lightspeed issued new subpoenas seeking the personally identifiable information. The ISPs removed the case to federal court. The district judge denied an emergency motion to obtain the identification information. After several “changes” with respect to Lightspeed’s lawyers, the court stated that they “demonstrated willingness to deceive … about their operations, relationships, and financial interests have varied from feigned ignorance to misstatements to outright lies … calculated so that the Court would grant early‐discovery requests, thereby allowing [them] to identify defendants and exact settlement proceeds.” After granting Lightspeed’s motion for voluntary dismissal, the court granted attorney’s fees under 28 U.S.C. 1927, stating that the litigation “smacked of bullying pretense.” Failing to pay, the lawyers were found to be in civil contempt and ordered to pay 10% of the original sanctions award to cover costs for the contempt litigation. The Seventh Circuit affirmed.View "Duffy v. Smith" on Justia Law

In 2009, Sheth, a cardiologist, pled guilty to a single count of healthcare fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1347. As agreed by Sheth, the district court entered an order of criminal forfeiture for cash and investment accounts then valued at $13 million plus real estate and a vehicle. The government represented that the forfeited assets represented the proceeds of Sheth’s fraud, calculated to be about $13 million. Sheth’s plea agreement specifies that forfeited assets would be credited against the amount of restitution, which the district court had determined to be $12,376,310. In 2012, before the government had liquidated all of the forfeited assets or disbursed any of the proceeds, it sought more of Sheth’s assets to apply to restitution. Sheth objected. Without resolving the factual dispute, the district court ordered turnover of the assets, which were held by third parties. The Seventh Circuit vacated, holding that the court erred by ordering turnover of the assets without first allowing for discovery and holding an evidentiary hearing. View "United States v. Sheth" on Justia Law

E.Y., a child, was diagnosed with diplegic cerebral palsy. His mother alleges that E.Y.’s illness resulted from medical malpractice by the federally-funded Friend Family Health Center, where she received her prenatal care, and the private University of Chicago Hospital, where she gave birth. Federal law makes a suit against the Center a suit against the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) that had to be filed within the FTCA’s two-year statute of limitations, 28 U.S.C. 2401(b). The district court granted summary judgment for the government, finding that the suit was filed about two weeks too late. The mother argued that although she was aware she might have a claim against the University Hospital more than two years before filing this suit, she remained unaware that the Friend Center might be involved until she received a partial set of medical records on December 14, 2006, making her suit timely. The Seventh Circuit reversed. A reasonable trier of fact could find that Ms. Wallace the mother was unaware and had no reason to be aware of the Friend Center’s potential involvement in her son’s injuries until less than two years before she filed suit. View "E. Y., v. United States" on Justia Law