Justia Professional Malpractice & Ethics Opinion Summaries

Lippa and Manmohan Grewal sold a gas station to Theodore Hansen, who later sold it to Junction Market Fairview, L.C. (JMF). The sale contract required Hansen to make regular installment payments, with the final balance due after three years. Hansen missed many payments and failed to pay the full balance when due. The Grewals initiated foreclosure proceedings over six years after Hansen's first missed payment. The applicable statute of limitations for a breach of contract action is six years, raising the question of when the statute begins to run for installment contracts.The Sixth District Court in Sanpete County granted partial summary judgment in favor of JMF, concluding that the statute of limitations began when Hansen missed the first payment, making the Grewals' foreclosure action too late. The court awarded sole control of the gas station to JMF and ordered the Grewals to release the title. When the Grewals failed to comply, JMF seized the station and sold it to a third party. The district court also awarded JMF attorney fees under the Public Waters Access Act and the reciprocal attorney fees statute.The Utah Supreme Court reviewed the case and found that the sale of the gas station to a third-party bona fide purchaser rendered the Grewals' appeal on the title issue moot, as no court action could affect the litigants' rights to the property. However, the issue of attorney fees was not moot. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding attorney fees to JMF under the reciprocal attorney fees statute. The court affirmed the award of attorney fees and remanded to the district court to determine the amount of reasonable attorney fees JMF incurred in defending against the appeal. View "Grewal v. Junction Market Fairview" on Justia Law

A man convicted of murder sued his former attorney and law firm for legal malpractice and fraud, alleging they failed to properly represent him in a federal civil rights action and a state habeas action. The trial court dismissed the plaintiff's claims related to the habeas action, concluding they were not ripe for adjudication because the plaintiff's underlying criminal conviction had not been invalidated. The plaintiff appealed to the Appellate Court, which affirmed the trial court's judgment regarding the legal malpractice claim but reversed with respect to the fraud claim.The Supreme Court of Connecticut held that the Appellate Court improperly affirmed the trial court's dismissal of the plaintiff's legal malpractice claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The Supreme Court disagreed with the Appellate Court's reliance on a previous case that a criminally convicted plaintiff's failure to obtain appellate or postconviction relief from his conviction prior to commencing a criminal malpractice action renders the action unripe and presents an issue of justiciability that implicates a court’s subject matter jurisdiction. Instead, the Supreme Court determined that the question was whether a criminally convicted plaintiff who had not obtained appellate or postconviction relief from his conviction has alleged facts sufficient to state a valid cause of action for criminal malpractice. The Supreme Court concluded that the plaintiff's claim of criminal malpractice should have been the subject of a motion to strike rather than a motion to dismiss. The judgment of the Appellate Court was reversed with respect to the plaintiff's claim of criminal malpractice and the case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Cooke v. Williams" on Justia Law

A defamation lawsuit was filed by Dana Cheng, a New York resident and political commentator, against Dan Neumann and Beacon, a Maine news outlet, for characterizing Cheng as "far-right" and a "conspiracy theorist" in an article. Neumann and Beacon sought dismissal of the case under both federal law and a New York anti-SLAPP law, which applies to meritless defamation lawsuits. The district court conducted a choice-of-law analysis, decided that New York law applied, and granted the motion to dismiss under New York's anti-SLAPP statute.The district court's decision was appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit. The appellate court agreed with the district court's ruling but for a different reason: it decided that Cheng's lawsuit had to be dismissed under binding First Amendment principles protecting free speech by the press. Back at the district court, Neumann requested attorneys' fees under the fee-shifting provision of New York's anti-SLAPP law. The district court denied Neumann's request after determining that Maine, not New York, law applied to the specific issue of attorneys' fees.Neumann appealed again, arguing that the district court erred in its choice-of-law analysis. The appellate court, noting the lack of clear controlling precedent on the issue, certified to the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine the question of which state's law applies to the attorneys' fees issue. View "Cheng v. Neumann" on Justia Law

The case involves Sharon Lewis, an African-American woman who worked as an assistant athletic director for Louisiana State University’s (LSU) football team. Lewis alleges that she experienced and witnessed numerous instances of racist and sexist misconduct from former head football coach Les Miles and that she received complaints of sexual harassment from student workers that she oversaw. In 2013, LSU retained Vicki Crochet and Robert Barton, partners of the law firm Taylor, Porter, Brooks & Phillips LLP, to conduct a Title IX investigation of sexual harassment allegations made against Miles. The report and its contents were kept confidential, and allegations brought by the student complainants were privately settled.The district court dismissed Lewis's Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act (RICO) claims against Crochet and Barton because Lewis’s claims were time-barred and she failed to establish proximate causation. On appeal of the dismissal order, a panel of this court affirmed the district court on the grounds that Lewis knew of her injuries from alleged racketeering as early as 2013, and thus the four-year statute of limitations had expired before she filed suit in 2021.The district court ordered Lewis to file a motion to compel addressing the lingering “issues of discoverability and the application of [its Crime-Fraud Exception Order].” The district court denied Crochet and Barton’s motion for a protective order and compelled the depositions of Crochet and Barton and the disclosure of documents drafted during the 2013 investigation. Crochet and Barton timely appealed.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed the district court’s Crime-Fraud Exception Order and remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion. The court concluded that the district court clearly erred in holding that Lewis established a prima facie case that the Board violated La. R.S. 14:132(B) and that the alleged privileged communications were made in furtherance of the crime and reasonably related to the alleged violation. View "Lewis v. Crochet" on Justia Law

The case revolves around Jon Comstock, a lawyer who was observing Rule 8.1 hearings in a Benton County jail courtroom. Comstock was seated behind a glass window where he could see but not hear the proceedings due to a malfunctioning or turned-off sound system. He attempted to make Judge Griffin aware of the violation of the constitutional guarantees of open court proceedings. During a break, Judge Griffin and Comstock had a heated exchange about Comstock's right to hear the proceedings, which resulted in Comstock being held in direct criminal contempt and sentenced to five days in Benton County Jail, with four and a half days suspended.Comstock filed an omnibus motion for a new trial, petition for review, and notice of appeal in the Benton County Circuit Court, arguing that the circuit court had jurisdiction to conduct a de novo trial of the contempt finding. The circuit court initially granted Comstock a new trial, but later ruled that it lacked jurisdiction to conduct a trial in the matter and dismissed the case, determining that the contempt order was a final order from a circuit court and that the appellate court was the proper venue for a review of that order.The Supreme Court of Arkansas affirmed the decision of the Benton County Circuit Court. It held that the contempt order was indeed a final order from a circuit court and that the appellate court was the proper venue for a review of that order. The court also found substantial evidence to support the circuit court’s order finding Comstock in direct criminal contempt. Therefore, the court affirmed the circuit court's finding and declined to reach Comstock’s recusal argument. View "Comstock v. State" on Justia Law

This case involves a legal malpractice claim brought by Victoria Loepp against her former attorneys and their law firm. The dispute originated from an inheritance issue involving a house that Loepp was supposed to sell to her sister, Ms. Scott. Loepp hired attorney Ryan Ford to assist with the sale, but disagreements arose, leading to litigation. After a series of events, Loepp refused to accept the settlement terms negotiated by Ford, leading to his withdrawal from the case. Scott Murray replaced Ford as Loepp's counsel, but a court later ruled in favor of Scott. Loepp then filed a legal malpractice action against Ford, Murray, and their firm, alleging multiple instances of malpractice, breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, and gross negligence.The District Court of Natrona County dismissed Loepp's claims based on a summary judgment order that struck her malpractice expert, Michael Watters, an attorney from California. The court found that Watters was not a qualified expert because he was not familiar with legal practice in Wyoming. The court also granted summary judgment on all claims, arguing that without Watters's expert testimony, Loepp could not prove the elements of legal malpractice.The Supreme Court of Wyoming reversed the lower court's decision, finding that the district court did not fully analyze the reliability and fitness of the proffered expert under W.R.E 702. The court held that where a lawyer is licensed or practices is just one factor to consider in the W.R.E 702 analysis. The court remanded the case for further proceedings on the motion to strike and the related summary judgment decision. View "Loepp v. Ford" on Justia Law

The case involves an individual, referred to as "John Doe," who repeatedly applied for admission to the Idaho State Bar. Doe's applications were denied due to concerns about his character and fitness, including his honesty, judgment, and respect for the rights of others. Doe challenged these denials, arguing that his federal lawsuits against the Idaho State Bar were a necessary defense of his rights and that his conduct was protected by the First Amendment.The Idaho State Bar filed a petition with the Idaho Supreme Court, seeking permission to reject Doe's third application and to prohibit him from filing future applications for a specified period. Doe cross-petitioned, seeking immediate admission to the Idaho State Bar.The Idaho Supreme Court denied Doe's cross-petition, finding that he had not demonstrated that he met the essential eligibility requirements to practice law. The court granted the Idaho State Bar's petition in part, allowing it to reject Doe's third application and prohibiting Doe from filing a new application for two years. The court found that Doe had not shown a significant change in his circumstances that would render him eligible to practice law. The court also ordered the Idaho State Bar to refund Doe's application fee. View "ISB v. John Doe" on Justia Law

The case involves attorney Larry Klayman, who has been subject to multiple disciplinary investigations and proceedings by the District of Columbia Bar’s Office of Disciplinary Counsel. In response, Klayman filed a series of lawsuits against the District of Columbia Bar, the Office of Disciplinary Counsel, and individual D.C. Bar officials, alleging torts and constitutional claims. In June 2020, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals ordered a ninety-day suspension of Klayman’s license to practice law. Employees of the Office of Disciplinary Counsel mailed notice of that suspension to other jurisdictions where Klayman is admitted to practice law. Klayman then brought three lawsuits against the Office of Disciplinary Counsel employees and the Chair of the D.C. Board on Professional Responsibility, alleging that the notification letters amounted to tortious interference and abuse of process. The district court dismissed Klayman’s suits in full and entered a pre-filing injunction restricting Klayman’s ability to file any related actions or claims for relief in any forum, state or federal.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit vacated the pre-filing injunction. The court affirmed on immunity grounds the district court’s dismissal of Klayman’s claims for damages, but it affirmed in part and reversed in part the district court’s dismissal of Klayman’s claims for injunctive relief. The court held that the Office of Disciplinary Counsel employees were entitled to absolute immunity from Klayman’s damages claims. However, the court found that there was no relevant pending state proceeding to support Younger abstention at the time of the dismissal, and thus reversed the district court’s dismissal of Klayman’s claims for injunctive relief. The court remanded the case to the district court for further proceedings on those injunctive-relief claims. View "Klayman v. Porter" on Justia Law

Link Motion Inc., a Chinese company incorporated in the Cayman Islands, filed a legal malpractice action against the law firm DLA Piper LLP (US) and one of its attorneys in the New York State Supreme Court. The case was related to a previous lawsuit filed by a shareholder of Link Motion, Wayne Baliga, in which DLA Piper represented Link Motion. The law firm removed the case to the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, which dismissed Link Motion's complaint as time-barred and denied its motion to remand the case back to state court.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case and concluded that the district court lacked federal jurisdiction. The court found that the federal law standing question identified by the district court as embedded in Link Motion's malpractice claim did not fall within the narrow category of "disputed and substantial" questions of federal law permitting the exercise of federal jurisdiction over a state law claim. Therefore, the court vacated the district court's decision and remanded the case back to the state court. View "Link Motion Inc. v. DLA Piper LLP" on Justia Law

The case revolves around a legal malpractice action against a state public defender, who represented a client convicted of sexual abuse. The client, Donald Lyle Clark, was convicted and sentenced to prison. The conviction was affirmed on appeal. However, in postconviction proceedings, the court determined that Clark's defense counsel had provided ineffective assistance and ordered a new trial. The state declined to prosecute, and Clark filed a civil action for legal malpractice against the state as the lawyer’s employer. The district court granted partial summary judgment, holding that the finding of ineffective assistance in the postconviction proceedings established counsel’s negligence as a matter of law. The jury found the lawyer negligent and awarded Clark $12 million in emotional distress damages.The Supreme Court of Iowa reversed the judgment for emotional distress damages. The court clarified that to recover emotional distress damages for legal malpractice, the plaintiff must prove more than negligence. The court held that the plaintiff must prove by a preponderance of clear, convincing, and satisfactory evidence that the criminal defense attorney acted with willful and wanton disregard for the client’s rights or safety. The court concluded that the district court erred by instructing the jury that negligence was sufficient. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "Clark v. State of Iowa" on Justia Law