Justia Professional Malpractice & Ethics Opinion Summaries

Sheila Prato, the plaintiff, and her company, Prato Properties, LLC, filed a civil complaint against Thomas John Gioia and Lee & Associates Commercial Real Estate Services, Inc. (the Lee Firm) for breach of fiduciary duty and intentional interference with contract. The case was dismissed without prejudice due to the plaintiffs' failure to appear at trial. At the time of the trial, Prato's attorney, Timothy McFarlin, had been rendered inactive and ineligible to practice law by the State Bar of California due to pending disciplinary proceedings. Prato was unaware of her attorney's status, but the defendants and their counsel were aware and did not inform her or the court.The Superior Court of Orange County dismissed the case without prejudice and subsequently awarded over $70,000 in attorney fees against Prato and her company. The trial court granted the defendants' motions for attorney fees despite Prato's opposition, which argued that the defendants failed to provide the required notice under section 286 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which mandates that a party whose attorney has been removed or suspended must be given written notice to appoint another attorney or appear in person before further proceedings can be taken against them.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. The court found that the defendants' counsel failed to provide the required notice under section 286 before the trial, which prejudiced Prato. The court held that an attorney who has been rendered inactive and ineligible to practice law meets the definition of an attorney who has been "removed or suspended" for purposes of section 286. The court concluded that the trial court abused its discretion in awarding attorney fees to the defendants without considering the lack of notice and the circumstances surrounding Prato's unrepresented status.The Court of Appeal reversed the judgment and remanded the case to the trial court to reconsider the defendants' motions for attorney fees in light of section 286. View "Prato v. Gioia" on Justia Law

Vernon K. Smith, Jr. was declared a vexatious litigant by the Fourth District Administrative District Judge (ADJ) in Idaho. This order prevents Smith from filing new litigation pro se in Idaho courts without obtaining prior permission from a judge. The determination arose from Smith's conduct in litigation concerning the administration of his mother Victoria H. Smith’s estate. Smith, a former attorney, was involved in contentious probate proceedings after his brother successfully challenged their mother's will, which had left the entire estate to Smith. The estate was subsequently administered as intestate, leading to multiple appeals and disciplinary actions against Smith by the Idaho State Bar.The district court found that Smith repeatedly filed frivolous and unmeritorious motions, including petitions to remove the personal representative (PR) and the PR’s counsel, motions to disqualify the district court judge, and objections to court orders. These actions were deemed to lack legal or factual basis and were intended to cause unnecessary delay. The PR of the estate moved to have Smith declared a vexatious litigant under Idaho Court Administrative Rule 59(d)(3), which the district court supported, leading to the referral to the ADJ.The Supreme Court of Idaho reviewed the case and affirmed the ADJ’s decision. The court held that the ADJ did not abuse its discretion in declaring Smith a vexatious litigant. The ADJ acted within the legal standards set forth in Rule 59(d) and reached its decision through an exercise of reason. The court also found that Smith’s due process argument was not preserved for appeal as it was raised for the first time. The court declined to award attorney fees to the ADJ, concluding that Smith’s appeal, although unsuccessful, was not frivolous or unreasonable. View "Smith v. Hippler" on Justia Law

In this case, the plaintiffs, Tsz Keung Wong and Huechi Wong, filed a malicious prosecution action against Yi Dong and his attorneys, alleging that Dong's previous cross-complaint in an earlier lawsuit was filed with malicious intent and lacked probable cause. The Wongs had initially sued Dong over unpaid rent, and Dong responded with a cross-complaint, which he later voluntarily dismissed while an anti-SLAPP motion by the Wongs was pending. The trial court ruled that the Wongs' anti-SLAPP motion would have been granted, entitling them to attorney fees.Dong then filed a motion to strike the Wongs' malicious prosecution action under the anti-SLAPP statute and sought dismissal under Civil Code section 1714.10, which requires pre-filing approval for conspiracy claims against attorneys. The trial court denied both motions, leading Dong to file an interlocutory appeal.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Five, reviewed the case. The court determined that it lacked jurisdiction to review the denial of Dong's anti-SLAPP motion because the Wongs' action qualified as a SLAPPback, which is only reviewable by a peremptory writ petition, not an interlocutory appeal. The court dismissed this portion of Dong's appeal.Regarding the denial of Dong's motion under Civil Code section 1714.10, the court affirmed the trial court's decision. The court held that the Wongs' malicious prosecution action did not require pre-filing approval because it sought to hold the attorneys independently liable for their own actions, not based on a conspiracy with Dong. The court found that the allegation of conspiracy was surplusage and did not affect the applicability of section 1714.10.In conclusion, the court dismissed Dong's appeal concerning the anti-SLAPP motion and affirmed the trial court's denial of the motion under Civil Code section 1714.10. View "Wong v. Dong" on Justia Law

This case involves a dispute over the sale of real property. Patricia Ann Scott, the seller, previously sued real estate agent Kaylee Schnelle for professional negligence, alleging mishandling of the sale. Schnelle's motions for summary judgment and directed verdict were denied, and the jury found in her favor. Subsequently, Schnelle filed a malicious prosecution claim against Scott and her attorneys, arguing they lacked probable cause and conspired against her. The defendants moved to dismiss, citing the prior denials as evidence of probable cause.The district court denied the motion to dismiss, stating that the previous denials were factors to consider but did not conclusively establish probable cause. The court found Schnelle's allegations sufficient to support her claim. The Colorado Court of Appeals affirmed this decision, agreeing that the denials did not create a rebuttable presumption of probable cause.The Supreme Court of Colorado reviewed the case to determine if such denials should create a rebuttable presumption of probable cause. The court concluded that while the denials are factors in the probable cause analysis, they do not create a rebuttable presumption. The court emphasized the need for a careful, case-by-case analysis rather than a bright-line rule. Consequently, the court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals, holding that the denials of summary judgment and directed verdict motions do not establish probable cause as a matter of law. View "Cantafio v. Schnelle" on Justia Law

Dr. Jeffery Weisman filed a lawsuit after resigning from Washington University’s residency program, alleging that he was forced to resign due to hostile treatment and that Washington University and Barnes Jewish Hospital prevented him from transferring to another residency program. Weisman brought claims for breach of contract, tortious interference, fraudulent inducement, and defamation under Missouri law. Washington University and Barnes Jewish Hospital counterclaimed for a violation of the Missouri Computer Tampering Act (MCTA).The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri dismissed Weisman’s tortious interference and fraudulent inducement claims, and some of his breach of contract claims. The court granted summary judgment in favor of Barnes Jewish Hospital on the remaining breach of contract claims and the defamation claim. The court also dismissed the MCTA counterclaims and the defendants’ request for attorneys’ fees. Weisman appealed the adverse judgments on his claims, and the defendants cross-appealed the dismissal of the MCTA counterclaims and denial of attorneys’ fees.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decisions. The appellate court held that the statute of frauds barred Weisman’s breach of contract claim related to the Lab-Residency Contract, as it was an oral agreement for a term of five years. The court also affirmed the dismissal of the tortious interference claims, concluding that Evers and Benzinger, as agents of Washington University, were not third parties to the contracts. Additionally, the court upheld the dismissal of the fraudulent inducement claims, as the alleged Separation Agreement did not exist. Finally, the court affirmed the dismissal of the MCTA counterclaims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, as Weisman’s tender of full payment rendered the claims moot. View "Weisman v. Barnes Jewish Hospital" on Justia Law

Ron Griffin filed a legal malpractice lawsuit against the law firm Snow Christensen & Martineau (SCM). On the last day for timely service, Griffin’s process server attempted to serve SCM’s registered agent but was unsuccessful. Instead, the process server left the complaint with Dawn Chapman, SCM’s administrator. SCM moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that Chapman was not authorized to receive service under rule 4(d)(1)(E) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires service on an officer, managing or general agent, or other authorized agent. The district court agreed, finding that Chapman did not exercise general power involving judgment and discretion in her role.Griffin appealed to the Utah Court of Appeals, which reversed the district court’s decision. The appellate court, relying on previous cases Beard v. White, Green & Addison Associates, Inc. and In re Schwenke, held that Chapman was a managing or general agent because she was more than a mere employee and had some responsibility for the firm’s affairs. The court also found that it was fair to conclude that service on SCM was proper under the circumstances.SCM petitioned for certiorari review, and the Utah Supreme Court granted the request. The Supreme Court concluded that Chapman was not a managing or general agent under rule 4(d)(1)(E). The court defined a managing or general agent as someone with general power involving the exercise of judgment and discretion, which Chapman did not have in her role as an administrator. Consequently, the Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals’ decision and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Griffin v. Snow Christensen and Martineau" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, 640 Octavia LLC and Edward Kountze, owned an apartment building in San Francisco and hired Walston Law Group to represent them in a federal unlawful detainer action against a tenant. During the trial, it was discovered that Walston's attorney had created a document with new house rules during the trial, which led to the federal judge excluding the document and giving a curative instruction to the jury. The jury found in favor of the tenant, and plaintiffs subsequently sued Walston for legal malpractice, alleging various breaches and negligence.The San Francisco Superior Court dismissed plaintiffs' complaint with prejudice due to their failure to comply with discovery orders, and the case proceeded to trial on Walston's cross-complaint for unpaid attorney fees. The jury awarded Walston $78,905.43 in damages plus $29,826.25 in prejudgment interest. Plaintiffs appealed, arguing that the trial court's pretrial order excluding evidence of their malpractice allegations was erroneous and prejudicial.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Five, reviewed the case and concluded that the trial court erred in applying the doctrine of claim or issue preclusion to exclude evidence supporting plaintiffs' malpractice allegations. The appellate court held that the dismissal of plaintiffs' complaint was interlocutory and not a final judgment, thus preclusion doctrines did not apply. The court found that the exclusion of evidence was prejudicial, as it prevented the jury from properly considering plaintiffs' defense that Walston's alleged malpractice excused them from paying the fees.The appellate court reversed the judgment and remanded the case for a new trial, allowing plaintiffs to present evidence of Walston's alleged malpractice. View "640 Octavia LLC v. Walston" on Justia Law

Numerous plaintiffs filed claims against a law firm and its attorneys who represented them in mass-tort actions. The plaintiffs alleged mishandling and improper distribution of settlement funds obtained from these actions. After years of litigation and jurisdictional conflicts, the cases were brought before the Rankin County Circuit Court.The circuit court referred the cases to a special master who conducted hearings on various motions, including plaintiffs' motions to consolidate, defendants' motions to sever, and defendants' motions to re-open discovery. The special master recommended granting the plaintiffs' motions to consolidate and denying the defendants' motions to sever and re-open discovery. The circuit court adopted these recommendations by order on February 27, 2023. Defendants sought interlocutory appeals on all four cases, which were granted.The Supreme Court of Mississippi reviewed the case and affirmed the decisions of the Rankin County Circuit Court. The court held that the plaintiffs' claims met the requirements for joinder of parties under Rule 20 and consolidation of cases under Rule 42. The court found that the claims arose from a distinct chain of events involving the same defendants, the same mass-tort litigation, and the same settlement funds. The court also determined that consolidating the cases would further judicial economy without prejudicing any party. Additionally, the court upheld the denial of defendants' motions to re-open discovery, noting that the litigation had been pending for years with no restrictions on discovery and much of the requested discovery had already been obtained. The case was remanded to the Rankin County Circuit Court for further proceedings. View "Freese v. Estate of Alford" on Justia Law

A creditor and a debtor’s law firm both claimed settlement funds held by the superior court. The creditor had a charging order against the debtor’s distributions from a limited liability company (LLC), while the law firm had an attorney’s lien on the funds. In a previous appeal, the attorney’s lien was deemed valid, but the case was remanded to determine if the funds were LLC distributions subject to the charging order and the value of the attorney’s lien.The superior court ruled that the funds were LLC distributions and subject to the charging order. It also found that the debtor failed to prove any money was owed to the law firm for work performed, thus invalidating the attorney’s lien. The court mistakenly released the funds to the creditor, who returned them within two days, but was sanctioned with attorney’s fees for temporarily keeping the funds.The debtor appealed, and the creditor cross-appealed the attorney’s fee award. The Supreme Court of Alaska affirmed the superior court’s rulings on the merits but reversed the attorney’s fee award. The court held that the funds were indeed LLC distributions subject to the charging order and that the debtor and law firm failed to prove the value of the attorney’s lien. The court also vacated the second final judgment and the attorney’s fee award against the creditor, finding no rule violation by the creditor. View "Baker v. Duffus" on Justia Law

Two Texas lawyers, Michael A. Pohl and Robert Ammons, represented out-of-state clients in personal injury cases filed outside Texas. The clients, from Louisiana and Arkansas, alleged that they were solicited by individuals on behalf of the lawyers, which led to the signing of legal-services contracts. The clients later sued the lawyers in Texas, seeking to void the contracts under Texas Government Code Section 82.0651(a), which allows clients to void contracts procured through barratry, and to recover fees and penalties.The trial court dismissed all claims, granting summary judgment in favor of the lawyers. The clients appealed, and the Court of Appeals for the First District of Texas reversed the trial court's decision, concluding that Section 82.0651(a) applied because part of the lawyers' conduct occurred in Texas. The court also rejected the lawyers' arguments regarding limitations and res judicata and allowed Reese's intervention in the case.The Supreme Court of Texas reviewed the case and held that Section 82.0651(a) does not extend to the nonresident clients' claims because the core conduct targeted by the statute—solicitation of a legal-services contract through barratry—occurred outside Texas. The court reversed the Court of Appeals' judgment to the extent it allowed the clients to proceed with their claims under Section 82.0651(a) and rendered judgment that they take nothing on those claims. However, the court affirmed the Court of Appeals' judgment regarding the breach of fiduciary duty claims and remanded those claims to the trial court for further proceedings. View "POHL v. CHEATHAM" on Justia Law