Justia Professional Malpractice & Ethics Opinion Summaries

An attorney, Morris S. Getzels, challenged the constitutional validity of State Bar Rule 2.30, which prevents inactive licensees from acting as private arbitrators and mediators. Getzels argued that this rule violates the Equal Protection Clauses of the federal and California Constitutions by treating inactive licensees differently from others. He claimed that the rule impinges on the fundamental liberty of "freedom of contract" and that there is no rational basis for the rule.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County sustained the State Bar's demurrer without leave to amend, leading to a judgment of dismissal. The court found that rational basis review was the appropriate standard for evaluating Getzels's equal protection claim. It concluded that funding the State Bar’s regulatory functions was a legitimate government purpose and that requiring licensees to pay the active membership fee was related to this purpose. The court determined that the State Bar had sufficiently articulated a rational basis for the disparate treatment of inactive licensees.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Four, reviewed the case. The court held that rational basis review was the correct standard, as the rule did not involve a suspect class or a fundamental right. The court found that the State Bar had a legitimate interest in maintaining a competent bar and ensuring the professional conduct of its licensees. It concluded that Rule 2.30’s distinction between active and inactive licensees was rationally related to this goal, as inactive licensees acting as private arbitrators and mediators could burden the State Bar’s regulatory system. The court affirmed the judgment of dismissal, upholding the constitutionality of Rule 2.30. View "Getzels v. The State Bar of California" on Justia Law

In January 2015, Juan Carlos Benitez-Torres, a lawful permanent resident, was stopped by police while driving a car with tinted windows. The car, not registered to him, was searched, and methamphetamine was found in hidden compartments. Benitez was charged with narcotics offenses. His family hired attorney Kenneth Reed for $15,000, but Reed appeared only four times and did not file a motion to suppress the evidence. In August 2015, Reed advised Benitez to accept a three-year plea deal without adequately explaining the immigration consequences. Benitez pleaded guilty and was deported after his release.Benitez filed a motion under Penal Code section 1473.7 in January 2023 to vacate his guilty plea, arguing he did not understand the immigration consequences and was prejudiced by this lack of understanding. The Superior Court of Orange County denied the motion, finding insufficient evidence that Benitez did not understand the consequences of his plea.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. The court found that Reed did not provide adequate advice regarding the immigration consequences of the plea, as required by Padilla v. Kentucky. The court determined that Benitez did not meaningfully understand the mandatory deportation consequences of his plea and that there was a reasonable probability he would have rejected the plea had he understood these consequences. The appellate court reversed the trial court's order and remanded the case with directions to allow Benitez to withdraw his 2015 guilty pleas. View "People v. Benitez-Torres" on Justia Law

Tenants Michael Gogal and Hildy Baumgartner-Gogal, a married couple, prevailed on a retaliatory eviction claim against their former landlords, Xinhui Deng and Jianhua Wu. Michael, a licensed attorney, represented the tenants for most of the lawsuit. Post-judgment, the tenants sought to recover half of Michael’s attorney’s fees, attributing them to his representation of Hildy. Despite declarations from the tenants indicating that Hildy believed she had retained Michael as her attorney, the trial court denied the request, applying the precedent set in Gorman v. Tassajara Development Corp., which held that fees are not awardable when spouses’ interests are joint and indivisible.The Superior Court of San Diego County ruled in favor of the tenants on their retaliatory eviction claim, awarding them compensatory and punitive damages. The court also ruled in their favor on most other claims and on the landlords’ cross-claims, resulting in a total judgment against the landlords. Subsequently, the tenants filed a motion to recover attorney’s fees under Civil Code section 1942.5, which mandates an award of reasonable attorney’s fees to the prevailing party in retaliatory eviction cases. The trial court granted the motion for fees billed by another attorney but denied it for Michael’s fees, citing the Gorman case.The Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, State of California, affirmed the trial court’s decision. The appellate court agreed with the trial court’s application of Gorman but emphasized the need for a nuanced analysis to determine whether a true attorney-client relationship existed between Hildy and Michael. The court concluded that the tenants failed to present sufficient evidence to establish such a relationship, as the record did not demonstrate that Hildy played a significant substantive role in the litigation or that her consultations with Michael were for the purpose of obtaining legal advice in his professional capacity. View "Gogal v. Deng" on Justia Law

Kristopher Birtcher, experiencing a mental health crisis, was reported to law enforcement by a Hobby Lobby manager. Birtcher, unarmed and not threatening anyone, was detained by sheriff’s deputies. During the detention, Birtcher attempted to flee but was subdued by multiple deputies who restrained him in a prone position, applying bodyweight pressure to his back. Despite Birtcher’s pleas that he could not breathe, the deputies maintained the restraint, and Birtcher eventually stopped moving and died from asphyxiation and sudden cardiac arrest.In the Superior Court of San Diego County, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants, finding no triable issues of material fact regarding the excessive force claim. The court concluded that the deputies’ actions were in accordance with their training and that Birtcher’s restraint was proper. The court also ruled that plaintiff failed to establish a legal basis for the negligent training claim against Sheriff William D. Gore.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, reviewed the case. The court reversed the trial court’s decision, holding that there were indeed triable issues of material fact regarding the excessive force used by the deputies. The appellate court found that the evidence, including expert testimony, suggested that the deputies’ use of bodyweight pressure on Birtcher while he was restrained in a prone position could be considered excessive force. The court also held that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment on the negligent training claim against Sheriff Gore, as there was a statutory basis for the claim and evidence suggesting his involvement in the training policies.The appellate court reversed the judgment in favor of all defendants and remanded the matter for further proceedings. View "A.B. v. County of San Diego" on Justia Law

Marc B. Hankin appealed a probate court order that dismissed his petition for the appointment of a probate conservator for Anne S. and imposed $5,577 in sanctions against him. Hankin, who had only met Anne once and lived nearby, filed the petition along with attorney G. Scott Sobel, who had known Anne for many years. The petition alleged that Anne was being unduly influenced and possibly mistreated by her housemate. Anne, through her attorney, objected to the conservatorship. Sobel later withdrew from the petition, leaving Hankin to maintain it on his own. Anne and other parties involved reached a settlement agreement, which Hankin opposed, arguing Anne lacked the capacity to sign it.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County granted Anne's motion for judgment on the pleadings, concluding that Hankin lacked standing to petition for conservatorship under Probate Code section 1820. The court also imposed sanctions on Hankin, finding his petition legally frivolous. Hankin appealed both decisions.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court affirmed the lower court's decision, agreeing that Hankin did not qualify as an "interested person" or "friend" under section 1820. The court noted that Hankin's brief interaction with Anne did not establish a close or intimate relationship necessary to be considered a friend. Additionally, the court found that Hankin's arguments for standing were unsupported by existing law and did not present a good faith argument for extending the law. The court also upheld the sanctions, determining that Hankin's petition was legally frivolous and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding them. View "Conservatorship of Anne S." on Justia Law

Sheila Prato, the plaintiff, and her company, Prato Properties, LLC, filed a civil complaint against Thomas John Gioia and Lee & Associates Commercial Real Estate Services, Inc. (the Lee Firm) for breach of fiduciary duty and intentional interference with contract. The case was dismissed without prejudice due to the plaintiffs' failure to appear at trial. At the time of the trial, Prato's attorney, Timothy McFarlin, had been rendered inactive and ineligible to practice law by the State Bar of California due to pending disciplinary proceedings. Prato was unaware of her attorney's status, but the defendants and their counsel were aware and did not inform her or the court.The Superior Court of Orange County dismissed the case without prejudice and subsequently awarded over $70,000 in attorney fees against Prato and her company. The trial court granted the defendants' motions for attorney fees despite Prato's opposition, which argued that the defendants failed to provide the required notice under section 286 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which mandates that a party whose attorney has been removed or suspended must be given written notice to appoint another attorney or appear in person before further proceedings can be taken against them.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. The court found that the defendants' counsel failed to provide the required notice under section 286 before the trial, which prejudiced Prato. The court held that an attorney who has been rendered inactive and ineligible to practice law meets the definition of an attorney who has been "removed or suspended" for purposes of section 286. The court concluded that the trial court abused its discretion in awarding attorney fees to the defendants without considering the lack of notice and the circumstances surrounding Prato's unrepresented status.The Court of Appeal reversed the judgment and remanded the case to the trial court to reconsider the defendants' motions for attorney fees in light of section 286. View "Prato v. Gioia" on Justia Law

In a personal injury case, the plaintiff, Jerry Cradduck, sued Hilton Domestic Operating Company, Inc. for negligence related to an incident at a spa in 2019. During the trial, Cradduck's attorney, Todd Samuels, failed to appear due to a medical emergency, leading to a series of events that included a mistrial and ultimately the dismissal of the complaint. The trial court dismissed the case primarily because Samuels did not provide timely evidence of his medical condition and continued to work on other cases shortly after claiming he was too ill to speak.The Superior Court of Riverside County initially granted an eight-day continuance after Samuels' medical emergency but later dismissed the case when neither Cradduck nor Samuels appeared as ordered. Samuels' failure to provide adequate medical evidence and his continued legal work in other cases led the court to question the legitimacy of his claims. The court also found Samuels' conduct sufficiently egregious to warrant a referral to the State Bar of California.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, reviewed the case and found no abuse of discretion by the trial court. The appellate court affirmed the judgment, agreeing that the trial court had acted within its discretion based on the evidence and circumstances presented. The appellate court also referred attorney Narine Mkrtchyan to the State Bar for her uncivil and disrespectful conduct during the proceedings. The judgment was affirmed, and the defendants were awarded their costs on appeal. View "Cradduck v. Hilton Domestic Operating Co." on Justia Law

In this case, the plaintiffs, Tsz Keung Wong and Huechi Wong, filed a malicious prosecution action against Yi Dong and his attorneys, alleging that Dong's previous cross-complaint in an earlier lawsuit was filed with malicious intent and lacked probable cause. The Wongs had initially sued Dong over unpaid rent, and Dong responded with a cross-complaint, which he later voluntarily dismissed while an anti-SLAPP motion by the Wongs was pending. The trial court ruled that the Wongs' anti-SLAPP motion would have been granted, entitling them to attorney fees.Dong then filed a motion to strike the Wongs' malicious prosecution action under the anti-SLAPP statute and sought dismissal under Civil Code section 1714.10, which requires pre-filing approval for conspiracy claims against attorneys. The trial court denied both motions, leading Dong to file an interlocutory appeal.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Five, reviewed the case. The court determined that it lacked jurisdiction to review the denial of Dong's anti-SLAPP motion because the Wongs' action qualified as a SLAPPback, which is only reviewable by a peremptory writ petition, not an interlocutory appeal. The court dismissed this portion of Dong's appeal.Regarding the denial of Dong's motion under Civil Code section 1714.10, the court affirmed the trial court's decision. The court held that the Wongs' malicious prosecution action did not require pre-filing approval because it sought to hold the attorneys independently liable for their own actions, not based on a conspiracy with Dong. The court found that the allegation of conspiracy was surplusage and did not affect the applicability of section 1714.10.In conclusion, the court dismissed Dong's appeal concerning the anti-SLAPP motion and affirmed the trial court's denial of the motion under Civil Code section 1714.10. View "Wong v. Dong" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, 640 Octavia LLC and Edward Kountze, owned an apartment building in San Francisco and hired Walston Law Group to represent them in a federal unlawful detainer action against a tenant. During the trial, it was discovered that Walston's attorney had created a document with new house rules during the trial, which led to the federal judge excluding the document and giving a curative instruction to the jury. The jury found in favor of the tenant, and plaintiffs subsequently sued Walston for legal malpractice, alleging various breaches and negligence.The San Francisco Superior Court dismissed plaintiffs' complaint with prejudice due to their failure to comply with discovery orders, and the case proceeded to trial on Walston's cross-complaint for unpaid attorney fees. The jury awarded Walston $78,905.43 in damages plus $29,826.25 in prejudgment interest. Plaintiffs appealed, arguing that the trial court's pretrial order excluding evidence of their malpractice allegations was erroneous and prejudicial.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Five, reviewed the case and concluded that the trial court erred in applying the doctrine of claim or issue preclusion to exclude evidence supporting plaintiffs' malpractice allegations. The appellate court held that the dismissal of plaintiffs' complaint was interlocutory and not a final judgment, thus preclusion doctrines did not apply. The court found that the exclusion of evidence was prejudicial, as it prevented the jury from properly considering plaintiffs' defense that Walston's alleged malpractice excused them from paying the fees.The appellate court reversed the judgment and remanded the case for a new trial, allowing plaintiffs to present evidence of Walston's alleged malpractice. View "640 Octavia LLC v. Walston" on Justia Law

Ogen and Dorit Perry, along with their limited partnership Dahlex LP, sought a writ of mandate to compel Milestone Financial LLC and its managers to produce corporate records under the California Revised Uniform Limited Liability Company Act. The trial court partially granted the petition, ordering the disclosure of some records but redacting member names and addresses, deeming the member list a protected trade secret. The court also declined to order the production of audited records.Milestone appealed, arguing the Perrys lacked standing, the records request did not meet statutory standards, and the redaction order should have included more documents. The Perrys cross-appealed, contending the member list is not a trade secret and the court erred in not ordering audited records. They also appealed the trial court's order on attorney fees and costs, arguing the awarded amount did not reflect the findings in the writ order and was an abuse of discretion.The California Court of Appeal, Sixth Appellate District, found substantial evidence supporting the trial court's decision that the Perrys' request was reasonably related to their interests. The court affirmed the trial court's finding that the member list is a trade secret but directed the trial court to amend its order to require Milestone to provide financial statements accompanied by the appropriate report or certificate. The appellate court also reversed the attorney fee award and remanded for reconsideration, requiring the trial court to provide a more detailed explanation for the reduced fee award. The judgment was otherwise affirmed, and each party was ordered to bear its own costs on appeal. View "Perry v. Stuart" on Justia Law