Justia Professional Malpractice & Ethics Opinion Summaries

Kimberly Kirchmeyer, as Executive Director of the Medical Board of California (the Medical Board), launched an investigation of Geoffrey Phillips, M.D., a licensed psychiatrist, based on a complaint that Phillips had carried on a sexual relationship with a patient. As part of the investigation, an investigatory subpoena duces tecum for the production of specified medical records of the patient was served on Phillips. After both he and the patient objected to the subpoena duces tecum, and he failed to produce the medical records, the Kirchmeyer filed a petition to compel their production. The trial court denied the petition and dismissed it. The Kirchmeyer appealed that dismissal. After review, the Court of Appeal concluded the trial court did not err and affirmed: "The medical records sought by the investigatory subpoena duces tecum were protected by the psychotherapist-patient privilege of Evidence Code section 1014. Because the psychotherapist-patient privilege is grounded in the patient’s constitutional right of privacy, the Director had to show a compelling interest justifying production of the medical records sought. The Director failed to show a compelling interest and has not established that an exception to the psychotherapist-patient privilege applied to the medial records sought by the investigatory subpoena duces tecum." View "Kirchmeyer v. Phillips" on Justia Law

The Board issued an administrative investigative subpoena seeking complete, certified records of three of plaintiff's patients on the grounds that there was good cause to believe that plaintiff departed from the standard of care in connection with the treatment of those patients. Plaintiff's petitions to quash the subpoena were denied, and the Board’s petition to compel compliance was granted in part, with the limitation that the records to be provided should be limited by time period. The court concluded that the Board had pointed out specific instances of prescribing irregularities, which were sufficient for a finding of good cause; substantial evidence supports the trial court’s finding of good cause; and there is no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s determination that Dr. Pollak was qualified to render an expert opinion in this matter. The court also concluded that plaintiff failed to convince the court that, if the evidence of medical records at issue was obtained in violation of Civil Code section 56.26, the Board was not permitted to use it in the investigation. While the trial court may not have specifically stated it was engaging in a balancing test, the long discussion of good cause shows careful consideration of the patients’ right to privacy versus the state’s interest in safeguarding its citizens from negligent medical care. Finally, the court rejected plaintiff's claim that the subpoena was overbroad where the trial court did not err in failing to modify the subpoena in more ways than it already did in applying time restrictions. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Fett v Medical Bd. of CA" on Justia Law

Jesse's father, Crow, a retired physician, was aware that Jesse had a history of fights and arrests, including brandishing a gun on the highway. Crow first met Ryann after she married Jesse and saw her fewer than 10 times. Once, Crow went to their house and found the couple intoxicated. Ryann was in pain and stated that her foot had been run over by a stranger. Crow’s wife arranged for Ryann to see Dr. Williams. Ryann’s injuries were consistent with her explanation. Ryann did not mention abuse. Ryann’s mother, Pipitone, later learned that Jesse had run over Ryann’s foot. Jesse, with help from Crow, paid Ryann $5,000. Ryann signed an agreement, stating that the incident was an accident; Pipitone signed as a witness. Pipitone eventually reported the abuse to the police. Ryann’s sister also reported. Ryann was not cooperative. Ryann admitted that Jesse had deliberately run her over, that she felt threatened, and that he had “guns and a lot of illegal things.” Six months after their marriage Jesse murdered Ryann, and with assistance, dismembered and dumped her body into the San Francisco Bay. Jesse committed suicide in jail. Pipitone brought a wrongful death action against Doctors Crow and Williams for failure to report suspected abuse under Penal Code 11160. The trial court granted the defendants summary judgment, on grounds of duty and causation. The court of appeal affirmed. View "Pipitone v. Williams" on Justia Law

Defendants Chaim Woolf and Steven Camhi were attorneys who represented plaintiffs in a prior civil action. They appealed an order granting plaintiffs' motion to set aside the dismissal of a legal malpractice action. The court dismissed the case after plaintiffs Michael Younessi and Alea Investments, LLC failed to timely file an amended complaint in response to an order sustaining demurrers to the original complaint with leave to amend. Plaintiffs filed motions to dismiss the appeal, for relief from default in failing to file a respondents' brief, and for judicial notice. The Court of Appeals denied plaintiffs' motions. But the Court "reluctantly" affirmed the trial court's order vacating the dismissal: while the evidence did not support granting relief for mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect, since the dismissal resulted from plaintiffs' newly retained attorney's failure to oppose the demurrers and timely file an amended complaint, plaintiffs were entitled to relief under Code Civ. Proc. section 473, subdivision (b)'s attorney-fault provision. View "Younessi v. Woolf" on Justia Law

Sheppard Mullin, J-M's former attorneys, sought recovery of attorney fees relating to litigation in which Sheppard Mullin represented J-M. Sheppard Mullin was disqualified from that litigation because, without obtaining informed consent from either client, Sheppard Mullin represented J-M, the defendant in the litigation, while simultaneously representing a plaintiff in that case, South Tahoe. The trial court ordered the case to arbitration based on the parties’ written engagement agreement, and a panel of arbitrators found that the agreement was not illegal, denied J-M’s request for disgorgement of fees paid, and ordered J-M to pay Sheppard Mullin’s outstanding fees. The trial court confirmed the award. The court concluded that, under California law, because J-M challenged the legality of the entire agreement, the issue of illegality was for the trial court, rather than the arbitrators, to decide. The court further concluded that the undisputed facts establish that Sheppard Mullin violated the requirements of California Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 3-310 by simultaneously representing J-M and South Tahoe. Sheppard Mullin failed to disclose the conflict to either J-M or South Tahoe, and it failed to obtain the informed written consent of either client to the conflict. The representation of both parties without informed written consent is contrary to California law and contravenes the public policy embodied in Rule 3-310. Therefore, the trial court erred by enforcing the contract between the parties and entering judgment on the arbitration award based on that contract. Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment. The court remanded for factual findings on the issue of disgorgement of all fees paid to Sheppard Mullin. View "Sheppard, Mullin, Richter & Hampton v. J-M Manufacturing Co." on Justia Law

James Kelly, as trustee of the Beverly Snodgrass Clark Inter Vivos 1999 Separate Property Trust, sued Barbara J. Orr, Joseph Holland, Gretchen Shaffer, and DLA Piper LLP (US) (Defendants) for professional negligence in relation to legal advice they provided to his predecessor trustee of the Trust. Defendants demurred on statute of limitations grounds, arguing his action was barred by the one-year statute of limitations under Code of Civil Procedure section 340.6. The trial court sustained Defendants' demurrer without leave to amend, and Kelly filed a timely notice of appeal. On review of the matter, the Court of Appeal concluded the statute of limitations was tolled under section 340.6, subdivision (a)(2), until March 22, 2013, the date Kelly alleged Defendants ceased representation of Kelly's predecessor trustee. Because Kelly filed suit on February 27, 2014, less than one year after Defendants ceased representation of the predecessor trustee, the Court of Appeal concluded Kelly's action was not time-barred. The Court reversed the judgment and remanded for further proceedings. View "Kelly v. Orr" on Justia Law

In a previous decision, the Court of Appeal affirmed a judgment terminating Johneisha Kemper's parental rights to her daughter, rejecting Kemper's contention that she received ineffective assistance of her appointed juvenile dependency counsel. Kemper then brought a legal malpractice action against the same appointed juvenile dependency attorneys, their supervising attorney, and the County of San Diego.2 She alleged defendants' legal representation breached the applicable standard of care and caused the termination of her parental rights. Defendants moved for summary judgment based on the collateral estoppel doctrine. The court granted the motion and entered judgment in defendants' favor. Kemper appealed, and the Court of Appeal affirmed: "Causation is an essential element of a legal malpractice claim, and Kemper is barred by the collateral estoppel doctrine from relitigating the issue of whether her juvenile dependency attorneys caused the termination of her parental rights. We decline Kemper's request that we create a new exception to the collateral estoppel rule based on an analogy to the writ of habeas corpus procedure applicable in juvenile dependency cases." View "Kemper v. Co. of San Diego" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Jill Shelton, Mobile Medical Services for Physicians and Advanced Practice Nurses, Inc. (NPS), and Mobile Medical Services for Physicians and Advanced Practice Nurses, Inc., a Nursing Corporation (MMS) filed a complaint against defendant Chalat Rajaram. The complaint was based on defendant’s statements to the California Nursing Board (Board) that led to the investigation of Shelton. The trial court granted defendant’s special motion to strike the complaint (anti-SLAPP motion), granting leave to amend one cause of action for breach of contract. After NPS filed an amended complaint for breach of contract, defendant filed another anti-SLAPP motion, which the court denied. Defendant appealed, contending the amended breach of contract cause of action was a sham because NPS merely eliminated the offending allegations from the original complaint. Defendant argued the amended breach of contract cause of action seeks to impose liability on him based solely on his statements to the Board. Thus, he argued the court erred in denying the anti-SLAPP motion. After review, the Court of Appeals concluded there was no authority for the court to grant leave to amend the original complaint. Therefore, the Court reversed and remanded with directions to the court to grant defendant’s original motion to strike without leave to amend. View "Mobile Medical Services etc. v. Rajaram" on Justia Law