Justia Professional Malpractice & Ethics Opinion Summaries

Tower Homes, LLC retained William Heaton and his law firm (collectively, Heaton) for legal guidance in developing a residential common ownership project. The project eventually failed, and Tower Homes entered Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection. The plan of reorganization and confirmation order stated that the trustee and bankruptcy estate retained all legal claims. The trustee subsequently entered into a stipulation with a group of creditors (collectively, the Creditors) permitting the Creditors to pursue any legal malpractice claims in the Tower Homes’ name. The bankruptcy court then entered an order authorizing the trustee to permit the Creditors to pursue Tower Homes’ legal malpractice claim in Tower Homes’ name. The Creditors subsequently filed a legal malpractice lawsuit against Heaton, naming Tower Homes as plaintiff. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Heaton, concluding that the stipulation and order constituted an impermissible assignment of a legal malpractice claim to the Creditors. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the stipulation and order constituted an assignment, which is prohibited under Nevada law; and (2) the Creditors may bring a debtor’s legal malpractice claim pursuant to 11 U.S.C. 1123(b)(3)(B) when certain conditions are met, but those conditions were not met in this case. View "Tower Homes, LLC v. Heaton" on Justia Law

Illinois attorney Jahrling was contacted and paid by attorney Rywak to prepare documents for the sale of 90-year-old Cora’s home. Rywak’s clients paid $35,000 for Cora’s property, which was worth at least $106,000 and was later resold by the purchasers for $145,000. Cora later alleged he understood that he would keep a life estate to live in the upstairs apartment of the home rent-free. Jahrling’s sale documents did not include that life estate. Jahrling and Cora could not communicate directly and privately because Cora spoke only Polish and Jahrling spoke no Polish. Jahrling relied on counsel for the adverse parties for all communication with Cora. After the buyers tried to evict Cora, Cora sued Jahrling in state court for legal malpractice. After a partial settlement with a third party and offsets, the court awarded Cora’s estate $26,000, plus costs. Jahrling filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy protection. Cora’s estate filed an adversary proceeding alleging that the judgment was not dischargeable under 11 U.S.C. 523(a)(4) because the debt was the result of defalcation by the debtor acting as a fiduciary. The bankruptcy court found in favor of the estate. The Seventh Circuit affirmed.Jahrling’s egregious breaches of his fiduciary duty were reckless and the resulting malpractice judgment is not dischargeable. View "Jahrling v. Estate of Cora" on Justia Law

W. Steve Smith, trustee of a complex Chapter 7 estate, appealed the bankruptcy court's removal of him as trustee. Smith also appealed his removal from all of his other pending cases. Smith had traveled with his wife and children to New Orleans for an oral argument related to his work as trustee, billing the the firm for work that included estate funds for trip expenses. The district court affirmed. The court concluded that the bankruptcy court applied a proper legal standard, and its determination that Smith’s conduct violated that standard was not clearly erroneous. Therefore, the bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion in finding cause sufficient to remove Smith as trustee. The court rejected Smith's notice argument as well as his as-applied constitutional argument to section 324(b) of the Bankruptcy Code. Finally, the court's ruling moots the issue of whether the bankruptcy and district courts wrongly refused to stay his removal pending appeal. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Smith v. Robbins" on Justia Law

John Stokes appealed the judgment against him in a defamation case and retained attorney Greg Duncan to advise him on how to maintain his appeal while discharging his obligation in bankruptcy. After Duncan filed a bankruptcy petition on Stokes’ behalf, the bankruptcy court granted Duncan’s motion to withdraw. While the bankruptcy action was pending, Stokes filed the present action in state court against Duncan and his paralegal (collectively, Duncan) seeking damages for legal malpractice. The bankruptcy trustee intervened in the malpractice action, arguing that the action was an asset of the bankruptcy estate. The district court stayed all proceedings in the malpractice action. The bankruptcy court concluded that the malpractice action was an asset of the bankruptcy estate and subsequently sold the action to Duncan. After Stokes’ bankruptcy proceeding was discharged, the bankruptcy court entered an order concluding that Stokes’ claims against Duncan were property of the bankruptcy estate that had been purchased by Duncan. The state district court subsequently lifted the stay and granted Duncan’s motion for summary judgment, concluding that Stokes’ malpractice claims were property of the bankruptcy estate and had been purchased by Duncan. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Stokes’ claims were part of the bankruptcy estate. View "Stokes v. Duncan" on Justia Law

HSBC initiated a Wisconsin foreclosure action on the Rinaldi’s mortgage. The Rinaldis counterclaimed, alleging that the mortgage paperwork had been fraudulently altered and that HSBC lacked standing to enforce the mortgage. The Rinaldis lost at summary judgment and did not appeal. The court later vacated its foreclosure judgment after HSBC agreed to modify the loan. The Rinaldis filed a new state lawsuit reasserting their counterclaims. Before the court ruled on the defendants’ motion to dismiss, the Rinaldis filed for bankruptcy. In those proceedings, HSBC filed a proof of claim for the mortgage. The Rinaldis objected and filed adversary claims, alleging fraud, abuse of process, tortious interference, breach of contract, and violations of RICO and the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act. The bankruptcy court found in favor of HSBC and recommended denial of the adversarial claims. The district court agreed, noting the Rinaldis’ failure to comply with Federal Rules. The court dismissed the Rinaldis’ adversary claims as meritless and warned that the Rinaldis would face sanctions if they filed additional frivolous filings because their tactics had “vexatious and time- and resource-consuming” and their filings “nigh-unintelligible.” After additional filings of the same type, the Rinaldis voluntarily dismissed their bankruptcy. Their attorney filed additional frivolous motions. The court ordered the attorney to pay $1,000. The Seventh Circuit upheld the sanction. View "Nora v. HSBC Bank USA, N.A." on Justia Law

Tommy Sundy petitioned for a writ of mandamus to direct the circuit court to dismiss third-party claims asserted against him by accounting firm Frost Cummings Tidwell Group, LLC ("FCT"). Adams Produce Company, Inc. ("APCI"), purchased Crestview Produce of Destin, Inc., from Sundy. As part of the transaction, APCI and Sundy executed a promissory note in the amount of $850,000, and Sundy became an employee of APCI. FCT alleges that, based on representations from APCI and Sundy, certain budget and bonus projections were set for APCI, but those goals were not met. Because of that failure, Sundy was not entitled to bonuses that had been paid to him throughout 2009. With the alleged help and direction of FCT, APCI recharacterized the bonuses as repayments of principal on the promissory note. The nonpayment of certain amounts to Sundy in the context of this action effectively increased APCI's income and decreased its indebtedness. APCI also allegedly entered into an oral, undocumented agreement with Sundy stipulating that it would make him whole in future years for the forfeited bonus payments. In 2009, APCI's shareholders decided to sell the company to API Holdings, LLC. API Holdings alleges that it discovered that, contrary to representations made by FCT in an audit report, APCI's financial statements were fraudulent, causing API Holdings to believe that APC was worth more than it actually was. API Holdings sued FCT asserting claims of negligent misrepresentation, auditing malpractice, fraud, and other claims of professional malfeasance. Among several other claims, API Holdings alleged that FCT had failed to uncover misrepresentations by Sundy and APCI and that FCT had acted fraudulently in confirming the recharacterization of Sundy's bonuses as payments on principal of the promissory note. A few months later, APC filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection. APC filed an adversarial complaint in FCT's bankruptcy case, alleging that FCT's audit work had painted a false financial picture of APC upon which APC had relied in continuing to operate its business even after reaching the point of insolvency. FCT filed a third-party complaint with the bankruptcy court against Sundy and others. FCT's complaint alleged various theories under Alabama law as bases for FCT to "recover over" against Sundy. Sundy subsequently moved to dismiss FCT's third-party complaint on the basis of 6-5-440, Ala. Code 1975, Alabama's abatement statute. The circuit court denied the motion, and Sundy then filed his petition for a writ of mandamus seeking to have the Supreme Court direct the circuit court to vacate its judgment denying his motion to dismiss and to order the circuit court to dismiss FCT's claims against Sundy asserted in its third-party complaint at circuit court. The Supreme Court concluded that FCT's third-party claims against Sundy were not barred by the abatement statute. The circuit court properly declined to dismiss those claims. Therefore, the Court denied the petition for a writ of mandamus. View "In re: API Holdings, LLC v. Frost Cummings Tidwell Group, LLC" on Justia Law

Attorney Stilp represented Miller in claims concerning the construction of Miller’s house by contractor Herman. The district court dismissed. Stilp recommended that Miller terminate the action based on state law. Miller told Stilp that needed time to consider whether to refile., Herman filed a Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition. Herman’s bankruptcy attorney, Jones, prepared schedules listing the addresses of all creditors. Miller was listed as a creditor on the bankruptcy schedules and creditor matrix, but his address was listed as “c/o Thomas Stilp, Attorney” at Stilp’s office address. Notice of the bankruptcy was delivered to Stilp’s office but was routed to another attorney. Neither Stilp nor Miller was informed of the notice. Miller subsequently informed Stilp that he wanted to refile his complaint against Herman. Stilp then discovered that Herman had filed for bankruptcy protection. Miller did not take immediate action and, about a month later, the bankruptcy court entered a discharge order. About 13 months after he learned of Herman’s bankruptcy petition, Miller moved to reopen the case (11 U.S.C. 727(a)(4)(A)). The bankruptcy court denied the motion. The district court and Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding that Miller had been properly served when notice was delivered to Stilp’s firm.View "Miller v. Herman" on Justia Law

Starr, AIG's former principal shareholder, filed suit against the FRBNY for breach of fiduciary duty in its rescue of AIG during the fall 2008 financial crisis. The district court dismissed Starr's claims and Starr appealed. The suit challenged the extraordinary measures taken by FRBNY to rescue AIG from bankruptcy at the height of the direst financial crisis in modern times. In light of the direct conflict these measures created between the private duties imposed by Delaware fiduciary duty law and the public duties imposed by FRBNY's governing statutes and regulations, the court held that, in this suit, state fiduciary duty law was preempted by federal common law. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Starr Int'l Co. v. Federal Reserve Bank of New York" on Justia Law

After the mutual funds, known as the Lancelot or Colossus group, folded in 2008, the trustee in bankruptcy filed independent suits or adversary actions seeking to recover from solvent third parties, including the Funds’ auditor, law firm, and some of the Funds’ investors, which the Trustee believes received preferential transfers or fraudulent conveyances. The Funds had invested in notes issued by Thousand Lakes, which was actually a Ponzi scheme, paying old investors with newly raised money. In these proceedings the trustee contends that investors who redeemed shares before the bankruptcy received preferential transfers, 11 U.S.C. 547, or fraudulent conveyances, 11 U.S.C. 548(a)(1)(B) and raised a claim under the Illinois fraudulent-conveyance statute, using the avoiding power of 11 U.S.C. 544. The bankruptcy court dismissed the claims against the law firm that prepared circulars for the Firms. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. No Illinois court has held that failure to report a corporate manager’s acts to the board of directors exposes a law firm to malpractice liability. The complaint does not plausibly allege that alerting the directors would have made a difference. View "Peterson v. Winston & Strawn, LLP" on Justia Law

Lamesa filed suit against Liberty Mutual alleging that Liberty Mutual was liable under a federally-required surety bond for the alleged misconduct of its principal, a trustee in a Chapter 7 bankruptcy proceeding. On appeal, Liberty Mutual appealed the district court's decision to affirm the bankruptcy court's judgment that the trustee had committed gross negligence and Liberty Mutual, as the trustee's surety, was liable for damages under the terms of the bond. The court held that the controlling limitations period in this case was provided by 11 U.S.C. 322(d). Because Liberty Mutual did not contest that Lamesa's claim was timely under that provision, the court affirmed the bankruptcy court's conclusion that Lamesa's suit was not time-barred. On the merits, the court concluded that the bankruptcy court's finding that the trustee was grossly negligent in performing her duties was not clearly erroneous; expert testimony was not necessary to establish that the trustee failed to meet her standard of care; and Liberty Mutual failed to demonstrate that the district court's damage award was clearly erroneous. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. USA by Lamesa National Bank" on Justia Law